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Environmental health is concerned with relations between the environment and human health 
and their management and remains a considerable public health challenge into the 21st century, 
particularly for cities where more than half the world’s population now lives. In South Africa 
local government Environmental Health Practitioners (EHPs) have been regulating local 
environmental health since Victorian times and are well placed to bring protective and 
developmental laws to life but are confronted by challenges not dissimilar to their Victorian 
forebears. The main research question is therefore: how do the EHPs of the City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (CoJ) regulate environmental health? A literature 
review developed an interdisciplinary model of governance to describe and explore how EHPs 
regulate environmental health (EH) and the factors that could influence this process. This model 
utilised a socio-legal framework grounded in theoretical perspectives from criminology, history, 
the law, organisational studies, political science and sociology.  
 
A multiple case study strategy was developed to test this model. Qualitative methods were 
conducted on 10 street-level case EHPs from four CoJ regional offices through observation, 
interviews, questionnaires and the analysis of regulatory documents. These were supplemented 
by observations and interviews with other street-level EHPs and their managers and the analysis 
of other relevant documents, including quantitative data on the activities of CoJ EHPs.     
 
A new model of governance was developed by this thesis to describe, analyse and explain how 
CoJ EHPs regulate and found most of their work focused on a traditional regulatory ‘law 
enforcement’ pathway alongside other activities, notably an EH monitoring role for other CoJ 
departments and provincial government. But contrary to their Victorian inspector stereotype, 
EHPs behaved as responsive regulators and used mainly persuasive approaches (e.g. education, 
advice, negotiation), with more punitive approaches generally used for serious cases or when 
persuasion fails. This responsiveness was limited by factors including resources and weaknesses 
in more punitive approaches. A second regulatory pathway involving EH project and promotion 
activities was documented but remained secondary to traditional regulatory work.  
 
In conclusion, the model of governance conceptualised urban EH regulation as the continuous 
circulation of power within and between EHPs and local government itself, other spheres of 
government and civil society. Power was unequally distributed between these actors, but there 
were many opportunities for challenging power that were rarely captured or closed. Local 
government EHPs are therefore contributing towards making cities more productive, inclusive, 
sustainable and better governed and the model of governance created by this thesis was a useful 
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Chapter 1 Environmental health regulation in urban South Africa  
 
1.1  Introduction and thesis overview  
Environmental health is concerned with relations between the environment and human health 
and their management and remains a complex and persistent public health challenge into the 21st 
century, particularly in the cities of developing countries like South Africa. Local government 
Environmental Health Practitioners (EHPs) have been regulating the environmental health of 
businesses and the public in areas including food safety, housing and environmental pollution 
control in Johannesburg, South Africa’s largest city, since 1887. Working at the local level they 
are well placed to deliver protective laws that could make cities safer, more productive, 
inclusive, sustainable and better governed. But EHPs find themselves confronting public health 
challenges not dissimilar to their Victorian predecessors whilst their organisations and the law 
itself are undergoing huge changes and communities remain suspicious of their actions.  
 
This thesis originated in the question: how do the EHPs of the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality regulate environmental health? The overall aim of this research was 
to describe and explain how these EHPs regulate environmental health.   
 
A literature review is presented in Chapters 1 and 2. The next section of Chapter 1 defines 
environmental health before exploring how environment-health relationships and their 
management have shaped and been shaped by societies over the centuries but remain a complex 
and persistent problem. This chapter then reviews South Africa’s environmental health 
challenges, particularly in its cities, before exploring the work of its local government EHPs, the 
challenges they face and why this thesis is focused on finding out more about them. Chapter 2 
develops a model of governance to describe how EHPs regulate environmental health based on 
an inter-disciplinary socio-legal approach grounded in theoretical perspectives from 
criminology, history, the law, organisational studies, political science and sociology. It starts by 
defining regulation as governance before describing responsive regulation and its utility for 
describing why EHPs regulate using mainly persuasive (e.g. education, negotiation) instead of 
punitive (e.g. fines, prosecutions) approaches. Chapter 2 then embeds responsive regulation 
within a model of governance in Figure 2.2 and created by this thesis to incorporate the 
individual, legal, organisational and external factors and explain why they frequently favour 
persuasive regulatory approaches. Chapter 2 ends by identifying key gaps in knowledge and the 
aim and objectives of this thesis.     
 
Chapter 3 reviews the methods developed to answer the research question and begins by 
introducing the epistemology and strategic approach of this thesis before detailing the case 
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study strategy developed. The methods of data analysis are then outlined and the chapter ends 
with reflections on how the case study worked in practice. 
 
The results are presented across Chapters 4 to 7 and are structured around the model of 
governance originally developed in section 2.5 but updated here for the CoJ by this thesis. 
Chapter 4 begins with an overview of this new governance model of responsive regulation by 
CoJ EHPs in Figure 4.1 before moving to its centre to describe how CoJ EHPs regulate 
environmental health. This includes an overview of the CoJ’s structure and the working days of 
EHPs before explaining the stages of regulation and the proactive and reactive ways they work. 
Chapter 4 then moves to the outer ring of the governance model to start exploring the external 
factors influencing regulation, specifically here the regulatory context in Johannesburg. This 
revisits South Africa’s historical context briefly before exploring how the macroeconomic 
policies and public and media attitudes can influence the work of EHPs towards more 
persuasive regulatory approaches.    
 
Chapter 5 analyses how legal and organisational factors influence regulation. Its first section 
reviews the developmental legal framework before exploring the uncertainties that characterise 
these laws and the role of EHPs. The second section explores the strategic framework for 
environmental health at the CoJ before reviewing the monitoring work its EHPs undertake for 
others. The chapter then considers how the CoJ seeks to control its EHPs and begins by 
exploring relations between EHPs themselves and Managers and the influence of performance 
management before analysing the influence of local politicians and resources. This chapter 
argues that legal and organisational factors create an uncertain mandate for EHPs that often 
favours more persuasive regulatory approaches.  
 
Chapter 6 reviews how EHPs themselves can influence regulation and begins by exploring their 
backgrounds, views, professional identities and personal safety concerns. The chapter then 
focuses on EHPs’ views of the criminality of environmental health offences and sanctions and 
the roles of the criminal courts, factors that often favour persuasive regulatory approaches. 
Chapter 7 completes the governance model by analysing the influence of relations between 
EHPs and the regulated and begins by describing EHPs’ typologies of the regulated and 
complainants. The severity and persistence of offending are then investigated before considering 
how the various characteristics of the regulated themselves and morality can influence EHPs. 
Chapter 7 then focus on how EHPs regulate the informal sector before exploring corruption. 
Once again these factors often favour persuasive regulatory approaches.   
 
Chapter 8 presents a further discussion based on themes from the results chapters that relate 
back to the theoretical framework. Chapter 9 presents the thesis conclusions and starts by 
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revisiting the research aim and objectives before making policy recommendations. The thesis 
contributions to knowledge are then presented and the chapter ends with consideration of the 
strengths and weaknesses of this thesis and recommendations for future research. 
  
1.2 What is environmental health?  
The term environmental health is relatively new (Macarthur and Bonnefoy 1997) but hard to 
define (CEH, 1997; Smith et al. 1999). The Environmental Health Policy Committee of the 
United States government identified more than 28 different definitions but refused to adopt one 
because they had functioned well (in their opinion) without it and were reluctant to add another 
to the list (EHPC, 1998). Definition is problematic not least because ‘environment’ and ‘health’ 
are themselves hard to define (Eyles, 1997). Definitions of the ‘environment’ include the 
‘surroundings in which plants or animals live’ and the ‘natural world’ itself (OED, 2006) but 
Eyles argues that the relationships between humans and nature broadens its scope into fields 
like ecology concerned with the development of the human species and the environment as a 
resource (1997). In environmental health these collective and relational ideas of environment 
are combined with ‘health’, a phenomenon that often centres on the individual and its 
associations with quality of life and a resource for living (Eyles, 1997).  
 
This thesis uses the definition developed by the World Health Organisation:   
   
“Environmental health comprises those aspects of human health, including quality of 
life, that are determined by physical, chemical, biological, social and psychosocial 
factors in the environment. It also refers to the theory and practice of assessing, 
correcting, controlling and preventing those factors in the environment that can 
potentially affect adversely the health of present and future generations”  
(WHO, 1994 cited in MacArthur and Bonnefoy 1997 pp5-6) 
 
This definition is chosen because its two parts acknowledge the breadth, complexity and inter-
related nature of environment-health relationships and the interventions that seek to manage 
these relationships. These are a product of the development of environmental health to which 
the next sections turn, but this definition also captures its inter-disciplinary nature. Research to 
better define this remains a priority (Eyles, 1997), but environmental health is continuously 
informed by disciplines from the humanities (e.g. history, philosophy, religion), natural sciences 
(e.g. biology, chemistry, physics) and the social sciences (e.g. economics, geography, political 
science, psychology, sociology). This definition is also appropriate because of its adoption by 
the WHO Regional Committee for Africa (WHO AFRO 2002) and the South African 




1.3 The dynamic and wicked nature of environmental health  
The relationships between the environment and human health and their management are being 
continuously shaped and redefined by societies. This section summarises some key shifts in 
these relationships and the philosophies, values and ideological debates underpinning them. A 
comprehensive account of this complex terrain is beyond the scope of this thesis, but tensions 
between individual and collective responsibilities continue to frame environmental health 
debates to this day (Baggott, 2000). This section argues that environmental health remains a 
persistent and ‘wicked’ problem for the 21st century given that its unique, complex nature lacks 
definitive formulation, whilst explanations of and potential solutions to these problems are hard 
to describe and test (Rittel and Webber 1973). 
 
In Purity and Danger Mary Douglas argues that different societies define their environment-
health relationships in terms that go far beyond mere health (1966/2008). Here dirt is matter that 
is out of place and creates social disorder; the definition and enforcement of rules of hygiene 
thereby creates social order by maintaining the boundaries between dirt and cleanliness, purity 
and pollution or the sacred and profane. In Ancient Greece the Hippocratic book Airs, Waters 
and Places recognised that climate, soil, water, lifestyles and nutrition influenced endemic 
disease but diseases from outside (epidemic) were also a threat (Rosen, 1993). This text also 
provided guidance on protective interventions including the construction of houses in elevated 
areas warmed by the sun and receiving clean winds (Rosen, 1993). Science influenced the 
Ancient Greeks, particularly the belief that disease was caused by poisonous airs or ‘miasmas’ 
(Smith, 2007) and continued to informed Victorian sanitary reformers 2000 years later. Religion 
also explained environment-health relations. Offending public order risked creating ‘pollutions’ 
and the wrath of Gods but these could be cleansed by purification rituals (Curtis, 1998). 
Compliance with Old Testament rules of hygiene (e.g. prohibiting unclean acts, isolating lepers) 
also provided collective protection against God’s retribution (Hamlin, 2002).  
 
Religion sometimes reinforced science. Quarantine interventions first described in Venice in 
1127 could derive from the belief that the fortieth day marked the separation between acute and 
chronic disease (Hecker in Rosen, 1993) as well as being a period of great significance in 
biblical episodes like the great flood (Rosen, 1993). Quarantine also illustrates how society 
structured the environment-health relationship and sought to maintain social order. With illness 
residing in places, quarantine separated places and controlled the movement of people 
(Armstrong, 1993). During medieval plagues the fear of miasma led to the sealing of infected 
houses and their purification with ‘good’ odours (Smith, 2007) whilst in early Victorian 




During the 16th to 18th Centuries the British economy operated within a mercantile system, with 
government recognizing its social responsibility for public welfare whilst assuming it could 
regulate and direct the nation’s economy by interventions including the protection of national 
industry and shipping restrictions to protect colonial trade (Fraser, 2003). But in 1776 Adam 
Smith argued instead that freedom for economic activity, based on individual freedom, was 
central to a free society (Jones, 2004). Assuming fair competition, a ‘perfect’ self-adjusting 
market served private and public interests without government intervention: for example 
consumers paid the lowest prices for the goods they demanded and self-interested producers 
could make profits whilst serving the public interest through social goods (e.g. employment, 
wealth) distributed amongst market participants (Jones, 2004).  
 
Adam Smith did not reject all state intervention and identified the need to protect people from 
injustice and oppression and establish public works for the benefit of society (Fraser, 2003), but 
the systems of poor relief like workhouses were harsh and attracted widespread protest (Hamlin, 
2002). This classic liberalism still dominated early 19th century Great Britain when widespread 
poverty and inequality were not attributed to market failures but to the inability of the poor to 
adopt the values of their economic superiors (Jones 2004). But Victorian sanitary science 
gradually redefined environment-health relationships and continues to underpin the work of 
local government EHPs across the world today.    
 
From the mid-19th century growing concern about the public consequences of individual private 
actions, particularly migration into industrialising towns and cities, led to increasing state 
interventions in the public’s health. One important philosophical driver was the utilitarian 
movement, with leading proponents like John Stuart Mill - not unlike Adam Smith - adopting a 
liberal individualist position which feared that state intervention could weaken individual 
responsibility (Fraser, 2003) but was justified on the basis of harm:  
 
“Whenever… there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an 
individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in 
that of morality or law” (Mill, 1859/1972 p150)  
 
This lack of individual incentive to contribute towards public health improvement has been 
labelled the ‘prevention paradox’ and long used by collectivists to argue for state intervention in 
public health (Baggott, 2000). But Edwin Chadwick, secretary to the Poor Law Commission 
and former secretary to Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, first articulated the 
utilitarian philosophy of environmental health in his sanitary idea. Based on Ancient Greek 
knowledge, sanitary science believed that a space for the healthy body to exist could be created 
by policing substances entering the body space (e.g. air, water and food) and managing 
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substances from the body (e.g. faeces) that belonged to neither body nor the environment 
(Armstrong, 1993).  
 
Under pressure to reduce the costs to tax payers of the Poor Law welfare system, Chadwick’s 
inquiries during the 1830s led to a focus on the mortality of male breadwinners whose families 
then became dependent on poor relief. His 1842 Report On The Sanitary Condition Of The 
Labouring Population Of Great Britain described the relationship between environmental 
conditions and the huge geographical and socio-economic variations in health and disease in 
industrialising Britain. To reduce the mortality rate of male breadwinners, and hence the costs to 
the poor relief, Chadwick proposed a series of ‘great preventives’ including household water 
supplies, toilets and sewerage to be delivered through rational and impartial public 
administration (Chadwick, 1842/1965). For Chadwick the purpose of public health was securing 
the economic advance of society (Rayner and Lang 2012) and from 1847 legislation to enact his 
preventives included, for the first time, the post of sanitary inspector or inspector of nuisance as 
local government EHPs were then known (Crook, 2007).  
 
Chadwick’s collectivist reforms were also designed to appeal to liberal individualists. By 
associating disease with insanitary environments he avoided offending powerful interests like 
manufacturers and property owners (Hamlin and Sheard, 1998). Chadwick’s sanitary idea also 
promised to make a better world by improving amenity, morality and social order, factors that 
were particularly important given the economic depression and fear of revolution at that time:  
  
“…the removal of noxious physical circumstances, and the promotion of civic, 
household and personal cleanliness, are necessary to the improvement of the moral 
condition of the population; for that sound morality and refinement in manners and 
health are not long found co-existant with filthy habits amongst  any class of the 
community” (Chadwick, 1842/1965 p425). 
 
Many Victorian sanitary reformers including Chadwick were miasmatists (Hamlin, 1998), but 
the potential of his sanitary idea was later confirmed by rival contagionists who believed that 
disease was spread by direct or indirect contact. These included pioneering epidemiologist Dr 
John Snow whose investigations confirmed that the London cholera outbreak of 1854 was 
caused by polluted water supplies (Snow, 1855). The delivery of Chadwick’s municipal 
preventives is increasingly recognised to have played a primary role in improving Britain’s 
public health from the 1870s (Szreter, 1988). Further, Chadwick’s utilitarian argument that by 
maximising collective well-being, even to the detriment of the individual, investment in public 
health is good for social development continues to underpin public health strategies to this day 




From the early twentieth century however public health in the global North has increasingly 
focused on the individual and the boundaries between people themselves; instead of poverty and 
insanitary conditions the danger was now from the bodies of others (e.g. by the transmission of 
communicable diseases) with strategies directed towards personal hygiene by controlling the 
attitudes and behaviours of individuals in this psychosocial space (Armstrong, 1993). These 
strategies have also influenced local government EHPs, alongside advances in the bio-medical 
and social-behavioural models of public health. In health protection from communicable 
diseases for example, their interventions include measures to manage infected people 
themselves (e.g. disease surveillance and quarantine of suspected cases) and measures to 
prevent further infection (e.g. regulation to prevent overcrowded housing) (Hamlin, 2013; 
Wohl, 1983). Local government EHPs also have long experience of trying to influence 
behaviours by educating those they regulate (e.g. food handlers and business operators) and the 
wider public including complainants and tenants.  
    
Since the 1970s a so-called ‘new public health’ continues to redefine environment-health 
relationships; here dangers are everywhere and necessitate broad ranging political and 
ecological interventions (Armstrong, 1993). One important driver was Thomas McKeown’s 
critique of modern medicine. In The Modern Rise of Population he argued that the contribution 
of modern medicine to declining levels of disease since the end of the nineteenth century was 
exaggerated and due to other factors, particularly nutritional improvements and rising standards 
of living (1976). Further, McKeown argued that the major causes of ill health in industrialised 
societies (e.g. cancer, heart disease) were largely caused by individual behaviours and 
environmental factors and could therefore be prevented. The contribution of local sanitary 
reform, including the work of local government EHPs, to McKeown’s thesis remains the subject 
of debate but Szreter (1988) concluded in his re-examination of McKeown’s data that sanitary 
reforms played a leading role in mortality decline from 1850 to 1914.  
 
Another important driver of the ‘new public health’ are concerns about escalating health care 
costs and rapidly aging populations (WHO, 1993). In A new perspective on the health of 
Canadians for example, Canadian Health Minister Marc Lalonde attacked ‘traditional’ medical 
health care systems and argued instead that future health improvements would mainly come 
from individuals adopting less risky lifestyles, a better understanding of human biology (e.g. 
genetics, ageing) and addressing environmental risks including pollution control, urbanization 
and socio-economic inequalities (Lalonde, 1974).  
 
Having largely ignored the limits of nature for the last two hundred years the rise of 
environmental ideologies in various forms, particularly climate change and sustainable 
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development, increasingly inform environmental health debates (Baggott, 2000). 
Environmentalists have some associations with collectivism, particularly through concepts like 
social justice and collective action, but they also remain suspicious of state power, particularly 
its abilities to oppress individuals and pollute the environment (Baggott, 2000). They also reject 
liberal individualist arguments, particularly their justifications in favour of freer markets and 
less state intervention (Baggott, 2000). This ‘new public health’ era has also seen environmental 
health become integral to international public health policies and strategies to reduce poverty 
and promote sustainable development including:  
 
 The Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (UNCHE, 1972);   
 The United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (UN, 1976) 
 The Alma Ata Declaration on Primary Health Care1 (WHO, 1978);   
 The WHO Healthy Cities Project (from 1987) (Tsouros 2015);  
 The Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987);  
 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (UNCED, 1992); and   
 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Cairncross et al. 2003) 
 
More recently the World Health Organisation’s Commission on Social Determinants of Health 
recognised that the protection and improvement of the local environment, that has occupied 
local government EHPs and their forebears for nearly 200 years, is essential for reducing health 
inequalities (WHO, 2008a), particularly in urban settings (WHO, 2008b). In 2015 many of the 
United Nation’s new Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 include environmental health 
related targets covering health and well-being (Goal 3), water and sanitation (Goal 6), reducing 
inequalities (Goal 10) and creating sustainable cities and communities (Goal 11) for example 
(UN, 2016). Satterthwaite (2015) welcomes this ground breaking vision for the common good 
but also criticizes the SDGs for saying so little about the roles of local government that are 
central to delivering the SDGs in so many cities.         
 
These continuing strategies also suggest the persistence of environmental health related burdens 
of disease. Measuring the proportion of global ill health attributable to environmental factors 
remains difficult but data from Harvard University’s Global Burden of Disease database 
estimates that between one-quarter and one-third of global ill health can be attributed to 
environmental factors (Smith et al. 1999). Further, they found that the greatest environmental 
                                                     
1 Environmental health aspects of primary health care include education on the prevention and 
control of health problems, promotion of food supply and nutrition, safe water and basic 
sanitation, maternal and child health care and the prevention and control of endemic diseases.  
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disease burden is borne by children under five years of age and those living in the poorest 
countries where poor air, food and water quality at the household level are the greatest 
environmental risk factors. More recently Pruss-Ustun and Corvalan (2008) estimated that one 
quarter of the global burden of disease and premature deaths are related to modifiable 
environmental factors, with children and those in developing countries facing far greater risks 
from diarrhoeal diseases and respiratory infections particularly. In both studies the Sub-Saharan 
Africa region suffered the greatest environmental burden of disease.  
 
This section has highlighted some key influences on environment-health relations and their 
management and the philosophies and values underpinning them. They are characterised by 
complexity, change and on-going individualist/collectivist debates but common themes also 
include a concern for environmental health inequalities, particularly their potential to create 
social disorder, and a desire to manage by prevention where possible. The continued relevance 
of environmental health also earns its description as a ‘wicked’ problem (see p4 above), but this 
chapter now considers why South Africa and Johannesburg were chosen for this thesis. 
 
1.4 Why South Africa and Johannesburg? 
For centuries cities have symbolised both civilisation and wealth and poverty and deprivation 
(Chadwick, 1842/1965; Engels, 1845/1987; Rosen, 1993). Concerns about the environmental 
health impacts on city dwellers continue (Hardoy et al. 2001; Harpham et al. 1988; UN, 1976; 
WHO, 2008b) and are increasingly relevant now more than half the world’s people are urban 
(UNFPA, 2007). Further, this wicked challenge could persist given predictions that the 
populations of African and Asian cities could double between 2000 and 2030 and be largely 
composed of the poor (UNFPA, 2007). In 2011 Johannesburg was home to nearly 4.5 Million 
people, a population increase of more than 3% in 10 years (SSA, 2011b).  
 
The term ‘urban’ remains difficult to define with no common criteria internationally (Hardoy et 
al. 2001; Wratten, 1995) or in South Africa itself, where historically any settlement within a 
local authority boundary was classified as ‘urban’ (SACN, 2004). The diversity of human 
settlements also makes the urban-rural divide problematic, not least because of their many 
interdependencies including the flow of people, goods and services (Hardoy et al. 2001; 
Wratten, 1995). Whilst this thesis is focused on the EHPs operating within the boundaries of the 
CoJ, this thesis acknowledges that Johannesburg’s environmental health can be influenced by 
factors beyond geographical boundaries and to these this section now turns.     
 
South Africa is affected by three concurrent epidemics (Coovadia et al. 2009); poverty-related 
ill health remains widespread, whilst HIV/AIDS accounts for 31% of disability adjusted life 
years and the burdens from non-communicable diseases and other causes, particularly violence 
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and road traffic injuries, are increasing. Returning to the definition of environmental health this 
section explores some of the physical, chemical, biological, social and psychosocial factors in 
the urban environments of South Africa with the potential to influence human health. The work 
of Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2004) in Figure 1.1 below structures this section because of its 
foundations in the wider social determinants of health and acknowledgement that poverty is 
complex and inter-linked, where one aspect may cause another but addressing one could resolve 
or lessen others.   
 
Figure 1.1 Different aspects of poverty (Source: Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2004 p15) 
 
 Inadequate and often unstable income; 
 Limited or no safety net (e.g. access to grants);  
 Inadequate, unstable or risky asset base (e.g. housing);  
 Poor quality and often insecure, hazardous and overcrowded housing;  
 Inadequate provision of public infrastructure;  
 Inadequate provision of basic services (e.g. day care, transport, law enforcement);  
 Inadequate protection of poorer groups’ legal rights (e.g. to environmental health); 
 Poorer groups’ voicelessness and powerlessness within political systems and 
bureaucratic structures  
 
South Africa is described as a middle-income, industrialised country but its Gini coefficient has 
remained around 0.7 since 2000 and ranks it amongst the world’s most unequal countries in 
terms of its income distribution (SSA, 2013; World Bank, 2016). Similarly, its Human 
Development Index (HDI) has remained around 0.6 since 1990 and in 2014 South Africa was 
categorised as a ‘medium development country’, but when adjusted for inequality its 2014 HDI 
falls by more than 35% to 0.428 and ranks it amongst the world’s most unequal countries in 
terms of its human development (UNDP, 2015a).    
 
Some HDI indicators have not changed since these data were first collected and are useful to 
illustrate South Africa’s mixed but relatively static overall development. Between 1980 and 
2014 the average years of schooling increased by 5 years (to 9.9 years), expected years of 
schooling increased by 2 years (to 13.6 years) and gross national income per capita increased by 
nearly 12% (to $12122 – 2011 PPP) (UNDP, 2015b). But life expectancy at birth has only 
increased by 0.5 years and only started improving since 2005 (UNDP, 2015b), a trend attributed 
to South Africa’s concurrent epidemics and persistent inequalities (Coovadia et al. 2009; 




In 2011 around 46% of South Africa’s 52 million population were defined as poor2, though this 
was an improvement compared to the time of fieldwork in 2007 when around 57% were 
considered poor and earned less than R458 per capita per month (SSA, 2014). Such figures 
remind of the importance of the so-called middle-income countries like South Africa that are 
home to around 1.3 billion people, some three quarters of the world’s poor (Sumner, 2010).   
 
Cities provide more employment opportunities and higher wages than in the rest of South Africa 
(SACN, 2004) but the 2011 census found that 35% of CoJ households reported having an 
income of less than R1633 per month (SSA, 2011b). Further, Census 2011 found that 25% of 
Johannesburg’s economically active population (age 15-64) were unemployed, nearly 32% of 
them youngsters (aged 15-34 years) (SSA, 2011b). This is an improvement on Census 2001 data 
(37% unemployment, 46% youngsters) but highlights the persistence of South Africa’s 
employment problems even in its relatively prosperous cities.  
       
Small, medium and micro-enterprises3 (SMMEs) comprise around 93% of registered 
economically active businesses in South Africa, though this percentage does not include 
informal sector businesses (DTI, 2008). One small survey (n=25) of small business 
entrepreneurs in Soweto identified obstacles to business growth including crime, poor township 
infrastructure, regulatory costs (e.g. business registration) and corrupt government officials 
(CDE, 2007). The informal sector is also growing in Johannesburg (Beall et al. 2002; 
Tomlinson et al. 2003) and across South Africa could employ between 1.7 million (DTI, 2008) 
to 2.7 million people with no employment or social protection (Bivens and Gammage 2005). 
Further, one rare survey of 150 informal South African businesses found their median annual 
sales turnover was R8482 (SBP, 2004).   
 
The income of many South Africans continues to be inadequate and unstable but one 
contributor to the socio-economic improvements between 2001 and 2011, and something that 
differentiates South Africa from many other low-income countries, is its social welfare system. 
More than 16 million South Africans earning less than R6000 per household per month benefit 
from interventions including free primary health care, no-fee schools, social grants for 
vulnerable groups (e.g. elderly, children, disabled), free/subsidised housing and free services 
(e.g. water) (National Treasury, 2013). From 2002/3 to 2012/13 spending on the social wage 
                                                     
2 The poor are defined by Statistics South Africa as those living below the upper-bound poverty 
line at which they can purchase adequate food and non food items (SSA, 2014 p7).  
3 Definitions of SMMEs vary by sector, turnover and asset value, but using numbers of full time 
equivalent employees: medium enterprises employ < 200, small <50 and micro <5 (DTI, 2008).  
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rose from around 13% to 19% of GDP, around R600 Billion in 2012 (National Treasury, 2013), 
but significant and complex environmental health challenges remain.    
 
Many South Africans face a double burden from exposures to traditional and modern (Thomas 
et al. 2002) or brown and green hazards (McGranahan and Satterthwaite 2000). The 
traditional/brown hazards would be familiar to Victorian EHPs and include inadequate access to 
basic services like housing, water and sanitation. In 2011 hundreds of thousands of households 
have benefited from improvements in these areas but nearly 14% of households still live in 
informal dwellings, less than half of households have indoor water supplies and more than 7% 
rely on bucket latrines or have no access to sanitation (SSA, 2011a). Norman et al. (2010) 
estimated the total burden of disease in South Africa related to unsafe water and sanitation, 
indoor air pollution, outdoor urban air pollution and lead exposure and found around 5% of total 
deaths were attributable to these factors, though for under 5 year olds this was nearly 11%.    
 
In Johannesburg itself urban living standards are relatively high compared to other parts of 
South Africa (SSA, 2011a) and cities in sub-Saharan Africa (Beall et al. 2000a) but Census 
2011 reported that more than 18% of the city’s 1.4 million households live in informal 
dwellings (e.g. informal settlements, backyard shacks) (SSA, 2011b) with acknowledged 
backlogs in environmental health infrastructure and services (CoJ, 2008). Informal housing 
persists for reasons including historic backlogs in the state housing programme, urban 
inequalities and population growth (Huchzemeyer, 2004). Vearey et al. (2010) also consider 
these problems symptomatic of the ‘weak rights’ of informal households, whose frequently 
‘illegal’ status can make them even more vulnerable to exploitation and powerless to hold 
officials to account (Huchzermeyer, 2004). Poor access to basic services also affects many 
formal households in Johannesburg, particularly when exploitative landlords refuse to pay for 
services (CoJ, 2005b) and tenants fear eviction (COHRE, 2005). Some new housing 
developments are creating new problems due to contaminated land (e.g. mine dumps) and poor 
access to services like shops, schools and transport (Mathee and Wright 2014).  
 
Green/modern environmental health hazards can have more of a delayed affect and regional or 
global impacts (McGranahan and Satterthwaite, 2000). Johannesburg’s air pollution is 
concentrated in and around Soweto and the inner city, areas that coincide with concentrations of 
air pollution related diseases (SACN, 2004). Air quality management challenges include the 
regulation of industrial emissions, the spatial geography of apartheid cities and the continued 
use of solid fuel or paraffin burners in townships due to shortfalls in electrification and high 
electricity prices (SACN, 2004). The illegal dumping of wastes in South African cities is also a 




Those living near industrial areas can suffer ‘green’ and ‘brown’ hazards simultaneously 
(Leonard and Pelling 2010; Thomas et al. 2002; UNDP, 2003). For example Naicker et al. 
(2003) found that mining in Johannesburg was contributing to the acidification of surface waters 
that rendered local water courses unusable and exposed locals to heavy metals. Home based 
cottage industries (e.g. hair dressing, car repairs, welding, crèches) provided important income 
but one long term study of poor Johannesburg households found around 22% involved in 
cottage industries that risked potentially harmful exposures to substances including lead and 
volatile organic compounds (Mathee et al. 2009). This study also identified social/psychosocial 
factors in poor households including noise and fears related to violence (e.g. rape, intentional 
gunshot, stabbing, beating) that were frequently based on past experiences.   
 
Poverty in Johannesburg still broadly follows the spatial patterns of apartheid (Beall et al. 2002; 
Tomlinson et al. 2003) with former Black-African areas in the south having the poorest access 
to basic services (SACN, 2004) whilst the former White northern suburbs continue to enjoy the 
highest standards and benefit from the relocation and growth of former inner city manufacturing 
and service sectors (Beall et al. 2002). Certain groups also have greater environmental health 
vulnerabilities, particularly women and children and those affected by HIV/AIDS (Hardoy et al. 
2001; WHO, 2008b; Norman et al. 2010). Women in Johannesburg, and Black-African women 
in particular, are more likely to earn less than men and to have low income jobs (CoJ, 2005a) 
though they are sometimes the main breadwinners and an important source of social cohesion 
(Beall et al. 2002). Further, the State of Children in Gauteng review concluded that poverty was 
a significant threat for nearly half of Gauteng’s children and put them at greater risk of maternal 
and child mortality, HIV infection, violence and sexual abuse (Dawes, 2003).  
 
Migrants to Johannesburg also face greater risk of poor environmental health. Landau (2007) 
concluded that ignorance, xenophobia and legal discrimination were preventing many foreign 
migrants from integrating productively into Johannesburg, as echoed in one description of the 
city’s migrants and refugees as a “…silent group, never engaging with the authorities or 
drawing attention to themselves for fear of incurring official sanction or social wrath” (Beall et 
al. 2002 p125). Migration status is also important, one household survey finding that South 
African migrants were more likely to live in informal settlements on Johannesburg’s periphery 
(with worse environmental health) compared to cross-border migrants in the inner city (Vearey 
et al. 2010) though the CoJ considered both areas inequality ‘hot spots’(2005a). 
 
In summary, the environmental health problems of South Africa and Johannesburg are 
inherently dynamic and wicked. How and why these problems continually influence the work of 
EHPs is explored further in the literature review in section 2.5 below and then presented and 
discussed in the results across Chapters 4 (regulatory context), 5 (legal and organisational 
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factors), 6 (views of EHPs) and 7 (relations with the regulated). The final section now considers 
why we need to know more about the EHPs confronting these challenges each day.    
 
1.5 Why local government EHPs?  
This thesis focuses on CoJ EHPs because they are tasked with protecting and improving 
Johannesburg’s environmental health amidst challenges not dissimilar to their Victorian 
forebears. This section starts by summarising the historical development of EHPs before 
exploring their main roles and responsibilities, some of the wider challenges they face and why 
we need to know more about them.  
 
Records of city officials regulating environmental health date back to Greek and Roman times 
(Rosen, 1993) and across medieval Europe powerful urban authorities regulated areas including 
food markets, municipal abattoirs, street cleaning and sewerage (Hamlin, 2002). Today’s local 
government EHPs gradually emerged in Victorian Britain during the industrial revolution. 
Inspectors of nuisances or sanitary/health inspectors as EHPs were then called were first 
appointed by industrialising city authorities like Manchester from the 1820s (Brimblecombe, 
2003) but became more widespread from the 1840s following Chadwick’s sanitary reforms. 
From 1872 all British local authorities were mandated to appoint them (Crook, 2007) and in 
South Africa the first EHPs were part of Britain’s colonial administrations. Johannesburg’s first 
EHP, Charles Shaw, was appointed in February 1887, less than one year after the gold diggers 
community there was established (Walliss, 2000).   
 
Across South Africa today EHPs work for national, provincial and local government, for the 
private sector and for non-profit organisations. In 2006 there were 2555 EHPs and other 
professionals (including student EHPs and Food Inspectors) registered with the Board of EHPs 
of the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) to practice environmental health 
(HPCSA, 2006b). Registration is mandatory for all EHPs and minimum requirements include a 
University Diploma in Environmental Health Sciences, the successful completion of community 
in-service training (typically one year in a local authority) and the maintenance of continuous 
professional development. Local government remains the dominant provider of environmental 
health services and the most recent survey data from 42 of the country’s 52 local authorities 
employing EHPs found a total of 1126 EHPs employed by them, more than half (n= 658) 
working for seven of South Africa’s eight metropolitan municipalities (Mudaly, 2013).   
 
Returning to the environmental health definition in Section 1.2 above, the role of the local 
government EHPs can be summarised as the assessment, correction, control and prevention of 
the environmental factors that can potentially affect the health of present and future generations 
as summarised in Figure 1.2 below. Here ‘control’ is absent possibly because Burke et al. 
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(2002) reproduced the definition of environmental health used by MacArthur and Bonnefoy 
(1998 pp8-9) that omits ‘control’ from their earlier work (1997 pp5-6).   
 
The role of EHPs in maintaining and improving environmental health directly affects the quality 
of life of current and future generations, but their work often goes unnoticed being typically un-
dramatic and usually hidden from the public eye (Hutter, 1988). They serve as gatekeepers to 
regulation, deciding whether an offence exists and further action is necessary. EHPs are 
therefore responsible for bringing South Africa’s protective laws to life and have long used 
many proactive (e.g. inspections) and reactive (e.g. complaints) regulatory approaches alongside 
more recent approaches including EH project and promotional activities. Therefore EHPs are 
well placed to respond to the challenges above and contribute towards the cities desired by the 
Constitution and the South African Cities Network (SACN, 2004). For example by working at 
the local level EHPs are enforcing protective laws that could make cities more productive and 
sustainable. By protecting the rights of people and responding to their voices EHPs can make 
cities more inclusive. EHPs are also accountable to the public and politicians via local 
government and the criminal justice system, both important aspects of a well governed city, but 
this section now returns to Figure 1.1 above to consider other challenges they face. 
   
Figure 1.2 The scope of EH services (Source: Burke et al 2002 p4) 
 
Beyond the dynamic and wicked challenges summarised above, the scale of the restructuring 
and transformation of South African local government is also daunting. Local government only 
covered all South Africa for the first time in 2000, but before 1994 EHPs sometimes created and 
sustained local inequalities and communities remain suspicious of their motives (see section 
2.5.2 below). Other organisational challenges include resource shortages and confusion over 
responsibilities for service delivery (see section 2.5.5 below). The UK literature also suggests 
that EHPs remain stuck in their ‘Victorian’ roles and unwilling to embrace more flexible, 
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multidisciplinary and community centered approaches advocated by ‘new public health’ policy. 
EHPs have been described as the ‘general practitioners’ of public health (Cornell, 1996) but 
Armstrong argues that as the 20th century progressed public health would be “relegated to a 
subordinate, technical and routinised administrative function” (1993 p401). Similarly Ashton 
regrets how the pioneering work of Chadwick and others “…has been defined and codified, 
frozen in relation to another era and another way of looking at the world. Its practice seems to 
have become reactive and bureaucratic, rather than proactive and innovative” (1991 p190).  
 
More recent studies of UK local government EHPs (Burke et al. 2002; CEH, 1997; Dhesi and 
Lynch 2016) suggest that little has changed more recently and a combination of organisational 
and legal factors and the attitudes of EHPs themselves are blamed. These insights are important 
because the South African literature suggests its EHPs could also be experiencing similar 
problems. For example the draft National Environmental Health Policy urged EHPs to leave 
their old ‘health inspector’ model behind in favour of community development approaches 
(Eales et al. 2002). Similarly, McGranahan (2007) argues that EHPs should not see their roles as 
inspecting and regulating but as working with communities and other groups already improving 
conditions in cities. But EHPs remained uncertain of (Allison 2002; Lewin et al., 1998) and 
sometimes hostile (McDonald, 1997) towards these new roles.  
 
1.6 Conclusions  
This chapter began by defining environmental health and then explored how environment-health 
relationships and their management have been shaped by societies over the centuries. A concern 
for inequalities, particularly their potential to create social disorder, and a desire to manage 
using preventative interventions are integral to 21st century environmental health but it remains 
a persistent and wicked problem. The chapter then explored the considerable environmental 
health challenges facing South African cities, including Johannesburg, before introducing the 
potential role of local government EHPs for assessing, correcting, controlling and preventing 
the environmental factors with the potential to harm human health.  
 
Working at the local level EHPs are potentially well placed to deliver the Constitution’s 
developmental agenda through the protective laws that could make cities more productive, 
inclusive, sustainable and better governed. Beyond their core challenges, EHPs also find 
themselves based in organisations and implementing laws that are themselves undergoing 
significant change whilst they work amongst communities that remain suspicious of their 
actions. Reflecting on these issues, Mathee and Wright (2014) describe the paradox whereby 
21st century demand for scaled up and prudent action remains considerable, but South African 
environmental health services seem stagnant or in decline. Therefore it’s in our interests to learn 
more about them and Chapter 2 develops a model of governance towards this aim. 
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Chapter 2  Environmental health regulation as governance  
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter develops the model of governance used by this thesis to describe how local 
government EHPs regulate environmental health and starts by defining environmental health 
regulation as a form of governance before introducing the concept of responsive regulation to 
describe the work of EHPs. The chapter then embeds responsive regulation within a model of 
governance that incorporates the individual, legal, organisational and external factors identified 
in the literature and ends by identifying key gaps and the aim and objectives of this thesis.     
 
2.2 What is environmental health regulation?  
Regulation is generally concerned with the management of public and private relations in a 
complex society (Hawkins, 1984) and historically refers to the use of the law to constrain and 
organize economic activity (Kagan in Hutter, 1999). Ogus’s (2004) substantial work on law and 
economic theories of regulation differentiates between two forms of regulation: 
 
 Economic and financial regulation -  primarily focused on the control of markets for 
purposes including government spending (e.g. via interest rates), distribution of income 
and wealth (e.g. via taxation) and fair allocation of resources (e.g. competition laws)  
 Social regulation -  acting in the public interest to protect against the potentially 
damaging consequences of market failure (e.g. pollution or unsafe food)  
 
This distinction and the definition of environmental health regulation as a form of social 
protection is adopted by other regulatory scholars (Hutter, 1997; Yeager, 1991), but in the 
absence of consensus Baldwin et al. identify three different meanings of regulation: 
  
 An authoritative set of rules – accompanied by a means of monitoring and promoting 
compliance, like a public enforcement agency;  
 State influence in the economy – all government interventions designed to influence the 
economy and can include commands or incentives (e.g. taxes or subsidies);  
 All forms of social control – these includes the forms of state control above and the 
actions of non-state processes like social norms and market pressures that can be both 
intentional and unintentional (Baldwin et al. 1998 pp3-4).  
 
Following Chapter 1 the role of local government EHPs in assessing, correcting, controlling and 
preventing the environmental factors that can potentially affect the health of present and future 
generations is central to the first of Baldwin et al.’s meanings, but environmental health 
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regulation has also long sought to influence the economy and wider society. For example 
section 1.3 described how early quarantine controls were mainly to protect the state itself 
(Armstrong, 1993) given that high mortality levels could disrupt commerce, tax collection and 
state defence (Hamlin, 2002). Sanitary science provided the means of securing a healthier 
environment through state intervention, but Chadwick’s vision was also directed towards the 
greater goal of social development (Chadwick 1965/1842) and was particularly attractive at a 
time of economic depression and the threat of revolution (Hamlin, 1998). Further, Crook argues 
that sanitary science and the emergence of regulation and local government EHPs was part of a 
broader liberal rationale that included a concern for the “maintenance of a civilized, respectable 
public sphere, free from sources of disgust and disquiet and committed to the integrity and 
enjoyment of property” (2007 p375).  
 
These historical attempts by regulators to manage the tensions between individualists and 
collectivists are more overt in economic justifications for regulation. Here regulation is justified 
given the danger that if left uncontrolled the market will fail to act in the public interest 
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999), though as a wicked problem (see section 1.3 above) environmental 
health regulation defies easy cost-benefit analysis (Kelman, 1981). Arguably the most well 
known environmental health related market failures are externalities, activities that can have 
consequences (positive or negative) for third parties (Ogus, 2004) as illustrated by Hardin’s 
‘tragedy of the commons’:  
 
“The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the waste he discharges into the 
commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this 
is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of ‘fouling our own nest’, so long as 
we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprises”  
(Hardin, 1968: page unknown).         
 
Regulation here is justified to compel polluters to pay the full cost of their activities and protect 
third parties and society more broadly (Baldwin and Cave, 1999), but the work of local 
government EHPs provides a response to other market failures. For example education and 
advice can help protect market consumers against information deficits, whilst regulation can 
ensure that essential services are maintained when market conditions are unfavourable (Baldwin 
and Cave, 1999). In unequal societies regulation can transfer resources to affected parties (Ogus, 
2004), particularly vulnerable groups like the poor (Hardoy et al. 2001; Mitlin and Satterthwaite 
2004).  
 
This thesis therefore considers environmental health regulation as a form of social regulation of 
the market in the public interest whilst recognising its broader role in shaping society itself, 
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particularly in maintaining social order. However, this thesis also rejects a simplistic and 
ideological reading of regulation as social protection by the triumph of public interests – as 
represented here by the state and its EHPs - over those of private capital. Instead this thesis 
adopts a more critical approach by recognising what Hall (2012 p114) likens to the dualistic role 
of the state as “simultaneously repressive and protective”; here the state can both construct 
dangers and provide the means to maintain social order and sustain its legitimacy. The challenge 
of accommodating this complexity explains why a model of governance has been developed, to 
which Chapter 2 now turns.          
 
2.3 Environmental health regulation as governance   
Many models have been developed to describe public policy processes like environmental 
health regulation, but this thesis views regulation in its broadest sense as a four stage process:  
 
 Emergence – defining the problem to be regulated and the economic, social and 
political processes involved in deciding to enact legislation;  
 Drafting – deciding  the content of the written law;   
 Implementation - by the bureaucracy responsible for its enforcement; and 
 Impact – the effects of regulations upon those they seek to control and protect. 
(Dodd & Hutter 2000)  
 
The utility of stages models for investigating the complex realities of such processes is 
recognised by policy academics (Hill and Hupe 2002; Parsons, 1995) and this thesis is focused 
on implementation, specifically how local government EHPs bring environmental health laws to 
life. However Dodd and Hutter (2000) themselves acknowledge that the regulatory process is 
far from linear, with stages often overlapping in reality. For example Lipsky’s classic theory of 
street-level bureaucracy argues that when faced with the dilemmas of public service (e.g. 
limited resources, seemingly endless demand) “…the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the 
routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work 
pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out” (1980 p xii).  
 
Empirical studies of front line environmental health officials describe similar dilemmas in 
which they use their considerable discretion to effectively construct legal compliance during 
regulatory encounters (Carson, 1970b; Fineman, 1998; Hawkins, 1984; Hutter, 1988, 1997). 
Therefore implementation is synonymous with regulation by local government EHPs and is 
used here to describe “the whole process of compelling observance with some broadly 
perceived objectives of the law” (Hutter, 1988 p5). In this ‘game’ (Hawkins, 1984) compliance 
with the law is a dynamic or working definition and the product of many interacting factors 
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(Fineman, 1988; Kelman, 1981; Hutter, 1988 & 1997; Richardson et al. 1983) that are 
incorporated into the model of governance below. For regulatory officials themselves however 
these studies found that legal compliance was not an end in itself but more a means towards the 
greater goal of improving environmental health, but this section now considers why the 
regulatory work of local government EHPs is best conceptualised as governance.      
 
The emergence of local government EHPs during the Victorian period is located by the 
historian Crook (2007) within two theories of modern state power. The first theory associates 
local government EHPs with the gradual movement away from laissez-faire towards an 
increasingly bureaucratic and interventionist state. The term bureaucracy here refers to Weber’s 
(1947) characteristics of rational public administration that for this thesis, drawing on Hutter’s 
(1988) classic study of EHPs, describes:  
 
 EHPs with professional qualifications; 
 EHPs appointed by local government to carry out its legal duties;  
 EHPs working in departmental hierarchies – seniors are generally desk bound and work 
in strategic and management roles, more junior staff divide their time between office 
and field; and  
 EHPs with discretion but also rule bound and subject to organisational standards and 
expectations.  
 
For the interventionist state, the historian MacDonagh (1958) described a Victorian revolution 
in government where, amidst growing pressure for reform, scandals triggered the development 
of legislation to control the problem that was the product of many competing parties and 
gradually implemented by an increasingly expert local administration. The sociologist Paulus 
(1974) used this model to describe the regulation of food adulteration by local government 
EHPs (and others) in Victorian England and EHPs worldwide retain extensive legal powers to 
intervene in the activities of business and the public in the collective interests of public health. 
But Crook (2007) argues that viewing regulation as solely interventionist obscures its 
interpersonal nature and its operation within a critical and sometimes hostile public sphere that 
is common to South African studies (Barnes, 2007; Lewin et al. 1998).    
 
The second theory associates local government EHPs with the rise of the bureaucratic 
surveillance state. Here the characteristics of Weber’s bureaucracy above are instead embedded 
within a broader theory of social power characterised by rational-legal authority that rests “on a 
belief in the ‘legality’ of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority 
under such rules to issue commands” (Weber, 1947 p328). Similarly Foucault (1977) argues 
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that discipline and bureaucratic surveillance are integral to the modern capitalist state; here 
power is not simply a possession but a strategy inseparable from knowledge. This is deployed to 
discipline and control populations by techniques including hierarchies, organisational controls 
of continuous body supervision (e.g. barracks, wards and prisons) and panoptic surveillance 
whereby the disciplined subject knows he is being constantly observed whilst his observer sees 
everything but remains unseen and anonymous (Foucault, 1977).  
 
Accounts of colonial and apartheid South Africa (Andersson and Marks 1988; Parnell, 1991, 
1993, 2002; Rogerson, 1986; Swanson, 1977) describe this bureaucratic surveillance state, 
particularly its use of environmental health to justify the racial segregation, surveillance and 
control of the urban space to safeguard the (White) public’s health. But this literature also 
suggests that the use of state environmental health power before democracy was more complex 
and multi-dimensional. For example in the early 20th century attempts by urban local authorities 
to enact segregationist laws on environmental health grounds were sometimes thwarted for 
reasons including the reluctance of local authorities to finance alternative housing and services 
for (Black) Africans (Parnell, 1991; Swanson, 1977), resistance from African property owners 
(Swanson, 1977) and the resistance of landlords and manufacturers who wanted Africans to live 
closer to work (Parnell, 2002). 
  
After independence the bureaucratic surveillance state tightened its surveillance and control 
under apartheid and environmental health inequalities increased. But from the late 1970s factors 
including the increasing resistance and militancy of oppressed groups, structural changes in the 
economy (e.g. sanctions) and the demands of capital for a more skilled and stable urban 
workforce gradually weakened the state’s power (Andersson and Marks 1988). This period also 
prompted the gradual development of new environmental health infrastructure and services for 
non-Whites, particularly in rural and ‘homeland’ areas though these improvements were 
fragmented and underfunded (Agenbag & Balfour-Kaipa 2008; Andersson and Marks 1988).            
 
With democracy the vision for a new and developmental local government characterised by 
responsiveness, cooperation and accountability seems far removed from the bureaucratic 
surveillance state. Environmental health regulation is still shaped by the top-down actions of 
state bureaucrats concerned with disciplining and controlling the public’s health; but this thesis 
argues that regulation has also always been influenced from the bottom-up and even sideways 
given the roles of the regulated and wider public (bottom), local government EHPs themselves 
(sideways) and their political masters (top & bottom) amongst others in shaping regulation 
(Crook, 2007; Hutter, 1988). This thesis uses governance to capture this complexity and now 




The Oxford English Dictionary (2006) defines both ‘governance’ and ‘government’ as ‘the 
action or style of governing’ but others distinguish between these terms, associating government 
with organisations that make and implement policies (Harpham & Boateng 1997; Leach et al. 
2007; Stoker, 2002) whilst governance is a much broader concept. For Allison governance 
constitutes “the patterns of interaction between civil society and government” (2002 p1540) and 
others identify civil society as crucial in distinguishing government from governance (DFID, 
2001; Harpham and Boateng 1997).  
 
Governance is also associated with political power. The World Bank claims to have first started 
the governance debate in its report Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth 
where it was defined as “the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs” (World 
Bank, 1989 p60). Leach et al. (2007) argue that four years later the World Bank was using 
governance to support its broadly neoliberal development interventions. For example Osborne 
and Gaebler saw governance as the process by which governments would not simply be 
providing services but “catalyzing all sectors – public, private and voluntary – into action to 
solve their community’s problems” using market orientated methods like contracting and 
public-private partnerships (1992 p20 – italics in original). Debates about this changing role of 
government long predate governance but its neoliberal form has also been criticised for over 
simplifying state-market relations and failing to acknowledge that political power can move in 
individualist and collectivist directions (Leach et al. 2007).  
 
Debate also centres on ‘good governance’ whereby existing systems of governance are not good 
and can be improved (Harpham and Boateng 1997). Factors associated with good governance 
include economic stability, pro-poor economic growth and accountable and effective public 
services (DFID, 2001; World Bank, 1989). But Grindle considers this expanding and idealistic 
agenda unrealistic, particularly in developing countries where public institutions are often weak, 
poorly resourced and have questionable legitimacy (2004). Instead she proposes a ‘good 
enough’ governance focused on the minimum conditions necessary for poverty reduction 
established by the systematic assessment of governance factors in each country (e.g. 
institutional history, reforms known to alleviate poverty).  
 
This thesis adopts Allison’s definition of governance as “the patterns of interaction between 
civil society and government” (2002 p1540). Here ‘government’ is focused on metropolitan 
local government, particularly the CoJ and its EHPs, but other spheres of government and the 
criminal justice system are included. Civil society constitutes those individuals and institutions 
outside government control (Harpham and Boateng 1997) which in this thesis include regulated 
businesses and the public, non-government organisations (NGOs), the media and professional 
organisations. For EHPs themselves governance resembles what Crook (2007) describes - 
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during the late Victorian era - as the on-going circulation of power between state and civil 
society where all actors, by turn, resist and cooperate with one another in a form, however 
messy, of social ordering:  
 
“…in the case of sanitary inspection, governance was the struggles inspectors endured 
and sought to overcome, which informed all aspects of their job, from direct encounters 
with the public to the on-going battle for greater professional independence” (Crook 
2007 p393). 
 
Whether the work of CoJ EHPs represents good, good enough or bad governance is considered 
by this thesis, but this chapter now introduces responsive regulation and its utility for describing 
environmental health regulation before the next section embeds this within a framework of 
governance.       
 
2.4 Introducing responsive regulation     
This section starts by explaining how the framework of this thesis was expanded by inter-
disciplinary socio-legal approaches before exploring the gradual development of the concept of 
responsive regulation and why it should be embedded within a framework of governance    
 
2.4.1 Policy implementation to regulation: expanding socio-legal frameworks   
This thesis was originally structured around two related theories about street-level public policy 
implementation. The political scientist Michael Lipsky developed his classic theory of street-
level bureaucracy using research from cities in 1960s and 1970s America where poorly 
resourced officials - including EHPs - were accused of distorting policies by being unwilling to 
work with their clients, incompetent, biased and resistant to change (Lipsky, 1971). Lipsky 
critiqued these perspectives (1980) by synthesising previous theories to describe street-level 
bureaucrats as public service workers with substantial discretion that gives them considerable 
power over service users and autonomy from their employers. But this power is accompanied by 
the dilemmas of working in contexts not of their own choosing and in which resources are 
limited and demand far exceeds supply. This compels them to devise strategies to protect their 
working environment, for example by making decisions in private and favouring clients 
considered more likely to succeed. Here public policy is very much the product of street-level 
bureaucrats themselves, but is shaped by organisational and policy constraints, their relations 
with service users and the contexts in which their work takes place.       
 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000) build on Lipsky’s work in their own research on 
American public service workers. They identify Lipsky’s bureaucrats, calling them ‘state-
agents’, but they argue that street-level bureaucrats do not describe themselves as such. Instead 
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they liken themselves to ‘citizen-agents’, making decisions based on their own identities as 
helpers or protectors for example and in response to individuals and circumstances. Here 
moralities are vital with citizen-agents more likely to help those considered worthy, whilst 
pragmatism is essential given the complexities of street-level work (Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno 2003). Sometimes both narratives exist in concert, for example when laws or policies 
support officials’ views of people, but tensions are also inevitable, for example when the law 
conflicts with officials’ views of fairness or morality. Therefore street-level work is “as much a 
process of forming and enforcing identities – of both citizen-clients and street-level workers – as 
of delivering services and implementing policy” (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003 p153). 
 
The utility of both theories for describing how EHPs implement policy was confirmed during 
pilot studies in London and South Africa (see section 3.3.1 below). But this thesis has been 
enriched and further contextualized by locating these perspectives in the framework of Hutter’s 
(1988) socio-legal study of UK local government EHPs. This empirical study describes how 
local government EHPs implement policy by regulation and created the structure of the main 
literature review below. Here the core elements of the state-agent and citizen-agent narratives 
are incorporated in a broader socio-legal approach. There is no single agreed definition of socio-
legal approaches, but this thesis reflects Harris’s (1983) work by going beyond a study of ‘the 
law in its social context’ towards an interdisciplinary study of the law and legal institutions from 
the perspectives of the social sciences. This thesis is grounded in theoretical perspectives from 
criminology, history, the law, organisational studies, political science and sociology. The 
methods used were largely unchanged from the two pilot studies but a greater emphasis was 
placed on the socio-legal aspects of environmental health regulation to provide better 
descriptions of how CoJ EHPs work.  
 
To develop the governance model other studies of street-level environmental health regulators 
were identified and are summarised in Table 2.1 below. Two UK studies (Hawkins, 1984; 
Richardson et al. 1983) are colleagues of Hutter from the Centre of Socio-legal Studies of 
Wolfson College, Oxford University, whilst Fineman (1998) was chosen for its focus on the 
street-level construction of regulation. Kelman (1981) was selected because of its international 
insights and contributions to the development of the Oxford studies. The central government 
agencies in these four Northern studies were very different to local government but they enabled 








Table 2.1 Key studies of street-level EH regulators  
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Crook and Ayee’s (2006) work was also included as a rare study of local government EHPs in 
two African cities undergoing reforms with some parallels to South Africa. In the absence of 
studies of South African EHPs other studies related to urban environmental health and local 
government informed the development of the governance model. These include Lewin et al.’s 
(1998) study of local government environmental health service reform in Cape Town, Beall et 
al.’s studies of local government reform in Johannesburg (2000a, 2000b and 2002) and the on-
going work of the South African Cities Network (SACN, 2004, 2006 and 2016). But this thesis 
now introduces the concept of responsive regulation at the centre of the governance model. 
 
2.4.2 What is responsive regulation?  
Early descriptions of regulation echoed Weber (1947) and Foucault’s (1977) descriptions of the 
bureaucratic surveillance state by focusing on whether to punish or persuade offenders by what 
Hawkins (1984) calls compliance or deterrence/sanctioning strategies. Both aim to secure legal 
compliance and prevent offending behaviours (Reiss, 1984) but differ in how to achieve this. 
Compliance strategies seek to encourage compliance (Reiss, 1984) by solving problems and 
preventing others using methods like persuasion, negotiation and education (Hutter, 1997). 
Sanctions are primarily used as threats (Reiss, 1984) and are generally used in the long term and 
as a last resort when other options have failed (Hawkins, 1984; Hutter, 1988).  
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In contrast, sanctioning strategies use deterrence to achieve compliance by detecting and 
punishing offenders to prevent future offending behaviours (Reiss, 1984) or prohibit certain 
activities (Hutter, 1999). Such strategies have been associated with the police and compliance 
strategies with regulators (Reiss, 1984), including local government EHPs (Hutter, 1988), 
though this distinction maybe simplistic. For example Hawkins reminds that all law enforcers, 
whether police or regulators, “will sometimes advise, instruct, exhort, bargain, or threaten, and 
will sometimes take formal steps to initiate the process of criminal prosecution” (1991 p428).   
 
Other studies retain the compliance/deterrence distinction but identify different degrees of 
compliance based approaches. For example Kelman (1981) differentiated between the formal 
approaches of the American Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the 
accommodative approaches of the Swedish Worker Protection Board. Within one regulator, the 
American Office of Surface Mining, Shover et al. (1986) associated some field offices with 
conciliatory/results-oriented approaches and others with more legalistic/rule-oriented 
approaches. Similarly, Hutter identified two degrees of compliance strategy when comparing 
four UK local government environmental health departments (1988) and three sections of the 
UK Health and Safety Executive (1997):  
 
 Persuasive strategies - accommodating and characterised by education and negotiation 
over the long term; and 
 Insistent strategies - also accommodating, but less flexible and more likely to invoke 
formal action.   
 
Moving beyond the compliance/deterrence distinction Braithwaite, Walker and Grabovsky’s 
(1987) study of regulatory agencies remains one of the most comprehensive attempts to 
differentiate between enforcement approaches. They assessed 96 Australian regulators using 
enforcement related variables to develop the following taxonomy:  
 
 Conciliators - 9 reactive agencies rejected law enforcement altogether, relying instead 
on mediation;  
 Benign Big Guns  - 17 reactive agencies had significant enforcement powers that 
business could not ignore but they rarely used them;  
 Diagnostic Inspectorates - 11 de-centralised agencies had proactive inspection policies, 
well qualified inspectors and cooperative enforcement strategies concerned that gave 
prosecution a low priority;  
 Token Enforcers - 25 conducted proactive inspections but these were more rules based, 
not diagnostic, with steady prosecutions but very low average penalties; 
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 Detached Token Enforcers - 9 shared the characteristics of token enforcers but were less 
co-operative with business; 
 Detached Modest Enforcers – 7 agencies were more rules based and prosecute more 
than Detached Token Enforcers but remain closer to them than to Modest Enforcers;    
 Modest Enforcers - 18 agencies conducted rules based inspections with more sanctions 
oriented enforcement strategies than all other types.   
 
Hutter (1989) thought the four local government environmental health departments in her 1988 
study fit best between the diagnostic inspectorate and token enforcer depending on whether 
they, respectively, used persuasive or insistent strategies. This taxonomy also illustrates that 
regulation is influenced by more than the decision to punish or persuade the regulated, the 
variables used by Braithwaite et al. (1987) including the law itself, the structure and policies of 
the regulator, the attitudes of officials and the characteristics of the business.   
 
More recent debate has combined both approaches into a responsive model that instead 
questions when, not whether, regulators should punish or persuade. For example Kagan and 
Scholz (1984) argued that regulators should respond to the motivation and ability of businesses 
to comply in accordance with three images of the regulated:   
 
 Amoral calculators - motivated entirely by profit seeking, their non-compliance results 
from economic calculation with regulators responding like the police using less flexible, 
sanctioning strategies;  
 Political citizens - inclined towards compliance, but non-compliance could result from 
principled disagreement with laws considered authoritarian or unreasonable. The 
regulator acts as a politician trying to persuade businesses to act in the public interest 
but willing compromise in response to legitimate business concerns or use sanctions if 
non-compliance continues.  
 Organizationally incompetent - inclined towards compliance but offending results from 
organizational failures that require regulators to consult with and educate the business.  
 
These three images are not mutually exclusive and Kagan and Scholz warn how they lack 
predictive power, for example where an inspector risks exploitation by the ‘bad apple’ whose 
perceived incompetence is actually amoral calculation. They also stress responsiveness whereby 
inspectors are “…prepared to shift from strict policemen, to politician, to consultant and back 




These images were further developed by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) who drew on game 
theory and wider sociological arguments to combine compliance and deterrence in responsive 
regulation. This aims to provide a flexible and measured framework for regulation that is 
responsive to the changing behaviours and motivations of the regulated and is summarised by 
Figure 2.1 below from Hutter’s (1997) study of environmental health regulators. Here the least 
intervention by the regulator occurs at the base of the pyramid using persuasion in the first 
instance, but the regulator can escalate their interventions upwards on a ‘tit for tat’ basis using 
increasingly punitive approaches to secure compliance. Likewise, regulators can de-escalate 
once compliance is achieved and sustained. By doing so it is argued that regulators can secure a 
moral commitment to the law that rewards compliance, deters non-compliance and enables 
potential offenders to change their ways (Braithwaite 2007).    
 
Figure 2.1 The pyramid model of responsive regulation  
(Source: Hutter 1997 p227) 
 
 
The pyramid above is commonly known as the ‘hierarchy of sanctions’ (Ayres and Braithwaite 
1992 – hereafter the regulatory pyramid) and describes the responsive regulation of individual 
businesses in two ways. First, the decreasing area of each level higher up the pyramid represents 
the decreasing proportion of regulatory activity at each level. Second, a hierarchy of sanctions 
exists with most regulation occurring at the base of the pyramid to persuade individual 
businesses to comply. Most cases enter at this base; failure to secure compliance escalates 
enforcement on a tit-for-tat basis via verbal and written warnings and increasingly punitive 
approaches including legal notices that specify the improvements required for compliance or 
prohibit specific activities until rectified; further non-compliance could lead to the highest 
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punishment, criminal prosecution. Vice-versa, compliance at any stage could result in de-
escalation down the pyramid.  
 
2.4.3 A critique of responsive regulation  
This critique first summarises the theoretical debate amongst sociologists about the regulatory 
pyramid, particularly its emphasis on prosecution as the last resort, and then sets out the 
theoretical position of this thesis on regulation. This critique then considers the effectiveness of 
responsive regulation and wider theoretical and empirical criticisms that justify its embedding 
within a wider framework of governance. The very shape of the regulatory pyramid has long 
prompted debate about why persuasion predominates, with prosecution generally a last resort. 
In response, Tombs and Whyte identify four competing theories that are now summarised 
before the theoretical position of this thesis is clarified.  
 
Consensus or compliance-based theories of regulation are broadly pluralist, with power shared 
more or less equally between political parties, and based on the belief that the most effective 
regulatory strategies are those involving persuasion, bargaining and compromise through close 
relationships between regulator and regulated (Tombs and Whyte 2007). These remain 
dominant in Northern societies, particularly in the work of the Centre of Socio-legal Studies of 
Oxford University whose work includes three of the key studies informing this thesis (Hawkins, 
1984; Hutter, 1988; and Richardson et al. 1983).   
 
Alternatively, in capture theories regulatory relationships can get too close making government 
and regulators vulnerable to capture by powerful interests like big business. For example 
Bernstein argued that during the life cycle of the regulator its initial enthusiasm gradually ebbs 
away until it is eventually captured by business due to corporate lobbying, the consolidation of 
public and private interests and the movement of personnel between regulator and regulated 
(Bernstein, 1955). Both Gunningham (1974) and Yeager (1991) described this capture of 
environmental health regulators in the UK and USA.    
 
The term neoliberalism is used here to describe a form of political economy that since the 1970s 
has influenced a wide range of national government policies across the world (Tombs, 2016), 
including South Africa (Habib and Padayachee 2000). Neoliberalism is hard to define but the 
following traits are characteristic of neoliberal policies:  
 
1. A confidence in the market as an efficient mechanism for allocating scarce resources; 
2. A belief in the desirability of a global regime of free trade and free capital mobility; 
3. A belief in the desirability, all things being equal, of a limited and noninterventionist 
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role for the state and of the state as a facilitator and custodian rather than a substitute for 
market mechanisms; 
4. A rejection of Keynesian demand-management techniques in favour of monetarism, 
neo-monetarism and supply-side economics; 
5. A commitment to the removal of those welfare benefits which might be seen to act as 
disincentives to market participation (in short, a subordination of the principles of social 
justice to those of perceived economic imperatives); 
6. A defence of labour-market flexibility and the promotion and nurturing of cost 
competitiveness; and 
7. A confidence in the use of private finance in public projects and, more generally, in 
the allocative efficiency of market based mechanisms to provide public goods.  
        (Hay, 2004 pp507-8) 
 
Neoliberal theories of regulation therefore argue that society is over-regulated by interventionist 
states; instead the self-regulation of business using market mechanisms (e.g. competitive 
advantage, compensation, insurance) could better protect environmental health (Tombs and 
Whyte 2007). That state regulators - like local government EHPs - still exist suggests that the 
neoliberal argument has not yet won, but this context inherently favours more persuasive 
interventions. Since the 1980s for example regulatory policy in many Northern countries has 
been characterised by deregulation, greater co-operation with businesses (e.g. via support, 
outsourcing, privatization) and increasing pressure on regulators to account for their activities 
and the costs they impose on business (Hutter, 2005; Snider, 2003; Tombs, 2016).  
 
These theoretical arguments are returned to throughout this study, but this thesis adopts Tombs 
and Whyte’s (2007) preference for so-called ‘critical approaches to regulation’. These move 
beyond struggles between states versus capital only and instead view regulation as a process 
determined both by the product of struggles between states and business and states and the 
electorate; here power is distributed unequally but spaces for challenging power are not 
captured or closed down by dominant markets. Here the role of local government EHPs in 
managing the struggles between the environmental health interests of business and the wider 
public is therefore critical to maintaining social order and a functioning economy, arguments 
that date back to the origins of environmental health in section 1.2 above. But this section now 
considers what is known about its effectiveness before considering other theoretical and 
empirical critiques of responsive regulation.   
 
This thesis uses responsive regulation to describe, not prescribe, how local government EHPs 
regulate environmental health and does not seek to measure its effectiveness but debate centers 
on whether regulators are actually responsive to the regulated. In her analysis of regulatory 
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responsiveness to more than 2500 environmental health offences in Denmark, Nielsen (2006) 
found that inspectors can act responsively to the regulated, but this was generally to a low 
degree and did not follow the tit-for-tat pattern described by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992). 
Instead the area being regulated, the characteristics of the regulator itself and the individual 
preferences of inspectors were more influential. In a later study of 141 Australian businesses in 
relation to federal competition and consumer protection law, Nielsen and Parker (2009) also 
found little evidence of tit-for-tat responsive regulation in practice but they acknowledged its 
potential for coercing businesses into compliance when compared to more cooperative 
(persuasive) approaches. In the absence of more reviews of responsive regulation, this section 
now considers two studies of the effectiveness of different regulatory approaches used by local 
government EHPs, amongst others.  
 
In her systematic review of workplace health and safety regulation Davis (2004) identified some 
gaps in knowledge but concluded overall that there was enough evidence that regulation, 
particularly the threat of credible enforcement, is the primary motivator for organisations to 
improve their health and safety. Further, UK government moves towards increasingly self-
regulatory drivers could fail for reasons including the poor track record of voluntary business 
reforms in other areas (e.g. the environment), the gap between increasing knowledge and 
improving compliance and the weak business case for improving compliance. Therefore Davis 
argues that regulators should increase the levels of inspection and law enforcement, whilst 
alternative approaches like partnership working should add to, not replace, core regulatory 
activities. In response to this review Wright and Marsden (2005) agreed that more research was 
needed but disagreed that government policy was a simple choice between law enforcement 
versus self regulation and instead argued this was more about the ‘relative roles’ of 
enforcement, education and other approaches.   
 
Fairman and Yapp (2005a) completed an empirical study exploring perceptions of compliance 
amongst UK food sector SMEs and evaluating the impact of the regulatory approaches of local 
government EHPs. They found most SMEs were poor at identifying offences and, more 
worryingly, perceived compliance as the norm for their businesses until told otherwise by EHPs 
and additional research into workplace safety compliance in UK SMEs (Fairman and Yapp 
2005b) further confirmed these findings. Persuasive approaches involving high levels of 
education and the breaking down of risk management systems into prescriptive (‘just tell me 
what to do’) instructions were most effective in securing compliance. But for reasons including 
the lack of resources to educate SMEs Fairman and Yapp concluded more punitive regulation 
might be necessary, including the automatic prosecution of SMEs without safety management 




In summary both these studies illustrate the complexity of measuring the effectiveness of 
regulation, particularly the importance of understanding the regulatory policy context and 
business perceptions of regulation. But both also illustrate the significance of local government 
EHPs in driving regulation and the utility of approaches utilising both persuasion and 
punishment to improve environmental health.    
 
In wider policy terms, Baldwin and Black argue that in certain circumstances (e.g. serious 
incidents) gradual escalation up the pyramid may not be appropriate and such by-passing 
towards increasingly punitive approaches is described by others including Hawkins (1984) and 
Hutter (1988). Movement up and down the pyramid is also dependent on the cooperation of the 
regulated but Baldwin and Black (2008) argue that this may not be so easy in practice because 
the threat and reality of more punitive approaches risks damaging these relationships as studies 
of EHPs have also described (Crook and Ayee 2006; Hutter, 1988).   
 
Tit for tat responsiveness also assumes that the regulated will behave rationally and respond to 
increasingly punitive approaches, but Baldwin and Black suggest that other pressures including 
culture and competition could exert more influence on businesses than regulators (2008). 
Studies also suggest that the sanctions available to EH regulators could provide an inadequate 
deterrent as discussed in section 2.5.3 below. Lastly, regulatory systems are complex with 
businesses typically exposed to many regulators such that the transmission of clear messages 
between regulator-regulated is much less likely (Baldwin and Black 2008). 
 
Baldwin and Black (2008) also identify some practical limitations of responsive regulation. 
Sometimes there may not be enough interactions for the pyramid to operate, though for EHPs 
this is less likely given the district based nature of their work (assuming the same EHP works 
there). As Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) recognise, regulation is more than a two player game 
but regulators might also lack the resources for responsiveness and encounter legal uncertainties 
or a lack of political will towards using more punitive approaches (Baldwin and Black 2008) as 
confirmed by section 2.5 below. The fairness, proportionality, accountability and consistency of 
responsive regulation can also be questioned, particularly whether its lack of formality 
undermines these values and the rule of law (Baldwin and Black 2008) and in response this 
section now introduces three alternative models of regulation developed in recent years.   
 
Gunningham and Grabosky’s (1998) ‘smart regulation’ puts greater emphasis on non-state 
actors (e.g. trade associations, professions, business) in the regulatory process using a three-
dimensional pyramid. However, these authors admit that many of the limitations of responsive 
regulation remain, notably the problems of escalation and communication within even more 
complex systems. Alternatively, Baldwin and Black’s (2008) ‘really responsive regulation’ 
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argues that regulators should not only be responding to the compliance behaviours of business 
but also their motivations and context as well as those of the regulator itself (e.g. history, 
resources, performance management) and changes to the law and policy.  
 
Risk based approaches to regulation are increasingly popular (Hutter, 2005), particularly 
amongst EH regulators (Fairman, 1999; Hampton, 2005). In the UK the Hampton Report 
continues to influence local government EHPs (and others) towards risk based regulation by 
arguing that it enables the prioritisation of (its assumed) increasingly limited state resources for 
regulation towards high risk businesses/sectors, whilst promoting self regulation because (it is 
assumed) most other businesses can regulate their own risks and thereby earn autonomy from 
regulatory scrutiny (Hampton, 2005). Others question Hampton’s rationale because of its 
neoliberal assumptions (Tombs, 2016) and the scientific uncertainties of risk based regulation 
(Jones et al., 2008; Mullen et al. 2002; Rothstein et al. 2006) that have been borne out in 
practice. For example two investigations into fatal E.coli 0157 food poisoning outbreaks 
identified premises local government EHPs had categorised ‘low risk’ (Cox, 1998; Pennington, 
2009). Wider concerns include its greater demands on resources and expertise (Baldwin and 
Black 2008; Rothstein et al. 2006) and its ability to render inequalities of power and conflicts of 
interest all but invisible (Tombs, 2016).  
 
In conclusion, this thesis continues to use responsive regulation to describe the work of EHPs 
but recognises its theoretical and empirical assumptions and challenges. In recognition of the 
need to explore responsiveness to factors beyond the behaviour of the regulated this thesis 
therefore embeds the regulatory pyramid within a wider governance model to which the next 
section turns. Further, this thesis will look out for evidence of risk based regulation in South 
Africa and could also be considered a response to Nielsen and Parker’s (2009) call for more 
research into how regulators communicate threat and cooperation.  
 
2.5 A governance model of environmental health regulation   
This section starts with an overview of the governance model created by this thesis to 
summarise how local government EHPs regulate environmental health before exploring each 
factor within the model in more detail and how it might influence the regulatory approaches of 
EHPs towards punishment or persuasion.       
 
2.5.1 An overview of the governance model  
This model in Figure 2.2 below embeds the hierarchy of sanctions pyramid of responsive 
regulation towards individual businesses from Figure 2.1 above within a wider framework of 
governance created by this thesis and based on the critique above and the key studies in Table 
2.1 above. These identified responsiveness to factors at three different levels that could shape 
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how local government EHPs regulate which are explored across section 2.5. At the centre of the 
governance model the regulatory strategies used by EHPs are shaped by individual, legal and 
organisational and so-called external factors arranged in concentric circles to depict the blurred 
boundaries of governance where these factors frequently overlap and power circulates between 
various actors. A metaphor from Herbert Kaufman’s (1960/2006 p68) classic study of American 
forest rangers visualises this well. Viewing Figure 2.2 below in three dimensions, here 
regulation at the level of the local government EHP looks like a vast funnel with the EHP at its 
throat: all the factors above pour out materials which, mixed and blended by the EHP, emerge in 
a stream of regulatory action in the field. Section 2.5 now reviews the literature on each factor 
and why EHPs frequently favour persuasion over punishment. 
 




2.5.2 The regulatory context   
Studies have described how regulators can be influenced by what are crudely termed external 
factors in Figure 2.2 above and this sub-section explores the changing political and 
socioeconomic contexts in which regulation takes place (Diver, 1980; Hutter & Manning 1990; 
Kelman, 1981; Shover et al. 1986), what Hawkins (2002) calls the ‘surround’. Chapter 1 
described the poverty and inequality that EHPs are confronted by each day but this sub-section 
adds the historical and macroeconomic context and public and media attitudes to regulation to 
this regulatory context.   
 
There is little published on regulation and local government EHPs in South Africa before 
democracy, but mentions in the historical literature suggests that their work was characterised 
by law enforcement and sometimes contributed to poverty and inequality described in section 
1.3 above. The earliest records of environmental health regulation in the region back to the mid-
17th century when early European Cape settlers enacted and enforced laws including those to 
protect drinking water from contamination (Rabie and Fuggle 1992). The British took control of 
the Cape from 1795 and gradually created racially based local authorities across Southern 
Africa (de Visser, 2005).  
 
Colonial sanitary inspectors used regulation to enforce the racial segregation of urban areas 
(Parnell, 1993) in response to outbreaks of disease (Swanson, 1977) and, with echoes of a racial 
Chadwick-type utilitarianism, the belief that segregation could increase labour controls and 
solve problems like insanitary housing and ‘deteriorating moral standards’ like prostitution 
(Mabin, 1986). This ‘sanitation syndrome’ equated black urban settlement, labour and living 
conditions with threats to public health whilst rationalizing white fears and prejudices and the 
need for official social controls (Swanson, 1977). Colonial local authorities also extended their 
regulation of the urban space to control African street vendors in particular (Parnell, 2002; 
Rogerson, 1986) but remained reluctant to provide basic services to emerging townships 
(Proctor, 1986) and urban slums (Parnell, 1991).    
 
After independence in 1948 the environmental health of the majority of South Africans 
continued to deteriorate during the apartheid era. At the national level the environment was a 
low priority next to industrialisation and economic development, particularly from the 1970s 
when on-going sanctions, boycotts and recession prioritised economic survival (Steyn, 2008). 
International opposition to apartheid also isolated South Africa from the earlier global ‘new 
public health strategies’ identified in section 1.3 above (Steyn and Wessels 2000). Apartheid 
reinforced existing racial local government structures (de Visser, 2005), with cities ‘run by 
Whites for Whites’ (Beall et al. 2000a) and their local authorities able to sustain the highest 




By contrast Black areas had entirely separate local government structures or none at all, whilst 
apartheid limitations on business activities in these areas produced inadequate revenues for 
service provision (RSA, 1998). Without basic services these areas were prone to disease 
outbreaks that provided renewed justification for the removal of Black-Africans from urban 
areas (Andersson and Marks 1988; Ferrinho et al. 1991). The law largely failed to protect 
environmental health because large state owned polluters were exempted (Steyn, 2008), whilst 
regulators often failed to regulate because of fragmented responsibilities, poor resources (Petrie 
et al 1992) and a lack of political will (Davies et al. 1997; Rabie and Fuggle 1992). From the 
mid-1980s attempts were made to restructure local government and direct funding towards 
priority areas like the townships (RSA, 1998), but in 1994 the democratic government inherited 
approximately 12 million people without access to clean drinking water, 21 million with 
inadequate sanitation (ANC, 1994) and local government characterised by racism, weakness and 
illegitimacy (de Visser, 2005).  
 
South African local government EHPs therefore find themselves in a difficult situation. 
Historically disadvantaged populations could be understandably suspicious of their motives, 
whilst the pressure is on local government EHPs to maintain the highest standards in former 
White areas but what might this mean for the approaches of local government EHPs 
themselves? On the one hand this context favours more persuasive approaches to support 
historically disadvantaged populations and help build the legitimacy of local government as an 
organisation to develop the environmental health of all. But there also remains a need to retain 
the more punitive regulatory approaches of the past, though without the racial dimension, for 
those businesses whose activities are harming South Africa’s public health, but this section now 
explores the potential influence of macroeconomic policies on regulation.     
 
In the UK a powerful and sustained deregulatory rhetoric has characterised macroeconomic 
policy since the 1980s, with regulators including EHPs accused of inefficiency and being 
burdensome to business (Hampton, 2005; Hutter, 2005; Tombs, 2016). One study from this 
period describes health and safety inspectors perceiving the government as hostile to regulation, 
one manager arguing that this context could make new inspectors think more like social workers 
than regulators because prosecution may not be “the right thing to do” (Hawkins, 2002:118). 
The South African government’s shift towards more neoliberal macroeconomic policies is 
widely recognised (Coovadia et al. 2009; Habib and Padayachee 2000; Sanders and Chopra 
2006) but whether/how this is influencing EHPs is considered by this thesis.   
 
During periods of economic downturn and declining political support for regulation other 
studies describe how regulators, including local government EHPs, felt pressured to co-operate 
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more with business (Hutter, 1988; Kelman, 1981; Shover et al. 1986; Tombs, 2016). South 
Africa is very different to the UK/USA but in Cape Town Lewin et al. described several local 
government EHPs reflecting that it would be difficult to enforce policies that could harm 
development and jobs, one commenting that “...the enforcement will always be weak, because 
the economic forces are stronger” (1998 p21) but this section now considers how public and 
media attitudes could influence regulation. 
 
Hutter (1988) argues that local government EHPs do not generally attract public attention or 
automatic support because their work is characteristically undramatic and largely hidden from 
the public eye, whilst the public might not know a potentially harmful offence has been 
committed and that EHPs exist to protect them. Unsurprisingly these EHPs acknowledged the 
need for public education about environmental health, and studies have identified poor public 
awareness of environmental health and EHPs in South Africa (Allison, 2002; Lewin et al. 1998) 
but that is not to say that the public do not care about this.   
 
Hawkins and Thomas (1984) describe how regulators can find themselves caught between 
‘activist’ and ‘business’ publics with the former committed to the regulation of serious harms 
produced by business despite its costs, whilst the latter see regulation an unnecessary burden on 
business by dictatorial bureaucracies. The regulator in the middle can attract criticism from both 
publics (Hawkins, 1984) and evidence from South Africa suggests that both are very active. 
Since 1988 a civil society ‘activist’ public (Steyn and Wessels 2000) has been instrumental in 
holding government environmental health regulators to account (Davies et al. 1997; Leonard 
and Pelling 2010). Simultaneously, the emerging narrative in South Africa’s neoliberal 
macroeconomic policies associating regulation with burdening business (RSA, 2006) suggests 
its business public is also influential. But regulators face pressure from other activist publics.    
 
Relationships between local government officials and the general public in developing countries 
are frequently described as poor (Hardoy et al. 2001; WHO, 1993). In South African cities 
affluent (former White) areas continue to benefit from better environmental health services for 
reasons including powerful voices (Beall et al. 2002) and uncertainties amongst EHPs about 
working in developing areas (Lewin et al. 1998). Poor service delivery has also led to civil 
unrest as illustrated by Barnes (2007) during the 2005 typhoid outbreak in Delmas, 
Mpumalanga. This killed five people and infected hundreds of others and prompted a textbook 
government response including the provision of temporary healthcare facilities, water points 
and a hygiene behaviour campaign. But Delmas residents saw this response differently; still 
reliant on bucket latrines they associated the outbreak with slow service delivery and 
government failure to meet their Constitutional environmental health rights. Residents were also 
offended by reports that the outbreak was their fault and began a series of protests and police 
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confrontations (Mail and Guardian 2005). Similarly, Nations and Monte (1997) describe 
widespread public resistance in Northeast Brazil when the poor felt blamed and punished by the 
government’s cholera control campaigns.  
 
The media plays an important role in bringing environmental health issues to public attention 
and shaping public attitudes towards regulation (Hutter, 1997) and holding regulators to account 
for their actions (Bardach and Kagan 2006; Hawkins, 2002; Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock 1990). 
The routine work of EHPs typically attracts little media interest (Hutter, 1988), but high profile 
cases can expose them to open scrutiny and make regulators more likely to use more punitive 
approaches towards maintaining their own credibility (Hawkins, 1984) and prompting media 
support for more regulation and stricter enforcement (Bardach and Kagan 2006). Regulators 
also value the threat of public stigma associated with prosecution cases (Hawkins, 1984), 
though Hutter (1988) found that most EHPs thought the press coverage of prosecutions 
provided a greater deterrent than (low) financial sanctions. Regulators are also keen to avoid 
coverage associating them with corruption (Perry, 2000) and injustice (Hawkins, 1984; 
Huchzermeyer, 2004).  But what are the implications of this for local government EHPs?  
 
Two key studies argue that the lack of a strong public and moral consensus for the mandate of 
environmental health regulators threatens their very authority (Hawkins, 1984; Hutter, 1988) but 
in South Africa any consensus that exists could be even weaker. Comparison with the police is 
useful here, where Hawkins (1984) argues that the British police enjoy a relatively secure moral 
mandate. After three years observing the South African Police Service in Johannesburg, 
Steinberg (2008) concludes that the public have not yet given their consent to being policed and 
factors associated with their poor legitimacy included the legacy of apartheid and corruption. 
Therefore it’s not surprising that Cape Town EHPs were viewed as ‘policemen’ by locals 
(Lewin et al. 1998) and Johannesburg’s public were suspicious of local government’s new 
participatory approaches (Mathee et al. 2002). 
  
Operating in this uncertain regulatory context Hawkins argues that more persuasive regulatory 
strategies enable the consent of the regulated to be sustained because “bargaining is, ultimately, 
morally compelled” (1984 pp127-8) and Crook and Ayee’s (2006) key study of EHPs in two 
Ghanaian cities provides some support for this. They describe how the public image of the 
‘authoritarian EHP’ and decades of city government failure to improve services created public 
indifference towards regulation. Amidst policy shifts advocating more persuasive approaches 
doubts remained about whether EHPs were actually working more cooperatively, but most 
EHPs thought their relationships with the regulated and wider public had become “more 




Together the regulatory context for local government EHPs is far from certain and frequently 
favours more persuasive strategies towards the base of the regulatory pyramid, particularly if 
they help legitimise the developmental role of local government in society. This section now 
turns to explore the uncertainties surrounding environmental health law itself.  
 
2.5.3 The legal framework for environmental health regulation  
This section argues that environmental health law is characterised by uncertainties that can 
weaken the mandate of local government EHPs and make them more likely to favour persuasive 
approaches. It starts by considering the uncertainties inherent in the law before summarising the 
debate questioning the very criminality of environmental health offences. The section then 
considers why the considerable discretion of EHPs is inevitable before considering how the 
fragmentation of responsibilities for environmental health and the legal position of EHPs creates 
further uncertainties. This review draws largely from studies of British law but its relevance is 
argued here because of its long standing influence on South African law and its EHPs.     
 
The vast number and breadth of laws enforced by local government EHPs has long 
characterised their work (Crook, 2007; Hill, 2005) and creates many basic challenges including 
staying up to date and finding the right law for the case (Kelman, 1981). EHPs in Hutter’s 
(1988) UK study inevitably likened themselves to ‘jacks of all trades and masters of none’, but 
they were also concerned about their expanding legal responsibilities and the inadequacies of 
the law in specifying their precise role (i.e. when to punish or persuade) and managing the 
conditions they are confronted with each day.   
 
Hawkins and Thomas (1984) argue that where regulatory goals are clearly defined and 
unambiguous they are likely to be enforced more stringently, but environmental health law has 
been characterised by a combination of broad legal standards and precise guidelines since 
Victorian times (Crook, 2007; Wilson, 1881). Standards like ‘adequate’ or ‘reasonable’ for 
example effectively save the law from deciding how to resolve the dilemmas created by 
competing regulatory interests (Hutter, 1988), but the interpretations of officials facing these 
dilemmas are themselves debated. For example in the UK and South Africa industry’s case for 
controlling emissions can seem far more reasonable to regulators than the concerns of local 
people (Davies et al. 1997; Gunningham, 1974; Leonard and Pelling 2010).   
 
The nature of environmental health law is constantly changing. Traditional ‘command and 
control’ laws have operated for centuries and assume that the threat of criminal sanctions 
wielded by regulators against offending individuals/businesses will be sufficient to induce the 
desired behaviours (Ogus, 2004). At the other extreme, systems of business self-regulation 
potentially eliminate the need for regulators completely (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992) and in the 
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UK self-regulatory agreements between regulators and business remain rare and controversial 
but are increasing in number (Tombs, 2016). But wider legal reforms in this direction via 
enforced self-regulation are widespread and compel businesses to devise their own rules for 
operating within legal parameters, where the role of the regulator changes to approving their 
management systems and monitoring their performance (Braithwaite, 1982). These legal 
parameters increasingly involve risk based regulation (Fairman, 1999) and all its assumptions 
and limits (see section 2.4.3 above), but this section now turns to the uncertain criminality of 
environmental health.      
 
Questions have long been raised about the criminality of regulatory offences when compared to 
more traditional crimes (Carson, 1980; Hutter, 1988). One distinction is that regulatory offences 
can sometimes be corrected (Hutter, 1997) but, returning to the theoretical debates in section 
2.4.3 above, sociological accounts of the criminalisation of UK business activities are divided 
about whether this differentiation was the product of negotiated compromise or the deliberate 
decisions of legislators in the interests of capital. Paulus (1974) argues that developments in the 
law to regulate food adulteration in Victorian England were achieved by an accommodation of 
interests. Here EHPs (then sanitary inspectors) and magistrates, Paulus argues, were frustrated 
at critical stages to avoid damaging the status of that ‘epitome of middle-class morality and 
respectability’, the mid-Victorian businessman.  
 
Alternatively, Gunningham (1974) describes how a powerful British industrial lobby influenced 
environmental protection laws that responded to public opinion but were so weak as to be 
virtually unenforceable by regulators who were themselves often reluctant to penalise industry. 
In this capture thesis, powerful interests and structures were therefore left largely undisturbed. 
Carson instead argues that in Victorian Britain the distancing of ambiguous factory crimes from 
the criminal law gradually legitimised the factory system and reproduced the emerging social 
class structure (1979). This ‘logic of regulation’ as he later described it both protected 
manufacturers from illegal domestic competition and created a disciplined workforce whose 
working conditions were legally enforceable (Carson, 1980).  
 
The moral neutrality associated with regulatory offences further differentiates them from more 
traditional crimes because they are sometimes less visible, harder to detect (Hawkins, 1984; 
Hutter, 1988) or have no obvious victims (Moran, 1997). But the association of regulatory 
offences with white collar crime (Carson, 1970b; Tombs and Whyte 2007) provides an 
alternative explanation. In White Collar Crime sociologist Edwin Sutherland (1949/1983) 
described how high status criminals frequently escape punishment, unlike the lower classes, 
because their crimes are administered differently and can remain undetected, or not prosecuted 
or convicted because of their power to influence the criminal law. Later, Foucault (1977) 
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described how developing capitalist societies structure themselves along class lines by more 
precisely defining and controlling the illegalities of the lower classes, particularly relating to 
theft. The bourgeoisie however can work around their laws through the ‘illegality of rights’, 
manipulating gaps in the law to redistribute these illegalities via measures including special 
legal institutions and reduced fines (Foucault, 1977).   
 
Empirical evidence for this in studies of environmental health regulation is mixed. The potential 
for large organisations to shape regulation in their interests is well established (Gunningham, 
1974; Yeager, 1991). Some found punishment less prominent in the regulation of larger 
businesses (Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986; Yeager, 1991), but their greater complexity 
provides an alternative explanation (Hutter, 1997). Local government EHPs exhibited no 
leniency towards high status offenders (Hutter, 1988) but in Ghana such offenders, particularly 
those with political connections, were largely untouchable by local government EHPs (Crook 
and Ayee 2006). This section now considers other ways in which regulatory offences can be 
differentiated from more traditional crimes.      
 
Mens rea (literally ‘guilty mind’) requires the prosecution to prove the defendant intended to 
commit a crime but in regulatory law it has largely been replaced by the principle of strict 
liability. This mandates businesses to comply with legally prescribed standards and originated at 
different times across environmental health law. In British workplace safety law for example the 
Factory Act, 1844 substantially removed intention from the crimes of employers. This made the 
law more enforceable for inspectors who prior to this had to prove in court that an employer 
intended to commit an offence, though an element of mens rea remained with employers 
retaining the defence of due diligence4 and the fault of other persons (Carson, 1979).  
 
In British food safety law strict liability dates back to 1873 when appeals against two 
convictions for the sale of adulterated foods under the  Food and Drugs Amendment Act, 1872 
led judges to reinterpret the law in favour of strict liability. They argued that the intention of any 
law is to prevent prohibited acts and those selling adulterated goods have a responsibility to 
know the nature and composition of the goods being sold (Paulus, 1974). In theory this provided 
a deterrent and made the law more enforceable because prosecuting inspectors - like their 
workplace safety counterparts above - no longer had to prove mens rea but in reality few were 
convicted and this Act was rarely enforced outside London (Paulus, 1974). However Norrie 
argues that strict liability remains a social and political construct that creates a paradox:  
                                                     
4 The defence of due diligence remains common in environmental health law and typically 





“The ultimate basis of strict liability is a judicial, and more broadly societal, perception 
of who the ‘real criminals’ are and it is this that informs the hazy distinctions between 
‘real’ and ‘quasi’-crime which bedevil the law in this area. Differentiation within the 
law fails because the need for it relies on a pre-existing societal differentiation that the 
law must deny in order to protect its universalistic and formalistic self-image” (Norrie, 
2001 p92).  
 
There is some evidence that strict liability provisions can make officials (Carson, 1970a) and the 
judiciary (Ogus, 2004) more hesitant to sanction offenders, but studies suggest that mens rea 
remains an important factor in the decision making of regulators (Carson 1970b; Hawkins 1984; 
Hutter 1988). Further, legal defences against strict liability continue to incorporate mens rea 
(Carson, 1970a) but the process of assimilation can also lessen the criminality of regulatory 
offences. Here Norrie (2001) argues that using the criminal law to regulate business activities is 
further limited by the challenge of establishing corporate criminal liability; here attempts to 
assimilate the criminal liability of the individual with those of complex organisations are fraught 
with problems. For example linking individual acts to those of the business itself, particularly in 
companies comprising many different structures and legal relationships (e.g. shareholders, 
contractors) can make them hard to sanction, but this section now considers why the discretion 
of regulatory officials is inevitable.    
 
Together all these legal uncertainties confer considerable discretion on officials like EHPs to 
determine whether an offence has been committed and how strictly the law should be enforced. 
By linking the law to the offence Hawkins argues that discretion gives the law its very 
substance and life (1984), but whether or not discretion is problematic is the subject of debate. 
Some consider official discretion necessary but that it should be minimised and subject to 
predetermined rules to ensure accountability and guard against injustice (Hutter, 1988), though 
Lipsky (1980) is sceptical of such controls given the abilities of street-level bureaucrats to 
subvert them! Others prefer broader standards that allow for more flexible interpretations by 
professionals and can accommodate changes in the activities being regulated (Hutter, 1988).  
 
Discretion also extends to the application of criminal sanctions where key studies have found 
they are not intended (by officials) to punish but are applied more as a practical tool towards 
compliance, frequently as a last resort (Hawkins, 1984; Hutter, 1988). One reason for this is that 
studies from the UK (Bartrip and Fenn 1983; Hutter, 1988; Ogus and Abbott 2002) and South 
Africa (Lazarus et al. 1997; Petrie et al. 1992) suggest that sanctions for environmental health 
offences are so low that they cannot deter and could undermine the authority of regulators. 
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The ability of EHPs to influence the law is made more difficult because responsibility for 
regulation has traditionally been fragmented across government departments and agencies 
(Burke et al. 2002; Hutter, 1988). Further, the statutory position of EHPs will also be considered 
because in the UK the duty on local government to appoint EHPs was repealed in 1972, 100 
years after its introduction (Crook, 2007), and replaced by ‘proper officers’ (or similar) who 
may, or may not, include EHPs. Since this time dedicated Environmental Health Departments in 
UK local government have largely disappeared with their functions increasingly undertaken by 
other departments (Burke et al. 2002; Hutter, 1988) or the private sector (Tombs, 2016) and 
potentially further weakens the mandate of EHPs. This section now considers how 
organisational factors can influence regulation.    
 
2.5.4 Local government and its environmental health services  
Seven years after its creation this thesis will explore the emerging structure and organisation of 
environmental health services at the CoJ and how they influence its EHPs. Section 2.5.2 above 
on the regulatory context identified the South African government’s shift towards neoliberal 
macroeconomic policies that is examined further by this thesis. One aspect of this is a 
redefining of the state’s role from ‘rowing to steering’ (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) or leading to 
facilitating the conditions to create development and economic growth (Chipkin, 2002). This 
changing role for government is integral to public service reforms in developing countries 
(Batley and Larbi 2004), where the failure of many governments to deliver basic services to 
poor people has led to policy shifts towards new ways of delivering services jointly with 
markets and civil society (World Bank, 2003).  
 
Part of this failure has been attributed to neoliberal perceptions of traditional/Weberian public 
administration - of which local government EHPs are a classic example - as bloated, inefficient 
and unresponsive (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Tombs, 2016). In response ‘new public 
management’ reforms have transformed public services into results-oriented organisations 
driven by performance measures, incentives and market mechanisms including the contracting-
out or privatization of public services (Hood, 1991; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). How these 
reforms are influencing the CoJ is considered by this thesis, but in Ghana Crook and Ayee 
found that they required greater collaboration between EHPs, the private sector and civil society 
(2006). Pressure was also on EHPs to be more flexible and responsive to public demands, but 
this study and others conclude that these reforms are proving more challenging than envisaged 
(Batley and Larbi 2004) and will take time and skilful political navigation (World Bank, 2003).   
 
Local government itself exerts various controls on its employees that is explored by this thesis. 
The role of policies to direct the behaviour of regulators has long been recognised but their 
influence is questioned by uncertainties including the great breadth of regulatory standards, the 
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impossibility of producing instructions for all situations and the inherent difficulties of 
monitoring front-line officials (Diver, 1980; Lipsky, 1980). These uncertainties are 
characteristic of the world of EHPs, but Hutter (1988) found that internal policies alone had 
limited influence on EHPs though they were more likely to ‘go by the book’ during work (e.g. 
complaints) that is more visible and open to public scrutiny.  
 
Performance management is an important driver of regulation and officials are likely to conform 
when their performance is linked to their actions (Hawkins, 1984; Hutter, 1997) though Hutter 
(1988) found that some EHPs viewed such monitoring a threat to their integrity and 
professionalism and sought to thwart it like Lipsky’s street-level bureaucrats (1980). One survey 
of UK EHPs described their ambivalence to performance management, some recognising it was 
essential but others warning that resources were increasingly based on outputs (e.g. numbers of 
inspections/complaints) and not outcomes (e.g. improved environmental health) (Burke et al. 
2002).  
 
Organisational culture can also influence regulation and important factors included the norms of 
the regulator, peer pressure and perceptions of what constitutes a ‘good’ enforcement officer 
(Hawkins, 1984; Hutter, 1989, 1997; Shover et al. 1986). Echoing the selection of Kaufman’s 
Forest Rangers (1960/2006), Hutter found local government recruited EHPs considered more 
likely to comply with the regulatory strategies and expectations of managers and peers (Hutter, 
1988). Differing organisational priorities are also influential, Hutter and Manning concluding 
that regulation is partly a product of the tensions:  
 
“…between management, with their concern for overall performance, compliance and 
the organisational mandate, middle management whose aim is to control the inspectors 
and their practices, and the inspectors who are inclined to see their task as exercising an 
immediate face-to-face responsibility and resolving culpability on their particular 
‘patch’ or ‘turf’” (1990 p127).  
 
In South Africa itself further organisational factors include restructuring fatigue (Hunt and 
Lewin 2000) and the lack of developmental skills and approaches amongst EHPs and other local 
government officials (Allison, 2002; Lewin et al. 1998) but this section now considers other 
ways that local government can control its officials.   
 
The location of EHPs in local government raises questions about the control of regulators by 
politicians that is explored by this thesis. In theory such democratic control ensures EHPs are 
responsive to public concerns (Hutter, 1988), but studies from Cape Town describe local 
politicians with a poor knowledge of local government and environmental health and suspicious 
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of official power (Allison, 2002; Lewin et al. 1998). Opportunities for political bias are also 
ever present. In the UK for example EHPs feared politicians could divert resources from 
preventative work towards more visible problems like housing (Hutter, 1988). In South Africa 
EHPs believed politicians were largely motivated by ‘vote catching’ (Lewin et al. 1998) and 
party politics (Allison, 2002) and the interventions of politicians connected to businesses in 
Ghana sometimes rendered EHPs powerless to regulate them (Crook and Ayee 2006).   
 
Concerns about the poor resourcing of EHPs date back to the Victorian age (Crook, 2007; 
Hamlin, 2013; Wohl, 1983) and continue in the UK (Burke et al. 2002; Pennington, 2009) and 
South Africa (Balfour-Kaipa, 2007; Eales et al. 2002; Hunt and Lewin 2000; Wright and 
Mathee 2013). One British political scientist even singles this out in his critique of top-down 
environmental health policy making to question whether it is little more than symbolic: 
   
“Parliament may relatively easily pass laws allowing the control of certain activities or 
the provision of certain services whilst not providing the resources to make action 
possible. Relatively small teams of local environmental health officials, for example, 
have to cope with a mountain of legislation designed to protect the public from many 
potential hazards in restaurants, shops etc.” (Hill, 2005 p180)  
 
Resource shortages are hard to link directly to regulation but studies describe regulators with 
limited resources deciding to focus on those considered higher risk (Gunningham, 1974; Hutter, 
1988). Limited resources can also give less time for persuasive approaches (e.g. education, 
negotiation), but EHPs were also wary that short term educational failures could result in more 
costly long term legal action (Hutter, 1988). Therefore this thesis will explore the resourcing of 
local government EHPs, but this section now completes the governance model in Figure 2.2 by 
considering the relationships between regulators and the regulated. 
 
2.5.5 The backgrounds and views of EHPs 
This section moves towards the centre of Figure 2.2 to explore how the backgrounds of officials 
and their personal and professional views can influence regulation. The influence of gender is 
largely unexplored by the key studies, but studies describe a majority of male EHPs in local 
government in the UK (Hutter, 1988) and Johannesburg (Mathee et al. 1999). Crook and Ayee 
(2006) judged female EHPs in two Ghanaian cities to be better negotiators but this did not 
necessarily lead to closer relationships with the regulated because female EHPs considered 
themselves more authoritarian than their male colleagues.  
 
Amongst the white male EHPs in Hutter’s (1988) study problems of language and culture were 
identified when regulating ethnic groups, but these groups were generally tolerated and EHPs 
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took steps to avoid accusations of prejudice. The South African context is very different, but 
McDonald (1997) described white male local government officials in Cape Town with little 
awareness of the environmental health problems in poorer areas amidst a culture of ‘victim 
blaming’. Three years later Cape Town EHPs were more positive about their developmental role 
but remained uncertain about their role in poorer areas (Lewin et al. 1998).   
 
Education and experience are also potentially important. Hawkins (1984) observed no practical 
differences between young and old UK officials in the field, but the younger and more educated 
viewed their work as an unproblematic ‘scientific endeavour’ and were more committed to more 
punitive approaches; in contrast their older, less educated, colleagues valued their experience 
and considered their work to be more about ‘common sense’ and ‘managing personal 
relationships’ and they sometimes thought their younger colleagues were officious. Similarly 
Crook and Ayee (2006) found younger Ghanaian EHPs were the least committed to more 
persuasive strategies, but in contrast to Hawkins’ inspectors these young EHPs were generally 
the worst educated. Significant experiences like serious cases could result in what Hutter (1997) 
described as inspectors’ ‘hobby horses’ where they focus on specific areas or refer to past cases 
to persuade the regulated to comply.  
 
Officials own perceptions of their roles are particularly important and UK studies generally 
found that regulators considered their primary role to be securing legal compliance, not 
punishing offenders (Carson, 1970b; Hawkins, 1984; Hutter, 1988; Richardson et al. 1983). For 
them compliance was not an end in itself, more a means towards improving environmental 
health. Some regulators, including EHPs, even considered prosecution a failure because 
persuasion was their ‘natural inclination’ (Hutter, 1988; Richardson et al. 1983). EHPs typically 
distanced their approaches from the police and saw themselves as experts, not law enforcers, 
delivering services by advising and educating (Hutter, 1988) and such views date back to the 
Victorian era (Crook 2007; Hamlin, 2013; Wilson, 1881). Further, EHPs frequently associated 
their role with solving problems and many saw themselves as guardians of their local districts 
though, in contrast to central government regulators (Hawkins, 1984; Kelman, 1981), few 
exhibited a sense of mission or considered the wider impacts of their work beyond the costs to 
individual businesses (Hutter, 1988).  
 
A common feature to all the key studies and others (Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno 2000) is the influence of moral judgments on the regulatory process. Hutter (1988) 
found that EHPs made constant moral judgments about the regulated, though they denied this, 
and were more willing to help the worthy/deserving (e.g. the hard working or honest) and take 
more punitive action against those considered morally culpable. Further, Hutter argues that such 
‘reasonable’ decision making is the hallmark of regulation and gives EHPs a pragmatic response 
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to situations not necessarily perceived by society as wrong or criminal and where the 
cooperation of the regulated is needed. Similarly, Bardach and Kagan describe the ‘good 
inspector’ as someone who is “willing and able to use the coercive tools of the law when 
necessary, but willing and intellectually able to make sensible compromises that avoid 
regulatory unreasonableness and elicit cooperation” (2006 p xi).    
 
The backgrounds of local government EHPs as professionals also have the potential to influence 
how they regulate environmental health. In his 1842 Report Chadwick raised concerns about the 
failure of local authorities to enact existing sanitary laws and partly blamed their incompetent, 
biased officials (Chadwick, 1842/1965). A more sympathetic historian describes the “poorly 
paid and lowly figure” of the early 19th century urban inspector of nuisance who rarely remained 
in post for long (Brimblecombe, 2003 p124). By the 1880s Wohl describes how some 
employers still thought ‘a man endowed with common sense’ had all the training necessary to 
be an EHP (1983), but this period also saw their gradual professionalization. Since 1876 
professional organisations have become important for publicising environmental health and 
representing their members’ interests (Crook, 2007) and continue to fulfill this role today.  
 
Evidence for the influence of professional expectations on regulation is mixed (Meidinger, 
1987) but one UK professional organisation has long preferred persuasive approaches:  
 
“Some [inspectors] went with the threat of legal proceedings in their mouth, and did not 
attempt to explain why certain work had to be done, and if they acted in this way they 
set up the backs of people, and did not get the work carried out to the satisfaction of the 
authority. It was far better that people should be taught by inspectors the reasons why 
different work had to be done, and to persuade them to carry out the principles 
necessary for the removal of nuisances and infectious disease. It was far better for them 
to do the work willingly, and look upon the sanitary inspector as their friend rather than 
as a prying, intolerant autocrat who would force down their throats the principles of 
sanitation whether they liked it or not” (Address of the President of the Sanitary 
Inspectors Association in 1890 in Crook, 2007 p387).  
 
“[w]hilst legal proceedings are often necessary it must be remembered that much of the 
improvement to man’s environment and quality of life results from the patient, 
painstaking, persuasive efforts of Environmental Health Officers through measures of 
environmental health education” (Institute of Environmental Health Officers in Hutter, 




“…local regulators would prefer to prioritise this approach [education and advice] over 
enforcement” (CIEH, 2009).  
 
Professional organisations also remain influential in setting and regulating the professional 
standards of EHPs. The first examinations for EHPs were in 1877 (Brimblecombe, 2003) and in 
the UK there has been a gradual transition from a diploma to a graduate profession since the 
1970s which is happening in South Africa today. Environmental health law and its enforcement 
continues to be central to the education of EHPs (CIEH, 2007; Wilson, 1881) and this thesis 
will explore the education and training of EHPs in this area. Wider concerns about education 
and training include the challenges of balancing knowledge (e.g. breadth, depth) with practical 
experience (Brimblecombe, 2003; CIEH, 2007).  
 
These concerns inform professional debates about whether EHPs should work in their 
traditional, generalist roles or more specialized roles. For example Hutter (1988) was concerned 
about the generalist education of EHPs, particularly how few opportunities for more specialist 
training left them ill equipped for the increasingly complex problems they faced (1988). Further, 
the need for increasing expertise had forced some departments to appoint increasingly specialist 
EHPs or other technical staff. This generalist/specialist debate continues (e.g. Burke et al 2002) 
but recent evidence from the UK suggests that cuts to local authority budgets are forcing 
specialist EHPs to work as generalists to maintain basic service levels (Tombs, 2016).  
 
Professional power has also long been a concern of policy analysis (Parsons, 1995). Lipsky 
describes how professions can be reluctant to criticise fellow professionals, tend to seek out 
higher status clients and favour financially rewarding specialties to the neglect of low-income 
groups to whom they respond in controlling or manipulative ways (1980). Chambers likens this 
to a “professional prison” where status, power and promotion come less from direct contact with 
the complexities of people and more from the “reductionist, controlled, simplified and 
quantified construction which becomes reality for the isolated professional” (1997 p55). In 
South Africa for example Huchzermeyer (2001) has expressed concern that housing policy is 
dominated by a local technocratic elite that fits the delivery-driven political agenda but side-
lines social movements and dominates the definition of illegality or informality.  
 
Lastly, the views of EHPs about regulation are also important. Hutter (1988) found they were 
largely untrained in the law and did not recognise the uncertainties described in section 2.5.3 
above nor consider their work in terms of the power structures of society. She attributes this to 
their education and a practical culture that does not encourage reflection on the ideology of 
regulation where arguably deliberate legal uncertainties were instead perceived as ‘quirks’ of 
the law and/or practical problems to be solved. Most EHPs thought at least some offences could 
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be considered crimes and their opinions about them concurred with the sociological 
explanations in section 2.5.3 above that associated criminality with more traditional criminal 
motivations.  
 
Front line officials valued the threat of prosecution towards achieving compliance (see section 
2.5.3 above) but Hutter (1988) found that even experienced EHPs rarely made court 
appearances. Many of these EHPs feared unsympathetic magistrates and were concerned they 
were too lenient or even biased because they were businessmen themselves. The impartiality of 
magistrates has been questioned since Victorian times (Bartrip and Fenn 1983; Paulus, 1974), 
but in the UK magistrates themselves have recognised their limited knowledge of environmental 
health crimes (Magistrates Association, 2009).      
 
Most environmental health prosecutions in the UK result in convictions (Hutter, 1988) because 
only the most serious and watertight cases are submitted to the public scrutiny of the courts 
(Hawkins, 1984; Ogus and Abbot 2002). But officials have long been concerned that the low 
fines could provide an inadequate deterrent that undermines their authority (Bartrip and Fenn, 
1983; Hutter, 1988) and similar concerns have been raised in South Africa (Lazarus et al. 1997; 
Petrie et al. 1992). In the UK others have criticized the criminal justice system for providing 
little incentive for compliance when fines are so low, offending so profitable (Hampton, 2005; 
Ogus and Abbott 2002) and the chances of detection so remote (Tombs and Whyte 2007).  
 
Crook and Ayee (2006) found that Ghanaian EHPs could summon offenders to court within 48 
hours where they were certain to receive fines of the equivalent of £12-20. This earned EHPs 
the nickname ‘Samman-Samman’ (‘Summons-Summons’) and an apathetic, sometimes hostile, 
public, but regulation could also lead to powerful local politicians requesting that offenders be 
excused. Therefore this thesis will therefore also explore the views and experiences of EHPs 
with the criminal justice system, but this section now returns to external factors to considers the 
influence of relations between EHPs and the regulated.    
 
2.5.6 Relationships with the regulated  
This section starts by reviewing how officials characterise the regulated before exploring other 
factors that can influence these relationships. The character of the regulated exerts an important 
influence on regulation and in section 2.4.2 above Kagan and Scholz (1984) argued that 
regulators should respond flexibly depending on whether businesses behaved as amoral 
calculators, political citizens or the organizationally incompetent. But they also warned that 
these categorisations lack predictive power, are not mutually exclusive and should be applied on 
a case by case basis. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) further caution that regulatory actors are 
constantly changing ‘multiple selves’. For example businesses “are bundles of contradictory 
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commitments to values of economic rationality, law abidingness, and business responsibility”, 
whilst regulators can be “nice guys or tough guys, self-interested or public-spirited, professional 
or unprofessional, diligent or lazy, intelligent or confused” (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992 p31).  
 
Other important factors for officials include the moral, legal and economic mandate for 
compliance, the reasons for non-compliance (e.g. cost, negligence) (Hawkins and Hutter 1993) 
and the regulatory history of a business (Hawkins, 1984). In the UK local government EHPs 
considered most offenders to be organisationally incompetent with only a small minority 
considered amoral calculators (Hutter, 1988). Occupation is also a factor, with uncooperative 
and/or dishonest behaviours most often associated with scrap metal merchants, second hand car 
salesmen (Hutter, 1997), street vendors and a few landlords (Hutter, 1988). In contrast, those in 
more skilled or professional jobs were considered more likely to be compliant (Hutter, 1997).  
 
These typologies are predicted to apply in Johannesburg, but studies of South African cities 
suggest that issues of ethnicity and culture are also important. In early 1994 some white local 
government officials in Cape Town commented that ‘those people’ (Black Africans and 
Coloureds) do not understand environmental issues because of their ‘culture’ (McDonald, 
1997). A few years later another Cape Town official explained that local government had to 
“culture people that this is their area” because people were responsible for maintaining their 
own environments (Groeter in Allison, 2002 p1547). Similarly, Hunt and Lewin (2000) found 
Cape Town EHPs described communities as lazy and responsible for their poor environmental 
health, but these communities in turn considered government to be corrupt and inefficient!  
 
In Johannesburg these characterizations are similar to Beall et al.’s (2000b) villains of the urban 
poor and typical of the amoral calculator. But in accordance with the ‘multiple selves’ 
argument, many could also be considered victims (Beall et al. 2000b), the organisationally 
incompetent products of South Africa’s complex history and persistent inequalities. Similarly, 
returning to Barnes (2007) analysis of the 2005 Delmas typhoid outbreak in section 2.5.2 above 
reveals its victims, still reliant on basic services (e.g. bucket latrines) a decade after democracy, 
and villains whose ‘poor hygiene’ was to blame and who protested when promised 
improvements never materialized.    
 
Beall et al. (2000b) also identify the fixers participating in community based environmental 
management and paying for municipal services. Indeed, McGranahan (2007) argues that EHPs 
should not see their role as to regulate but to work with groups like this already improving urban 
environmental health and the South African Cities Network (SACN, 2006) uses a case from 
Johannesburg that suggests this is happening already. Here a CoJ EHP describes a villainous 
township goat trader keeping livestock ‘illegally’ and causing complaints etc. but who is also a 
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victim because of the traditions of keeping and slaughtering animals in cities. But by leasing 
land in an old industrial area nearby the township the trader has become a fixer.    
 
The nature of the relationship between the regulator and regulated is also important. Black’s 
relational distance hypothesis argues that the greater the distance between parties in dispute, the 
greater the likelihood that the law will be used to settle the dispute (Black in Hutter, 1989 
pp169-70). This distance can be reduced by longer term relationships (Hawkins, 1984), more 
frequent inspections (Hutter and Hawkins 1993) and the regulatory context. For example Hutter 
found that urban EHPs adopted more formal approaches than rural EHPs because they worked 
in more anonymous settings and were not closely integrated into the community (Hutter, 1988). 
This bred a suspicion and distrust of the regulated, until proven otherwise, and the belief that 
more punitive approaches, instead of education, were the best response to offending and the 
literature on Johannesburg suggests a high relational distance for its EHPs.  
 
The size of the business could be important, where regulators sometimes considered large 
businesses more compliant and socially responsible (Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986; Hawkins, 
1984). The practicalities of inspecting large businesses and the need for information also 
potentially favour more persuasive approaches (Hutter, 1997; Shover et al. 1986), but others 
argue that larger companies also have greater capacity to challenge officials and shape 
regulation in their interests (Bernstein, 1955; Carson, 1979; Yeager, 1991). In contrast, smaller 
businesses are often unclear about the law and limit their activities to those indicated by the 
inspector (Fairman and Yapp 2005a; Genn, 1993). Such problems can be compounded by large 
numbers of SMEs lacking resources (Gunningham, 2002; Coleman, 1997), particularly in the 
informal sector (SBP, 2004). Hutter (1988) found that EHPs did not behave differently when 
regulating smaller or larger businesses, but others describe regulators expecting smaller 
businesses to be uncooperative and focused only on profit (Hawkins, 1984; Yeager, 1991).  
 
The regulator’s perceptions of the ability of a business to comply are also important, where 
good levels of compliance and staff awareness suggest a responsible company and vice-versa 
(Hutter, 1997). The costs of compliance are also important and based on the officer’s subjective 
assessment of whether compliance would demand an unacceptable economic burden (Hawkins, 
1984). Some EHPs thought public health was paramount and people should not run a business if 
they cannot afford to, but most wanted to encourage businesses and were more likely to be 
flexible towards small traders, new businesses or during periods of recession (Hutter, 1988).  
The nature of offending is also important, particularly the severity of the offence and its 
potential to harm people (Carson, 1970b; Hawkins, 1984; Hutter, 1988, 1997). Moral 
considerations were also critical (see section 2.5.4 above), with behaviours associated with 




Bribery is another important influence on regulation. Diver (1980) reflects that offences could 
be under reported when the costs of paying an inspector to ignore an offence are less than 
achieving compliance or the inspector has been captured, but Reisman’s typology helps explain 
why EHPs are particularly vulnerable: 
   
 Transaction bribes - paid to get an official to use their discretion with greater speed; 
 Variance bribes - paid to stop an official applying a rule on the bribe giver, they are 
generally more dangerous for the official and thus more expensive; and  
 Outright purchase bribes - involve the capture of the official who appears to remain 
loyal to the regulator but favours the briber’s interests (Reisman in Perry, 2000). 
      
The hidden nature of bribery makes it hard to determine but reports of corrupt EHPs date back 
to Victorian times (Crook, 2007) and in 1988 nearly half New York City’s food EHPs were 
arrested for accepting variance bribes (Leff, 1988). Further, Leff (one of the whistle blowing 
EHPs) commented that poor salaries made his colleagues more susceptible and warned that a 
“city that underpays its municipal employees is likely to be a corrupt city” (1988 p45). In 
Nigeria the corrupt EHP is immortalized in a Ken Saro-Wiwa (1995) short story whilst in 
neighbouring Ghana the public regularly offered bribes but EHPs did not have a reputation for 
accepting them (Crook and Ayee 2006). The authors thought the public nature of regulation and 
the willingness of the public to complain about EHPs, in contrast to the police, could explain 
this. In South Africa small businesses (SBP, 2004; CDE, 2007) described problems with corrupt 
local government officials that will be investigated by this thesis.  
 
2.6 Existing gaps in the literature  
Chapter 1 defined environmental health and described how environment-health relationships 
and their management have shaped and been shaped by societies over the centuries. Into the 21st 
century environmental health remains a complex, persistent and wicked problem, particularly 
for cities like Johannesburg. Local government EHPs are therefore potentially well placed given 
their responsibilities for bringing the South African Constitution to life by enforcing protective 
environmental health laws that could make cities more productive, inclusive, sustainable and 
better governed. But EHPs also find themselves based in organisations and using laws 
undergoing significant change, whilst the public remains suspicious and sometimes hostile 
towards them. It’s in our best interests to learn more about this, hence the main research 




This chapter developed a model of governance to answer this question. It started by defining 
environmental health regulation as one form of social regulation of the market in the public 
interest, whilst acknowledging that the state - as environmental health regulator - can act as both 
a protector and repressor of environmental health. The literature then described how the work of 
EHPs is inherently that of a bureaucratic interventionist and surveillance state, but this thesis 
instead argues that viewing their work as governance better captures the complex structures, 
processes and relationships that together describe how they regulate environmental health. A 
model of governance was created in Figure 2.2 for this with responsive regulation at its core that 
combines both persuasive AND punitive strategies to regulation. This was embedded within a 
wider framework of governance to explore the complex and interacting factors known to 
influence environmental health regulation.  
 
Key studies from the UK and other Northern countries suggest that the regulatory context, the 
law itself, local government, the views and background of EHPs and their relations with the 
regulated can all influence how EHPs regulate environmental health. Further, these factors often 
suggest a preference for persuasive regulatory approaches. This review was supported by the 
limited literature on EHPs from other African countries, including South Africa, but this thesis 
aims to fill this gap with an in-depth case study of the CoJ’s EHPs. This thesis will therefore 
contribute to improving our understanding of the work of local government EHPs in urban 
South Africa and, more broadly, our understanding of environmental health regulation as 
governance.  
 
2.7 Research aim and objectives 
This thesis originated in the question: how do the EHPs of the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality regulate environmental health? The aim of this thesis was to describe 
and explain how these EHPs regulate environmental health via three objectives:  
 
 to develop a model that illustrates how CoJ EHPs regulate environmental health  
 to explore and analyse the factors that influence how CoJ EHPs regulate  
 to make recommendations for policy   
  
In the next chapter the methods developed to answer this question, the aim and objectives are 
explained in detail. 
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Chapter 3 Methods   
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the research design developed to answer the main research question: how 
do CoJ EHPs regulate environmental health? The chapter begins by introducing the 
epistemology and strategic approach of this thesis before detailing the case study design, 
including the measures taken to maximise data quality. The methods of data analysis are then 
described and the chapter ends with reflections on the case study in practice. The author is 
grateful to the Development Partnerships in Higher Education (DelPHE) programme of the UK 
government’s Department for International Development who part funded the fieldwork as part 
of an urban EH project with the University of Johannesburg, the Medical Research Council of 
South Africa and London South Bank University.   
 
3.2 Relativist epistemology and the case study strategy 
Informed by the theoretical framework developed in Chapters 1 and 2 this thesis takes a 
relativist epistemological position. This recognises there are multiple, complex realities which 
can be experienced and reflects the aim of this research to describe these realities as experienced 
by CoJ EHPs. For example this thesis rejects simplistic descriptions of regulation as a process in 
which criminal offences are detected and then acted upon by EHPs; instead it argues that   
offences and compliance are constructed in the field by EHPs and are influenced by the constant 
interactions (as governance) between many factors including the regulatory context, the views 
of EHPs themselves, relations between EHPs and the regulated, organisational controls and 
legal uncertainties. This relativist position also recognises the subjectivity of the author who is 
not independent of the researched (see section 3.5.2 below). The term case study does not refer 
here to the study of a single object but is used to describe the strategic research approach of this 
thesis (Verschuren, 2003). As a research strategy Yin (2003) explains that the case study 
provides a holistic approach for investigating real life events to understand these complex social 
phenomena. The regulation of environmental health by CoJ EHPs is one such phenomenon and 
the case study strategy provides an approach for describing and managing its complexity.  
 
3.3 The case study design 
 
3.3.1 A multiple-case, holistic design 
This case study is based on a multiple-case, holistic design (Yin, 2003) developed around the 
unit of analysis, the street-level CoJ EHP. A multiple case design was chosen because each EHP 
produces independent data and conclusions, therefore direct replication by the investigation of 
ten case-EHPs will produce more powerful conclusions than a single case. The literature review 
in section 2.5 above describes how the decisions of EHPs can vary for predictable reasons, with 
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theoretical replication across ten cases providing greater external generalizability than for a 
single case (Yin, 2003). A holistic design was chosen because the case study focused on street-
level EHPs only and not their managers, the regulated or other actors that would be 
characteristic of an embedded design. Further, the socio-legal framework that informed this 
design is itself holistic because it considers theoretical perspectives from disciplines including 
history, the law, political science and sociology and how these shape the governance model 
developed in Chapter 2 above.    
 
3.3.2 Pilot studies in London and Ekurhuleni   
The design of this case study was informed by two pilot studies in one London local authority 
over November and December 2005 and in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (which 
borders the CoJ) in June and July 2006. Each pilot study was structured around the methods 
used in Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s (2000, 2003) studies of street-level policy 
implementation. For example each began with negotiating access to potential pilot EHPs via 
senior managers that the author knew were interested in research and therefore might be willing 
to participate. Briefings were then held with senior managers to introduce the pilot study and 
request permission, the written summaries of which became Appendix A in the main study. 
Permission was granted immediately in both pilot studies, though the author was wary that this 
might not happen in the main study as he did not know the CoJ senior managers very well.  
 
Next, following Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s (2000, 2003) methods, meetings were 
arranged with  street-level EHPs in their local offices who were then briefed on the pilot study 
using a summary that became Appendix B in the main study. This stage included the need to 
define the sample population, section 3.3.3 below explaining why street-level EHPs were 
selected as the unit of analysis. During these pilot briefings the author requested the 
participation of only two or three volunteers, but in both London and Ekurhuleni there were 
only two volunteers anyway out of 11 and 12 potential EHPs respectively. The author did not 
know why so few EHPs were interested, but during observation the four volunteers said they 
had noticed this too and suggested to the author that their colleagues may be too busy to 
participate. When this happened during the main study (see section 3.3.3 below) it was therefore 
not unexpected. The four pilot EHPs were based in regional offices and were then approached 
individually to complete individual consent forms that became Appendix C in the main study.  
 
Before data collection started, after Yin (2003) a case study protocol was developed to guide the 
data collection process alongside a database to archive data in physical and electronic formats. 
Following Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s (2000, 2003) methods, the author began pilot data 
collection by arranging one day of observation with each pilot EHP. In London observation 
included the inspection of houses in multiple occupation and the investigation of related 
56 
 
complaints (e.g. mould, noise); in Ekurhuleni observations included the inspection of food 
premises and crèches, particularly those in the informal sector. Starting with observation 
enabled the author to get to know each pilot EHP and the routine aspects of their work, whilst 
giving insights into their areas and daily challenges. For example regulating the informal sector 
became a significant factor in the main study (see section 7.7 below). Further, the pilots 
provided vital experience of observation techniques as described in section 3.3.5.1 below. These 
included the importance of avoiding involvement, where possible, in regulatory encounters and 
trying to remain impartial, themes that recurred during the main study (see section 3.5.2 below).                   
    
The author then conducted semi-structured interviews with the four pilot EHPs in their regional 
offices. These were structured to explore the model of governance in Figure 2.2 and emerging 
themes from the literature review and followed a protocol that became Appendix F with very 
few further changes, apart from a greater emphasis on the socio-legal aspects of regulation as 
explained in section 2.4.1 above. These pilot interviews gave the author important interviewing 
experience, particularly around timing, and basic challenges like finding quiet areas in busy 
regional offices and interviewing EHPs with limited time amidst constant interruptions. These 
experiences informed the main study as described in section 3.3.5.2 below.          
 
The story method described in section 3.3.5.3 below was developed during the two pilot studies, 
based on Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s (2003) methods. The four pilot EHPs each 
contributed two stories that provided important data on the regulatory process, particularly the 
influence of morality on decision making that became a separate theme in the main study (see 
section 7.6 below). The Ekurhuleni stories mainly focused on the challenges of regulating the 
informal sector and informed section 7.7 below. However, the pilot study also revealed that 
whilst EHPs had many stories about their work, recording them required time and 
encouragement. At the end of the Ekurhuleni pilot this led the author to revisit his case study 
protocol and timetable to make contingency plans for the main CoJ case study that were later 
realized when stories were dropped from the main study because data collection was running 
behind schedule (see section 3.3.5.3).  
 
The last pilot data collection method involved the completion of multiple choice questionnaires 
that were largely unchanged from Part II of Appendix I. These questions were adapted from 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s (2003) own questionnaire to explore factors in the decision 
making process, particularly EHPs’ own views of their work, legal and organizational factors 
and their relations with the regulated. The answers provided useful general insights into these 
factors for comparison with interview and observation data, particularly surrounding the routine 
elements of work and views on pay and managers for example. Due to inexperience the author 
was reluctant to tailor more of the questionnaire to better reflect the work of EHPs and therefore 
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the generic nature of some questions (e.g. ‘rules and procedures’ in questions 7 to 11) somewhat 
limited their value. Completion of the questionnaires also involved timetabling further meetings 
with the four pilot EHPs. By this stage the author was becoming increasingly wary of how long 
pilot data collection alone was taking. Indeed, with hindsight, in section 9.7 the author argues 
that if repeating the main study he would extend the observation period and interviews 
(incorporating vignettes) and not attempt the story method or questionnaires. Though both 
worked, there wasn’t the time available given the busy schedules of EHPs.  
 
Documents relevant to the study were also collected during the pilots in London and 
Ekurhuleni, particularly legislation, organizational policies and procedures and examples of the 
regulatory paperwork produced by EHPs during their work. For Ekurhuleni particularly this 
provided a guide to what documents might be available during the main study and potential 
themes to look out for. Important examples from Ekurhuleni including their continued reliance 
on apartheid era legislation, as their new Public Health By-laws were still being drafted, and the 
absence of legislation and wider guidance for regulating the informal sector. Both these themes 
were important in the main study, see sections 5.2 and 7.7 respectively.   
 
The two pilot studies also developed the analytical framework for the thesis and provided 
experience of writing up the case studies. No quantitative data were collected during the pilots, 
but in accordance with Miles and Huberman (1994) the qualitative data for each pilot EHP were 
subject to thematic analysis (see section 3.4 below) and individual reports written. Following 
Yin’s (2003) case study approach, these reports were reviewed by the four pilot EHPs with any 
comments and corrections made. Very few were received other than clarifications of the text, 
but the author knows that one London pilot EHP continues to refer to his report to this day, 
particularly when asked to describe his work by managers and other researchers. Each pilot 
EHP report was then compared to their colleague’s and the Figure 2.2 model of governance 
developed in Chapter 2 before final reports were drafted for the two pilots.  
 
These final pilot stages also warned the author of the time needed for analysis and writing up 
whereby the author knew that time for analysis during main study data collection in South 
Africa would be very limited. Wider learning from the pilot included the development of a 
coding framework that became the start codes for the main study based around the themes/sub-
themes of the Figure 2.2 model of governance which was later expanded by the main study. The 
overlaps between many themes/sub-themes also informed the development of Figure 2.2’s 
overlapping structure, whereby one regulatory decision could be informed by many different 
factors. The author also experimented with the use of QSR’s NVIVO coding software during this 
period, but later chose to stick with manual coding using MS Word and Excel documents.    
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Overall, though the results of the pilot studies were not used in the main case study, the lessons 
learned during the two pilot studies informed every stage of the main case study design and the 
development of the final model of governance in Figure 4.1 below. The pilot process also 
informed the decision to expand the theoretical framework of the thesis as explained in section 
2.4.1 above, though the methods used were very similar to the pilots apart for a greater 
emphasis on the legal aspects of regulation during data collection. This chapter now returns to 
the main case study design to describe how potential case EHPs were defined and accessed.  
 
3.3.3 Accessing and identifying potential EHP cases 
The street-level CoJ EHP was selected as the unit of analysis for four reasons. The author’s 
initial interest was prompted by his own background as an EHP and is explored further in 
section 3.5.2 below. Chapters 1 and 2 above reviewed the many complex environmental health 
problems in South African cities and how local government EHPs are potentially well 
positioned in response, but little is known about how they regulate environmental health. By 
selecting the EHPs of one city the research scope was narrowed to provide a manageable unit of 
analysis within the budget available. Lastly, managers were excluded from the unit of analysis 
because they are not responsible for specific areas, though the flexible case study design 
enabled some to be interviewed to further explore emerging themes.    
 
The first step involved gaining access to the Environmental Health Sub-directorate and the 
regional offices where EHPs are based. This started during pilot study work in June 2006 when 
the author met with a CoJ Regional EH Manager and the Deputy Director of EH (DD-EH). 
Following this the author sent Dr Refik Bismilla, Executive Director of the CoJ Department of 
Health, a research proposal summary and request for permission to conduct research which was 
approved on 01 November 2006 along with a request that the DD-EH co-ordinate the research.  
 
In January 2007 the author met again with the Regional EH Manager, now promoted to 
Assistant Director – Resources (AD-Res), to ask his advice on the next steps towards accessing 
CoJ EHPs. This led to a successful request to the DD-EH to attend the next Regional EH 
Manager’s meeting on 23 February 2007. During this meeting the author presented a briefing 
(see Appendix A) to the nine Managers present who all agreed in principle to participate in the 
research. The author then contacted seven of the nine Regional EH Managers to arrange 
meetings at their offices. Of the other two Managers, one was on holiday at the time and the 
other did not return the author’s calls or emails. Four of the seven Managers confirmed 
appointments to meet with the author, but the author was unable to make further contact with 
the other three. The author decided not to pursue them further because at least one of these 
managers was known to be busy moving regional offices and therefore probably unlikely to 
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want any additional pressures. The four interested Managers also provided potential access to 
more than 50 EHPs and their offices were accessible to the author.   
 
The meetings with the four Regional EH Managers reviewed their briefing once again before 
the author asked whether the Manager would allow their EHPs to participate in the research. 
Three meetings were also attended by one or more Operations Managers and though all present 
were willing to participate they also expressed some concerns. All were concerned about how 
much time the methods would take their EHPs and mentioned the pressures of performance 
targets they were under. The author explained that the methods would be structured around the 
EHPs’ diaries and he gave time estimates based on the two pilot studies. Two managers were 
also concerned that their regions were not representative of Johannesburg, particularly the inner 
city region. The author reiterated the rationale for the multiple case design, particularly how it 
does not seek to be representative of all CoJ EHPs but is grounded in theories of how EHPs 
regulate and seeks to replicate these across the case-EHPs selected. Two managers also did not 
want their EHPs to see this study as a ‘moaning session’ which the author noted. At the end of 
these meetings all managers granted permission for the research and arrangements were made to 
visit their EHPs.  
 
One week later the author gave briefings (Appendix B) to the street-level EHPs in three regional 
offices and answered their questions about the study which, like their managers, mostly related 
to the time the methods would take. Operations Managers in Regions B and D1 also attended 
these briefings but their presence did not seem to influence proceedings and one later expressed 
regret that she did not fit the case criteria. After Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003), at the 
end of each meeting the EHPs were asked to consider whether they wanted to participate in this 
research as a regional office to ensure they accepted the author’s presence even if they did not 
want to participate as cases. All gave this permission and when fieldwork started the author also 
obtained verbal consent from managers and others (e.g. licensing officers, pest controllers and 
administrators) that worked there. All were very welcoming and interested in his research and 
wider views of Johannesburg and South Africa.  
 
The author returned to the three regional offices the following week to request the participation 
of EHPs. In Regions B and F2 the author visited every potential case-EHP and asked if they 
would be willing to participate as individuals. Willing EHPs were asked to read and sign the 
consent form (Appendix C) which also reminded them of the voluntary and confidential nature 
of the research and their right to withdraw at any time without reason. In Region D1 only two of 
the 10 potential case-EHPs were willing to participate and both presented themselves to the 
author on his next visit. In Region F2 only four out of 12 potential EHPs were willing to 
participate, but in Region B eight of the 14 potential EHPs gave their consent.  
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The author was initially concerned that relatively few EHPs agreed to participate, though this 
was not entirely unexpected. At the planning stage the AD-Res consulted recommended that 
there shouldn’t be too much emphasis on asking EHPs to participate because the Executive 
Director had given his permission. EHPs were not asked why they did not want to participate, 
but some willingly provided explanations. For example one was about to go on maternity leave, 
two were about to go on holidays but most - including some new starters at the CoJ - explained 
that they were too busy to participate. One Region F2 Operations Manager was surprised that 
any of his EHPs had volunteered given their heavy workloads!  
 
In inner city Region F1 this briefing and consent process was very different. The Regional EH 
Manager there explained in his first meeting that some of his areas were dangerous and 
therefore he wanted the author to accompany only experienced EHPs whose work he knew and 
trusted. The author did not argue because these EHPs fit the case definition and factors 
including experience and manager relationships were being investigated. The author also trusted 
the Manager’s judgement and knew that rejecting it would have stopped research there 
immediately. The Manager pre-selected six EHPs and during their first meeting with the author 
in the Manager’s office all six were willing to participate in the research and wanted to confirm 
observation dates immediately. The Manager was working nearby within earshot of the meeting 
and therefore the author postponed requesting written consent until he could approach the EHPs 
individually. When the author did so four were still willing to participate and signed the consent 
form but one did not wish to participate and the other was off sick.    
 
3.3.4 Selecting individual EHP cases from the four regional offices  
Until the end of 2006 CoJ EHPs worked from 11 regional offices across Johannesburg but in 
early 2007 fieldwork coincided with the re-organisation of the CoJ into seven regions (A to G) 
as summarised in Fig. 3.1below. Four out of nine regional offices were initially selected due to 
the willingness of their Regional EH Managers to participate in this study and their accessibility 
to the author, but the author also checked with the AD-Res that these four offices covered the 
breadth of environmental health in Johannesburg. He confirmed that the four offices covered 
were very different areas in developmental terms but together covered most of Johannesburg’s 
diverse environmental health. For example Region B (formerly Regions 3 & 4) included highly 
developed residential areas and retail centres in the Northern Suburbs alongside some townships 
and informal settlements. Region D1 (formerly 6) covered the western part of Soweto and was 
dominated by residential townships, with some informal settlements and new retail centers. 
Region F1 (formerly 8) covered the inner city and its many businesses and residential areas, 












In accordance with the multiple case study design the EHP cases were selected for their 
replication potential. In Region B and F2 offices five EHP cases were selected from a possible 
12 following observations of their work and comparing these to the theoretical framework and 
considering its potential for replication. For example those selected included a new starter to the 
CoJ (B1), the CoJ’s most experienced EHP (B4) and a White female EHP (F2B). In Region D1 
the only two EHPs that volunteered were selected to enable replication in this township region. 
In inner city Region F1 office the author withdrew from observation (see section 3.5.3) but four 
front line EHPs pre-selected by their manager initially agreed to participate in the other 
methods, though one (F1A) later withdrew.  
 
After Yin (2003), two forms of replication logic were applied to the multiple case study design. 
For literal replication similar results were predicted because all cases were CoJ EHPs, regulating 
using the same laws and subject to similar organisational controls. The multiple case design thus 
enabled comparison between two or more case-EHPs in each region and between the four 
regional offices. The design was also based on theoretical replication by applying the model of 
governance developed in Chapter 2, the author predicting some differences between how EHPs 
regulate particularly due to factors like their relations with the regulated.  
 
3.3.5 Methods of data collection 
All data collection was conducted by the author himself to maintain quality and stay on budget. 
The methods used were informed by the key studies in Table 2.1 and others reviewed in Chapter 
2 and were largely qualitative in nature, apart from limited quantitative performance 
management data. The criteria of validity and reliability also informed this selection as 
explained below. Five methods were developed to answer the main research question and meet 
the aim and objectives of the research (see section 2.7). As summarised in Figure 3.2 below, 
each method collected data from across the governance model of regulation created by this 
thesis in Figure 2.2 above. For example data were collected that describe the regulatory 
strategies of CoJ EHPs (the centre of Fig.3.2 below - see results Chapter 4) and explore the 
factors influencing this process relating to the regulatory context (see results section 4.6), legal 
and organizational factors (see results Chapter 5), the backgrounds and views of EHPs (see 
results Chapter 6) and their relations with the regulated (see results Chapter 7). After Yin 
(2003), these methods provided multiple ‘measures’ of the same phenomenon (EH regulation as 








Figure 3.2 Data collection activities and their convergence on the model of governance   
 
 
External validity establishes the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized (Yin, 
2003) and case study findings have been criticised for their poor generalizability beyond the 
original case, often because statistical generalizability is considered the only valid basis on 
which inferences can be drawn (Mitchell in Verschuren, 2003). Case studies rely instead on 
analytical generalization where results are applied to existing theory and tested by replication 
(Yin, 2003). For example this thesis aims to describe how CoJ EHPs regulate using the model 
of governance theoretical framework and to explore its replication by 10 case-EHPs to 
contribute to our knowledge of urban environmental health regulation in South Africa. 
 
Construct validity establishes the correct operational measures for the concepts being studied 
and is another criticism of case studies, particularly their use of subjective judgments during 
data collection (Yin, 2003). The construct validity of this thesis has been increased using 
multiple sources of evidence, as summarised in Table 3.1 below, that allow for the development 
of converging lines of enquiry by triangulation (Yin, 2003). A chain of evidence was also 
maintained during fieldwork which included maintaining a case study database and protocol 
(see below). The review of draft case study reports provides another means of maintaining the 
construct validity of a case study (Yin, 2003). The departure of the author from South Africa 
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shortly after fieldwork meant the ten case-EHPs were unable to review their draft case study 
reports but on-going correspondence with two of them provided further advice and comments.    
 
Table 3.1 Multiple sources of data and evidence used  










B1 1 1 1 0 
B2 1 1 1 1 
B4 1 1 1 0 
D1A 1 1 1 0 
D1B 1 1 1 0 
F1B 0 1 1 0 
F1C 0 1 1 0 
F1D 2 1 1 0 
F2A 1 1 1 0 
F2B 1 1 1 0 
Non-case-EHPs 
Region B  3 1 0 0 
Region D  1 0 0 0 
Region F1 0 1 0 0 
Key informants 
Region B EH Manager N/A 1 0 0 
Region F2 EH Manager N/A 1 0 0 
AD-Res N/A 1 0 0 
 
The reliability of the case study is also integral to its quality and seeks to minimise bias and 
errors by demonstrating that the case study strategy could be repeated with the same results 
(Yin, 2003). A case study protocol was developed from the theoretical framework and the two 
pilot studies to guide the author during fieldwork. The multiple case study design meant that the 
author was always at different stages of data collection across the ten case-EHPs and the 
protocol provided a constant reminder of the aim, objectives, questions and fieldwork 
procedures that enabled the author to remain flexible but consistent. A case study database was 
also created to organise and document the data collected and comprised a case study diary and 
the on-going maintenance of electronic archives and folders for all fieldwork data (see 
Appendix J summary), but this chapter now reviews the data collection methods in more detail.   
 
3.3.5.1 Observation   
Data collection started in the offices of Regions B, D1 and F2 with the direct observation of 
EHPs and their office colleagues. In Region F1 the author did not observe inner city EHPs in 
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their areas for safety reasons (see Section 3.5.3 below) but F1D was observed running two EH 
training courses. Observation was chosen to investigate the routine elements of work and the 
contexts that the observed might not otherwise comment on (Green and Thorogood, 2004) and 
to enrich descriptions of the beliefs and values of the observed and their relationships with 
others (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). Starting with observation also enabled the author 
to get to know the EHPs and Hutter’s (1988) comment that observing their work might make 
them more likely to give honest answers was confirmed by comments throughout fieldwork 
along the lines of ‘you know how it is out there’.     
 
Before each observation the EHP was reminded that they should work as normal, but in Regions 
B and D1 EHPs admitted on a few occasions they diverted briefly from their planned work to 
visit premises or areas (e.g. a mortuary, illegal dumping hotspots) they thought the author might 
be interested in. Following similar experiences, Hutter (1988) commented that such 
arrangements were made to be helpful and avoid ‘mundane’ activities and the author’s 
experiences concurred with this. Things seemed to return to normal after these diversions, 
though the ability to make them also suggested the considerable field discretion of EHPs. 
 
During observations no notes were taken, but immediately after leaving the field the author 
spent the evening writing up his observations directly onto computer in a roughly chronological 
order. Each observation report ended with reflections and reminders identifying new lines of 
enquiry. The author sometimes recalled data missed from his original notes that were then 
added but labeled as potentially less reliable. Throughout the fieldwork period the author 
reviewed the observation data to identify potential patterns or new lines of enquiry. Appendix D 
is an extract of the original and un-coded data from the observation of case-EHP F2A. During 
the first visit on the first observation day the author realised that he did not have his own CoJ 
identification and therefore he drafted an identify letter (Appendix E) that was signed by the 
DD-EH. The author only showed this letter on the few occasions when asked and when EHPs 
showed their identification, on most occasions they were known to those being visited. The 
author also provided a photocopy of his passport and emergency contact details to the reception 
administrators and Regional EH Managers of each regional office and each day the author made 
sure the office administrators knew which EHP he was accompanying.  
 
Table 3.2 below summarises the categories of premises, activities and complaints observed 
during fieldwork between 27 March and the 14 June 2007. In summary all the main categories 
of municipal health services (MHS) were observed at least once during fieldwork apart from the 





Table 3.2 Fieldwork observations by MHS area, category and region  
Main MHS 
area 
Categories of premises, activity or 
complaint 
Number of inspections, visits or 
related complaints by office 
B D1 F1 F2 Total 




Food factories 0 0 0 0 0 




Places of care (e.g. crèches)  3 11 0 0 14 
Accommodation establishments (non-
food) 
0 0 0 1 1 
Business premises (formal, non-food) 0 1 0 0 1 
Personal services (e.g. hair dressers, 
clinics) 
0 0 0 0 0 
Formal dwellings (e.g. bad buildings) 












Community facilities and recreation 
premises 
0 1 0 0 1 
Animal related premises (e.g. kennels, 
stables) 
0 0 0 0 0 
Waste 
management 
Solid waste (e.g. illegal dumping) 1 0 0 1 2 
Open areas (e.g. public areas, vacant 
stands) 
1 0 0 2 3 
Water quality  Water quality monitoring  
















Investigations of communicable diseases 0 0 0 0 0 
Bacteriological samples 0 0 0 0 0 
Vector control e.g. infestation investigations and 
controls  




Noise related complaints  3 0 0 0 3 
Air quality related complaints    2 0 0 0 2 
Disposal of 




















Food safety training course  















Beyond more traditional regulatory activities, wider EH project and promotional activities were 
also observed in two regions, but Table 3.2 above also captures the limitations of the 
observational data. During fieldwork some services were not seen at all in a regional office or 
very small numbers were observed in one or two offices only. Omissions include food factories, 
vector control, after-hours noise inspections and diesel vehicle emissions testing. Direct 
comparison of the observation data for inspections of food premises and places of care is also 
limited by small numbers, the separate figure of 40 arising from observing two EHPs inspecting 
all 40 food premises at a Region F2 food festival. These limitations reinforced the importance of 
the other methods to which this section now turns.  
 
3.3.5.2 Semi-structured interviews   
Interviews are one of the most important sources of case study information (Yin, 2003). As 
summarised in Table 3.1 above semi-structured interviews were undertaken with all ten case-
EHPs and followed the semi-structured interview protocol (Appendix F) developed from the 
theoretical framework and emerging observation themes. As well as exploring the model of 
governance and emerging factors, interviews also enabled the EHPs’ responses to determine the 
information produced about these factors and their relative importance (Green and Thorogood 
2004). The author limited most interviews to one hour in recognition of the busy schedules of 
the case-EHPs and some commented afterwards that the interviews would be included in that 
day’s performance monitoring report. Interviews with two Region F2 case-EHPs had to be 
cancelled and rescheduled three times and were finally only 40 minutes long because of events. 
Two semi-structured interviews were also conducted with non-case-EHPs in Regions F1 and B. 
The former EHP (coded F1A) withdrew from the study just after this interview to start a new 
job, the latter was an Operations Manager (coded B3) who volunteered her experience of how 
EH cases are treated in the courts once it became clearer that case-EHPs had so little courts 
experience. 
 
In Table 3.1 above semi-structured interviews were also conducted with four key informants. Of 
these, two Regional EH Managers (B and F2) and the AD-Res were interviewed at the end of 
the fieldwork using a managers’ semi-structured interview protocol (Appendix G). The author 
planned to interview the other two managers but both were summoned to meetings during the 
author’s arrival and there was no time left to reschedule them. Meetings were also held with 
senior managers to provide contextual data about the CoJ and recorded by hand. All semi-
structured interviews were recorded using an Olympus VN-960 PC digital voice recorder which 
is small, portable and does not require an external microphone. The recorder also produced high 
quality recordings, even in offices with noisy air conditioning units though the recorder was 
always positioned to try to minimise background noise. The digital format also allowed for easy 
computer backup and storage of files. Before starting each interview the author asked again if 
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the interviewee was happy to be recorded and then demonstrated how the digital voice recorder 
worked before starting which helped to put people more at ease.  
 
3.3.5.3 Stories 
Stories are a powerful research instrument for describing how people behave and comprehend 
their work lives (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003) and the narrative analysis method 
provided good descriptive data in the two pilot studies. After completing their semi-structured 
interviews, case-EHPs B1 and B2 only were given a small notebook containing a story briefing 
(Appendix H) and blank pages in which to make brief notes. After Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno (2003) they were asked to write down outlines of two or three stories over the 
following week describing situations where their beliefs about ‘fairness’ helped them make 
decisions. One week later B2 reported that he had two stories and these were recorded, with B2 
reminded beforehand that recording was voluntary and confidential. The author asked questions 
at the end of each story to avoid interruptions and all recorded data were then transcribed by the 
author and checked by B2 who made no further changes. By the sixth week of fieldwork the 
author knew he was behind schedule and therefore he decided to stop the narrative analysis 
method after only two stories had been collected from B2 (see Table 3.1 above) and to focus on 
the other methods. B1 did not volunteer any stories and the decision to stop was explained to all 
other case-EHPs at the end of their interviews.      
 
3.3.5.4 Questionnaires 
A two part questionnaire was developed and is presented in Appendix I. The first part used four 
vignettes based on events the author encountered during the pilot studies and main fieldwork 
and designed to further investigate emerging themes. The vignettes were particularly important 
for the Region F1 EHPs whom the author had not observed beyond their offices and training 
rooms. Each vignette was read out to the EHP and their responses recorded by the author on 
paper and checked for accuracy by the EHP at the end. In the second part multiple choice 
questions informed by the theoretical framework sought to compare how the views of case-
EHPs align with those of their colleagues and the other data collected.  
 
All data collection methods (apart from observation) were completed in privacy. All case-EHPs 
had access to private rooms or areas but EHPs were also offered the use of the offices of the 
Medical Research Council of South Africa where the author was based and F1C and the AD-
Res accepted this offer for their interviews. Most interviews and questionnaires were interrupted 
by mobile phone calls or colleagues/managers, but these interruptions were brief and did not 





3.3.5.5 Collection of documents  
The review of documents encountered during fieldwork also provided important contextual data 
and assisted in validating and augmenting other data. Documents are advantageous because they 
are not created from the case study, they can be reviewed repeatedly and cover long term events 
(Yin, 2003). However they can also be deliberately biased and inaccurate or the author can 
introduce their own bias through incomplete selection or problems of access (Yin, 2003). The 
collection of documents was guided by the theoretical framework and governance model of 
regulation (Figure 2.2) developed in Chapter 2 and included legislation, organisational policies 
and procedures, the paperwork produced by EHPs (e.g. letters, fines, educational materials) and 
media articles. Limited quantitative performance management data for the preceding year of 
fieldwork (2005-6) was also collected and analysed (see section 3.4 below), particularly to 
explore whether trends in regulation identified using the main methods were reflected in the 
quantitative activity of CoJ EHPs. Unfortunately requests to the CoJ for more complete and 
detailed data for subsequent years were unsuccessful.  At the end of the fieldwork period the 
case-EHP cases and their Managers were all provided with feedback on the initial findings and 
the next steps in the research process.  
 
3.4 Data analysis 
The quantitative performance data collected relating to the work activities of EHPs required no 
further analysis but there were many gaps in these data and they were treated with caution. For 
example only 2005-6 data were available and therefore the author was unable to explore trends 
in the nine years after fieldwork. This data was also incomplete, for example activity data by 
region, sector and premises was often missing and sometimes the data focused only on core 
regulatory activities with other activities (e.g. EH project & promotion work) missing 
altogether. However enough data was available to give a basic account of the activities of EHPs 
that informed the qualitative data at the centre of the case study design.          
 
After experiments with QSR NVIVO during the pilot study phase the author decided to analyse 
all qualitative data manually and the case study protocol and database helped organise and 
manage these data. All digitally recorded interview data and the two stories from B2 were 
transcribed by the author into MS Word using Olympus Digital Wave Player software. Given the 
case study focus on factors influencing how EHPs regulate, largely denaturalized transcripts 
were produced but some naturalistic elements were retained including some basic South African 
terms (e.g. ‘location’ for township, ‘ja’ for yes, ‘ag’ for ‘oh’) and the use of block capitals to 
recreate when the interviewee puts deliberate emphasis on words.  
 
After Miles and Huberman (1994) a start list of codes was produced prior to analysis based on 
the themes from the theoretical framework and developed during the two pilot phases. These 
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codes were applied to the multiple sources of evidence for each case-EHP and other data 
sources using MS Word. Each case resulted in further revision and development of the codes 
until a final list was applied to all the data collected. Themes identified for each case-EHP were 
then reduced and displayed in matrix form in MS Excel, partly to improve their accessibility for 
later analytical comparison (Miles and Huberman 1994). A report was then drafted for each 
case-EHP using the multiple sources of evidence5 and data and then compared across the ten 
case-EHPs and other data based on theoretical replication (Yin, 2003). These reports were then 
subject to further discussion based on the theoretical framework and model of governance 
developed before conclusions and recommendations were made. 
 
3.5 Reflections on the case study design in practice  
This section reflects on how the case study design worked in practice, beginning with the 
importance of its flexibility, research ethics and the influence of the author before exploring 
how personal safety issues shaped the case study design.  
 
3.5.1 Flexibility of the case study design 
Flexibility was central to the case study design. Time was inevitably lost when meetings were 
cancelled and rescheduled, particularly towards the end of each month when EHPs were busy 
compiling their monthly performance reports. The end of fieldwork also coincided with the end 
of the South African financial year (30 June) when all EHPs were busy compiling annual reports 
or using up any remaining leave. The flexible design and case study protocol enabled the author 
to accommodate changing schedules and events with minimal disruption. For example the 
sudden withdrawal of case-EHP F1A caused no problems because his data were used to validate 
and develop the data from other case-EHPs. Being able to drop the narrative analysis method 
without adverse consequences for the research design also enabled fieldwork to remain on 
schedule and on budget.       
                                                     
5 These sources of evidence included the two part questionnaire in Appendix I. Responses to the 
vignettes in Part I and the multiple choice questions in Part II were coded, then analysed and 
written up for each case EHP following comparison with the data from the other methods 
(particularly observation and interview) and the theoretical framework. These results were then 
compared across the ten case-EHPs and with the other data collected (e.g. policy documents, 
interviews with managers), the theoretical framework and emerging model of governance. The 
questionnaire results were written up across the result chapters according to their relevant 
themes. For example Part I data from two vignettes exploring EHP-EHP and EHP-manager 
relations are reported and discussed alongside other data in section 5.3.3 (inc. Table 5.4), whilst 
moral tensions in regulation are explored with other data in section 7.6. Similarly, Part II data 
exploring job satisfaction and views about pay are discussed, with other data, in section 6.3.         
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3.5.2 Research ethics and the influence of the author  
Ethics continually shaped the case study design. This section begins by summarizing the basic 
ethical controls developed before exploring the ethical issues that arose during fieldwork and 
how these were managed. Ethical approval for the case study design was granted by London 
South Bank University on 19 December 2005. Dr Refik Bismilla, the Executive Director of the 
Department of Health of the CoJ, granted permission for the study on 01 November 2006 which 
was later reconfirmed on the 18 July 2007 in accordance with the new research policies of the 
CoJ. During the research process written consent was obtained from all participants and they 
were able to withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason (see Appendix C). 
Before fieldwork verbal research consent was obtained from all EHPs, managers and others that 
worked in the regional offices. The names of all those who participated were removed from the 
data and no photographs were taken. The names of areas were also removed and substituted 
with terms like ‘inner city’, ‘township’, ‘suburbs’ and ‘informal settlement’ that are common to 
South African cities. All the data collected were backed up and stored in a locked desk at the 
author’s offices and homes in Johannesburg and London.  
 
The relativist position of this thesis acknowledges the subjectivity of the author and his position 
as someone not independent of the researched. This section now explores how this continually 
influenced the case study design, the ethical issues that arose during fieldwork and how these 
were managed. One important design factor was the development of methods the author could 
carry out himself, but his values and position as a White, non-South African and English-only 
speaking EHP had many influences on the research. Beginning with values, Green and 
Thorogood identify three typologies of author based on the purposes of their research and its 
relationships with society:  
     
 The neutral outsider: Authors should strive to be disinterested in political and social values, 
given that their role is to produce knowledge for its own sake. The implications of that 
knowledge, and the impacts it has on society, are not the proper concern of the author; 
 The liberal relativist: As ethical standards are differently constructed across different 
settings, authors should follow their own (professional) conscience in deciding what to 
research and how to do it; and 
 The radical: The proper role of research is to improve society, and the author should be 
explicitly partisan about their practice, striving to redress inequalities and increase social 
justice through their research practice (Green and Thorogood 2004 p55).   
This thesis has a radical agenda but during data collection the author sought not to express his 
own values on participants. All research briefings were designed to be as value free as possible, 
focusing on the need to know more about how EHPs make decisions. The only hint towards the 
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wider research agenda was the statement that “…until we better understand how we work, the 
full potential of our work may not be realised” (see Appendix B p237).  
 
During all data collection the author sought to remain impartial but during observation this 
could be difficult, particularly when EHPs were upset. For example during a visit to a township 
crèche case-EHP D1B burst into tears and asked the author how its owner could allow such 
overcrowded conditions? The author said nothing but the overcrowding there also moved him to 
tears that he did not try to hide. During a visit to an informal settlement in sub-zero 
temperatures case-EHP B4 encountered a toddler wearing only a ragged t-shirt and playing 
alone on the frozen ground near a lit brazier whose flames were licking the roof of the shack 
nearby. B4 exchanged a knowing glance with the author and nothing more was said at the time, 
but this encounter later prompted many reflections from B4 about the life of the urban poor.  
 
The author was aware that his EHP background could bias data collection, not least because this 
had created the original idea for this thesis. Reed and Procter identify three positions of authors:  
 
 Outsider: An author undertaking research into practice with no professional experience; 
 Hybrid: A practitioner undertaking research into the practice of other practitioners; and 
 Insider: A practitioner undertaking research into their own and their colleagues practice 
(Reed and Proctor 1995 p10)         
 
The author approached this study as a ‘hybrid’ and decided from the very first meetings to be 
honest with all participants about his own EHP background. This helped to negotiate access for 
the research, the AD-Res recommending at the planning stage that the author establish his 
‘common ground’ with participants (AD-Res 02 Feb meeting p2). Therefore the author was 
sometimes asked about environmental health in the UK, three EHPs expressing an interest in 
working there one day. In response the author encouraged this whilst also explaining the 
difficulties because of the different qualification systems between the two countries.   
 
During fieldwork the author was aware of his own potential EHP bias. This informed the focus 
of this thesis on local government EHPs and sometimes prompted comparisons during field 
work, but the theoretical framework was also grounded in objective empirical studies and 
theories to describe how EHPs work. The small number of studies from South Africa and 
Johannesburg also meant that the author did not know what to expect other than from his pilot 
study experiences. During observation the author recognised the problems of selectivity and 
making judgments (Robson, 2002), but the settings were different to anywhere the author had 
worked before and he did not feel like Reed and Proctor’s (1995) ‘insider’. The risks of 
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selectivity were controlled by a case study designed to describe all the work of the case-EHPs, 
not just the interesting cases. In terms of judgments, the author’s initial concerns that EHPs 
might think they were being assessed by a ‘foreign EHP’ proved unfounded. On only one 
occasion (a smoke complaint investigation) was the author asked for his professional opinion 
but the author reminded case-EHP B1 that he was only an observer and this was accepted 
without further comment. On two occasions the author was asked by business owners for his 
opinion of standards there but on both occasions the author politely declined to comment. The 
impact of the author’s own judgments was lessened by repeat observations with the same EHPs 
and follow up discussions with them to further explore the reasons for their decisions.  
 
The author’s presence influenced observations but was minimised in different ways. All 
observed EHPs were briefed at the start of each day that the author did not want to participate in 
the events being observed. CoJ EHPs regularly take out medical and nursing students and 
student EHPs and were therefore used to being accompanied in their work. During most visits 
the author was not introduced, but on a few occasions the author was introduced as ‘Rob’ or as 
‘someone from the UK who is interested in environmental health in South Africa’. The author 
made no notes during observations and tried to remain in the background when possible, though 
he deliberately intervened on three occasions. On one occasion the author helped case-EHP B1, 
a new EHP to the CoJ, with map reading to find a complaint and he later let B1 borrow his 
Johannesburg A-Z map because the office map had gone missing. After one visit the author 
helped a teacher to fix a blood-glucose meter she was struggling with. During a food safety 
training course for street hawkers one Mozambiquan delegate was struggling to complete the 
attendance form herself, probably because it was written in English and/or she was illiterate. 
Case-EHP F1D observed this and gave the author her ID and he completed the form for her.  
 
The author’s presence and the decision of most EHPs not to introduce him influenced two visits. 
One township crèche owner was very upset with case-EHP D1A’s judgement and attempted to 
negotiate with her in English. The owner probably assumed that the ‘White man’ present did not 
understand isiZulu and might have some influence over D1A, but the author said nothing and 
tried to remain as unmoved as possible during this very hostile encounter. During an inspection 
conducted in isiZulu a pub manager seemed to deliberately switch to English to challenge the 
EHP about the responsibility for the repairs needed. When he responded evasively, the manager 
looked to the author for support and the author remarked that it seemed unfair but said nothing 
more, conscious that he had broken his own case study protocol. The inspection continued and 
the issue of responsibility was raised again by the EHP at the end of the inspection as a matter 




For the EHPs themselves only once was their use of English obviously influenced by the 
author’s presence. At the start of a street hawkers training course the author was the only White 
person present but case-EHP F1D started the course in English. The delegates quickly became 
uncomfortable and, sensing this, F1D immediately asked them about languages and conducted 
the rest of the course in seSotho and isiZulu and calm was restored. The author had anticipated 
his own language limitations and therefore reviewed each visit (including paperwork) 
afterwards with the EHP. These accounts were inevitably the EHPs’ version of events, but 
despite the language barriers the author could generally understand what was happening during 
visits. Further, the use of multiple sources of data and evidence converging on the themes 
identified helped validate the observation themes.         
 
Lastly, the completion of this thesis nine years after fieldwork was delayed by events. In early 
July 2007 the author returned to the UK with very limited funds. Balancing the demands of data 
analysis with new jobs in the National Health Service and University sector was difficult at 
times and compounded by part time caring responsibilities for the author’s father with 
Parkinson’s Disease and a homeless friend. In February 2012 the author had a brain 
haemorrhage caused by a rare congenital condition called an arteriovenous malformation 
(AVM). Most of the AVM was occluded by brain surgery in May 2012 and the author’s 
epilepsy is now controlled well but he was off work for seven months and the author continues 
to undergo regular monitoring with the intention of further surgery. The author suspended his 
PhD during this time and re-started in September 2013, two months after the birth of his 
daughter Freya. The author’s homeless friend died suddenly in April 2012 and his father died in 
November 2013 which further delayed writing up. In February 2015 the author resigned from 
his part time University teaching post to dedicate at least two days a week to writing.           
 
3.5.3 The impact of personal safety concerns  
Ethical considerations also influenced the impacts of personal safety on the case study. 
Johannesburg’s violent reputation is recognised by researchers (Mathee et al. 2010; Leslie and 
Storey 2003) and influenced the author’s decision not to observe Region F1 inner city EHPs in 
the field following a series of meetings and discussions. The Regional F1 EH Manager warned 
the author that the inner city could be a dangerous place to work, that in some areas his White 
skin could be a danger and that the CoJ accepted no responsibility for his personal safety. In the 
following meeting potential case-EHPs repeated these warnings and commented that you never 
know what will happen each day, but this was part of their job and something they accepted.  
 
After these briefings the author asked the advice of three White EHPs with inner city 
experience. All recommended observing there but one suggested establishing emergency 
procedures with each EHP in the event of gun threats for example, another considered it 
75 
 
important to work in groups so that you can constantly watch out for each other. The author 
then contacted London South Bank University’s insurance company for advice using these 
examples and they confirmed that he would not be insured for events that constituted a 
‘deliberate exposure to unnecessary danger’. The authors’ supervisors agreed that he should not 
put himself in danger during fieldwork and therefore the author decided not to observe the inner 
city EHPs outside their office nor to observe higher risk activities like night visits and blitz 
work targeting offending hot spots.     
 
All the inner city EHPs were happy with this decision. The Regional EH Manager also stated 
that he did not want to attend a conference in two years time and hear the author describing the 
inner city as too dangerous because he has four white EHPs working there (0006/F1 
Observation p2). Later observations found that inner city EHPs found the safety aspects of their 
work very difficult (see section 6.4 below) and further discussions with EHPs supported the 
author’s precautionary approach. For example F1C thought that inner city observation would be 
“very tough” because EHPs are not respected and he found this “psychologically disturbing” at 
times (F1C interview pp50-1). F1D commented that because the author had observed in Soweto, 
where she lived, he would be fine in the inner city though it would also be wise to avoid 
entering buildings and stick to the more public main streets (0007/F1 Observation pp4-5).  
 
The author was occasionally reminded by EHPs that he looked out of place in certain areas and 
could have problems there if he was by himself, but all the observations proceeded without 
incident. Only on two occasions did the author think there could be problems. Both occurred 
during monitoring visits to informal settlements when the author and EHP were approached by 
threatening looking men. On both occasions the (male) EHPs were unmoved and nothing 
further happened and the author’s ‘nerves’ were probably heightened by his own experiences in 
Johannesburg that included an attempted robbery one evening and being threatened by an inner 
city gang when walking to the main Bree Street taxi rank. But the greatest danger was probably 
travelling around in poorly maintained and badly driven minibus taxis. Fieldwork also coincided 
with a turf war between two taxi operators that included a series of fatal shootings at Bree Street 
taxi rank which the author missed by minutes on one occasion. The author therefore enlisted the 
help of a private taxi driver during data collection.   
 
3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided details of the methods used to investigate how CoJ EHPs regulate 
environmental health in Johannesburg. The epistemology and the case study design and 
methods of data analysis were presented and discussed. Reflections on the case study in practice 
were also made, particularly the importance of flexibility and how ethical considerations 
continually shaped the case study. The next four chapters present and discuss the results.
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Chapter 4 The EHP in the City of Johannesburg and the regulatory context    
 
4.1 Introduction 
The following four results chapters are structured to explore the governance model of 
responsive regulation by CoJ EHPs in Figure 4.1 below. This was created by this thesis by 
comparing and contrasting the main study results with the literature in the theoretical framework 
developed in section 2.5 and summarised in the governance model in Figure 2.2 above. This 
chapter begins at the centre of Figure 4.1 by describing and explaining the regulatory strategies 
of EHPs and starts with an overview of the CoJ and its environmental health services before 
describing the working days of EHPs. Chapter 4 then explores two pathways of regulation, their 
stages and responsive regulation before describing the proactive and reactive work of EHPs. 
 
Figure 4.1 The governance model of responsive regulation by CoJ EHPs  
 
 
Chapter 4 ends by moving to the outer part of Figure 4.1 to revisit the regulatory context 
explored in Chapters 1 and 2, notably how EHPs are influenced by South Africa’s history, 
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macroeconomic policies and public and media attitudes. Chapters 5 to 7 then explore the other 
factors in the governance model, specifically how legal, organisational and individual factors 
and relations between EHPs and the regulated influence the regulatory process. These factors 
are complex and interacting as per Kaufmann’s (1960/2006) funnel metaphor (see section 2.5.1) 
and the decision to organise them using the governance model. But the argument repeated 
across these four results chapters is that for EHPs these factors frequently favour persuasive 
over punitive approaches to regulation.   
  
4.2 Environmental health in the CoJ  
 
4.2.1 An overview of the CoJ  
Local government in Johannesburg has been through continual restructuring since 1990 and 
fieldwork coincided with the latest re-organisation. A detailed description of this on-going 
process is beyond the scope of this thesis but between 1994 and 2000 the phases of the Local 
Government Transition Act, 1993 saw political struggles between many interest groups and 
cycles of centralization/de-centralisation as they attempted to shape local government in their 
interests (Tomlinson et al. 2003). In 1997 a financial crisis led to national and provincial 
government intervention and an interim committee running Johannesburg until the local 
government elections of 2001 (Beall et al. 2002). In early 1999 this committee published iGoli 
2002, a three year plan that created the CoJ in December 2000 (CoJ, 2005b).  
 
Under the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 metropolitan municipalities include areas with a high 
population density, an intense movement of people, goods, and services, extensive 
development, multiple business districts and industrial areas and a “centre of economic activity 
with a complex and diverse economy” (Section 2). iGoli 2002 also proposed institutional 
changes to Johannesburg’s new structure including the division of policy making and 
implementation responsibilities via the ‘client-contractor split’ (CoJ, 2005b) that are distinctly 
neoliberal. Figure 4.2 below summarises the structure of the CoJ during fieldwork.  
 
CoJ politicians have ultimate legislative and executive power. They include 109 directly elected 
Ward Councillors, with whom most EHPs were in regular contact (see section 5.3.5 below), and 
108 Councillors elected by proportional representation. During fieldwork the African National 
Congress (ANC) held 61% of Council seats and the Democratic Alliance 27% (CoJ, 2005b). 
The Speaker heads the legislature and oversees all CoJ committees. The Executive Mayor, Clr 
Amos Masondo, is elected every five years and supported by a ten member Mayoral 
Committee. During fieldwork this Committee were all ANC members and each member, or 
MMC, has a specific portfolio. Environmental Health, as a sub-directorate of the Department of 
Health, is led by the Health Committee’s MMC (hereafter MMC:Health).  
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The core ‘client’ administration is led by a City Manager who is also responsible for policy 
making in areas including finance, planning and contract management. 13 central departments 
including Health, the home of EHPs, are also part of this core administration and develop and 
monitor policy for regional implementation. On the ‘contractors’ side, iGoli 2002 established 11 
new regional administrations and 14 new utilities, agencies and corporatized entities. Until the 
end of 2006 these 11 regions delivered a wide range of services, including environmental health, 
but fieldwork coincided with the re-organisation of the CoJ into seven regions (A to G) as 
summarised in Fig. 3.1 above.  
 
Figure 4.2 The structure of the CoJ in 2007 
 
The seven regions act as contractors to the central departments, with each service responsible 
for meeting performance targets (see section 5.3.4) and expected to liaise with Ward 
Councillors and be responsive to local citizens. The utilities, agencies and corporatized entities 
are owned by the CoJ but intended to function as ‘arms-length’ companies (CoJ, 2006b). The 
Departments, utilities, agencies and corporatized entities of the CoJ are hereafter referred to 
collectively as ‘CoJ organisations’ and are important for this thesis because of the monitoring 
work EHPs conduct on their behalf (see section 5.3.2).  
 
4.2.2 The Environmental Health sub-directorate   
The structure of the Department of Health is summarised in Figure 4.3 below and from 1 July 
2006 it was led by the MMC: Health, Clr Mfikoe, with its administration led by the Executive 
Director of Health, Dr Refik Bismilla, a general medical practitioner by background. Before this 
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the two posts had been of equal rank. This Department employed around 1500 people across 
five sub-directorates in central and regional offices and clinics working towards the following:  
 
“Vision: A City with a high quality, efficient, accessible and equitable health system for 
all, that has adequate and flexible capacity to meet the changing health challenges 
facing Johannesburg. 
 
Mission: Improved general health, well being and increased life expectancy of the 
citizens of Johannesburg” (CoJ DoH 2006b p1).         
 




In its own words the Environmental Health sub-directorate is responsible for delivering its 
services by complaints investigation, compliance monitoring, law enforcement and health 
promotion and training (CoJ DoH 2006b). In section 1.3 above it was argued that environmental 
health is one part of a broader public health given its long history in preventing and controlling 
communicable and non-communicable diseases and its contributions to primary health care and 
the wider social determinants of health. However as in Figure 4.3 above the Department of 
Health retained a traditional bio-medical structure, its other four sub-directorates covering:   
 
 Public Health – Communicable and non-communicable diseases and health data 
management; 
 Primary Health Care – Delivering primary health care services in 86 local government 
clinics and elsewhere;   
 HIV/AIDS – Co-ordinating HIV/AIDS related programmes/projects; and    
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 Resources – Supporting the Department by integrating with national policy and 
advising on internal management     (CoJ DoH 2006b). 
 
In 2007 the Environmental Health sub-directorate comprised a Central EH Unit and EHPs 
working in seven regions from nine offices. The Central EH Unit was working “…towards the 
ultimate goal to protect the environment and to ensure that Johannesburg is a healthy, clean and 
safe city” (CoJ DoH 2006b p37). It was headed by a Deputy Director (DD-EH) and three 
Assistant Directors (AD-EH), all experienced EHPs, and supported by a data capturer and 
secretary. The Central EH Unit was responsible for overseeing and supporting the regions and 
developing policy (e.g. the Public Health By-laws) and new standards and procedures, a process 
that one senior EHP considered very ‘top-down’ (AD-Res 12 July interview pp3-4).  
 
Before the latest regional re-organisation 11 Regional EH Managers reported to Regional Health 
Managers, but centralization during fieldwork meant each now reported directly to the 
Executive Director of Health as in Fig. 4.3 above. In early 2007 the Department of Health 
employed 134 EHPs operating from nine regional offices. This regional structure was only a 
few years old and prior to this EHPs usually operated alone from clinics that were closer to 
communities in theory, but in practice in the words of one case-EHP they found themselves 
“scattered all over” and often unreachable because of this and a lack of basic facilities like 
telephones (F1C interview pp23-4). Therefore EHPs now valued being together with colleagues 
and managers in regional offices and having the basic resources for the job. Problems with 
community engagement remained but there were always EHPs or others available to receive 
complaints or other issues but this section now describes the regional offices briefly.    
 
Region F’s two Environmental Health offices each occupied part of one floor of multi-storey 
CoJ offices that housed many other municipal services. Inner city Region F1 was home to 30 
EHPs making it the largest in the CoJ, whilst 12 EHPs were based in Region F2. The Region F2 
EH Manager emphasised that the two offices had a close working relationship and effectively 
operated as one office, but separate offices were maintained for practical reasons including 
major local traffic problems. The 14 Region B EHPs and 10 Region D1 EHPs were based in 
dedicated EH offices within larger regional CoJ compounds. Most EHPs had their own desks, 
computers, telephones and filing cabinets within open plan offices, though a few Region B 
EHPs had their own offices. A strong feeling of camaraderie was observed in all four offices 
and EHPs clearly valued being together to share information, knowledge and gossip. A few 
were concerned about the lack of privacy, but other rooms were available nearby for meetings 




4.2.3 Who are the case-EHPs?  
Table 4.1 below summarises the kinds of EHPs working for the CoJ. Most case-EHPs were 
Black-Africans in their 20s-30s as were most of their colleagues across the four regional offices, 
with very few Coloured, Indian/Asian or White street-level EHPs. One level up the hierarchy 
White Operations Managers were more common, though many in the four regional offices were 
also Black-African. Seven of the nine Regional EH Managers were White, as were two of the 
four Assistant Directors in the Central EH Unit. Half the case-EHPs were raised in rural areas 
outside what is now Gauteng Province, but four were born and raised in Johannesburg/Soweto. 
Most lived within the CoJ but in different regions to those they worked in. Most lived nearby 
because of family commitments and/or a desire to minimise travel costs.   
 
Table 4.1 The backgrounds of the ten case-EHPs   
EHP 
code 














PG - 1.5 
NG - 1 
0.25 




PG - 1 5 
B4 M 59 Black – 
African 
Soweto Diploma None 32* 
D1A F 34 Black – 
African 
Soweto Diploma None 8* 




PG - 4 2.5 




PG - 1 
NG - 0.3 
2 
F1C M 35 Black – 
African 
Rural Diploma LG - 1 5 




PG - 1 
PS - 6 
2 




PS - 1 
LG - 6 
3 
F2B F 44 White Jo’burg Diploma None 12* 
 
Diploma = Diploma in Environmental Health Sciences   
B.Tech. = Bachelor of Technology degree in Environmental Health Sciences 
LG = local government   
PG = provincial government   
NG = national government   
PS = private sector  




All had National Diplomas in Environmental Health, the minimum qualification for EHPs in 
South Africa, and were members of the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA). 
After graduating, six continued studying for a further one or two years to complete their 
Bachelor of Technology (B.Tech.) degrees in Environmental Health Sciences and F1C was half 
way there. B4 and F2B trained during apartheid in government funded schemes before working 
as EHPs in Johannesburg. The others all worked part time to fund their Diplomas/Degrees and 
recalled the challenges of balancing study with work and other commitments during this period.  
 
Most case-EHPs had worked elsewhere before joining the CoJ. A few had different jobs (e.g. 
gardening, administration, sales) before and during their EHP training. F1C and F2A had 
worked as local government EHPs before the CoJ, but five EHPs had also worked in provincial 
government in rural areas (B1 & F1B), port health (B2 & F1D) and coordinating rural nutrition 
programmes (D1B). Two EHPs had also worked in national government, F1B as a projects 
officer for the National Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and B1 as a 
workplace health and safety inspector for the National Department of Labour. Two EHPs had 
worked in the private sector, F1D as the quality controller for an airport catering company and 
F2A as the hygiene officer for a commercial abattoir. Other EHPs observed had worked for the 
government owned railways and the South African National Defence Force. 
 
The majority of case-EHPs had at least two years of CoJ experience, but even the least 
experienced B1 had worked as an EHP for two and a half years elsewhere. The results are 
potentially biased towards more experienced EHPs but this was controlled by the case study 
design (see section 3.3.4 above) and recognition of experience as an important factor in its own 
right (see section 6.2 below). Most case-EHPs had interests in continuing education and had 
pursued these at the CoJ, often in accordance with their future career plans. For example F1D 
had just finished a Certificate in Public Administration, B2 had nearly completed a Certificate in 
Noise Control, B4 had Degrees in Public Administration and Urban Studies and a Diploma in 
Financial Management and F2A was half way through a Masters in Environmental Health. 
Others were planning qualifications in safety management (B1), solid waste management (D1B) 
and business studies (F1B) and hoped to work in these areas in the future.  
 
There was also evidence of career development amongst the case-EHPs. D1A spent her first 
three years as a contract EHP before securing a permanent post and shortly after fieldwork 
ended F2B and F1D were promoted to Operations Managers. The other case-EHPs hoped their 
continuing education would open up new opportunities at the CoJ or elsewhere and B4’s own 
career illustrated what they could achieve. He started as an EHP in the 1970s, became a regional 
manager in 1994 and then worked in policy development and the private sector. He returned to 
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the CoJ in 2001 as an EHP but became a Regional EH Manager shortly after fieldwork ended 
and on his retirement in 2010 became a university academic.  
 
Working in local government was also considered good for career development. The EHPs had 
varied careers before the CoJ, but F1D summarised what many felt:  
 
“…to really practice being an Environmental Health Practitioner you have to do it at the 
local level, at the municipality” (F1D interview p3). 
 
This was partly in recognition of the breadth of responsibilities and opportunities in local 
government that were not available elsewhere, but most EHPs believed that in local government 
they could finally put into practice what they had learned at University.  
 
When asked why they originally chose Johannesburg only three case-EHPs considered it a good 
career move because, in F1C’s words, it was “the place to be” (F1C interview pp5-6). Instead 
most cited better pay and conditions and/or a desire to be nearer home and family. The Region 
F2 EH Manager recognised these attractions but was concerned that metropolitan municipalities 
were draining rural areas of EHPs and she was relieved that the CoJ had recently stopped 
recruiting from Limpopo province (Region F2 EH Manager reflections p3).   
 
4.3 The working days of EHPs  
Having established that EHPs are qualified professionals, this next section further confirms their 
Weberian (1947) bureaucrat status by outlining their role delivering municipal health services 
before exploring how their working days are determined by their position in departmental 
hierarchies. The section ends by introducing the rules, standards and expectations that shape the 
work of EHPs whilst acknowledging their considerable discretion.  
 
The working days of EHPs involved delivering municipal health services (MHS) that cover both 
brown and green environmental health hazards and include: 
 
 water quality monitoring; 
 food control; 
 waste management; 
 the health surveillance of premises; 
 surveillance and prevention of communicable diseases (excluding immunizations);  
 vector control; 
 environmental pollution control; 
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 disposal of the dead; and 
 chemical safety   (National Health Act, 2003 Section 1) 
 
To explore how EHPs divide their work between these areas two sets of data for the period 
2005-6 were collected from the Department of Health’s annual report (CoJ DoH 2006b) and are 
summarised in Appendices K1 and K2 for information. They must be interpreted with caution 
because they only count the numbers of encounters (K1)  or (more detailed) evaluations (K2), 
not the time spent on these activities. Further, three MHS areas are missing because data on 
water quality monitoring and chemical safety (e.g. training workshops, chemical poisoning 
investigations) were unavailable whilst data on the disposal of the dead (some 129 visits to 
mortuaries and crematoria) are incorporated into the health surveillance of business premises 
category. Important non-MHS areas (e.g. health promotion, project working) are also not 
included and attempts to get more complete data were unsuccessful (see section 3.3.4 above). 
This data also includes non-EHPs (e.g. licensing officers, pest controllers) and pre-dates the 
restructuring of the regional offices.   
 
During 2005-6 CoJ EHPs mostly focused on the health surveillance of premises, particularly 
formal and informal dwellings (usually non-permanent structures) and business premises, and 
the control of food, particularly retail food premises and informal food traders. This focus was 
mirrored across the four regional offices, but local priorities included the informal food traders 
in inner city Region F1 and informal dwellings in the townships of Region D1. Most other MHS 
work focused on vector control, environmental pollution control and waste management, 
particularly the problems of illegal dumping. There were relatively few investigations of 
communicable disease but those case-EHPs involved were concerned about how long these 
investigations took and its impacts on their other work.  
 
EHPs identified the greatest health risks across the CoJ (see Appendix K2) from 
accommodation establishments (62%), informal dwellings (88%) and open areas (67%) due to 
problems like illegal dumping. However the health risks from informal food traders were only 
slightly higher than in formal food premises and this is explored further in section 7.7 below. 
Appendix K2 shows that Region D1 completed far fewer evaluations than the other three 
regional offices and during fieldwork its EHPs admitted that their health surveillance work had 
been affected by limited resources but things were beginning to improve, not least because so 
many evaluations of places of care (61%) were identifying health risks.   
 
The working days of EHPs were largely determined by their position in the Departmental 
hierarchy in Figure 4.3 above. The four Central EH Unit Directors developed policy and 
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coordinated the work of the regions and liaised with regional EHPs, politicians, the Executive 
Director-Health, other CoJ organisations and external organisations like Provincial and National 
government. From their nine offices Regional EH Managers were mainly office based and 
managed service delivery in their regions, liaising with the ED-Health and the Central EH Unit 
and local politicians. Occasionally they worked in the field, particularly during non-routine 
and/or complex cases and when politicians were involved. Further, Regional EH Managers also 
assisted in basic office tasks (e.g. answering phones, logging complaints), particularly after 
10:00AM when most EHPs were in their areas.   
 
Most Operations Managers had responsibility for four or five district EHPs but in each regional 
office at least one Operations Manager was responsible for supervising officers, including 
EHPs, delivering auxiliary services specializing in pest control, licensing and environmental 
pollution control. Operations Managers were mainly office based but sometimes accompanied 
their EHPs/officers in the field, particularly during complex cases. They also worked on 
complex cases, coordinated prosecutions and specialist EH projects.   
 
Nine of the ten case-EHPs were district EHPs covering all nine MHS areas listed above and 
others (e.g. health promotion) within their areas. In contrast case-EHP B1 was one of two newly 
appointed auxiliary EHPs and specialised in environmental pollution control across all Region 
B. Most of the EHPs’ daily work was in the field and face to face and this was something all 
valued, some commenting that they did not want an ‘office job’. They mostly worked alone and 
covered areas that followed the administrative boundaries of CoJ wards, though sometimes 
other factors including resources and the numbers of premises shaped their areas. Interestingly, 
it was also common for EHPs to act up one level when their manager was on holiday or there 
were extended gaps in their appointment. Their daily responsibilities and pay remained 
unchanged, but EHPs gained valuable experience for their future careers. 
 
The structure of their working days was the same across the four regional offices and B4’s 
recollections from 1970s Johannesburg suggest they remain largely unchanged. From Monday 
to Friday most EHPs were in the office before 08:00AM and busy with administration until 
around 10:00AM when they started work in their areas. Around 15:00PM they return to their 
offices and spent the last hour on administration before leaving around 16:30PM. Two case-
EHPs summarised their daily routines as:   
 
“We do the same thing every day, every day you do the same thing. And, you are 




“So mainly it’s inspection, inspection, inspection, complaints, complaints, complaints 
the whole day…. that is mainly what I do” (F1D interview p2). 
 
EHPs normally did not work evenings or weekends. Instead an answer phone recorded public 
complaints and EHPs would start responding the next working day though they knew that 
sometimes the following day or Monday morning could be too late. Non-routine work (e.g. 
health surveillance of night clubs, blitz6 work) required EHPs to work evenings or weekends 
and was popular with EHPs when counted as overtime. Other activities including project 
working or promotional activities also sometimes involved working outside the standard day.       
 
EHPs generally considered paperwork a ‘necessary evil’ and D1B described a culture that “if 
it’s not written then it means it’s not done” (D1B interview p21). B4 thought EHPs had far more 
paperwork discretion than during apartheid but the quantities had also increased alongside the 
demands from managers and other CoJ organisations (B4 interview pp24-5). In each office 
small numbers of EH assistants and administrators supported EHPs in various ways (e.g. 
recording complaints, finding GIS locations and business owners) but EHPs completed their 
own paperwork. Most preferred this because support was limited and “…you cannot actually go 
outside there and then have another person write the report” (F1C interview p29). The recording 
of daily, weekly and monthly performance data was a constant and each day all paperwork went 
to Operations Managers for review and approval. Getting the fieldwork-paperwork balance right 
was a constant struggle amidst unpredictable workloads, where “…more problems [equals] 
more admin” (B4 interview p24). Managers recognised these concerns and generally supported 
their EHPs in managing these tensions. EHPs also valued how paperwork provided constant 
evidence of their work to managers. On Fridays any unfinished paperwork (e.g. unresolved 
complaints, revisits) was recorded on ‘holdover’ forms submitted to managers for approval.  
 
Despite these controls, the case-EHPs all recognised and valued their discretion in the field:   
 
“...you start at 8, leave at half past 4, you are in the office from 8 to 10, from 10 you 
should be out of the office because your work is at the field, come back 3 o’clock… But 
they’re [managers] rarely telling you exactly how to work, there is no, you must just do 
it yourself” (F1D interview p6).  
 
“...you are given an area and then you supervise that area, whatever problems arise in 
that area, and then you are responsible. There is no one always behind you, ‘where are 
                                                     
6 Blitz work targeted known hotspots for EH offending and frequently involved other CoJ 
organisations, particularly the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD).    
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you, what are you doing?’ ...we are responsible people, that is very good about our job, 
there is not always somebody going with you... you become responsible, you become 
adult, you know to supervise yourself it’s something else.” (F1C interview p26)    
 
EHPs knew the limits to their discretion, but F1C believed it had made him stronger as a person 
and more able to “face whatever problems” (F1C interview p26). Further, all valued the 
flexibility discretion gave them and how it enabled them to manage their work in different 
ways, for example by organising their work geographically to reduce travel time and to focus on 
those in the greatest need. These decisions sometimes created tensions with managers, but EHPs 
maintained they were best placed to make these decisions and managers usually accepted this.  
 
4.4 Introducing the regulatory strategies of CoJ EHPs 
This section introduces the stages of regulation as summarised by two pathways in Figure 4.4 
below. This was developed by the author from the results data to describe and explore the stages 
CoJ EHPs go through before reaching their own pyramid model of responsive regulation. The 
first is the traditional regulatory law enforcement pathway that begins with the initial detection 
of offences and ends with the responsive regulation pyramid. But this thesis also identifies a 
second pathway associated with EH project and promotion activities that usually do not 
originate in offending but which are often influenced by the regulatory pyramid. 
 
Figure 4.4 The stages of regulation by CoJ EHPs 
 
4.4.1 Detecting the EH offence 
The regulatory process begins with the detection of potential environmental health offending by 
proactive or reactive means (see section 4.5 below). The word ‘potential’ is important because 
at this stage it could be hard to establish whether an offence has been committed without further 
investigation. Most proactive work was unannounced but before accessing any premises/areas 
EHPs would show their CoJ ID and introduce themselves as ‘[name] from the Health 
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Department’ and explain the purpose of their visit. Depending on the case, they would then ask 
to speak to the owner/person in charge and discuss their visit in more detail before starting any 
investigations. If EHPs knew the premises these introductions were brief and did not involve 
ID, but when visiting for the first time EHPs were careful to clarify the purpose of their visit for 
many reasons, not least the hope of starting to build co-operative working relations.  
 
4.4.2 Referral or gathering and interpreting evidence  
Matters obviously not relevant to EHPs were referred (via reports) to the relevant CoJ 
organisation or provincial/national government regulator. All other matters were then subject to 
further investigation by EHPs using skills like observation, interviews and the analysis of 
documents. Back in the office other checks might include the past history of the business, 
previous complaints and/or background checks of the CoJ’s GIS records. Other CoJ 
organisations might also be contacted and together this evidence informed whether referral to 
the relevant CoJ organisation or other regulator is necessary or if EHPs have complete or shared 
responsibilities for a case. Responsibility could be shared because EH regulation is fragmented 
in the CoJ itself and between other spheres of government (see section 5.3.2).   
 
4.4.3 Monitoring reports  
EHPs undertake a wide range of EH monitoring for other CoJ organisations and provincial 
government that is explored in more detail in section 5.3.2 below.  In summary many EHPs 
thought the ability to work with such a diversity of organisations was a key skill and monitoring 
reports were drafted by EHPs then reviewed by their managers before being sent to the relevant 
organisation(s). In theory this ended the EHP’s involvement, but in practice monitoring usually 
continued because conditions changed or the problems continued, particularly when the 
recommendations of EHPs were not acted upon.  
 
4.4.4 Confirming the pyramid of responsive regulation  
As summarised in Figure 4.4 above, the regulatory options available to CoJ EHPs in their 
regulatory pyramid differ from those described for UK EHPs (and other EH regulators) by 
Hutter (1997) in Figure 2.1 above. However, the core pyramid distribution of regulatory 
activities of EHPs was confirmed by three sources of evidence that suggest the predominance of 
persuasive approaches during routine work. First, the observation of 14 CoJ EHPs during 
fieldwork confirmed routine activities dominated by persuasive approaches towards the base of 
the pyramid, particularly the provision of education and advice.  Written warnings in the form 
of statutory notices were issued after some visits but only one fine/summons was served during 
89 observed visits. Non-routine work targeting known offending hotspots, when punitive 




Second, the author was unsuccessful in his requests for law enforcement data (see section 3.3.4) 
but the regulatory pyramid mirrors the CoJ performance targets for EHPs summarized by the 
author in Table 4.2 below. Performance management is explored in section 5.3.4 below but the 
case-EHPs usually exceeded their performance targets. In Table 4.2 the estimated figure of 1800 
premises is based on the typical agreements observed by the author, where EHPs complete eight 
inspections/complaints per day during a working year of around 225 days7. This suggests the 
probability of a fine/summons during routine encounters of around 1:50. This calculation could 
not be directly applied to the target data for all the EH sub-directorate in the next column of 
Table 4.2 below because the total target number for all evaluations was not available. However, 
the Appendix K2 data show at least 122262 evaluations were completed over 2005-6 which 
suggests a similar probability of around 1:49 assuming that EHPs at least meet their annual 
fine/summons targets. This probability could be lower still when EHPs are involved in non-
routine work targeting offending hotspots.       
 
Towards the top rows of Table 4.2 below the author was unsuccessful in his requests for data on 
the numbers of prohibitions (e.g. premises closures) and prosecutions carried out by the CoJ. By 
its nature the fine/summons automatically becomes a prosecution if unpaid and contested, but 
this process was organised by the criminal justice system and EHPs did not know what 
happened after they had issued the fine/summons as explored in section 6.9 below.  
 
Table 4.2 CoJ data confirming the pyramid distribution of regulatory activities  





directorate targets for 
2005-6 and 2006-7 
Inner city Clean and 
Green campaign 














Number of statutory 
notices 
264 29 781 3678 




No target data, but 
122262 evaluations over 
2005-6 
10970 
Crude probability of 
fine/summons 
1:50 1:49 1:7 
 
                                                     
7 Assuming a working year of 250 days that excludes weekends and 12 days of public holidays, 
from which the EHPs’ typical annual leave of 20 days and 5 days training is then subtracted.  
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Third, in the final column of Table 4.2 non-routine activity data from the Executive Mayor’s 
inner city Clean and Green campaign in 2006 suggested a far steeper regulatory pyramid where 
the probability of a fine/summons increases to 1:7. This is not surprising given the campaign’s 
targeting of known offending hotspots and its ‘zero tolerance’ approach to offending where the 
fine/summons was issued without prior warning (CoJ DoH 2006c). No similar non-routine 
activities were observed during fieldwork but more punitive approaches were an important 
regulatory tactic for CoJ EHPs.   
 
4.4.5 Moving up and down the regulatory pyramid   
The stage at which cases entered the regulatory pyramid and the speed they moved up/down 
thereafter depended on the case and the factors explored in Chapters 5-7 but the case-EHPs used 
predominantly persuasive approaches towards the base of the pyramid in Figure 4.4 above 
towards achieving compliance with the law. If these initial attempts were unsuccessful they 
would be followed by negotiations where EHPs typically appealed to a person’s sense of 
responsibility to their customers or the public. The agreement of deadlines was also useful here 
because, as Hutter (1988) found, it suggested reasonableness on the part of the EHP whilst 
obliging the offender to carry out the works needed in the agreed time period. Shaming 
businesses into compliance, for example by comparison with better premises nearby, was 
another technique used in these early stages. Bluffing strategies included making demands or 
threats that would be difficult to enforce if called. For example EHPs observing relatively minor 
offences sometimes commented that ‘you know I could close you down’ or ‘I could fine you 
R500’. Dramatic techniques like raised voices or asking people to point out their offences also 
helped EHPs reinforce their demands.   
 
Failure to secure compliance would usually result in an escalation to verbal and written 
warnings, the next level of the pyramid in Figure 4.4 above. The former included threats of 
further escalation, particularly the fine/summons, that EHPs would be forced to take if 
offending continued. This could include involving managers, other CoJ organisations or the 
courts themselves and, after Hutter (1988), helped shift responsibility for action onto the 
offender in a reasonable way. The most common written warnings were statutory notices but 
they also included reports or letters depending on the case. Standard formats and checklists were 
used to record inspection data for some premises (e.g. food premises, places of care) and the 
Central EH Unit was developing more. There was no standard format for written warnings but 
F1D thought this was deliberate because “... [our managers] don’t want to tell you what to do, 
they want you to use your own way of doing things...” (F1D interview p6). Appendix L 




 Date  
 Name and address of potential offender 
 Address and stand number of offending premises 
 A summary of the offence committed, including the relevant laws 
 The works to be completed towards compliance, with timescales  
 The EHP name and contact details  
 
Depending on the case, details like the GIS location were also included and photos using digital 
cameras were being used to give reports more impact. Written warnings typically ended with a 
standard sentence like ‘your co-operation will be greatly appreciated, but failure to comply may 
result in legal proceedings being taken against you’.  
 
Depending on the offence some warnings cautioned that a fine/summons could result from 
continued non-compliance and stated the maximum fine for that offence upon conviction. In the 
field statutory notices were written on blank and indexed carbon copy sheets, with the top sheet 
given to the offender at the end of the visit. Of the two remaining copies, one was retained by 
the EHP in their filing cabinet and the other sent to their Operations Manager for review. On 
returning from the field, hand written warnings were usually typed up by EHPs and reviewed by 
their manager. The final copies were posted to the offender where possible (e.g. some informal 
traders lack postal addresses) or hand delivered and filed for future reference. Written warnings 
were subject to further scrutiny by EHPs during revisits.  
 
Continued non-compliance could result in another written warning or increasingly punitive 
action by escalation to the next stage of the regulatory pyramid in Figure 4.4 above, typically a 
spot fine/summons. This was the most common punitive sanction used by EHPs and 
incorporates both a fine and a court summons (see Appendix M) and is normally used by the 
CoJ’s JMPD and its Department of Transportation for regulating road traffic. Authorised EHPs 
(called Peace Officers) completed the carbon copy form on site with details of the offence and 
the next regional court date (EHPs carried lists of local court dates in their bags) if the offender 
wishes to appear before the magistrate and contest the offence. The fine/summons thus gave 
EHPs the power to prosecute offenders, a sanction that makes them much more powerful than 
their UK counterparts where prosecution decisions are usually made by the local authority itself.  
 
The spot fine/summons also provides further information for the accused in Afrikaans and 
English (not shown in Appendix M) that includes a warning that the failure to comply could 
result in arrest and sentencing to a fine not exceeding R1500 or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 3 months. For those admitting guilt, details of the various payment methods of the 
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Department of Transportation are included. Those disputing the offence should inform the 
public prosecutor in writing before the payment of the fine deadline and are recommended to 
use a lawyer or apply for legal aid via the court. The original copy of the spot fine/summons 
was left with the offender, another was filed by the EHP and the third submitted to the local 
JMPD duty Sergeant/Inspector. This police officer then reviews the document, signs the EHP’s 
handover form when happy and the fine/summons enters the criminal justice system.   
 
Other formal options exist but were not observed during the fieldwork and were only mentioned 
briefly by more experienced EHPs and managers. They are grouped under the heading 
‘prohibitions’ in Figure 4.4 above and include the closure of premises, the 
suspension/withdrawal of licenses/permits and other procedures like court orders to take control 
of premises/buildings or confiscate equipment (e.g. music amplifiers). Only a few EHPs had 
prohibition experience but the Central EH Unit were drafting guidance for EHPs who were very 
keen to try these approaches, not least because of the problems with the fine/summons as 
explored in section 6.9 below. Inner city Region F1 EHPs also worked with the CoJ’s Inner City 
Task Force because they had far greater expertise of prohibition related approaches.    
 
At the peak of Figure 4.4 above, criminal prosecution is the highest sanction and the nature of 
the spot fine/summons meant that, in theory, prosecution happened automatically if an offender 
chose to contest their fine in court. Offenders not paying their fines and then failing to appear in 
court were, in theory, automatically issued with warrants of arrest. EHPs could also force such 
cases to court by requesting that public prosecutors serve a ‘Notice to Appear in Court’ on the 
offender, a procedure commonly known as a ‘J175’. During fieldwork Operations Managers 
were preparing prosecution cases but the involvement of the EHPs observed was limited.  
 
4.4.6 Environmental health project and promotion activities 
Returning to Figure 4.4 above, most case-EHPs were also engaged in a second pathway 
associated with on-going EH project and promotional activities with local actors including 
schools, businesses, community groups and non-government organisations (NGOs). These 
interventions are separate from the first pathway described above, not least because they often 
do not originate from offending and can be initiated by local actors themselves. However a 
broken arrow is used to link the two pathways in Figure 4.4 for two reasons. Occasionally 
project/promotion activities did lead to the detection of offending and these activities were often 
shaped by the regulatory pyramid as illustrated by some examples below. Therefore whilst 
project/promotion activities remain separate from the educational activities towards the base of 
the regulatory pyramid, they remain regulatory by nature given their role towards achieving 




Some EHPs were responsible for health education in their regions. During fieldwork F1D was 
delivering half-day hygiene training courses for informal food handlers and lead awareness 
training for pre-schools from across Region F1. Each course was structured around the technical 
and practical aspects of the subject and tailored to the requirements of delegates, particularly 
those from the informal sector, but F1D constantly reminded delegates of their legal 
responsibilities and warned that non-compliance could result in punitive sanctions. Fieldwork 
coincided with Johannesburg’s Annual Water Festival with stands from many CoJ 
organisations, including Region F1 Environmental Health, and talks to visiting school children 
about CoJ services. Global environmental health days were celebrated each year and F2A was 
busy with local teachers planning activities for ‘World No Tobacco’ and ‘World Environment’ 
days, the latter including plans for a ‘healthy environment’ poster competition and community 
workshops on the environment and illegal dumping.  
 
EHPs worked regularly with local groups and NGOs in different ways. Attending meetings gave 
opportunities to provide information and education on environmental health and other CoJ 
services. EHPs could also receive complaints and feedback about local problems and concerns 
that might otherwise remain undetected. Further, EHPs could also make referrals to other CoJ 
services where appropriate. F2A had recently attended a local youth event to talk about illegal 
dumping and By-law enforcement and was planning more events like this in the future. He 
hoped that by educating the youth “…you make your programme sustainable, because they are 
the future leaders and they can EASILY take the information back to their homes” (F2A 
interview p4). Work with local NGOs included the provision and maintenance of basic EH 
services for vulnerable groups like refugees and those affected by HIV/AIDS and EHPs 
recognised that maintaining good relations with them could be mutually beneficial:  
 
“They know us, that we are there, whenever we need their assistance we call them on 
board, or maybe their chairman and sit down and discuss... we are working hand in 
hand, you know it’s good to work like that, that can make our job easier at the end of 
the day because they are actually there every day, they are staying there, they know, 
they are not like people going there and go, they know. When you are speaking to them, 
they know the situation” (F1C interview pp32-3).    
 
As well as contributing to existing community projects, some EHPs had developed their own. 
Field work coincided with an on-going hostel clean-up campaign targeting 10 hostels identified 
by EHPs across Regions D, E and F. The hostel heads worked with residents, Ward Councillors 
and other CoJ organisations (e.g. Pikitup – the waste management utility) on activities including 
the cleaning of hostels and surrounding areas and workshops on healthy lifestyles and the CoJ 
By-laws. Half way through the campaign more than 450 residents, including women, children 
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and the unemployed had participated (CoJ DoH, 2007). Former gardener B2 was also working 
with township residents to create a local park (B2 interview p21). Two Region F1 EHPs had 
also developed a smokeless coal stove (see Appendix N) and in 2011, as part of a wider 
programme to improve air quality and empower small businesses, they donated 25 to informal 
township traders and were planning similar future donations (CoJ, 2011).  
 
The illegal dumping of solid waste had also prompted EHPs to organise local projects to 
complement their regulatory activities. For example B2 had reduced illegal dumping by 
involving local people in the monitoring of known hotspots; they now did not hesitate to call 
him if they saw anything (0006/B Observations p11) and other EHPs were developing similar 
projects. B4 had started a similar project around his own home, partly by shaming (in his own 
words) his neighbours into action by asking what they had done to make a difference to their 
local environment beyond just complaining to the council (0010/B Observations p11). Across 
the four offices EHPs were actively trying to persuade the public to take more responsibility for 
their environmental health, Region D1 using a briefing that began:  
 
“The City of Joburg takes the protection, conservation and enhancement of its 
environment seriously. However, inconsiderate people litter our streets, dump refuse 
and waste on vacant stands and open spaces and pollute our underground water 
resources, soil, streams and air. The monitoring and control of illegal activities, 
pollution and dumping cost the City a great amount of money. This cannot be allowed, 
as these wasted funds are needed for urgent projects such as housing, infrastructure and 
other services. The City of Joburg cannot protect, conserve and enhance the 
environment on its own and therefore requests the assistance and commitment of all 
stakeholders in combating these crimes” (Region 6 Notice, undated) 
 
The briefing then requests the public to inform EHPs of anyone who commits any of the 
offences listed there and warns that ‘zero tolerance’ will be applied with ‘stiff fines’ for those 
found guilty by the courts. By prosecuting offenders the briefing argues that the CoJ is 
protecting the rights of South Africans and it ended with a separate section outlining the 
information required by EHPs plus a guarantee of confidentiality for all informants.  
 
4.5 The proactive and reactive approaches of EHPs  
This section summarises the proactive and reactive ways that EHPs regulate across Figure 4.4 
above. Table 4.3 below summarises the results in terms of the numbers of proactive or reactive 
visits observed during fieldwork, the additional 40 premises in Region F2 reflecting the 




Table 4.3 Proactive/reactive nature of field work visits  
(Source: Results in PhD observation notes) 
Type of visit Number of visits by Regional office 
Region B Region D1 Region F1 Region F2 Total 
Proactive 5 18 0 10 + 40 33 + 40 
Reactive 10 0 3 5 18 
 
The importance of proactive working was widely acknowledged. One Region F2 Operations 
Manager commented that the CoJ had lost a lot in the past by reactive working but by becoming 
more proactive environmental health was improving, particularly through better surveillance 
and targeting of known hotspots (0001/F2 Observations p3). Most proactive work was 
unannounced and EHPs were flexible in fitting around busy workplaces, though as Hutter 
(1988) found this was also dependant on whether they thought business owners/managers were 
genuinely busy or being evasive. EHPs only booked proactive visits when issues like access or 
safety were problematic, for example prisons.  
 
Whether EHPs were accompanied by business owners/managers during proactive visits was 
determined by the case itself (e.g. seriousness, staff availability) and their own preferences. For 
example some EHPs preferred to work alone and report their findings afterwards, but others 
gave people the option to accompany them which was usually accepted. All visits ended with 
meetings to review the findings and the next steps. Much of this proactive work was initiated by 
EHPs themselves in accordance with the traditional regulatory pathway in Figure 4.4 above, 
though some project/promotion activities were also proactive as described above.            
 
Of the 73 proactive visits observed during fieldwork, only one resulted in a spot fine/summons 
and all others involved largely persuasive regulatory activities. The following three results 
chapters will explore why in more detail, but the annual performance agreements between EHP 
and their Operations Manager were influential because each set minimum monthly targets for 
the numbers of premises inspected and complaints investigated and specific regulatory activities 
completed (see section 5.3.4 below). Proactive work was also influenced by the responsibilities 
of each EHP and the areas they cover. There were no formal systems of risk assessment to 
prioritise premises for proactive intervention. Performance targets influenced how many 
premises they visited and set minimum numbers for regulatory activities completed each month, 
but otherwise decisions about which premises to visit were left to the individual discretion of 
EHPs. For example, EHP B2 chose to inspect all the pre-schools in his area every month, not 
every six months as per his performance targets, because he was concerned that standards would 
drop if he did not do so.  
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For reactive work, complaints worked covered all EH areas but those related to waste 
management (e.g. illegal dumping, sewage leaks), environmental pollution control (e.g. noise, 
smoke) and vector control (e.g. pest infestations) were encountered during the observation of 
fifteen investigations in Regions B and F2. The author was unsuccessful in his requests for more 
complete complaints data, but during 2005-6 there were some 524 noise and 1473 air quality 
related complaints across the CoJ (CoJ DoH 2006b). Township Region D1 did receive 
complaints but no investigations were observed during fieldwork and EHPs there were 
noticeably more ‘proactive’ in their attempts to encourage the public to complain when 
compared to the other offices.  
 
Complaints reached EHPs from many sources. Most reached them via telephone calls or visits 
to the regional CoJ Peoples’ Centres that were being promoted as the public’s first point of 
contact. Sometimes complainants visited the offices of EHPs in person or complained to them 
during visits or meetings etc. This was important given the difficult relations between EHPs and 
the public, particularly in the poorer areas of Region D whose EHPs had concluded that 
bringing the complaints book to the people was vital because “…if you wait for them to come 
they are not going to come” (D1A interview p19). Outside office hours, complaints were 
recorded on answer machines and processed into complaints by administrators/EHPs the next 
working day. Other sources of complaints included local politicians, other CoJ organisations 
and senior managers from the Central EH Unit. All EHPs had CoJ email accounts and access to 
office computers, but this access was sometimes limited and EHPs usually corresponded with 
complainants by phone, letters and visits. All complaints were treated seriously by EHPs 
because, as Hutter (1988) found, their actions could be subject to greater public scrutiny than 
during proactive work, particularly when politicians were involved (see section 5.3.5 below). 
The EHP’s perceptions of a complainant’s motivations were also important in determining their 
regulatory approach as explored in section 7.2 below.  
 
The basic details of the complaint and the complainant were recorded by the administrator/EHP 
and entered into an electronic database and the office complaints book. During fieldwork a new 
database was centralising complaints via the regional Peoples’ Centres before distribution to the 
regional offices for further investigation. Where possible the GIS location of the complaint was 
also pinpointed to gather further details (e.g. land ownership) and ensure allocation to the 
correct EHP. This worked well in theory, but in practice centralised call operators lacked 
knowledge and were making mistakes like inputting the same details into the ‘Address of 
Complaint’ (i.e. where the offence happened) and ‘Address of the Complainant’ and 
consequently EHPs were even more careful to maintain confidentiality. It was also becoming 




Complaints were usually allocated to the EHP responsible for the area in which they originate 
and investigations began soon after receipt. Where possible the EHP would try to witness the 
complaint, well aware that delays could result in a loss of evidence as often happened with 
weekend noise complaints. Responding to complaints quickly also helped EHPs maintain good 
relations with all parties, though investigations could be delayed by a lack of evidence, 
difficulties contacting complainants (e.g. no telephones) and cases that involved other CoJ 
organisations. Performance targets for complaints usually required EHPs to initiate 
investigations within two working days of receipt, with a further three working days to initiate 
action. Reports for completed complaints were reviewed by managers before being sent to the 
Peoples’ Centres for archiving, though EHPs were retaining copies given the on-going problems 
of access. 
     
EHPs were also engaged in activities to raise public awareness of their services and 
environmental health more generally. During fieldwork EHPs were observed distributing 
advisory leaflets in residential areas, shopping malls and other workplaces that explained their 
services, gave instructions of how to complain and details of local EHPs by area. The EH sub-
directorate also hosted a website with this information and more covering five priority areas: 
   
 Permits for public health by-laws (including application forms) 
 Business licensing (including application forms) 
 Illegal dumping 
 Cleaning and clearing of vacant stands 
 Food safety at food premises: general tips and guidance    
 
This chapter started by exploring how environmental health is organised in the CoJ and 
introducing its EHPs before describing and exploring their working days, summarising their 
regulatory strategies and how these conform to the pyramid of responsive regulation. Their 
work in EH project and promotion activities was then explored, the section above summarising 
how EHPs work in both proactive and reactive ways. Having explored the regulatory strategies 
of EHPs at the centre of Figure 4.1 the final section of this chapter now turns to the first factor 
influencing regulation, the context in which it takes place.  
 
4.6 External factors: The regulatory context  
Theoretical and empirical studies provide accounts of how regulators can be influenced by the 
political and socioeconomic contexts in which regulation takes place, what Hawkins (2002) 
calls the ‘surround’. This section builds on the literature review in Chapters 1 and 2, particularly 
section 2.5.2, by using the results to revisit South Africa’s history before exploring its 
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macroeconomic policies, how public and media attitudes are influencing EHPs and why this 
context often favours persuasive regulatory approaches.  
 
4.6.1 Historical context  
Chapter 2 summarised the challenges for South African EHPs tasked with improving the 
environmental health of historically disadvantaged and potentially hostile populations whilst 
maintaining the highest standards expected in more affluent areas. The literature review in 
section 2.5.2 above painted a bleak picture of EHPs during colonialism and apartheid, notably 
how EH regulation was characterised by punitive regulatory approaches and frequently used to 
justify the segregation and control of populations. Indeed, the CoJ Public Health By-laws, 2004 
require EHPs (and others) to “take account of historic inequalities…” when dealing with matters 
affecting public health (Chapter 2 Section 3 (6) (c)).  
 
Two case-EHPs (B4 and F2B) and three Regional EH managers had worked as EHPs in 
Johannesburg during apartheid. All apart from B4 were White and had worked mainly in the 
city’s White areas since the 1970s-80s and further confirmed that the predominance of law 
enforcement approaches that included a lot of time in court. They acknowledged that this work 
was inherently unfair to non-White people and businesses, but two also believed that such 
prescriptive laws made their work clearer. However B4 volunteered a more nuanced account of 
apartheid era regulation. He first worked as a township EHP in Johannesburg in the mid-1970s 
with responsibilities for measles and polio immunisation and supervising bucket latrines before 
moving to Soweto as one of its 200 inspectors. There he was responsible for enforcing public 
health By-laws and was gradually promoted until working across all Johannesburg, including 
White areas.  
 
In the 1970s B4 explained that national government was deliberately selecting, training and then 
posting health inspectors to the areas with the worst environmental health like rural Limpopo.  
Those EHPs appointed by the rural (self-governing) homeland governments were not very 
effective because they were so few in number (e.g. 1 or 2 per homeland) and had to travel long 
distances so could only stay in one place a few days before moving to another area (B4 
interview pp16-7). In contrast, urban environmental health was much better due to population 
controls (e.g. pass laws) and the greater resources available, Soweto alone having 200 EHPs (B4 
interview pp17-8) when compared to 221 across all the CoJ in 2013 (Mudaly, 2013).  
 
In Soweto B4 would typically start work at 08:00AM and complete the previous day’s 
paperwork before being dropped off by his supervisor in his areas from 10:00AM to 16:00PM. 
During a typical day he would inspect 50 residential units (e.g. homes/hostels) and businesses 
and he thought the health surveillance and pest control measures then were of a high standard. 
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EHPs often worked in areas where they did not speak the language, but they soon learned it. 
Threats from township gangsters and the public were common, the latter often commenting:  
 
“How can you, a fellow African....”  (0010/B Observations p4)      
 
But B4 thought it important to have a job and by working as an EHP was proud of his work. He 
also recalled one incident that suggests public attitudes weren’t all hostile. During the Soweto 
uprising in 1976 three White pest controllers became trapped; two managed to escape but one 
was hidden by locals who later smuggled him out, assisted by boot polish to blacken his face.  
 
B4 gradually progressed beyond the township areas by conducting inspections in so-called 
‘grey’ food businesses serving Johannesburg’s factories and run by Greeks and Portuguese. 
Initially his White superiors would revisit the premises to communicate B4’s inspection 
findings but he was eventually authorised to do this himself. Offences generally resulted in fines 
and prosecutions and B4 spend a long time in the courts which he did not think were fair but 
they sometimes helped to improve local conditions. When prosecuting White people his 
presence would often be met with outrage (e.g. ‘how dare a Black man tell us what to do’, ‘who 
is this Black monkey?’) but he usually won his cases and magistrates sometimes held offenders 
in contempt of court for such comments (0010/B Observations pp6-7).  
 
These accounts further confirm that EH regulation before democracy reinforced apartheid and 
was characterised by more punitive regulatory approaches that today’s EHPs understandably 
want to distance themselves from. But B4’s recollections suggest that regulation was more 
complex and nuanced. His actions were maintaining apartheid, but they were often resisted by 
the public and businesses in the streets and the courts. Surveillance and control restricted 
freedoms but also provided B4 the opportunities to maintain and improve environmental health 
and enabled him to eventually transcend racial boundaries. Thus, after Hall (2012), B4’s past 
work illustrates the role of the apartheid environmental health state as repressor and protector 
because his actions simultaneously reinforced and undermined its legitimacy and this supports 
the need for more historical research into EH regulation as recommended in section 9.8 below.  
 
4.6.2 A neoliberal macroeconomic policy context  
This section summarises the movement of South Africa’s macroeconomic policy towards a 
more neoliberal model and how this has shaped the work of EHPs in different ways. No EHPs 
viewed their work in macroeconomic terms and, apart from their adherence to performance 
targets, there was no evidence of neoliberal preferences towards more persuasive regulatory 
approaches. However an emerging neoliberal policy rhetoric associating regulation with 
burdens on business was identified.  
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In 1994 the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) set out an integrated 
and developmental framework in which the state was to be transformed to lead development and 
economic growth (Chipkin, 2002). The ANC was cautious about privatization given the 
historical role of business in reinforcing racial division; instead its RDP vision was that 
reconstruction, development and sustainable growth could be achieved by a leading state and 
direct public investment, a thriving private sector and a people-driven process involving all civil 
society (ANC, 1994). Environmental health infrastructure and services were integral to meeting 
the RDP’s ten basic needs of the people, with a separate ‘Environment’ chapter calling for the 
environment to be integral to all decisions and for a review of historically weak and fragmented 
regulators (ANC, 1994). This chapter was removed from the final White Paper on 
Reconstruction and Development but the overall RDP vision remained (RSA, 1994). The new 
government also faced many problems in achieving the RDP consensus, including pressure 
from business for more export led (not RDP supply driven) growth and pressure from the unions 
frustrated by slow service delivery (Chipkin, 2002).  
 
In 1996 the national RDP coordinating office was closed (Habib and Padayachee, 2000) and an 
alternative ‘Growth, Employment and Redistribution’ (GEAR) strategy proposed changing the 
state’s role from leading to facilitating the conditions for development and economic growth 
(Chipkin, 2002). GEAR made no reference to the integration of environmental factors into 
macroeconomic planning, instead it proposed de-centralisation, more restrained and strategic 
government intervention and partnerships with non-state bodies and an expanding private sector 
(RSA, 1996). This could be achieved by reduced state spending, an accelerated program of 
privatization, deregulation and trade and industry liberalization (RSA, 1996). This change in the 
role of the state to ‘steering, not rowing’ (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) was also noted by Beall et 
al. in Johannesburg: 
 
“…the initial statist conception of local government’s task (one of leading 
development) was downgraded to one of facilitating development” (2002 p73, emphasis 
in original).  
 
The transition from RDP to GEAR has been described as a transition from socialist to neoliberal 
development (Habib and Padayachee, 2000; Peet 2002). The explanations for this are complex, 
but Habib and Padayachee identify a change in the ANC’s perception of the balance of political 
and economic power at the global and local levels that subordinated growth and development 
needs to those of the business community, international finance and foreign investment (2000). 




Section 4.2.1 above introduced the CoJ and how its structure was shaped by the market inspired 
iGoli 2002, particularly the split between the ‘client’ administration and its various ‘contractors’ 
that include its EHPs. In her study of CoJ waste management utility Pikitup, Samson describes 
how strategic priorities characterised by cost minimisation and profit maximisation both assisted 
and further entrenched exploitative social relations within its workforce. In their analysis of the 
case of Mazibuko & Others v. the City of Johannesburg & Others Bond and Dugard (2008) also 
describe how similar strategic priorities at CoJ utility Johannesburg Water towards water 
demand management and cost recovery were judged contrary to the Constitutional rights of 
access (Section 27(1)(b)) of Mazibuko & Others to sufficient water. Further, Samson (2008) 
identifies the paradox of iGoli 2002 which simultaneously created the uni-city of Johannesburg 
whilst shifting operational responsibility for many municipal functions outside the local state.  
 
During fieldwork the author encountered no public mention of plans for the future privatization 
or outsourcing of EHPs at the CoJ or any other local authority in South Africa. This may be due 
to considerable uncertainties about government responsibilities for delivering environmental 
health services as explored in section 5.2.2 that, until resolved, would imperil any alternative 
model from the outset. But the fact that environmental health related services are well 
established amongst CoJ contractors and the emerging trend towards the privatization or 
outsourcing of local government environmental health services (Tombs 2016) in influential 
countries like the UK suggests these options require careful scrutiny. But this section now 
considers the influence of the CoJ’s neoliberal policies on individual EHPs.      
 
No EHP identified themselves as a ‘contractor’ to their Department of Health ‘client’ but this is 
hardly surprising given their focus on local matters. However in accordance with Hood’s (1991) 
‘new public management’ approaches their work was inherently results-oriented and shaped by 
performance targets concerned with monthly outputs (e.g. numbers of inspections, complaints, 
notices served) that EHPs met with few difficulties (see section 5.3.4 below). Further, these 
outputs broadly conformed to the pyramid distribution of regulatory activities. In their daily 
monitoring work EHPs were often detecting the potential failures of other CoJ contractors, but 
their attempts to rectify these were very mixed as explored in section 5.3.2 below.   
 
There was no evidence that EHPs felt pressured by macro-economic policy to be more 
cooperative with business, but during fieldwork new policy developments suggested central 
government could become more hostile towards them. For example the new Accelerated Shared 
Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGI-SA) complemented GEAR and aimed for higher, 
sustained and shared growth by initiatives including reform of the regulation ‘burdening’ small 
and medium businesses and more local government support for local economic development 
(RSA, 2006). ASGI-SA made no mention of which regulations were burdening business, but in 
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the UK local government EHPs and other regulators have long perceived a hostility from central 
government to their work via neoliberal arguments that it ‘burdens business’ and binds it with 
‘red tape’ though little or no evidence is provided of this (Hawkins 2002; Tombs 2016). The 
final part of this section now considers how the local context can influence EHPs.  
 
4.6.3 EH in Johannesburg and public and media attitudes to regulation 
Chapter 1 summarised the environmental health challenges of South Africa and Johannesburg, 
but this section considers what EHPs themselves thought about these challenges and the public 
and media attitudes to their work. Here approaches across the entire regulatory pyramid in 
Figure 4.4 above were utilised by EHPs in response to this complex local context, but the 
emphasis towards more persuasive approaches remains. All the case EHPs had been born and 
brought up under apartheid and were well aware of the vast inequalities in their areas. For 
example most areas included affluent suburbs with the highest EH standards plus highly 
educated, vocal and demanding people who sometimes communicate via their lawyers:    
 
“If you happen to get one [a rich complainant] they tell you how rich they are, how they 
can talk to their lawyer and you don’t have to communicate directly with them. So if 
you are not familiar with the Act and the Regulation they can shut you out… so when 
you come they don’t look at you as a professional, they just measure you concerning 
their wealth. It seems like you are too poor to come talk to them, “send someone else 
they said to me (laughing)!” (D1A interview pp14-5) 
 
At the other extreme EHPs described people from low income areas with the worst 
environmental health who are the least vocal and sometimes will not say anything to them. 
When asked why this was their answers covered the aspects of poverty summarised in Figure 
1.1 above, with particular emphasis on fears of eviction, their own failures as EHPs and the 
legacy of the powerless ‘apartheid mindset’. EHPs responded in many different ways including 
greater monitoring of poorer areas and more education and awareness raising activities but this 
was a persistent challenge to which this section now turns.   
 
EHPs often commented on general improvements in their areas but feared these were not 
sustainable. For example D1B believed there was much less crime (e.g. car-jacking, rape) in 
some of her areas, but it remained a problem in others. F2B and others were concerned that 
drugs and prostitution were feeding wider problems like overcrowded housing that were 
spreading to neighbouring areas. F1C predicted that by next year his inner city area would have 




“Now the landlords of the people that stayed in these big houses... realised that whilst 
there’s money coming in they started subdividing the houses, getting people in, hence 
we have these overcrowding problems. Because now these houses were designed for 
families and we have forty people staying in a house designed for one family, and what 
happens to the infrastructure, blockages, problems of refuse removals, apart from the 
overcrowdings itself? Then also the neglect of the properties needing to be 
maintained… So problems become – MUCH BIGGER because of that” (B4 interview 
pp21-2). 
 
Informal settlements were common and EHPs reported sightings of possible illegal settlements 
to the CoJ that were usually removed a week or two later but EHPs knew they would return 
soon and there was some sympathy for their plight, not least given the housing shortages. In the 
inner city EHPs described people moving in and out of their areas constantly, some shops 
constantly changing ownership whilst ‘business tourists’, as EHPs described them, stayed for 
very short periods (e.g. 1 week). In the townships EHPs remarked that some crèches keep 
closing and re-opening and they never know what they will find. The 2010 World Cup was only 
a few years away and was beginning to add to workloads via planning and license/permit 
applications and wider issues like the anticipated growth in informal food traders. Two case-
EHPs (B4 & D1B) likened their work to constantly ‘putting out fires’ and this summarised well 
the general thoughts of EHPs about regulating Johannesburg, but the final part of this section 
explores public and media attitudes to their work.   
 
EHPs generally thought their relations with the public were improving but everything was still 
new and neither EHPs nor the public were used to it. For example two senior managers 
questioned how well EHPs were adapting to working in the CoJ ‘uni-city’. The Region B EH 
Manager described “the challenge of changing, coming from an old White Jo’burg to an old 
‘Black’ Soweto; you were working in very limited boundaries, but I don’t think we’ve passed 
that...” (Region B EH Manager interview p22). Similarly, the DD-EH had formerly worked for 
local authorities covering Sandton [an affluent suburb] and Soweto. In the former he had used 
punitive, ‘zero tolerance’ regulatory approaches, particularly for food trading and air quality but 
in Soweto his work mainly involved education and pollution control; the ‘uni-city’ challenge 
was to bring such different areas together under the same roof (DD-EH 10 April interview p2).    
 
Changing public attitudes was an ongoing challenge, particularly in the townships:    
 
“Our communities were used to apartheid for some time. This time the legislation was 
very prescriptive, blacks have… whites have… Everything came from the Government. 
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Now there are few complaints from the community and yet conditions remain 
unsatisfactory, even appalling” (D1 Operations Manager interview p2).  
 
 “... I usually tell them, compared to apartheid while you were born for like 60 years 
under oppression, suddenly you are free but I believe your mind is still born dead 
because there are so many things that you got used to doing a certain way. Things have 
changed on paper … but they actually come slowly. So I’m thinking people got used to 
staying in dirty environments, there were no By-Laws, anybody could do whatever they 
want, whatever. So now you come in, the Council, and you’re telling them to paint their 
shop, you’re telling them to put in hand wash basins, nail brush, soap and they are like 
‘Aha, you must be kidding me!’” (D1B interview pp38-9)      
 
Understandably, EHPs regularly encountered the public’s distrust of them and the CoJ more 
generally. The more affluent expected high levels of services and were willing to complain but 
did not seem to have much faith in EHPs to sort out their problems. In poorer areas EHPs 
sometimes encountered public hostility to their work driven in part by fears that EHPs were 
oppressing them and could close their business down or get them evicted. Such fears were 
sometimes justified, for example EHPs sometimes used verbal threats of business closure to 
encourage compliance (see section 4.4.5 above) and EHPs knew - and felt uncomfortable - that 
their reports on unsafe buildings could be used to evict tenants (see section 7.6).  
 
EHPs recognised the utility of the media for communicating their work and often asked them to 
cover projects and promotional activities. However the media rarely seemed interested unless 
there were serious and visible problems when EHPs could find themselves in the firing line: 
 
“Let’s say there are blockages in the squatter camp, then they will go there to shoot, to 
put it in the first page, telling the people that the Councillor and the EHPs are not doing 
their work... maybe the blocked drain happens on Friday late then I need to come here 
on Monday, they will say... “the whole week it was like this and the health inspectors 
did nothing, and the councillors did nothing” (B2 interview pp46-7).     
 
“...what happens is the newspapers and everybody will say ‘the environmental health of 
people in [my area] is put at risk. Who exposed them? It is the EHP of the area’” (F1B 
interview p47).         
 
During fieldwork the author monitored the local and national newspapers and found that articles 
on the environmental health problems of Johannesburg appeared regularly, particularly when 
highlighted by senior politicians and policy makers including the Executive Mayor (Mashaba, 
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2007a), the President of South Africa (Brown, 2007) and the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
for Housing (Benjamin, 2007). The Monitor section of the national weekly Mail and Guardian 
consistently focused on the environmental health of the urban poor and how actors including 
local government and the courts sometimes made matters worse (e.g. Donnelly, 2007; Ismail, 
2007). Such articles were mainly based on the experiences of poor people themselves, but 
important context was often provided by NGOs and academics, particularly those from the 
Centre for Applied Legal Studies of the University of the Witwatersrand.   
 
Articles on local green initiatives featured CoJ organisations like Pikitup (Bangerezako, 2007) 
and complaints for higher service levels, the letters pages of one suburban newspaper featuring 
a complaint to Pikitup about weeds, long grass and poor maintenance of local parks and paths 
(Anonymous, 2007). But most newspaper coverage was directed towards more serious issues 
that B2 suspected were driven largely by the need to sell newspapers (B2 interview pp46-7), not 
bearing witness or holding people/organisations (including EHPs) to account. However, EHPs 
were clearly engaged because some of their office walls were decorated with articles covering 
their cases, particularly in housing. During fieldwork only one newspaper article identified by 
the author referred directly to CoJ EHPs when the front page of City Vision (see Appendix O) 
covered the eviction of a mother and her newborn: 
 
“The chairperson of the [building] committee, John Sithole, said they received orders 
from the Johannesburg Council’s environmental health inspectors to renovate the 
building, and failure to do so would have resulted in a fine” (Mashaba 2007b p1).   
 
The article mentioned other factors behind the eviction decision, including the mother’s 
precarious employment and accusations of tenant fraud, but it illustrates how easily EHPs can 
become caught up in complex cases by the media. In another example one anonymous EHP was 
furious following the Executive Mayor’s tour of his areas where “…residents live in appalling 
conditions without running water, lights or toilets” and “…shacks comprise mostly of 
unemployed people who will do anything, including crime, to keep their house fires burning” 
(Mashaba 2007a p1). In a furious response this EHP accused Mayor Masondo of knowing 
nothing about environmental health but he was clearly anticipating a hard time as a result.    
 
4.7 Conclusions 
The first part of Chapter 4 confirmed that the core elements required for regulating 
environmental health were in place at the CoJ. It began with an introduction to the governance 
model of responsive regulation by CoJ EHPs in Figure 4.1 created by this thesis before 
describing and explaining the organisation of the CoJ and its EHPs and their work. The chapter 
then used Figure 4.4 to explore their regulatory strategies before confirming the pyramidal 
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model of responsive regulation and exploring the proactive and reactive approaches used by 
EHPs. Most of this work continues to follow the traditional law enforcement pathway, but 
during these stages EHPs also act as the environmental health eyes and ears for other CoJ 
organisations and provincial government. As summarised in Figure 4.4, this traditional pathway 
also operates alongside a second pathway focused on environmental health projects and other 
promotional activities involving a wide range of actors, not least local people themselves.   
 
The final section of Chapter 4 moved to the outer governance ring of Figure 4.1 above to 
consider how the regulatory context influences EHPs. Confronted by persistent and dynamic EH 
inequalities and a frequently hostile public and media, more persuasive regulatory approaches 
could help increase the public’s EH knowledge and build better relations between the CoJ and 
the public. More punitive approaches risked damaging already fragile relationships and were 
attracting adverse media coverage, but there was also clearly a need for them to try to maintain 
and improve standards in all areas and to protect the most vulnerable. Neoliberal policies were 
shaping the work of EHPs in many ways, but there was not yet any evidence that EHPs 
themselves felt pressured towards being more cooperative with business though new policy 
suggested this could change. Lastly, Chapter 4 suggests the utility of the model of governance in 
Figure 4.1 for identifying early on how power circulates between the many regulatory actors. 
The next chapter explores how legal and organisational factors can influence regulation. 
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Chapter 5 Legal and organisational factors 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The model of governance in Figure 4.1 explores how legal and then organisational factors can 
influence how EHPs regulate environmental health. The first section here describes and 
analyses the legal framework for EH regulation at the CoJ and explores the uncertainties that 
characterise it. The second section considers how organisational factors within the CoJ itself 
shape the work of its EHPs and it is argued that legal and organisational factors frequently 
favour more persuasive activities towards the base of the regulatory pyramid in Figure 4.4. 
 
5.2 The legal framework for environmental health regulation in the CoJ 
During the transition to democracy environmental health law has been through a continual 
process of review. This section is focused on main characteristics of the law and begins by 
reviewing the developmental framework for environmental health set out in the Constitution 
and subordinate legislation. The section then explores the uncertainties that characterise the law, 
beginning with the definition of municipal health services before analysing the criminality of 
environmental health offending and exploring the wider uncertainties surrounding the role of 
EHPs. Together, it is argued, these give local government EHPs an uncertain legal mandate that 
frequently favours persuasive approaches towards the base of the regulatory pyramid.  
 
5.2.1 Rights and reasonableness: the Constitutional framework for environmental health  
The Constitution shapes the legal framework for environmental health regulation by defining 
the environmental health rights of South Africans and the organisational structures and 
procedures for EH regulation across the three spheres of government. This section begins with 
an overview of the developmental local government framework for delivering these rights that 
is inherently ‘reasonable’ and is extended through a continual emphasis on reasonableness in 
environmental health law that remains integral to this developmental mandate.  
 
The Constitution is the highest law and was enacted in December 1996 after nearly two years of 
consultation and was informed by the “largest public participation programme” in South Africa 
and represents “...the collective wisdom of the South African people and has been arrived at by 
general agreement” (Preamble). The Constitution created local government across the whole of 
South Africa for the first time (Section 151 (1)) in three different forms:  
 
 6 Category A or  metropolitan municipalities (including the CoJ)     
 242 Category B or local municipalities  




The Constitution recognises local government as a distinctive sphere of government but one that 
is simultaneously equal, interdependent and interrelated to the national and provincial spheres of 
government (Section 40 (1)). These relationships are enshrined by the principles of co-operative 
government and include a duty on all spheres to secure the well-being of the people (Section 
41(1) (b)) and five more specific objectives for a local government committed to:   
 provide democratic and accountable government for local communities;  
 ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;  
 promote social and economic development;  
 promote a safe and healthy environment; and  
 encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters 
of local government (Section 152. (1))  
In 1998 this mandate was extended by the White Paper on Local Government and its vision for 
a developmental local government “committed to working with citizens and groups within the 
community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and 
improve the quality of their lives” (RSA, 1998). This vision extended to metropolitan 
municipalities like the CoJ by requiring that metropolitan development is socially just, equitable 
and integrated spatially and economically (RSA, 1998). Measures to realize this included a 
focus on local economic development and more developmental service delivery in accordance 
with the ANC’s original Reconstruction and Development Programme (see Section 4.6.2 above) 
though Beall et al. (2002) interpret this considerable extension of responsibilities on local 
government as a form of ‘decentralisation by stealth’.  
 
The Bill of Rights of the Constitution also sets out the environmental health rights of South 
Africans. Most importantly the fundamental right “to an environment that is not harmful to their 
health or well-being” (Section 24a.) operates alongside the socioeconomic right “to have the 
environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable 
legislative and other measures that:   
i. prevent pollution and ecological degradation;  
ii. promote conservation; and  
iii. secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development” (Section 24b.) 
Other socioeconomic environmental health rights include the right to have access to adequate 
housing (Section 26 (1)) and access to health care services, sufficient food and water and social 
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security (Section 27 (1)). Distinct rights for every child include the right to basic nutrition, 
shelter, health care services and social services (Section 28 (1c)). The Constitution also shapes 
how the three spheres of government should deliver these rights by including the fundamental 
rights of everyone to:     
 
 equality before the law and equal protection and benefit of the law (Section 9 (1)); 
 dignity and to have this respected and protected (Section 10); and  
 administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair (Section 33 (1)). 
 
These rights are further enacted in subordinate law. For example the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act, 2000 requires municipalities to take measures to prevent corruption in 
their administration (Section 6. (2c)). Under the National Health Act, 2003 a ‘health officer’ 
may enter any premises, excluding a private dwelling, at any reasonable time (Section 82 (1)). 
Further, if the health officer has ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that any condition constitutes a 
violation of the Constitutional right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-
being (Section 24 (a)), or pollution detrimental to health, or is causing/is likely to cause a health 
nuisance then the health officer must investigate such condition (Section 83 (1).  
 
Reasonableness also shapes how other legislation should be delivered. In the Atmospheric 
Pollution Prevention Act, 1965 for example, if a person can demonstrate they used the 'best 
practicable means' to the prevention the escape of noxious or offensive gases or the dispersal or 
suspension of dust in the atmosphere or the emission of fumes by vehicles then they are exempt 
from criminal liability. EHPs must therefore consider factors including ‘local conditions and 
circumstances, the prevailing extent of technical knowledge and the cost likely to be involved’ 
to protect the public from the gases, dust or fumes (Section 1) that could arise from the activities 
regulated by this Act. The principle of ‘best practicable means’ originates from UK legislation 
but has been criticised for failing to define what is reasonable, particularly the balance between 
acceptable business costs and unacceptable dangers to public health (Gunningham 1974; Hutter, 
1988) and investigations into South African industries have raised similar concerns (Davis et al. 
1997; Leonard and Pelling 2010). 
 
At the CoJ reasonableness has also been written into the principles for delivering its Public 
Health By-laws but there is no further guidance there for EHPs on how to achieve this:   
 
“In dealing with matters affecting public health the Council must -  
(a) Adopt a cautious and risk-averse approach;  
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(b) Prioritise the collective interests of the people of the municipal area, and of South 
Africa, over the interests of any specific interest group or sector of society; 
(c) Take account of historic inequalities in the management and regulation of activities that 
may have an adverse impact on public health and redress these inequalities in an 
equitable and non-discriminatory manner;  
(d) Adopt a long-term perspective that takes account of the interests of future generations; 
and  
(e) Take account of, and wherever possible without compromising public health, minimise 
any adverse effects on other living organisms and ecosystems” (Chapter 2 Section 3 (6)) 
 
In summary, CoJ EHPs have a wide ranging Constitutional mandate for their work and a duty to 
act reasonably but there are few clues in the law to guide EHPs as to how they should regulate 
environmental health. The pyramid model in Figure 4.4 could help EHPs to navigate this 
uncertain legal mandate but this section ends by analysing the national frameworks for public 
service delivery and environmental health policy that complement the law and sometimes 
encourage EHPs towards more persuasive regulatory approaches.  
 
In 1997 the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery sets eight Batho Pele (People 
First) principles for delivering public services that include consultation with citizens (1), equal 
access to services (3), treating citizens with courtesy (4), providing information about services 
(5), openness and transparency (6) and accountability (7) (RSA, 1997b). Whilst these principles 
do not preclude more punitive approaches, the greater emphasis on cooperation, education and 
negotiation that characterise persuasive approaches arguably makes them more ‘Batho Pele’.     
Chapter 11 of the 1997 White Paper for the Transformation of the Health System in South 
Africa focuses on environmental health and is structured around five developmental principles:  
 Every South African has the right to a living and working environment which is not 
detrimental to his/her health and well-being.  
 All persons should have access to knowledge on environmental health matters and the 
services available to them.  
 Environmental health services should be accessible, acceptable, affordable and 
equitable. They must be implemented with the active participation of the communities.  
 Environmental health services should contribute positively towards sustainable physical 
and socio-economic development.  
 The establishment of effective environmental health surveillance is essential to 
determine whether or not the services are functional and effective and have a positive 
health impact (RSA, 1997a). 
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Two points further articulate this environmental health vision. First, alongside its Constitutional 
first principle it acknowledges that environmental health is a shared responsibility; here the 
environmental health sector itself is responsible for providing accessible services and supporting 
communities in managing their environmental health risks, but individuals remain ultimately 
responsible for maintaining a healthy environment (Chapter 11.1.1(d), RSA, 1997a). Second, 
the following statement under the heading ‘environmental health legislation’ is significant:  
 
“A community development rather then a law enforced approach will be followed in 
creating environmental conditions conducive to good health. Environmental health 
legislation will comply with the requirements contained in the Interim Constitution's 
Bill of Rights and will be based on integrated, appropriate and uniformly applicable 
legislation.” (Chapter 11.1.1(e) RSA, 1997 - Note: errors in original). 
 
This preference was reinforced during the development of the National Environmental Health 
Policy for South Africa. In 1996 its first draft called on EHPs to adopt community development 
approaches and envisaged them as educators and facilitators, monitoring and responding to 
community needs and demands and enabling access to essential local authority services (Eales 
et al. 2002). By 2004 the third draft described post-1994 services as developmental, with 
education, cooperation and community participation central to its ‘philosophy of environmental 
health’ (NDoH, 2004). The final draft was published on 4 December 2013 as a broad guide and 
framework for the effective implementation of Environmental Health Services in South Africa. 
Its key principles encompass the entire regulatory pyramid but with continued preference for 
persuasive activities. For example its first objective is to “promote a legal and regulatory 
framework that ensures mandatory but also supports voluntary compliance...” (NDoH, 2013 
p14). Its principles include an emphasis on voluntary compliance by education:  
 
 “Although it's a requirement for compliance to national policies and standards on 
environment and health by importers, producers, manufacturers, retailers and 
communities, environmental health strategies should strike an appropriate balance 
between promotion and education and law enforcement. 
 Education must be used as a vital tool of building capacity for all stakeholders /role 
players, to be able to attain voluntary compliance” (NDoH, 2013 p16).    
 
This consistent national policy preference for regulation by activities towards the base of the 
regulatory pyramid sends a clearer message to EHPs about how to regulate, but Chapter 5 now 




5.2.2 What are municipal health services?   
This section argues that the legal framework for environmental health regulation via the 
delivery of municipal health services is also characterised by uncertainty that potentially further 
weakens the mandate of EHPs. The Constitution lists 83 areas of legislative competence of 
national, provincial and local government in two schedules (Schedules 4 and 5). Environmental 
health services at the CoJ reside mainly as a local government competence within Schedule 4B 
municipal health services but environmental health is relevant to at least 71 of these 83 
competencies and it is argued in section 5.2.8 below that this fragmentation of EH 
responsibilities further weakens the mandate of local government EHPs. During fieldwork 
uncertainty also surrounded the definition of municipal health services. Section 156 (1) of the 
Constitution  mandates municipalities to deliver municipal health services, but metropolitan 
municipalities were not given responsibility for delivering these services until the promulgation 
of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 from the 1 February 1999. Further, municipal health 
services were only defined in 2006, during pilot fieldwork, as those services including: 
 
 water quality monitoring; 
 food control; 
 waste management; 
 the health surveillance of premises; 
 surveillance and prevention of communicable diseases (excluding immunizations);  
 vector control; 
 environmental pollution control; 
 disposal of the dead; and 
 chemical safety   (National Health Act, 2003 (Section 1)) 
 
No further definition of these nine areas is provided but the Act excludes port health, malaria 
control and the control of hazardous substances which have become provincial government 
functions (Agenbag and Balfour-Kaipa 2008).   
 
Concern about these uncertainties was widespread during fieldwork. In one survey Gauteng 
EHPs welcomed how its breadth avoided excluding services but remained confused about the 
scope of each function, who was responsible for delivery (i.e. provincial or local government, if 
local government: metropolitan, district or local municipality?) and resources (Haynes, 2005). 
Some established services including the licensing of premises and dogs, control of liquor 
establishments, regulation of accommodation establishments and abattoirs and the care and 




To provide more certainty the Professional Board for EHPs of the HPCSA attempted to define 
the scope of the work of EHPs (see Appendix P) but in 2006 this was little more than a long list 
of areas and sectors that ended with a catch all sentence concerning “[a]ny other matter 
incidental to or of Environmental Health significance, which, if unattended would compromise 
the quality of public and Environmental Health” (HPCSA, 2006a). At the CoJ the DD-EH 
confirmed that the Gauteng branch of the South African Local Government Association 
(SALGA) had pragmatically adopted a definition of municipal health services as environmental 
health and therefore the CoJ were delivering the nine functional areas above whilst continuing 
to regulate missing areas (e.g. accommodation establishments) and monitoring provincial 
government premises including schools, prisons and clinics (see section 5.3.2 below).    
 
5.2.3 Minimum legal standards and the inevitability of discretion 
Environmental health regulation by the delivery of municipal health services by EHPs and 
others (e.g. licensing officers, EH Assistants) is enabled by a wide range of legislation as listed 
in the bibliography of this thesis. These laws define minimum standards and give EHPs and 
others the powers to regulate but it is argued here that their uncertainties confer considerable 
discretion on those responsible for bringing them to life. Some laws date back to the apartheid 
era but did not contain any race-based standards. During the pilot study in 2006 however the 
EHPs of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality were still enforcing by-laws that included race 
based standards, though these provisions were (obviously) not being enforced and their new by-
laws were promulgated in 2007. 
 
Hawkins and Thomas argue that where regulatory goals are clearly defined and unambiguous 
they are likely to be enforced more stringently (1984) but environmental health law has been 
characterised by both broad and prescriptive legal standards since Victorian times (Crook, 2007; 
Wilson, 1881) and this continues in South Africa. Indeed the minimum legal standards for 
environmental health remained largely prescriptive and included requirements for 
permits/licenses that date back to the British colonial era (Rogerson, 1986). For example the 
Regulations governing general hygiene requirements for food premises and the transport of 
food (R.918 of 30 July 1999) (hereafter the ‘R918’ as EHPs call them) prohibit certain listed 
activities, prescribe wide ranging standards for food premises, equipment and handlers and then 
require a permit called a Certificate of Acceptability (CoA) from the local authority in order to 
operate. Similarly, Chapter 14 of the CoJ Public Health By-laws defines the minimum space 
standards and facilities (e.g. toilets, hand washing, kitchen etc) for child care facilities and a 
permit to operate. The CoA was free, but applications for by-law permits began with the full 
payment of fees. Standard application forms operated for all permits and collected details about 
the applicant and the business itself before requesting descriptions of the operations undertaken 
there. Premises were then subject to inspection by EHPs and sometimes other CoJ organisations 
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(e.g. Development Planning, Community Development) and once all were happy permits were 
granted and this information maintained in the premises files stored by each EHP.   
 
Applications for all permits/licenses also included an exemption process for premises that might 
not fully comply with environmental health conditions. Applicants were required to apply in 
writing detailing their grounds for exemption provided that no health nuisance or other hazards 
exist, that the exemption complies with the standards of other CoJ organisations and that the 
EHP and their Managers are in agreement.  
 
The separate provisions of the Businesses Act (Act 71 of 1991) also meant that many businesses 
required a business license to trade. The application process was similar to that summarised 
above for environmental health related permits but included a one off application fee (R145 
informal premises, R450 formal premises in 2007). As for environmental health offences, 
failure to comply with these requirements was also punishable by sanctions. These licenses and 
others covering areas like the sale of liquor were usually enforced by licensing officers based 
within the regional environmental health offices. Whilst not within the direct remit of EHPs, the 
work of licensing officers often helped EHPs discover new or temporary premises (e.g. events, 
festivals) that were then subject to regulation. The permit/licensing process was also being 
exploited by corrupt EHPs and criminals impersonating them (see section 7.8 below).    
 
The prescriptive minimum standards summarised above also co-exist alongside more general 
legal standards framed by terms like ‘adequate’ and ‘reasonable’. For example under R918 strict 
liability standards include the requirement that a person in charge of food premises ensures that:  
 
(a) effective measures are taken to eliminate flies, other insects, rodents or vermin on 
the food premises; 
(b) any person working on the food premises is adequately trained in food hygiene by 
an inspector or any other suitable person (Section 10) 
 
Similarly, Chapter 14 of the CoJ Public Health By-laws requires that child care services with 
outdoor play areas must: 
  
(a) be free of any excavations, steps, projections, levels or any surface which may 
adversely impact on the health and safety of children using that area;  
(b) provide a minimum outdoor play area of 2 m² per child;  
(c) have an adequate means of enclosure and a lockable gate to prevent a child leaving the 




What constitutes ‘effective’, ‘adequate’ or ‘free’ in the strict liability examples above 
effectively saves the law from deciding how to resolve the dilemmas created by competing 
interests but shifts this responsibility to EHPs who were found to spend considerable time 
interpreting the law and drawing on other resources including their colleagues and managers. By 
linking the law to the offence Hawkins argues that discretion gives the law its very substance 
and life (1984), but whether or not discretion is problematic remains the subject of debate. This 
crudely divides between those who think broader standards like those above enable more 
flexible interpretations by skilled professionals operating in dynamic contexts and others who 
maintain discretion is necessary but should be minimised and subject to predetermined rules to 
ensure accountability and guard against injustice (Hutter, 1988). Section 5.3 below explores 
why the case-EHPs leaned towards the latter argument.   
 
Environmental health laws based on enforced self-regulation included the Occupational Health 
And Safety Act (Act 85 of 1993) but were not being enforced by CoJ EHPs during fieldwork as 
they fall outside the remit of municipal health services. These standards compel businesses to 
devise their own rules for conducting their activities but within legal parameters and subject to 
regulatory approval (Braithwaite, 1982) and typically take the form of risk based self-
management approaches. However their emergence could create further discretion for EHPs 
given the uncertainties of risk based regulation identified in section 2.4.3 above and the 
existence of draft legislation suggested a change was imminent that could weaken local 
government EHPs. The draft Regulations Relating to the Application Of The Hazard Analysis 
And Critical Control Point (HACCP) System (R494 of 26 April 2002) require food business 
owners to identify, evaluate and controls hazards significant to food safety but compliance 
would be established by ‘external auditors’, not local government EHPs.  
 
The regulation of the informal sector created further legal uncertainties because minimum legal 
environmental health standards were all based on formal premises. The challenge for EHPs was 
adapting them to the informal sector, as explored in section 7.7 below. Other legal uncertainties 
include the regulation of continuous behaviours (e.g. the management of activities/processes) 
and long term cases (e.g. housing). Together these factors confer further discretion on CoJ 
EHPs, but this chapter now explores how the criminality of environmental health law creates 
further uncertainties.    
 
5.2.4 The uncertain criminality of environmental health offences  
This section starts by returning to the historical context to consider how the criminalisation of 
environmental health offending during colonialism and apartheid helped sustain these systems 
to the detriment of most South Africans. The section then explores the criminality of 
environmental health law since democracy and how strict liability differentiates environmental 
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health offences from more traditional crimes, though for EHPs themselves moral culpability 
remains important. The section ends with recognition of the problems for EHPs in regulating 
complex organisations.     
 
Before democracy the criminalisation of environmental health was integral to colonial and 
apartheid policy. Racially based environmental health laws assisted colonial local authorities to 
segregate and control urban areas (Parnell, 1993 & 2002; Swanson, 1977) and avoid the 
provision of environmental health services to urban slums (Parnell, 1993) and emerging 
townships (Proctor, 1986). After independence from Britain in 1948 these systems were 
reinforced with urban areas ‘run by whites for whites’ (Beall et al. 2000a) and their local 
authorities delivering the highest levels of environmental health service (de Visser, 2005). 
Simultaneously the environmental health of other areas continued to deteriorate under separate 
local government structures, or none at all, and inadequate revenues for service provision (RSA, 
1998). Further, heavily polluting state owned industries were largely exempted from 
environmental health law (Steyn, 2008) but regulators also failed for reasons including 
fragmented responsibilities, poor resources (Petrie et al 1992) and a lack of political will 
(Davies et al. 1997; Rabie and Fuggle 1992), notably the prioritization of economic 
development over environmental health (Steyn, 2008).  
 
Section 6.8 below explores how the case-EHPs themselves questioned the criminality of 
environmental health offences when compared to more ‘traditional’ crimes. Sometimes these 
were prompted by South Africa’s many crime problems and their own experiences. The case-
EHPs recognized that their work fell within the criminal law and more punitive law enforcement 
approaches were sometimes necessary. But their own views were also powerful, particularly 
that most offenders were not criminally motivated but did so because they lacked environmental 
health knowledge. In response they required education and other more persuasive approaches 
towards the bottom of the regulatory pyramid, but this section now returns to the questions 
surrounding strict liability.     
 
Most environmental health laws enforced by CoJ EHPs incorporate strict liability offences 
prescribing the minimum environmental health standards for businesses (see two section 5.2.3 
examples above). Some offences still incorporate mens rea, but these mainly relate to how 
standards are administered by regulatory officials. For example the National Health Act, 2003 
states that a person is guilty of an offence if they obstruct or hinder a health officer, or refuse to 
provide them with information or knowingly provide them with false or misleading information 
(Section 89 (1)). Some defences against strict liability offences also incorporate mens rea and 
could provide what Carson describes as an “escape route for the blameless” (1970a p397). For 
example in the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act, 1972 an employer can be convicted 
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for the offence of an employee or others unless he proves ‘that he took all reasonable measures 
to prevent an act or omission of the nature in question’ (Section 8.1.b.).   
 
There was some evidence to support Norrie’s (2001) argument that the abilities of the criminal 
law to regulate business activities are limited by the challenge of establishing corporate criminal 
liability. The case-EHPs admitted it sometimes took them months, even years, to establish who 
owned premises or buildings they were investigating because they were hidden behind complex 
corporate structures. Case-EHP B4 enjoyed the detective work involved, but one anonymous 
EHP commented that he did not enjoy this and was therefore reluctant to take on potentially 
complex and long term cases.  
 
Section 7.6 below describes how moral culpability remains an important consideration in the 
decision making of EHPs but Lazarus et al. (1997) question whether strict liability offences are 
Constitutional. They argue that strict liability offences might violate the fundamental right to a 
fair trial (Section 35 (3)) and thereby fail constitutional challenge unless provisions can be put 
in place to minimise the risk of convicting innocent people but the author has not found any 
examples of this being tested in the South African courts.   
 
There was also emerging evidence in case law that the uncertain criminality of environmental 
health law was being reinforced by conflict with Constitutional rights, particularly in two 
landmark cases where the regulation of informal housing was making public health worse. Here 
Huchzermeyer (2004) argues that there is a need to redefine problems not as a ‘contravention of 
laws’ but towards recognition of a lack of protection from the breaches of constitutional rights. 
In Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 for example Irene 
Grootboom and her community moved from an informal settlement onto private land intended 
for low cost housing but were then evicted and forced to live under plastic sheeting on a nearby 
sports field. Grootboom was successful in asking the Constitutional Court for the provision of 
adequate shelter/housing until permanent accommodation was available, but the Constitutional 
Court also ruled that State housing programmes were not reasonable because they were not 
providing for those in desperate need. 
 
Shortly after fieldwork the case Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg, CCT 
24/07, Judgment of 15 February 2008 began following a series of emergency applications to the 
Witwatersrand High Court by the CoJ to evict over 300 people from six bad buildings in inner-
city Johannesburg and is explored by Ray (2008). This was part of a wider regeneration strategy 
and in accordance with the CoJ’s powers under the National Building Regulations and Building 
Standards Act, 1977 to evict tenants from buildings judged by EHPs (and others) to be unsafe or 
unhealthy. The residents - assisted by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE, an 
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international NGO) and local academics from the Centre for Applied Legal Studies of the 
University of the Witwatersrand (CALS) - initially successfully opposed these applications on 
several legal grounds including the CoJ’s Constitutional right to provide access to adequate 
housing and the failure of its housing program to comply with its constitutional and statutory 
duties.  
 
These judgements were partially overturned in a series of appeals, but the CoJ’s inner city 
eviction programme was also suspended and further concessions by the CoJ included improving 
the environmental health of existing bad buildings. In its final decision the Court required a 
process of engagement to be followed whereby governments must consult with residents 
affected by policy decisions that may involve eviction to ensure their socioeconomic rights are 
protected and publicly report on this process. It was too soon for Ray (2008) to comment on its 
success and the final decision did not reject the need for more punitive interventions in future 
cases like this, but its endorsement of persuasive regulatory approaches that engage local 
government and civil society in working through these complex problems is significant.        
 
In summary therefore the criminality of environmental health offences is made uncertain by 
South Africa’s historical legacy and the differentiation of regulatory offences from more 
traditional crimes as identified by EHPs themselves and the widespread use of strict liability. 
EHPs were also busy trying to untangle attempts to assimilate the criminal liability of individual 
business and property owners within complex organisations. Lastly, two case law judgments 
illustrate the considerable tensions between the criminal law and the rights of the most 
vulnerable South Africans. Together these uncertainties potentially make more punitive actions 
less likely but this chapter now considers other aspects of the law that could further encourage 
more persuasive activities towards the base of the regulatory pyramid.   
 
5.2.5 The variable powers of EHPs  
The regulatory powers of local government EHPs are considerable and wide ranging. Section 
334 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 authorises the Minster of Justice and Constitutional 
Development to confer on local authorities like the CoJ the power to appoint EHPs as Peace 
Officers to regulate environmental health. The National Health Act, 2003 authorises EHPs to 
enter any premises, excluding a private dwelling, at any reasonable time (Section 82 (1)) and it 
is an offence to obstruct or mislead EHPs, as health officers, in the conduct of their work 
(Section 89 (1)). Accounts from late Victorian Britain when such powers were first enacted 
describe widespread opposition to this expansion of the intervention of EHPs into formerly 
private spaces (Crook, 2007) and it was not uncommon for CoJ EHPs to be obstructed in their 
work but here the individual’s rights to privacy are overridden by concerns towards protecting 




But after Hutter (1988) the powers of CoJ EHPs can also be described as ‘variable’ for two 
reasons. The legal right of access to a business does not automatically infer compliance with the 
law, for example most food premises observed had facilities like wash hand basins but food 
handlers were rarely seen washing their hands. Second, CoJ EHPs sometimes had little or no 
powers to regulate environmental health in areas that are not their responsibility and these 
included informal settlements, premises owned by the CoJ itself and those that were the 
responsibility of other spheres of government (e.g. schools, prisons). But this chapter now 
considers why the sanctions available for offences could make more punitive actions less likely.   
 
5.2.6 Sanctions for environmental health offences  
The discretion of CoJ EHPs extends to the application of increasingly punitive sanctions 
towards the top of the regulatory pyramid. Section 6.9 below describes how the case-EHPs 
generally perceive the role of criminal sanctions more as a tool towards legal compliance than to 
punish offenders, but the sanctions available are inherently problematic for EHPs for various 
reasons. The maximum penalties for offences are set out in legislation or in clauses explaining 
that penalties will be determined by the criminal justice system. During fieldwork the CoJ 
actually published the fines available for offences on its website and these are summarised in 
Table 5.1 below.  
 
Table 5.1 Maximum sanctions available to CoJ EHPs and/or the courts in 2007  
Law Maximum sanctions 
Health Act 1977  R1500; imprisonment not  
exceeding 2 years; or both 
Tobacco Products Control Act 1993 R1500 
Regulations governing general hygiene requirements for 
food premises and the transport of food (R 918, July 1999) 
R500 
Noise Control Regulations of Gauteng 1998 R1500 
Public Health By-laws 2004 R1000 
 
Sanctions for multiple offences during the same visit were not uncommon, EHPs recalling cases 
of fines/summons totalling R5000 for example, but for larger businesses such financial penalties 
were unlikely to deter offending. Indeed, CoJ EHPs were often reluctant to sanction more 
affluent offenders for fear of undermining their authority (see section 6.9 below). The threat of 
imprisonment could be more effective, but the author found no evidence of any cases in 
Johannesburg of imprisonment for environmental health offences though the National Health 
Act, 2003 was gradually repealing the Health Act, 1977 and increasing the maximum period for 
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imprisonment from two to five years. Other sanctions including the prohibition of activities, the 
closure of premises and the withdrawal of licenses/permits were available but most case-EHPs 
had little or no experience of them though their managers were using them and EHPs were 
waiting for more guidance on these more alternatives to the fine/summons. 
 
At the other extreme in 2007 around 57% of South Africans were considered poor and earned 
less than R458 per capita per month (SSA 2014) and for this majority such financial sanctions 
could be unaffordable. Other sanctions including prohibitions (e.g. evictions), the withdrawal of 
licenses/permits and criminal convictions could also have grave implications for their 
livelihoods and those of their dependants. However the case-EHPs were sometimes willing to 
sanction the poor despite being well aware of the consequences as explored in Chapter 7 below, 
particularly section 7.7.   
 
5.2.7 The uncertain role of the local government EHP   
The precise role of local government EHPs is not clearly defined in law and this section 
identifies an emphasis towards persuasive regulatory approaches. The Health Professions Act, 
1974 requires EHPs to register each year with the Board for EHPs of the HPCSA and to confine 
themselves to practicing in the field of environmental health (Annexure 4 (a)) but in 2007 this 
field was only defined in the Board’s Competency requirements and Scope of Profession of 
Environmental Health Practitioners (see Appendix O). This comprised a long list of so-called 
‘matters’ relevant to EHPs, but no detail on how EHPs should work. Further, the mission of the 
Board includes “[p]romoting the principle of excellent professional practice by ensuring 
ongoing professional competence” (HPCSA, 2006b) but no guidance on what excellent or 
competent practice might look like.  
 
In 2007 the role of South African EHPs was better articulated in the White Paper for the 
Transformation of the Health System in South Africa and the National Environmental Health 
Policies reviewed in section 5.2.1 above. These identified the need for approaches across the 
whole regulatory pyramid but expressed a clear preference towards persuasive approaches. 
When asked to describe their role most case-EHPs simply recited the nine areas that define 
municipal health services, as reviewed in section 5.2.2 above, before describing the typical 
premises and complaints they encounter plus a caveat along the lines of “anything pertaining to 
public health” (B4 interview p2). All the case-EHPs acknowledged their work as law enforcers 
but considered their primary role to be more about persuasion than punishment. For example 
EHPs typically described themselves as educators and advisors, persuading and awareness 




In the UK Hutter (1988) suggests that the gradual development of local government 
environmental health ‘more by chance than design’ could explain why their legal mandate is so 
broad, complex and ill defined. More recent historical work provides some support for this 
argument, particularly Crook’s (2007) exploration of the myriad factors that drove the 
expansion of the law and the role of British EHPs from the late Victorian period. South Africa’s 
historical context suggests this expansion was more deliberate given the role of EHPs in 
maintaining and expanding the colonial and apartheid systems as summarised in section 4.6.1 
above. Since democracy environmental health law and policy have been through a process of 
transition as described in section 5.2.1 above but this is a gradual process and in 2007 CoJ EHPs 
raised important concerns about the law and its suitability for regulating Johannesburg’s 
environmental health that are covered in Chapters 6 and 7 below.       
 
5.2.8 The statutory position of EHPs  
Legal responsibilities for environmental health policy are fragmented across national, provincial 
and local government. In theory this shouldn’t be a problem given that the Constitution 
designates all three spheres of government as equal and interdependent and obliges them to 
cooperate with each other (Sections 40 & 41) but studies suggest the national policy influence 
of EHPs is limited. The Environmental Health Directorate of the National Department of Health 
has responsibility for policy making, coordination and support for provincial and local 
government EHPs (NDoH, 2006). But this is inherently difficult when responsibilities cut 
across so many government departments as summarised following document analysis by the 
author in Table 5.2 below. Senior EHPs in this study (see section 6.3 below) and others 
(Haynes, 2005) voiced concerns about the lack of national leadership (Haynes, 2005) 
exacerbated by extended periods without a National Director of Environmental Health in post 
(Agenbag, 2006). During fieldwork a spokesman for the newly appointed National Director 
apologised to CoJ EHPs for their inactivity but sought to reassure them of future support 
(Murdoch in Nzo 0005Obs/Central p9).  
 
In 2007 the Board for EHPs of the HPCSA and the South African Institute of Environmental 
Health (SAIEH) were trying to influence national policy makers but by 2013 it was clear that 
they and the National Director of Environmental Health, by then an EHP and former secretary 
of the SAIEH, were becoming more established and successful advocates for EHPs but this is 




Table 5.2 National and provincial government Departments with EH responsibilities  
National department Scope of EH responsibilities 
Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism  
Chemicals and waste management policy  
Environmental advisory services & programmes  
Climate change and air quality policy  
Regulation via Environmental Management Inspectorate 
Housing Housing and sustainable human settlements 
Labour  Regulation of occupational health and safety by Labour 
inspectors  
Minerals and Energy Regulation of mine health and safety.  
Environmental management of mines and other energy 
sources.   
Trade and Industry EH standards policy – e.g. South African Bureau of 
Standards 
Transport Regulation of transport safety  
Water Affairs and Forestry Water & sanitation policy  
Water resources management  
Gauteng Departments  Scope of EH responsibilities 
Agriculture, Conservation and 
Environment  
Waste management, air quality and environmental 
management 
Regulation via Environmental Management Inspectorate    
Community Safety Projects related to safety in schools and communities 
including alcohol, drugs 
Education Provision of school meals (inc. nutrition & food safety) 
Health - Environmental Health 
Services 
Regulatory functions - covering provincial premises, port 
health, control of communicable diseases, control of 
hazardous substances, malaria control, environmental 
health sampling (e.g. food, water)  
Co-ordination functions – overseeing activities of Gauteng 
local government, including the CoJ.  
Health – wider public health Delivery of primary health care services (inc. HIV/AIDS 
and TB) across hospitals, clinics and in the community.   
Human Settlements Housing and sustainable human settlements in co-
ordination with local government  
Infrastructure Development Development and maintenance of provincial 
environmental health related buildings and infrastructure 
Roads and Transport Sustainable transport policy  
Social Development EH related services for vulnerable groups (e.g. disabled, 
elderly, those affected by HIV/AIDS)    
 
In the CoJ itself fragmentation and duplication in the delivery of environmental health services 
were challenges identified in its Department of Health Annual Report that required the 
“attention of top management” and the appropriate “alignment of organisational structures” 
(CoJ DoH 2006b p36). In South African local government environmental health departments 
are still the norm but in UK local government they have become increasingly rare with these 
services delivered by other departments (e.g. Housing) and/or combined with other services 
123 
 
(e.g. Trading standards, health education) into so-called ‘regulatory services’ (Burke et al. 2002) 
or in a few cases outsourced to the private sector (Tombs 2016). However time will tell whether 
the transition to municipal health services could result in the gradual loss of distinctive 
environmental health departments.   
 
For EHPs themselves the Health Professions Act, 1974 provides an important statutory basis for 
their work that requires them to register annually with the Board for EHPs of the HPCSA to 
practice environmental health (Annexure 4 (a)). During fieldwork new requirements for 
Continuous Professional Development were being developed but CoJ EHPs also thought the 
HPCSA could do more to promote their work. Section 6.3 below also explores why CoJ EHPs 
felt threatened by the re-emergence of Environmental Health Assistants and the new post of 
Environmental Management Inspector focused on environmental pollution control and based in 
Departments in all three spheres of government. There was a legal basis for these fears because 
most laws do not specify who is responsible for their enforcement and refer instead to general 
terms like ‘inspector’, ‘health inspector’ or ‘authorised person’. The CoJ Public Health By-laws, 
2004 specifically refer to HPCSA registered Environmental Health Officers/Practitioners for 
certain tasks, but Chapter 1. 1(1) also refers to ‘authorised’ officials. Therefore if the CoJ 
authorised Environmental Health Assistants or Environmental Management Inspectors in the 
future to enforce these By-laws there might be little EHPs can do.  
 
In 2007 responsibility for the delivery of municipal health services remained, by definition, 
within local government. But EHPs themselves were increasingly working for other local 
government departments, including the CoJ Department of Environment, in provincial and 
national government and the private sector and most case-EHPs had also worked in at least one 
of these areas before joining the CoJ. The fragmented nature of environmental health regulation 
and the continued influence of neoliberal policies on local government (see Section 4.6.2 above) 
suggest that in the future EHPs could find themselves working in far more centralised or 
privatised municipal health services.  
 
In summary, section 5.2 began by describing the developmental framework for environmental 
health in the Constitution and subordinate legislation before exploring the potential uncertainties 
that cut across environmental health law. Together, it is argued, these create a legal mandate for 
local government EHPs that is far from certain and frequently favours more persuasive 
approaches towards the base of the regulatory pyramid. But this chapter now explores the next 
part of Figure 4.1, how organisational factors influence EHPs.    
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5.3 Organisational factors  
The section starts by reviewing the strategic framework of the CoJ and its implications for 
regulation before exploring their monitoring work for other CoJ organisations and provincial 
government. The section then analyses four ways in which the CoJ seeks to control their daily 
work. This starts by considering relations between EHPs themselves and their Managers and the 
influence of performance management targets before considering how local politicians and 
resources can shape regulation. Together these organisational factors influence the work of 
EHPs across the regulatory pyramid, but once again the emphasis is frequently towards 
persuasive activities (e.g. education, advice, negotiation) around its base.  
   
5.3.1 The strategic developmental framework of the CoJ and EH   
Section 5.2.1 above summarised the legal framework for environmental health regulation in 
South Africa and Johannesburg and how its developmental mandate potentially encourages 
more persuasive approaches towards the base of the regulatory pyramid. This section reviews 
how the CoJ’s own strategies are bringing this to life, fieldwork coinciding with the launch of 
the CoJ’s new Growth and Development Strategy (GDS) and Integrated Development Plan 
(IDP). The GDS builds on previous long term city strategies and tries to address their past 
weaknesses. For example the CoJ’s previous Joburg 2030 strategy largely ignored 
environmental health (CoJ 2005a) whilst failing to recognise the informal economies of South 
Africa, including its narrow view that informal street traders must be ‘formalised’ (CoJ 2006a). 
At the centre of the new GDS is its vision for the Johannesburg in 2030:  
 
“In the future, Johannesburg will continue to lead as South Africa’s primary business 
city, a dynamic centre of production, innovation, trade, finance and services. This  
will be a city of opportunity, where the benefits of balanced economic growth will 
be shared in a way that enables all residents to gain access to the ladder of 
prosperity, and where the poor, vulnerable and excluded will be supported out of 
poverty to realise upward social mobility. The result will be a more equitable and 
spatially integrated city, very different from the divided city of the past. In this 
World-Class African City for all, everyone will be able to enjoy decent 
accommodation, excellent services, the highest standards of health and safety, and 
quality community life in sustainable neighbourhoods and vibrant urban spaces”  
(CoJ 2006b p20)  
This developmental vision is underpinned by six core principles that cut across 12 sector areas 
as depicted along the left hand side and the top (respectively) of Figure 5.1 below. At its centre 
the IDPs implement the GDS by aligning the long term GDS strategic goals and interventions 
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with five year local government political process, Mayoral priorities (see below) and the 
business plans and targets of CoJ organisations.    
 
Figure 5.1 GDS and IDP framework (Source: CoJ 2006b p20) 
 
 
Environmental health regulation is integral to the long term GDS goal for the systematic 
improvement in environmental health conditions and cuts across IDP Sector Plan 5: 
Environment and IDP Sector Plan 8: Health as summarised in Appendix Q. This environmental 
health goal is divided into three core interventions and objectives and programme activities that 
together cover most of the work of CoJ EHPs. But this long term strategy also sends out mixed 
messages to EHPs about how to regulate. For example IDP Sector Plan 5 refers repeatedly to 
‘combating’ the various forms of pollution using approaches including ‘rigorous’ law 
enforcement that suggests more punitive approaches higher up the regulatory pyramid. This 
emphasis continues in IDP Sector Plan 8 but its long-term strategic interventions refer to law 
enforcement ‘where necessary’ and the need to work with businesses, communities and others 
(see Appendix Q) that suggests more persuasive regulatory activities.   
 
Environmental health also features in other GDS goals and IDPs with a continued emphasis 
towards more persuasive regulation. For example in IDP Sector Plan 2: Human/Community 
Development one priority for the Early Childhood Development (ECD) programme is to 
establish a “…common Citywide approach to Bylaw- enforcement in ECD facilities, both to 
ensure enforcement of set minimum standards and to prevent unnecessary and prohibitive fining 
where a more developmental and supportive approach would be more effective” (CoJ 2006b -
p134). In IDP Sector Plan 3: Housing one priority for the Building Standards Promotion and 
Enforcement programme is to proactively “…intervene through regulations in management and 
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maintenance where necessary to prevent negligent and irresponsible property ownership causing 
decline in the built environment (CoJ 2006b p149). 
 
The GDS and IDP co-exist with six priorities set by the Executive Mayor for his 2006-11 term 
of office that place considerable emphasis on environmental health as a priority:  
 
1. Economic growth and job creation; 
2. Health and community development; 
3. Housing and services; 
4. Safe, clean and green city; 
5. Well-governed and managed city; and 
6. HIV and AIDS      (CoJ 2006b p21)  
 
These were informed by the GDS and IDP processes and other sources including feedback from 
communities during Mayoral road shows. The CoJ recognises these priorities within the other 
strategic plans but they are intended to set “…both the tone of the current term of office and, by 
implication, its critical strategic path” and all CoJ staff and politicians are asked to consider 
them during their daily activities (CoJ 2006b p21). The incorporation of environmental health to 
six of the Executive Mayor’s priorities is important, but section 5.3.5 below suggests that 
relations between EHPs and politicians including the Executive Mayor are more complex.  
 
In summary, environmental health regulation is well integrated across the CoJ’s medium and 
long term strategies and priorities. They provide few clues as to how EHPs should regulate 
environmental health, but where they do the emphasis is towards persuasive activities. This 
section now returns to consider the monitoring work of EHPs for other CoJ organisations and 
provincial government and its influence on regulation.     
 
5.3.2 Monitoring work for other CoJ organisations and provincial government  
Section 4.4.3 above introduced the monitoring work of EHPs for other CoJ organisations and 
provincial government and these roles are summarised in Table 5.3 below based on the results 
data. This work was advisory and thus outside the regulatory pyramid but remained important 
because of its impacts on EHPs. This section argues that whilst monitoring benefits EHPs and 
those they monitor for it is also costly and can undermine the legitimacy of EHPs.     
 
The case-EHPs described generally good relations with the many organisations they work for 
and acknowledged its advantages. For example EHPs developed a broader knowledge of other 
CoJ organisations and provincial government services and premises that was also valuable to 
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others including local politicians and the public. Indeed, one former senior EHP believed that 
EHPs had a duty, as part of the CoJ team, to work like this:   
 
“…if you pick up water running down the street, it might not even be a health nuisance, 
but there’s water running so you report it to Joburg Water. There’s nothing preventing 
you from contacting Joburg Roads Agency if you find that there’s a pavement that’s got 
a pot hole in it or whatever the case might be, and you as an EHP might think that this is 
a safety issue for pedestrians. It’s got nothing to do with you directly, it’s not your core 
business, but YOU are the eyes and ears of Council out there” (AD-Res 12 July 
interview pp8-9).  
 
Table 5.3 Examples of EH related monitoring activities by EHPs for other CoJ 
organisations and provincial government 
Organisation Examples of monitoring activities  
CoJ Agencies 
Jo’burg Roads Vacant stand conditions and roads (e.g. blocked drains) 




Joint approval of permits for pre-schools, advice on fire 
safety and water safety issues 
Health Immunisation programmes in schools and crèches  
Housing  Water and sanitation in informal settlements  
Environmental health conditions in residential buildings 
Transportation Diesel vehicle emissions  
Development Planning and 
Urban Management 
Location and use of buildings and settlements   
Environment  River and drinking water quality 
CoJ Utilities 
Pikitup Waste management 
Jo’burg Water Water and sanitation (e.g. leakages, overflowing drains) 
Gauteng provincial government  
Environmental Health 
Services 
Environmental health of provincial government schools, 
prisons, clinics 
 
The ability to work with such a diversity of organisations was part of being an EHP, though 
F1B commented that being “middle men” was also very challenging (F1B interview p47). Joint 
monitoring work also enabled EHPs to identify premises missing from their databases. For 
example the involvement of EHPs in city wide immunisation programmes enabled them to 
identify and then inspect previously undiscovered pre-schools. Joint working could also benefit 
the regulated, for example EHPs sent copies of crèche permits to the CoJ Department of 
Community Development because these permits could support social grant applications from 
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the crèches to improve facilities. However EHPs had many concerns about this work. One 
common complaint was that EHPs were effectively doing the work of others that was 
sometimes beyond the scope of environmental health:  
 
“...your correctional services, your police stations, your clinics, your schools... are 
supposed to have either their own health inspector, or the provincial government 
inspectors must go there. But then we do them. We must tell Pikitup that there’s 
dumping somewhere, and that’s the only time they go and pick it up. We must tell City 
Parks that there’s overgrown grass. Then that’s when they go and cut it... when I see a 
leaking water pipe I call Joburg Water…” (D1B interview pp46-7).  
 
“...it’s not part of our job to be involved in immunisation. Our job is to make sure that 
there are measures to control communicable disease, or investigate communicable 
disease, but not actually involve in the immunisation. But people think that 
communicable disease is one of our field so we have to be involved in immunisation...” 
(F1B interview p49).       
 
Some EHPs felt demoralised by this monitoring work, particularly when it wasn’t included in 
their performance targets and reduced their time for core environmental health work, a situation 
one EHP likened to being robbed. Some EHPs also questioned why other organisations were not 
doing their own monitoring and feared things could get worse:  
 
“I think the problem is WE as the Health Department, people come, people expect US 
to do the work for all of the other Departments, I think that’s the main thing. We must 
report on about everything that goes wrong, if the storm water drains are not working, if 
the lights are not working, if there’s problems with overcrowding, town planning, I 
mean if you think it’s pushed up to us, we must send the things through to them.” (F2B 
interview p28) 
 
[Imitating another Department speaking to an EHP] “Ok, you’re already there, tell us 
where they are dumping, you’re already there, you can tell us if it’s overgrown, you’re 
already there, you can tell us if there’s an invasion of land, you can tell us of the leaking 
pipe, you can tell us where there’s building rubble...” (D1B interview p49).    
 
“We are the only street-level people there are in the Council… Pikitup don’t have law 
enforcement people, Environmental Management don’t have law enforcement, Building 
Control they do have. We are the only ones that can go out and do real inspections in 
the streets. We are the only ones in the streets…. and then JMPD, but the other 
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Departments don’t have and then they piggy back on us to do their things. And they will 
take all the credit for it! (F2 Regional EH Manager interview p11).  
 
EHPs were also concerned that their monitoring reports were sometimes acted upon slowly, if at 
all. Knowing who to speak to was critical, but EHPs provided many examples of CoJ 
organisations taking a long time to respond to their reports of serious and persistent problems. 
When there was no response EHPs felt frustrated and powerless, particularly when they 
revisited these areas and were then blamed by the public and media for its continuing problems.  
 
The failure of some CoJ organisations to maintain their own standards of environmental health 
could further complicate matters. For example Region F2 was receiving complaints from 
residents about water entering their newly built homes. These had inadequate drainage, but the 
Region F2 EH Manager commented that they shouldn’t have been built by the CoJ Department 
of Housing in flood prone areas (authorised by CoJ Department of Planning) and she feared 
these homes would soon be demolished (F2 Regional EH Manager interview p21). In Region B 
Operations Manager B3 thought the failure of CoJ organisations to maintain their own vacant 
stands was making private owners reluctant to act; her requests were regularly countered with 
the argument that:  
 
“…you say I must clean my own house, you clean there first” (Operations Manager B3 
interview pp5-6).  
 
But EHPs also observed that other CoJ organisations were taking responsibility for 
environmental health matters. For example EHPs were increasingly referring environmental 
pollution control related cases (e.g. noise, air and water quality) to the new CoJ Department of 
the Environment whose growing workforce of Environmental Management Inspectors included 
some EHPs. Waste management cases that EHPs had traditionally handled were increasingly 
referred to Pikitup and others, but instead of freeing them up to concentrate on their core 
activities some EHPs considered this a threat to their own roles and professional status as EHPs. 
In response the Region B EH Manager questioned whether it mattered who EHPs worked for 
provided they could carry out their core functions (Region B EH Manager interview pp21-2).    
 
Joint working on permits/licenses with other CoJ organisations could also be problematic. The 
case-EHPs stated categorically that no person could trade without a permit/license and 
ignorance of the law was no defence, but in Johannesburg people continue trading and opening 
new businesses without them and this put EHPs in a difficult position: 




“If we find somebody trading we cannot close those people down. Instead we have to 
say ‘please come and apply for a license’. They will take their time, two or three months 
down the line you have to send out a notice, even summons them, but then speak to 
them first. Finally they come to apply for a license, you have to still wait for these other 
Departments to give their ok before you give the license. These are the ones that takes 
their time. And they’re spending their time, there’s nothing you can do. You cannot 
close the school down because you are still waiting for the Fire Department... You have 
to chase after them just to get a report back… a license application may take up to four 
or five years…You end up chasing and fighting with your own colleagues here, all for a 
report, it’s just ridiculous.”   (Operations Manager B3 interview pp19-21)  
 
During an on-going bat infestation in a block of CoJ flats this Operations Manager also 
commented that the CoJ Departments of Health and Housing were both refusing to carry out the 
expensive and specialist works required (quoted at more than R100 000) but the public 
continued to complain and months later bat faeces continued to cover the property (Operations 
Manager B3 interview pp10-2). It could take the CoJ 3 years or more to get a Demolition Order 
for a bad building and, in the meantime, people had moved back in (F2 Regional EH Manager 
reflections p2). Whilst converting his home to a guest house for the 2010 World Cup the owner 
had started construction works before contacting any CoJ Departments and F2B feared that 
costly and preventable alterations might be needed (0005/F2 Observation pp7-8). 
 
CoJ organisations were also prepared to challenge EHPs making these complaints. Case-EHP 
B4 recalled being contacted by a CoJ Department of Housing official after he wrote a report 
about an informal settlement (0010/B Observation p17). The official asked B4 who he was to 
say such things, but he replied by stating that he was telling the truth and the official put the 
phone down on him. B4 reported the incident to his managers whose actions led to a meeting 
the following week at the informal settlement with B4, community leaders and all the relevant 
Departments who validated B4’s report. Attempts to recover the costs of interventions by EHPs 
in other CoJ organisations were often challenged, particularly for pest control work when 
replies of “no, we don’t have money for that, we are the Council, you work for the Council...” 
were not uncommon (Operations Manager B3 interview p6). 
 
Monitoring work for other CoJ organisations could also harm relations between EHPs and the 
public. Case-EHP D1B commented that “...it always looks like we are spying on communities, 
and then giving other Departments information for forceful action like removals, taking of their 
possessions and evictions” (D1B email in 0009/PhD Results). Similarly, inner city EHPs were 
uncomfortable about attending building evictions informed, in part, by their monitoring reports 




“...here in the City centre, there’s bad buildings, there’s evictions and they want EHPs 
to be there, to be present when actual evictions are taking place, of which we have done 
our part, we have inspected and said the building it’s unsafe, or unhealthy for people to 
stay there, we’ve done the report. They have the powers to take action, but they want us 
to be there on the day of the eviction, of which it is not our role to be evicting the 
people, or to make sure that the people are eventually evicted.”  (F1B interview p49)       
 
EHPs also commented on how the on-going reorganisation of the CoJ was contributing to these 
problems, F1B commenting that “shifts in power” between the CoJ organisations made the 
avoidance of responsibility easier (F1B interview p47). But EHPs were also hopeful that this 
situation would improve. For example Operations Manager B3 was hoping new licensing 
policies would soon ensure planning issues (e.g. zoning and acoustics) were adequate before 
nightclubs were allowed to open (Operations Manager B3 interview pp22-3). The Department 
of Health were also exploring whether they could take the Department of Housing to court for 
its continued failure to take action to improve serious and persistent sanitation problems in one 
Region B  informal settlement (0009/B Observation p13).   
 
Fieldwork did not include any monitoring for provincial government but EHPs were clearly not 
happy with this extra workload, not least because Gauteng Province had its own EHPs. The DD-
EH explained that relations between the different spheres of government are governed by 
legislation that can assist with potential conflicts. Less than one year into this monitoring 
arrangement the CoJ were still exploring how to take law enforcement action against provincial 
government premises, but the DD-EH emphasised that when dealing with another state body all 
possible options had to be considered before going to court (DD-EH 10 Apr interview p4). 
 
When asked why these monitoring problems persisted, EHPs typically identified shortages of 
staff and other resources and accused some CoJ organisations of silo working and these 
concerns were verified by senior managers and politicians. For example Region F’s Manager 
described the culture of silo working in the CoJ, where the failure of one CoJ organisation could 
overshadow the good work of others and this culture needed to change with more collective 
work across all CoJ organisations (Mtetwa in CoJ, 2007). The DD-EH also admitted other CoJ 
organisations were routinely avoiding responsibility for their own environmental health and 
therefore EHPs were trying to persuade them otherwise (DD-EH 10 Apr interview p4). 
 
Therefore whilst beneficial, the monitoring work of EHPs for other CoJ organisations and 
provincial government came at some cost and sometimes undermined the legitimacy of EHPs. 
Chapter 5 now considers how the CoJ exerts control on its EHPs starting with relations between 
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EHPs themselves and their managers before exploring the influence of performance 
management systems and politicians before ending with resources.  
 
5.3.3 CoJ controls: Relations between EHPs themselves and their managers 
To explore how the CoJ was shaping the expectations of EHPs their initial inductions into the 
CoJ were discussed followed by their relations with colleagues and managers. In all four 
regional offices the case-EHPs described a general conformity in regulatory approaches 
between their colleagues that met with the expectations of their managers, the biggest reason for 
non-conformity being inexperience.  
 
B4 and F2B’s work as EHPs long pre-dates the CoJ’s creation but the other case-EHPs recalled 
important but informal induction process. Induction usually began with an orientation meeting 
about the CoJ by human resources before new EHPs met their new colleagues and Operations 
Manager. Each Operations Manager then introduced the EHP to their areas using a map and/or 
driving around the areas and identifying potential priorities and concerns. F1C likened his first 
tour with his Operations Manager to “another page” opening up for him and being shocked at 
“the REAL picture” he was seeing (F1C interview pp3-4). Indeed, the Region B EH Manager 
described his new EHPs to be in need of continual support:  
 
“…who need to be built up, who need to be trained, who need to be literally taken by 
the hand and shown ‘this is the boundary of your Region, of your District’... ‘this is 
what a food shop looks like, this is what you should be looking for in a food shop, 
where you find a problem, this is how you talk to a person, this is what you’re entitled 
to ask for, if they don’t do it, this is the process you follow…” (Region B EH Manager 
interview pp15-6).  
 
Managers then worked closely with new EHPs until they became familiar with their areas and 
the job itself, a process that took three months or more. Colleagues also provided vital support 
during this period, particularly in providing advice on cases and paperwork and this was 
observed during fieldwork, though the lack of experienced EHPs to mentor new recruits was an 
on-going concern.  
 
The case-EHPs all described good relations with their colleagues and this was observed during 
fieldwork. B4 believed everyone in his office respects each other and this made him very happy 
(B4 interview p23) whilst D1B commented that these relationships were “what’s keeping it 
together” (D1B interview pp18-9). EHPs would often ask each other for advice and share ideas 
and information, a process helped by the open plan layout of most regional offices. Sometimes 
EHPs worked together in the field, particularly when they had safety concerns (see section 6.4 
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below) or needed help with translation or more unpleasant tasks (e.g. inspecting mortuaries). It 
was not uncommon for EHPs to eat lunch together and they often socialised outside work, some 
Region F1 EHPs even sharing a house.  
 
The case-EHPs described good working relations with their Operations Managers as observed 
during fieldwork. Their Operations Managers were generally supportive and the EHPs thought 
they were treated as professionals. Their Managers were also good sources of information and 
advice, particularly about complex cases. During fieldwork the new EHPs, including B1, were 
being closely supervised by their Operations Managers and were clearly benefitting from this. 
All paperwork was scrutinised regularly, sometimes daily, by their Operations Managers, but 
provided this was in order EHPs were usually left alone to get on with their work. The location 
of their Operations Managers in the same office helped and EHPs valued their open doors, F1C 
recalling feeling very isolated under the previous structure when EHPs were based in clinics 
away from other EHPs and their managers (F1C interview p30). Some EHPs were also friends 
with their managers and socialised with them outside work.    
 
EHPs also described tensions with their managers. These were usually because of what one 
Region B EHP called differences between the discretion of EHPs and the priorities of managers 
(0008/B Observation p4). EHPs often complained about management pressures to meet 
performance targets, as explored in the next section, but they sometimes believed their 
Managers were ‘out of touch’ with events in the field, particularly regarding personal safety 
matters (see section 6.4 below). EHPs also did not like managers imposing projects on them, 
especially at short notice:        
 
“I have a campaign and I was just told about it this week: ‘next week it’s gonna be a 
campaign, and it’s gonna go like this.’ We are not involved in the planning. Things are 
just done, they come from on top, because in EH we know exactly what is going on, we 
know if we come with this approach it’s not gonna work because we know those 
people, we work with those people... So maybe it’s one of the reasons why campaigns 
or projects don’t succeed, because the people on top... come and impose things.” (F1B 
interview pp19-22) 
 
The case-EHPs knew their managers were in charge and were themselves under pressure from 
more senior managers but EHPs also did not think they should be blamed when ‘top-down’ 
projects fail, two (anonymous) EHPs citing the Executive Mayor’s inner city Clean and Green 
campaign to illustrate this (see section 5.3.5 below). Instead EHPs wanted to be more involved 
in future projects from the earliest planning stages and the AD-Res agreed and called for front 
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line EHPs to be involved in the development of all CoJ environmental health related law and 
wider policy in the future (AD-Res 12 July interview pp3-4). 
 
Two vignettes based on fieldwork cases were included in the questionnaire (see Appendix I 
Parts 1 and 2 p246) to explore departmental conformity and expectations. The ten case-EHPs 
were asked for their perceptions of how their EHP colleagues would proceed when confronted 
by the same scenario and whether their own actions conformed to their manager’s expectations. 
These results are summarised in Table 5.4 below and suggest that most EHPs were certain that 
their actions were similar to their colleagues’ and their manager’s expectations.  
 
In both scenarios most case-EHPs thought their colleagues would do the same and their 
approaches were very similar and generally favored persuasive approaches. However Table 5.4 
below also identifies some EHPs who either did not know what their colleagues would do or 
feared they might act differently. These EHPs (from all four regional offices) were concerned 
that their colleagues lacked experience and might therefore issue a CoA in the informal tuck 
shop vignette or, at the other end of the regulatory pyramid, serve a fine/summons or try to close 
it down. For the crèche scenario the case-EHPs were concerned that their inexperienced 
colleagues might allow the crèche to continue operating in its overcrowded state. Indeed, B2 
admitted that when he was inexperienced he had incorrectly issued a CoA to a tuck shop like 
this (B2 questionnaire pp2-3).  
 
Table 5.4 The extent to which case-EHPs’ actions were perceived to accord with their 
colleagues and the expectations of Managers 
 Tuck shop scenario Crèche scenario 
EHP colleague actions  (n=10) 
Alike 6 7 
Different 1 2 
Don’t know 3 1 
Managers’ expectations (n=10) 
Alike 9 10 
Different 1 - 
Don’t know - - 
 
Fieldwork also revealed inexperienced EHPs undermining the past interventions of more 
experienced colleagues during revisits. These included a sauce manufacturer that had closed 
temporarily following an inspection by F2B and her Operations Manager, but a revisit by two 
inexperienced EHPs shortly afterwards gave the manufacturer the impression that he could start 
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again provided some repairs were completed (Region F2 EH Manager interview pp24-5). This 
error was promptly detected by supervision and corrected immediately and examples like this 
were used by Managers to justify their close supervision of all EHPs, particularly those new to 
the CoJ.   
 
In both questionnaire vignettes almost all the case-EHPs thought their managers would expect 
them to follow their chosen courses of action. Only F2A thought his manager would expect a 
more punitive approach he characterized as “no negotiations, zero tolerance” (F2A 
questionnaire p3) but F2A respected his manager’s right to see things differently. Similarly, 
most other EHPs thought cases like these were not straightforward and required considerable 
discretion because: 
 
“…sometimes you can’t stick to the law 100%, we need to be practical” (B1 
questionnaire p4).  
 
Therefore five case-EHPs would also brief their manager and seek their advice and endorsement 
before taking further action.   
 
In summary, the relations between EHPs themselves and their Managers were an important 
influence on the regulatory process. This started from induction, but across the four regional 
offices the case-EHPs described a general conformity in approaches between their colleagues 
that met with managers’ expectations. Differences of opinion were acknowledged between 
EHPs and their managers, but inexperience was the most common reason for non-conformity 
and helped managers to justify their close supervision of all EHPs but this chapter now 
considers the influence of performance management on their work.       
 
5.3.4  CoJ controls: The influence of performance management  
The working day itself provided a basic control on the activities of CoJ EHPs, particularly the 
expectation that they would work in the field from 10:00AM until around 15:00PM unless they 
had good reason and management permission. Their workloads were also influenced by the 
nature of the job, particularly the number of complaints received, and the previous section 
reviewed the considerable influence of their colleagues and managers. But the CoJ’s 
performance management systems were an important influence on its EHPs and effectively 
reinforced the regulatory pyramid as this section now reviews.   
 
The Local Government Municipal Systems Act, 2000 requires local government to operate 
performance management systems in accordance with its IDPs and the wider policy objectives 
(Section 38) as covered for environmental health in Section 5.3.1 above. Performance 
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management within the CoJ Department of Health began around 2000 as part of the neoliberal 
iGoli 2002 strategy and in consultation with Dr Erik Bock, a management consultant and former 
local government Medical Officer of Health (AD-Res 17 Apr interview p3). Dr Bock drafted the 
initial key performance indicators for the Department of Health and after a period of 
consultation and redrafting a system was implemented based on Kaplan & Norton’s (1996) 
balanced scorecard approach. Here ‘balance’ refers to the use of other (non-financial) indicators 
to measure organisational performance like those related to employees, organisational activities 
and customer satisfaction (Kaplan & Norton 1996).  
 
During fieldwork the monitoring tools for environmental health for 2005-6 and 2006-7 were 
based on the CoJ’s IDP and comprised 65 key performance indicators with monthly and yearly 
targets for the CoJ and its Regions that covered four main areas: 
  
 Type and numbers of premises inspected (including vacant premises and those of 
provincial government ) 
 Type and numbers of law enforcement related actions (including referrals, awareness 
raising programmes)  
 Numbers of samples/tests conducted 
 Numbers of requests for service attended to, resolved or referred  
(CoJ DoH 2005, 2006a)  
 
Performance data were also collected relating to permits and licenses, for example the numbers 
of CoA permits issued for formal and informal food premises. A few targets were also designed 
to monitor persistent offending, for example the number of fines/summons issued to the 
owners/occupiers of buildings that have failed to comply with notices.    
 
Document analysis of the annual targets for regulatory actions for the whole Environmental 
Health sub-directorate for 2005-6 and 2006-7 and individual EHPs also conformed to the shape 
of the regulatory pyramid as summarised in Table 5.5 below. Yearly overall targets were broken 
down by the regions into monthly and weekly targets and allocated to their EHPs through yearly 
performance agreements based on their responsibilities and areas. Each EHP then maintained a 
daily scorecard of their activities that was compiled into a weekly scorecard for their Operations 
Manager at the end of each week. The scorecards of the case-EHPs differed, but the CoJ’s 
expectations for regulatory actions were similar for most district case-EHPs and also conformed 
to the regulatory pyramid. When asked during interview, Managers reported that the activities 
required of their EHPs could increase by up to 10% year on year but in the 2005-6 and 2006-7 
performance monitoring documents there was no increase. 
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Table 5.5 Annual activity targets for the Environmental Health sub-directorate and a 
typical district EHP (sources: EHP scorecard data; CoJ DoH 2005, 2006b&c)  
 
Activity target EH Sub-directorate 
targets for 
2005-6 and 2006-7 
Typical EHP targets 
– per year 
Number of 
fines/summons issued  
2495 36 
Number of statutory 
notices  
29 781 264 
Number of premises 
visited and evaluated/re-
evaluated 






The figure of 1800 premises visited by an EHP in Table 5.5 above was calculated by the author 
based on the typical performance agreements between case-EHPs and their managers to 
complete up to 8 inspections/complaints per day (see section 4.4.4 above). At the peak of the 
regulatory pyramid the author was unsuccessful in his requests to the CoJ for law enforcement 
data including the numbers of prohibitions (e.g. premises closures) or prosecutions (see section 
3.3.4). By their nature the fine/summons becomes a prosecution in the courts if unpaid and 
contested by the offender, but this was coordinated by the criminal justice system and EHPs did 
not know what happened next after they issued their fine/summons and the author’s requests for 
data on this were unsuccessful (see section 6.9 below).  
 
All the case-EHPs agreed that their work should be monitored but F2A summarised their 
general ambivalence about targets; on the one hand they were something you cannot go away 
from, but on the other they could usually be met without problems (F2A interview pp25-6). The 
case-EHPs agreed that targets were important, particularly for inexperienced EHPs, and gave 
them the opportunity to constantly review cases with their managers. F2A likened this to a 
process of self-regulation, a safeguard to ensure EHPs have “good facts” and “can produce 
results” (F2A interview pp26-7). Similarly, other EHPs commented that monitoring provided an 
important verification of their work that also helped protect and motivate them.    
 
Most case-EHPs believed their work was monitored too much. Some complained about the time 
taken completing scorecards that, in their view, could be better spent in their areas. EHPs 
undoubtedly felt pressured at times, particularly when reactive or long term cases intervened 
that were not reflected by the scorecard. If they failed to meet their monthly targets EHPs had to 
provide reasons in writing to their Operations Manager and missed targets could be carried over 
to the following month. Continued failure to meet targets could prompt disciplinary action, 
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including training, but this did not seem to happen very often. Indeed, certain activities (e.g. 
blitz work) meant that EHPs could sometimes meet their monthly target of three fines/summons 
in one day or evening.   
 
Some EHPs had also made agreements with their managers in response to local circumstances 
and sometimes far in excess of their targets. For example B2 had agreed to inspect all the day 
care centres and pre-schools in his areas once a month to maintain standards there and not 
quarterly as his targets required (B2 interview pp22-3 and 0006/B Observations p6). The case-
EHPs usually exceeded their targets but there was little incentive to do so:  
 
“…even if you exceeded FAR beyond what they actually put they don’t even look, 
there’s not even say ‘ok, fine, well done, so and so has done EXTRA work or double 
work per month.’ No, there’s nothing, you did what you’re supposed to” (F1C interview 
p35)     
 
EHPs had two main concerns about the influence of targets on their daily work. Some were 
uncomfortable with targets for regulatory actions, particularly the fine/summons, as summarised 
well by one manager:  
 
“Maybe the person deserved the fine… maybe they were breaking the law and get a 
fine, but was the fine the right thing to do on that occasion? It’s been determined by the 
target, not by what’s required” (Region B EH Manager interview pp5-6)”  
 
 “We’ve always done prosecutions, we’ve always done summonses, I’m the kind of 
person that says you can’t get away from it, [but] it needs to be the end of the process, 
towards the end of the process. Targets unfortunately makes it sometimes the 
beginning” (Region B EH Manager interview pp11-2).   
 
The case-EHPs considered this pressure unfair and contrary to their preventative ethos, 
particularly when a premises was trying to improve:  
 
“...you can’t teach a person today, and then tomorrow you fine him. And then tomorrow 
you want to teach him again something... by then… there’s that wall, people no longer 
listen to you open mindedly. They are like ‘Ok, my sister... maybe they’re going to fine 
me...” (D1B interview pp42-3).  
 
“…maybe Rob you told that person, maybe once, that they must provide a hand wash 
basin. You get there the next time, maybe they provided something to that effect, but 
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not fully to your satisfaction. Under normal circumstances you will tell that person ‘No, 
ok, fine you have put a hand wash basin but it’s only cold water and I said I wanted hot 
and cold water’…and under normal circumstances maybe you would write another 
notice or you would be able to say ‘no, put hot and cold water.’ But then because a fine 
is wanted, you fine that person for not providing hot water ...it causes tension because 
that person is TRYING to comply with your requirements but you are also trying to 
reach your targets. So sometimes it puts undue pressure on us and then we put undue 
pressure on the clients” (D1B interview pp42-3).      
 
To examine this further with case-EHPs this tension was built into the Situation 1 vignette (see 
Appendix I p246) about an informal settlement tuck shop. The final question asked if the EHPs 
would act differently if it was the last day of the month and they had only served two fines 
instead of their target of three. Six case-EHPs would not act differently, particularly on their 
first visit, F2A commenting:  
 
“I’m not writing tickets because 3 per month is required… There must be justification, 
not just a chase for the scorecard” (F2A questionnaire p3).  
 
For the other four case-EHPs the target was important but the fine/summons was a last resort. 
Further, all case-EHPs thought the fine/summons could be counterproductive for informal 
sector cases like this, unless there was a serious public health problem. B2 feared that the owner 
“...may think I’m looking for something with which to nail somebody” (B2 questionnaire p3) 
and others feared the damage to their relations with the public if EHPs were perceived to be 
raising revenues in this way. There were no revenue related targets in the scorecards, but this 
was clearly being considered because the Region F1 weekly scorecard included an ‘income 
generated’ box though it was incomplete in the examples seen.  
  
The second concern of EHPs was that targets do not reflect the value of their work, could distort 
it and damage longer term environmental health gains. For EHPs the omission of details like the 
types of premises from the scorecard suggested activities there were not important. Despite 
meeting her targets D1B concluded that she was not “implementing environmental health as a 
whole” because many core issues were not being addressed (D1B questionnaire p15). F1B 
commented that instead of being measured by the changes you’ve achieved a culture of 
“pleasing your boss” by meeting your targets now existed (F1B interview pp19-22) and these 
concerns were echoed in the warnings of one manager:   
 
“If you keep on telling them [EHPs] to do just this and this and this, unfortunately the 
score card creates gaps, because people end up just focusing on the score card. People 
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forget about all the other 80% of environmental health functions, but if they’re not 
worried about that part we’re only going to focus on the score card issues, because these 
are the things they are pushing. So the score card has created a monster, which is 
causing these EHOs to lose the skills that they’ve developed on other things because in 
the end, in five years time, they will only focus on those things, they will lose the sight 
of the other things, that’s what I’m afraid of” (Region F2 EH Manager interview p12).  
 
“…[T]hey tell you this is what you must do, this is your [scorecard] for the year, do it. 
So you act like a robot…. they [EHPs] lose their - ‘I want to do something more, I want 
to do this and I want to look into this,  because I don’t have time to look into this 
because I must write so many stat. notices and so many fines’ - their creativity, I’m 
worried about it” (Region F2 EH Manager interview p16).  
 
One former Regional EH Manager had noticed in his last post that some EHPs were becoming 
“negative” by focusing solely on targets (AD-Res 2 February interview p2). Other issues were 
creating further complications. For meeting their targets EHPs on permanent contracts typically 
got up to 3 days extra holiday per year (e.g. from 24 days to 27 days) or permission to attend a 
conference or equipment to this equivalent value. EHPs on temporary contracts could be eligible 
for financial rewards of up to 10% of their salary (AD Res 17 April interview p4), but senior 
managers got financial bonuses and one [anonymous] manager thought this was creating a 
corrosive situation:   
 
“[As an EHP] you work for somebody’s bonus, you don’t work for improving the 
quality of the environment. And then you’ll get the Mayor in an email telling you: ‘All 
managers please resign because their areas are not what they’re supposed to be!’ But in 
July, all the executives got their bonuses, so how can you tell us the areas are clean, 
they got their bonuses?” (Anonymous manager)  
 
In response to all these concerns the case-EHPs and their managers generally agreed about the 
need to review the balanced scorecard system with senior managers and politicians, including 
the Executive Mayor, and for the development of targets based on outcomes, not activities. For 
example one manager suggested targets based on compliance:   
 
“I would like to have a target to say ‘How many of your crèches have permits?’ 
SIMPLE! Not how many visits are you doing per year, but how many of them comply 
with the By-Laws… To say at the end of the year we have 50% comply, by now we 
have 70% complying, then you can say we’ve moved 20% or something like that…” 




Similarly, for vehicle testing this manager suggested targets based not on the numbers of 
vehicles tested but on the numbers that pass/fail that could provide further details to enable 
better targeting of vehicles. A few compliance related targets (e.g. the numbers of CoA permits 
issued to formal/informal food premises) already existed and EHPs hoped more changes like 
this could help them better demonstrate the impacts of their work. However, past lobbying for 
these changes with senior managers had been unsuccessful and EHPs were not optimistic that 
this would change.  
 
In summary, performance targets effectively maintained the regulatory pyramid distribution of 
activities as what the CoJ wanted. EHPs generally accepted them and had few problems meeting 
them but they voiced important concerns about their use for the more punitive fine/summons 
and how targets were distorting their work towards what’s counted instead of what is important 
for environmental health. EHPs suggested alternative targets more aligned to the outcomes of 
their work but past experience suggested there was little will amongst more senior managers for 
such changes. This chapter now considers how politicians can influence the work of EHPs.       
 
5.3.5 CoJ controls: relations between EHPs and politicians  
This section explored how CoJ politicians, particularly local Ward Councillors, largely 
supported their EHPs and sometimes gained much from them. But they also sometimes directly 
influenced the work of EHPs and did not hesitate to blame them for local environmental health 
problems, therefore EHPs treated them with great caution.  
 
The CoJ’s most senior politician regularly stated his support for environmental health. Section 
5.3.1 above identified its embedding within the Executive Mayor’s six priorities for 
Johannesburg and during fieldwork his State of the City address included commitments to 
provide access to clean water and sanitation for all communities by 2010, to expand air quality 
monitoring and rehabilitate illegal dumping hotspots (Masondo, 2007). Further commitments 
included the employment of more EHPs, continued public awareness campaigns on food 
handling and chemical storage, a focus on law enforcement for pest control hotspots and the 
encouragement of communities to report offenders who fail to maintain buildings. But relations 
between the Executive Mayor and EHPs were not always so positive as explored further below.   
 
The MMC-Health. Clr Mfikoe, was head of the CoJ Department of Health and also expressed 
her support for environmental health. In her foreword to the Department’s 2005/06 annual 
report she endorsed approaches across the regulatory pyramid, but also reinforced the 




“Environmental Health also remains high on the district’s agenda in ensuring not only a 
punitive role (in conjunction with JMPD) of adherence to By-laws is enforced but also a 
developmental one in ensuring empowerment, skills development, raising awareness, 
effective outbreak response and health promotion. Its main focus being ensuring that the 
district is regarded as safe, clean and green and focused on the well-being of the 
communities we serve” (Mfikoe in CoJ DoH 2006b pp2-3).  
 
At the Alfred Nzo8 conference for CoJ EHPs the MMC-Health admitted that she did not know 
much about them because environmental health was not recognised when she grew up though 
this changed when she was appointed ‘leader of rat chasers’ as she described herself 
(0005Obs/Central p4). The MMC-Health then asked her EHP audience whether they knew their 
roles and was met with a tired ‘yes’ before she then listed the nine activities that define 
municipal health services (Mfikoe in 0005Obs/Central p4). Clr Mfikoe recalled accompanying 
President Mbeki to Soweto where they found significant rat infestations in one township that 
prompted her to direct funds towards a vector control project there, though senior EHPs present 
whispered to the author that they did not think this would happen (0005Obs/Central p5). The 
MMC-Health also promised a budget increase of R5 Million for 2007-08 before repeating her 
commitment to environmental health and EHPs (0005Obs/Central p5) and the Region F2 EH 
Manager commented that Clr Mfikoe had been very supportive of their work to date and had not 
sought to interfere (F2 Regional EH Manager interview pp1-2).  
 
Most case-EHPs were engaged with the Ward Councillors for their areas, though F1D admitted 
having no contact with any politicians even though they were based in the same building. For 
most EHPs, Ward Councillors were a constant source of information and complaints and 
therefore an important means of detecting local issues and potential offences, though some 
EHPs were concerned that such communications could be very one sided: 
 
“…we hear from [Ward Councillors] once only if they need the help from us, whenever 
we need the help from them they are not there to phone” (F1C interview p31).      
 
EHPs sometimes worked closely with Ward Councillors to secure access to local communities 
via meetings and workshops for example or on related projects. EHPs and their managers were 
also observed briefing Ward Councillors on CoJ services and procedures during fieldwork, 
frequently on services beyond environmental health. The Region B EH Manager thought this 
                                                     
8 In 1994 Nzo became Minister for Foreign Affairs but in 1950 he began his career as an EHP in 
Alexandra township, Johannesburg, whose poor environmental health conditions prompted his 
engagement with politics that later led to him to lose his EHP job (ANC, 2000).     
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reflected the breadth of their work and the reputation of EHPs in the CoJ for ‘delivering’ that is 
sometimes abused by Ward Councillors (Region B EH Manager interview pp8-10). Some EHPs 
thought this was taking up too much time but a new reporting protocol for all Ward Councillors 
via the MMC-Health was being implemented during fieldwork to try to prevent this. There was 
also general agreement that Ward Councillors needed more training about how the CoJ works.  
 
The case-EHPs rarely felt pressured by politicians in their day jobs, but they all acknowledged 
that politicians were powerful in many different ways. During their regular work Ward 
Councillors sometimes reminded EHPs of their own accountabilities. B2 described his local 
politician as “…somebody who gives credit where it’s due and then if you are not pulling your 
socks [up] he will tell you” (B2 interview p18). B1 commented that Ward Councillors can adopt 
a “political approach” where instead of talking nicely they sometimes just tell EHPs to “do 1, 2, 
3” (B1 interview pp21-2). This was observed during one noise complaint investigation, when 
B1 was instructed by a Ward Councillor not to contact the complainant directly and this made 
the investigation much more difficult (0004/B Observations p7). EHPs often commented that 
local politicians lacked environmental health knowledge and therefore did not value their work 
or blamed EHPs themselves for poor conditions:  
 
“If we haven’t done our work, wrap me over the knuckles and say ‘you haven’t done it, 
I’m not happy, WHEN can I expect you to do it?’ But don’t tell me how to do it AND, 
don’t hold ME responsible for the whole of council’s work” (Region B EH Manager 
interview pp7-8).  
 
This was further illustrated during the tours of the CoJ regions by senior CoJ politicians during 
fieldwork. One anonymous manager described a tour of his region as a “wake up call” for the 
Executive Mayor. It retraced a previous tour five years before and found no improvements in 
some areas which led the Mayor to conclude that his ‘managers are dead’ before he questioned 
whether his front line officials were also dead. One anonymous EHP accompanied the Mayor on 
another tour and, in response to similar findings and comments, fumed with rage and accused 
the Mayor of knowing nothing about environmental health! The anonymous manager was also 
angry but acknowledged that things were much more complex given the scale of problems in 
Johannesburg and the need for politicians to think beyond their five year terms and engage with 
the people. This manager also thought more punitive approaches were needed:   
 
“People see illegal connections, but nothing is done about them. People are invading 
factories, but what are officials doing? The community think it’s a lawless society!” 




To further illustrate this disconnection between politicians and their EHP administrators, in 
2006 EHPs were involved in the Executive Mayor’s Clean and Green Campaign to regenerate 
parts of the inner city. This R8 Million campaign initially focused on waste management but 
later targeted problem areas and premises using increasingly punitive ‘zero tolerance’ 
approaches. For example the chances of targeted visits resulting in a fine/summons were 1:7 
compared to 1:53 during routine work (see Table 4.1 above). Two anonymous EHPs recalled 
significant short term improvements but two months after the campaign ended conditions had 
deteriorated to pre-campaign levels and these EHPs remained concerned that politicians could 
influence their work in such a top-down, costly and unsustainable way.       
 
EHPs could also find themselves caught up in local party politics. D1B recalled how Ward 
Councillors make unrealistic environmental health promises to people during elections that 
cannot be delivered (D1B interview p31). B2 described how non-ANC Ward Councillors try to 
show EHPs are doing nothing to send a message to the people that if you “put us in power next 
time, we will do x, y and z” (B2 interview pp47-8). Whilst working with local businesses and 
the community on an environmental health project, F1B found himself at the centre of a 
political dispute between the Ward Councillor and project leader who was accused of using the 
project to canvass for opposition votes. In response F1B managed to get the two sides to “work 
for the better view, because that’s the only way we can succeed in this area, making our area 
clean and uplifting” but he remained wary of politicians (F1B interview pp24-5).  
 
In summary, politicians were generally very supportive of their EHPs and the two benefited 
from working together in many ways, not least in making EHPs aware of local problems. But 
EHPs treated politicians with understandable caution and were careful to pass any 
correspondence from them immediately to their managers for further action. This tactic was 
reinforced by veteran Johannesburg EHP Joshua Mahlangu during the Alfred Nzo conference 
who, when asked by EHPs for one piece of advice, simply recommended that you always 
“cover your backside” when working, particularly when a Councillor wants a report (Mahlangu 
in 0005Obs/Central p6). The final section of Chapter 5 now focuses on resources.  
 
5.3.6 CoJ controls: resources for the EH Sub-directorate 
The reality of resource shortages identified in section 2.5.5 above is actually enshrined across 
the legal framework for South African local government. For example the Constitution requires 
municipalities to strive to deliver their objectives, including the promotion of a safe and healthy 
environment, “...within their financial and administrative capacity” (Section 152. (2)) and is 




“Every person has a constitutional right to an environment that is not harmful to his or 
her health or well-being… and the Council has a constitutional duty to strive, within its 
financial and administrative capacity, to promote a safe and healthy environment” 
(Chapter 2 Section 3 (1)).     
 
In 2003 Haynes (2004) found that over 2002-3 the average spend on core local government 
environmental health services in South Africa was nearly R9 per capita though the CoJ was 
spending nearly R14, just exceeding the National Department of Health’s suggested per capita 
spend of R13. Three years later the DD-EH confirmed that central government, via the National 
Department of Provincial and Local Government, continued to fund municipal health services at 
the CoJ based on R14 per capita which accounted for around 20% of the total Environmental 
Health Sub-directorate’s budget, the remaining 80% coming from the CoJ itself and mostly 
covering salaries. This central budget also provided the Regions with the same basic resources, 
though each Regional EH Manager also submitted yearly budget requests to cover these core 
functions and other activities like project working (DD-EH 10 April interview p5). 
 
Environmental Health at the CoJ was therefore relatively well funded compared to other 
municipalities. But Agenbag (2006) argues that when compared to the national budget for 
primary health care services of R150-260 per capita (depending on the region), preventative 
environmental health services remained the poorer relative to curative services. Further, the 
challenges of UK local authorities are relatively minor compared to South Africa but during 
2002-3 the estimated average spend by English and Welsh local authorities on environmental 
health services was around R150 per capita (CIPFA, 2004) but UK EHPs (Burke et al. 2002) 
and others (Hill, 2005) were concerned about their under resourcing.       
 
The DD-EH also stressed that national Government could intervene if a municipality is in 
financial trouble (DD-EH 10 April interview p5). This is particularly important because South 
African local government has historically been largely self-sufficient and raises around 90% of 
its own revenues (Beall et al., 2002). The work of CoJ EHPs raised some revenues via the 
charges for some permits/licenses for example (e.g. R450 for a business license for formal 
premises in 2007) but these wouldn’t cover the costs of the time of the EHPs involved let alone 
any other CoJ organisations. Further, the administration of the fine/summons by the JMPD and 
criminal justice system meant any revenues by-passed EHPs altogether. The existence of an 
‘income generated’ section on the weekly scorecards of some EHPs (see section 5.3.4 above) 
suggests their revenue generating potential was being considered. There was no evidence of 
such pressures being put on EHPs but they knew the public sometimes perceived them - 
particularly when serving a fine/summons - as revenue collectors for the CoJ. Ironically 
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therefore generating revenues could strengthen EHPs within the CoJ whilst undermining their 
legitimacy to the public!    
 
EHP to population ratios provide another crude way of exploring resources. Haynes (2004) also 
found a national average of nearly 24000 people per EHP in 2003, only the Western Cape 
province meeting the NDoH recommended standard of 15000 people per EHP. A more recent 
survey provides a better indicator of front line resourcing by calculating the number of 
functional-EHPs which excludes managers and graduates completing their compulsory one year 
community service training (Agenbag and Lues 2009). Using this indicator they calculated a 
new national average of nearly 46000 people per EHP, the Western Cape still the only province 
achieving the NDoH standard.  
 
In February 2007 the CoJ employed 119 functional EHPs9 to regulate the environmental health 
of around 4 Million people, a ratio of approximately 34000 people per EHP and more than 
double the national recommended standard. In 2013 Mudaly’s survey of EHPs in municipalities 
across South Africa found that the CoJ employed 221 EHPs in total (functional EHPs not 
known), nearly twice that of six years earlier, but 75 more were needed to meet the 1:15000 
ratio recommended by the NDoH given the increase in Johannesburg’s population by 500000 
(around 4.5 million total) during this period. In this survey the Western Cape municipalities 
remained the only ones meeting the NDoH recommended staffing levels.  
 
When asked to rate the resources they have the case-EHPs were divided. In Regions B and F2 
the case-EHPs considered their resources adequate, but those in Regions D1 and F1 considered 
them inadequate but when questioned further all the case-EHPs shared many concerns. For 
example they often worried that there were too few EHPs to cover such large areas, particularly 
in Regions B and D1. It could take weeks, even months to cover them all, whilst focusing on 
one area meant conditions in others deteriorated. This was compounded by the changing nature 
of Johannesburg, especially its growing population and the transient nature of many businesses, 
particularly in inner city Region F1. B4 and D1B likened their roles to ‘putting out fires’ but 
they also used their discretion to organise their proactive work geographically when possible: 
 
                                                     
9 The CoJ Department of Environmental Health employed to total of134 EHPs in February 
2007, but the four senior managers in the Central EH Unit and the 11 Regional EH Managers 
were subtracted from this total. In contrast to Agenbag and Lues (2009), Operations Managers 
and EHPs completing their community service training were included because most had their 
own caseloads in the field though admittedly they were not as active as the case-EHPs.     
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“…due to staff shortages you would wait a bit longer [to revisit a premises], so that the 
premises with 7, 14 or 30 days’ notices expires and then you can visit all of them” (D1B 
– email in 0009/PhD Results).  
 
In all four regional offices staff turnover created further pressures and all lost experienced EHPs 
during fieldwork, whilst new and inexperienced EHPs were constantly arriving and required 
much supervision and support. Following a recent reduction of EHPs in the Region D1 office 
from 23 to 13, D1A questioned (cynically) whether EHP:population ratios were still being used 
to determine staffing levels (D1A interview p55) whilst D1B concluded that “someone out there 
thinks there’s not much work for EHPs” (D1B questionnaire p17). EHPs were also concerned 
about the loss of experienced Managers, including older White EHPs who had reached a glass 
ceiling and were retiring early without passing on their experience.  
 
In future the DD-EH aspired to employ 300 EHPs to exceed the NDoH recommended standard 
but he was also concerned that EHP:population ratios distorted the picture in apartheid cities 
like Johannesburg where around half the population live in Soweto but work in the northern 
regions. Therefore the Central EH Unit was exploring other variables including the numbers and 
types of premises and the time EHPs spend on different tasks. In the meantime managers and 
the MMC-Health acknowledged the shortages of EHPs and were concerned about its impact on 
morale. For example the Region B EH Manager was operating with half the EHPs he required 
and had recently written directly to the Executive Director-Health to voice his concerns and his 
support for his struggling EHPs (0001/B Observation p2).  
 
A lack of resources was also influencing EHP functions. EHPs were concerned that the funding 
for some projects had ended long before their improvements became sustainable. During 
fieldwork the sampling of foods and drinking water across the regions had ceased and remained 
a great concern to EHPs and senior managers (CoJ DoH 2006b). Pest control services only now 
offered advice to the public, with interventions restricted to CoJ premises and those owned by 
provincial government. EHPs and managers were also concerned about the lack of resources for 
staff training, particularly in areas like law enforcement. This was compounded by the 2010 
World Cup and pressures to train more Peace Officers with the JMPD taking priority such that 
case-EHP B1 was still unauthorized to enforce the law despite working for 3 months. EHPs also 
expressed concerns about technology available. All had desks and telephones, but some shared 
computers connected only to the CoJ intranet and email. Sharing encouraged the exchange of 
knowledge, but two EHPs expressed a desire for external internet access to help keep them up to 




During fieldwork two regional offices were broken into with computers, printers and 
photocopiers stolen that were unlikely to be replaced for weeks. Some EHPs had access to work 
mobile phones, but most used their own mobile phones (and credit) whilst in the field, 
particularly when trying to access high security gated homes to investigate complaints. In 
Region D1 EHPs also regularly apologised to the author for the state of their temporary, mobile 
office that was in a poor state of repair and frequently undermined their own work:   
 
“We say to the public they should do this and this and this and only when they come to 
your office they see the opposite of what you are preaching. So if the Council, because 
Health it’s a core Department and it deals with the public and the clients visit them, they 
should set the trend... they should put their health staff in office which are lookable and 
which are kept clean all the times….” (D1A interview p20).  
 
Lastly, during fieldwork there was encouraging evidence of increasing EH resources. During 
2005-6 an additional 22 EHPs were appointed (CoJ 2006a p26), whilst 2006-7 highlights from 
the MMC-Health included a budget increase of R2 Million that enabled the recruitment of two 
new Managers, six EHPs and two administrators (0005Obs/Central p5). Further, the MMC-
Health reported that the 2007-8 budget included an additional R5 Million for environmental 
health and these increases were welcomed (0005Obs/Central p5). Mudaly’s (2013) survey 
reports of 221 CoJ EHPs were also encouraging, but whether the next six years will bring the 
total nearer the DD-EH’s aspiration for 300 EHPs (or more given Johannesburg’s growing 
population) remains to be seen.      
 
5.4 Conclusions  
Chapter 5 found that both legal and organisational factors exert considerable influence on how 
CoJ EHPs regulate environmental health that often favour persuasive approaches towards the 
base of the regulatory pyramid. The legal framework for environmental health and the statutory 
position of local government EHPs is characterised by uncertainties that together makes their 
mandate for regulating environmental health far from secure. The CoJ provided clear strategic 
and political support for environmental health regulation and its EHPs but this was sometimes 
undermined at the local level, particularly through performance targets, resource shortages and 
the regulatory interventions of CoJ politicians. For EHPs, relations with their colleagues and 
managers were vital for navigating the many uncertainties of the regulatory process and the next 
chapter now considers the influence of EHPs themselves on this process.    
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Chapter 6 Individual factors: The backgrounds and views of EHPs    
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses towards the centre of Figure 4.1and begins by reviewing the backgrounds 
and general views of EHPs about their work before exploring their personal safety concerns. 
The chapter then focuses on their views of the criminality of EH offending, sanctions and the 
criminal courts. Chapter 6 argues that individual factors can influence the decisions of EHPs 
across the regulatory pyramid but frequently favour persuasive approaches towards its base.  
 
6.2 The backgrounds of EHPs 
Table 4.1 above summarises the backgrounds of the ten case-EHPs studied. Seven years after 
Mathee et al.’s (1999) study male EHPs no longer dominated Johannesburg’s local government 
offices. In the four regional offices around half of EHPs were female but the author did not 
identify any differences between the regulatory approaches EHPs that could be attributed to 
gender. For example unlike Crook and Ayee (2006), females did not appear to be better 
negotiators than their male counterparts whilst females were also as willing as their male 
counterparts to use more punitive approaches as required. Nine case-EHPs were Black-African 
and this conferred some advantages in building relations with Black-African businesses and the 
public, particularly when languages, cultures and histories were shared. But disadvantages 
included the willingness of ‘fellow Africans’ to offer bribes (see section 7.8 below) or accuse 
EHPs of having a ‘bad attitude’ (see section 7.5 below). One white female case-EHP (F2B) 
thought her race and gender together put her at greater safety risk (see section 6.4 below).     
 
Following the earlier Cape Town studies (Lewin et al. 1998; McDonald, 1997) some victim 
blaming in poorer areas was identified amongst case-EHPs but this was usually attributed to 
organizational incompetence, not race or criminality, and reflected a need for the education, 
advice and support that EHPs could provide (see section 7.2). In contrast to the Cape Town 
studies, all the EHPs encountered were clear about their roles in poorer areas though they 
remained challenging as explored across Chapter 7, particularly section 7.7 on regulating the 
informal sector. Black-African EHPs sometimes had an obvious advantage over other races 
when working in poorer areas, though in Coloured townships for example this was not always 
the case.    
 
Half the case-EHPs had lived and/or worked in rural areas before joining the CoJ. They 
sometimes described a greater emphasis towards community development in rural areas where 
persuasive approaches like education and advice dominated. In contrast, at the CoJ all EHPs 
acknowledged that punishment AND persuasion, in the form of ‘law enforcement’, were 
required. The Region F2 EH Manager commented that some ex-rural EHPs initially found it 
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hard to adapt to the CoJ (interview pp5-6), but unlike Hutter (1988) this research did not 
identify any former rural EHPs who were reluctant to use more punitive approaches.       
 
Most case-EHPs were in their 20s-30s, as were their colleagues in the four regional offices, and 
all had National Diplomas in EH though six had also completed EH degrees and were studying 
for other qualifications. None were newly qualified, even CoJ new starter B1 possessing two 
and a half years of regulatory experience elsewhere. There were no noticeable differences 
between the views and practices of younger and older EHPs observed during fieldwork that 
could be attributed to age or education, though there was some evidence that experience 
influenced regulation beyond the case-EHPs. For example inexperienced EHPs were sometimes 
accused by colleagues and managers of being ignorant of the law (see section 6.6 below) and 
this was often used to justify the need for close supervision.    
 
6.3 EHPs’ views of their roles and motivations  
All the case-EHPs acknowledged their work as law enforcers but considered their primary role 
to be remedial rather than punitive, with the law acting as one means towards greater 
environmental health ends. EHPs typically described themselves as educators and advisors, 
persuading and awareness raising, protecting people and improving their lives. For some 
helping people was what they liked most about their jobs:  
 
“You have to help them because they need information … Some of them steal, some of 
them they went to school, so they need us, that’s why we are always having this 
awareness of them. You know we actually convey the message, we are educating the 
client. It’s good to see people improving in their lifestyle because you contribute...” 
(F1C interview pp25-6).     
 
The EHPs also saw themselves promoting health and more sustainable lifestyles and preventing 
ill health by solving problems and responding to community needs, particularly from those in 
low income areas. All recognised the inequalities in their areas, but B2 saw his role as trying to 
“bridge the gap” between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ communities (B2 interview p11). B1 
saw his role as “addressing the health needs of all the nation” but he admitted there was still 
some way to go (B1 interview p38). Three case-EHPs described themselves as ‘saviours of the 
community’, F2B commenting that without EHPs she did not know where Johannesburg would 
go (F2B interview p13). The DD-EH summarised many of these views by defining the role of 
EHPs as the “management of environmental health risks in the public interest” (DD-EH 10 
April interview p5). These views reflected the Constitutional objectives towards developmental 
local government (see section 5.2.1 above) and sometimes EHPs commented how their work 
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was delivering the Constitution, particularly Section 24 (the right to a safe and healthy 
environment), but none mentioned developmental local government during fieldwork.   
 
Despite their preference for persuasive approaches, EHPs also recognised the need for more 
punitive approaches towards the top of the regulatory pyramid:  
 
“.... when I arrived here I’ve realise that sometimes... I have to be an educator, but not 
all the cases will need… the education approach, some of the things they need you to be 
serious, they need you to be firm and say ‘this is the law’” (F1A interview pp47-8). 
 
“…you teach one day but tomorrow go three steps back... as I’m teaching I think all the 
inspectors that worked here before they have done that, I won’t make any difference of 
doing that. For me it’s law enforcement, it’s prosecution and then that’s all that will 
make people change their mind. We are having people who are unemployed and they 
are here to make money, but they don’t care about the legislation, they don’t care about 
the law... and they will NEVER even find out what the law says about those things” 
(F1D interview pp24-5).     
 
EHPs associated increasingly punitive approaches with serious offences, uncooperative people 
and persistent offenders (see Chapter 7) but they were also nervous that such approaches could 
put them in a difficult position:    
 
“…when people see you as somebody who is there to help they are open, then we can 
help them, then it’s better” (B2 interview p34) 
 
We must think about the poor and help them, but at the same time we “don’t want to be 
seen as the people sitting on top of other people” (F1C interview p23)  
 
Therefore EHPs generally preferred to use more punitive approaches as the last resort when all 
other options had been considered. They often went to great lengths to persuade people that 
their interventions could benefit them and their customers and this ability to navigate the whole 
regulatory pyramid was evident when EHPs were asked what makes a ‘good EHP’? Here the 
most common attributes described by EHPs included a flexible but firm approach, the ability to 
make decisions and work independently, good communication skills and the ability to work 
with people from all backgrounds. EHPs commonly identified the ‘good EHP’ as a people 




“…build a rapport with the public, to be able to converse with EVERY person from 
someone who might be a cleaner, right through to a Director of a company, all walks of 
life” (Region B EH Manager interview p4).  
 
Such skills could pay dividends, EHPs acknowledging that by respecting people they were more 
likely to respect you and be cooperative. Other important values included professionalism (e.g. 
current knowledge, accountability), honesty, dedication and a passion for environmental health.   
 
One AD-EH inserted a presentation on the ‘Characteristics of a Good EHP’ into the delegate 
packs for EHPs attending the Alfred Nzo conference (van Deventer, 2007). This was almost 
identical to those identified by EHPs themselves above, though predictable additions included 
meeting the CoJ’s expectations. The AD-EH also called on EHPs to demonstrate high levels of 
emotional competence, a concept he borrowed from Daniel Goleman’s book Working with 
emotional intelligence which he recommended for all EHPs though it reinforced what EHPs 
themselves had identified above. In return the AD-EH promised EHPs job satisfaction, skills 
development and rewards but his presentation ended with a warning that these expectations 
cannot be met if managers don’t take a keen interest in their EHPs (van Deventer, 2007).   
 
The author assumed that the nine Black African case-EHPs had experienced poor environmental 
health under apartheid. Some confirmed this and the author thought it might have informed their 
career choice but only F1C suggested an early vocational ethos when recalling an encounter 
with his school careers advisor:   
 
“I grew up in a rural area and I’ve seen a lot of things that are being not addressed, and 
then coming to choosing a career… this career it was actually addressing all those 
problems and I thought about that, the generation that is coming after me… now we 
need to do something and I said... give them education and save the community, that’s 
my job…” (F1C interview pp6-7).   
 
Careers advisors also steered D1B and F1D towards environmental health, but for the other 
seven case-EHPs chance meetings with EHPs in previous jobs or at school or via family, friends 
and neighbours led them to choose environmental health.  
 
The nine district case-EHPs all acknowledged the broad and largely generalist nature of their 
roles and responsibilities. B1 was the only auxiliary EHP specialising in environmental 
pollution control but he acknowledged this still required a broad EH knowledge given the 
complexity of cases encountered. When asked to describe their roles and responsibilities, the 
nine district EHPs typically provided long lists of the areas and types of premises they regulated 
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and complaints they investigated before listing the nine functional areas that define municipal 
health services in the National Health Act, 2003 (see section 5.2.2 above). They then added a 
‘catch all’ caveat like “anything pertaining to public health within a district area” (B4 interview 
p2) or “as long as it’s having a negative effect on the health of the community you are 
responsible for it, WHATEVER” (F1C interview p2).  
 
A few EHPs likened themselves as ‘jacks of all trades’ but all combined their generalist work 
with more specialist responsibilities. For example D1A and F1C had responsibility for 
communicable diseases surveillance across their regions, whilst B1, F1D and F2A had regional 
health education responsibilities. B4 was engaged with many long term housing cases and 
during fieldwork Region D1 EHPs were focusing on the health surveillance of day care centres 
driven in part by a growing back log for permits. Colleagues F1B and F1C had also noticed that 
other Metropolitan Municipalities were moving towards more specialist roles for EHPs, but in 
their view the CoJ continued with the generalist model without exploring these alternatives.    
 
Most case-EHPs were satisfied with their jobs and when asked what they most liked about being 
an EHP they spoke of helping people, solving problems and promoting health, and 
characteristics of the job itself like working with different people, the variety of the work and 
not being office bound. They also really valued their discretion and felt motivated by their work, 
particularly when it was acknowledged by the public. F1D loved being a health inspector, whilst 
D1B did not “have a problem waking up in the morning and coming to work” (D1B interview 
p19) and B4 stated that he was not working “because somebody’s pushing you” but because he 
likes his job, it makes him happy (B4 interview p31) and he can “make a difference” (0010/B 
Observation p11). Only F1B and F2B were unsatisfied with their jobs. F1B was concerned 
about the lack of training opportunities at the CoJ and F2B gave no specific reason, but EHPs 
expressed other sources of dissatisfaction. A few were upset to still be working the same areas 
for many years but this was changing as the regions were beginning to rotate their EHPs more 
regularly. EHPs were also frustrated when they failed to improve their areas or when their 
efforts were not appreciated by managers and the public, but pay and benefits were the most 
common cause of dissatisfaction.  
 
The case-EHPs did not consider themselves fairly paid for their work but there were many 
aspects to this. For some things were much better compared to their previous jobs as contract 
EHPs or in provincial government, though all remained concerned that their fixed car 
allowances were not covering these costs, particularly following recent increases in petrol 




“...what happens is we are still regarded as Environmental Health Officers, so the 
permit that we get it’s for Officers, and an OFFICER is someone who’s got matric10 
and... a qualification to work as let’s say a Metro. Police Officer they just want a matric 
and a driver’s licence, and an administrative officer, they want your matric... So we are 
more qualified, we’ve got degrees, we’ve got Diplomas... So that’s why the Officer part 
of it has an impact on our salary, because we get paid as Officers, we don’t get paid as 
qualified practitioners...” (F1D interview pp18-9) 
 
To establish this F1D and colleagues collected job advertisements for ‘Officer’ posts from 
across South Africa and found these lesser qualified posts had the same salary range as CoJ 
EHPs. Further, F1D explained that the law usually referred to inspectors, not practitioners, but 
during fieldwork momentum was building towards legal recognition of the title ‘Environmental 
Health Practitioner’ and this was finally achieved in 2013 as acknowledged by the President of 
the SAIEH: 
 
“Environmental Health Officer, to us, meant a professional who would just be looking 
at enforcement. An Environmental Health Practitioner is a person who should 
scientifically make a proper assessment of environmental health conditions and institute 
appropriate mitigating measures that would sustainably address environmental 
conditions. This is a true description of what we are trained to do, as professionals 
practising within the field of environmental health” (Chaka, 2013b) 
 
Another concern about pay was the difference between the CoJ and other Metropolitan 
Municipalities which did not seem fair because the CoJ was the biggest municipality in South 
Africa. Managers acknowledged this and it was common knowledge that EHPs could earn 
around R2500 more, with higher car allowances and merit increases in salary, in neighbouring 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality. Two EHPs readily admitted they would move to 
Ekurhuleni if a suitable post came up. Others likened the CoJ to a “training ground for EHPs” 
(D1A interview p56) or the “University of Gauteng for Environmental Health Practitioners” 
(Region B EH Manager interview p16) before they moved to better paid jobs elsewhere. All 
four regional offices were experiencing high levels of staff turnover during fieldwork. For 
example Regions B and D1 had lost five and three EHPs respectively during the last financial 
year, and there was widespread concern about its implications as summarised by F1D:   
 
                                                     
10 Matriculation, often shortened to matric, refers to the qualification received on graduating 
from high school at around 18 years old. It is now called the National Senior Certificate and is 
the minimum requirement for admission to a University Bachelor’s degree course.   
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“... we are having these inspectors who are coming in and out because of the salary 
issue and the more better they get paid they will leave the city and with the changing of 
inspectors it actually takes us back because we need somebody who will become the 
expert in an area... if the person stays there for a year and leaves then the new person 
doesn’t know what is happening there, so it actually doesn’t take us any further with... 
bringing out the changes” (F1D interview pp44-5).    
 
But EHPs also expressed concern that some of their colleagues, particularly younger EHPs, 
were preoccupied with money and considered this unprofessional and lacking a commitment 
and passion for environmental health as summarised by B4: 
 
 “You are not just here to earn a salary, you are here to make a difference” (0010/B 
Observation p11)       
 
B4 also expressed concern that some EHPs still come to work “just to simply work for the 
council” and this attitude created problems when they lack practical experience (B4 interview 
p32). Similarly, F2A thought the greatest challenge facing EHPs in his region was delivering 
good results before raising questions about money (F2A interview p33). In contrast F1C did not 
think EHPs were in it for the money, but they would be happier and get the job done better if the 
CoJ looked after them and valued them more (F1C interview pp27-8).  
 
Opinions varied about the differences in pay between EHPs themselves. Most case-EHPs did 
not think their managers were paid fairly, D1A commenting that if they were they wouldn’t 
keep resigning as her own Operations Manager had just done so (D1A questionnaire p13). On-
going reforms to pay scales also meant that newly appointed EHPs could be earning more than 
experienced EHPs and even Operations Managers, therefore D1A felt less motivated to assist 
her new colleagues (D1A interview p57). 
 
All the case-EHPs were members of either the South African Municipal Workers Union 
(SAMWU) or the Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU) and many 
explained that union membership was their Constitutional right (Section 23). Fieldwork 
coincided with public sector strikes across South Africa. The CoJ was unaffected during 
fieldwork but the strikes were very visible and often mentioned by EHPs. EHPs were also 
working with the unions and the CoJ via a bargaining council to address their pay concerns and 
there was some optimism of a resolution. F1D also thought the HPCSA should be lobbying for 




Lastly, most case-EHPs would also recommend a career as an EHP to a suitably qualified 
friend, though D1A and D1B would add a ‘friendly warning’ about the realities of working at 
the CoJ, particularly the pressure on EHPs to meet targets. This chapter now explores how the 
professional identities of EHPs could influence their work.   
 
6.4 The views of EHPs as professionals  
All the case-EHPs considered themselves professionals. This was partly due to their mandatory 
yearly registration with the HPCSA to practice environmental health but professionalism 
encompassed many other aspects. For some being a professional meant working hard, being up 
to date, committed and accountable and making a difference but EHPs were also united by their 
concern that their profession was under threat.   
 
The case-EHPs were divided in their views of the HPCSA. They recognised its role in setting 
standards and regulating their practice, but some complained that they got nothing from HPCSA 
membership - which they paid themselves - and only heard from them when fees are due or 
someone is nominated onto the HPCSA Boards. Some EHPs suspected this was because the 
HPCSA concentrated mostly on nurses and doctors and, after acknowledging this too, D1B 
wanted them to produce more guidelines for regulating EHPs (D1B interview pp13-5). EHPs 
also believed the HPCSA should be doing more for their professional development. F1B knew 
an engineer whose professional organisation regularly updates them on new developments 
unlike the HPCSA (F1B interview p16) but there were signs that this was changing. 
 
On the 1 January 2007 the HPCSA’s Professional Board for EHPs introduced a Continuous 
Professional Development (CPD) requirement for EHPs (excluding those doing community in-
service training) to complete 30 Continuous Education Units (or 30 learning hours) over a 12 
month period, supported by documentary evidence maintained within a CPD portfolio. In 
coming years EHPs would be randomly audited by an Education Committee, with non-
compliant EHPs facing sanctions including de-registration and criminal sanctions. One senior 
EHP on the Board for EHPs welcomed this as “…a challenge to those who don’t want to be 
developed…” (Van Niekerk, 2007 p10) but the Region B EH Manager was more cautious. He 
had recently completed his Master’s degree thesis on CPD and had been helping the HPCSA 
develop this system but he warned of new problems like the lack of CPD courses available and 
whether de-registration was wise at such an early stage and amidst a national shortage of EHPs 
(Region B EH Manager interview pp19-21).      
 
Before democracy there were separate Black and White professional associations for South 
African EHPs but they combined to create the SAIEH in 1995. The hosting of the 8th World 
Congress of the International Federation of Environmental Health (IFEH) in Durban in 
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February 2004 by the SAIEH helped build momentum when the IFEH President, Jerry Chaka, 
was also President of the SAIEH. The SAIEH has the following vision and mission:  
 
Vision: to be the nationally and internationally recognized leading professional 
organisation in the field of environmental health  
 
Mission: to promote the science and practice of environmental health thus capacitating 
members to render a professional service and ensure optimum participation of all 
stakeholders in environmental health matters (SAIEH 2004) 
 
In February 2006 the author attended the bi-annual SAIEH conference in Durban. The first two 
days featured EHPs and other speakers from local government and NGOs across South Africa 
covering many EH subjects. The third day focused on delivering municipal health services with 
a panel from local government, the NDoH, the SAIEH and the Universities and many 
contributions from the floor. The conference was aimed more at managers than front line EHPs, 
but by bringing more than 100 South African EHPs together to share their knowledge, 
experiences and concerns the SAIEH was playing an important role in organising EHPs and 
influencing policy. Back at the CoJ however the SAIEH was largely unknown to front line 
EHPs, but this section now explores their concerns about the decline of the profession.  
 
Within the CoJ case-EHPs described generally poor levels of environmental health awareness 
amongst senior managers and politicians. During his opening address to the Alfred Nzo 
conference for EHPs the Executive Director - Health admitted that in the past health services 
were only seen as doctors, nurses and clinics but EH services were no longer a Cinderella and 
should assert themselves and claim their rightful role (Nzo 0005Obs/Central p1). But EHPs and 
managers believed people did not know who they were and that the Executive Director - Health 
did not know much about environmental health. They welcomed the four new Central Unit 
Director posts, but some preferred the structure of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality whose 
Director of Municipal Health Services (EHP Jerry Chaka, also SAIEH & IFEH President) was 
in their view better positioned to support and promote EHPs (0003/B Observations p6).   
 
The case-EHPs were also concerned that some core environmental health functions (e.g. noise, 
air pollution, waste management) were being lost to other CoJ Departments and the 
Environmental Management Inspectors mentioned in section 5.2.8 above. F1C was concerned 
that EHPs would be reduced to doing “pretty small things” that “hide the weight” of EHPs (F1C 
interview pp53-5). These concerns were enhanced by the emergence of Environmental Health 
Assistants, typically educated to matric and responsible for assisting EHPs and their managers 
with technical tasks like sampling and administration. In 2005 the HPCSA formally recognised 
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their role - though it dates back to the colonial era (Anning, 1937) - but F1D considered this the 
greatest challenge facing South African EHPs:   
 
“...it looks like our qualifications are going to fade because they are going to look at any 
person who only have Matric to do environmental health. So the qualifications and our 
environmental health... looks like it’s going to fade away - because they are bringing in 
the assistant which will be 2 years and... now they wanted to come up with the Metro. 
Police in our job, with only Matric... they will have trainings even though you don’t 
have a diploma or a degree or whatever in environmental health that will actually be the 
health inspector” (F1D interview pp45-6).      
 
The Region F2 EH Manager thought these developments were related and becoming a reality:  
 
“…already JMPD [the CoJ’s police] wants to [test] diesels, [Department of] 
Environmental Management wants to take over air pollution and water pollution…. 
originally your Act states that these are the functions of the Health Department within 
local government, but now if we don’t take it seriously and we don’t do it, it will go. If 
environmental health opened their eyes what will be left, just vacant stands and barking 
dogs and things like that, which you can give to an assistant to do. So if they don’t take 
their work seriously, this is the way they will go. I think it’s just they must take their 
work seriously. And our management as well, they must, I think they just need proper 
guidance on what is environmental health” (F2 EH Manager interview p26). 
 
Further, despite the Executive Director - Health’s reassurances there was still concern amongst 
EHPs that environmental health remained a Cinderella:  
 
“The profession is not marketed. We are not known and we are just being taken as the 
people who just pass Matric and then are given a job to go and CHECK waste water in 
the street, go and CHECK building rubble on the sidewalk. They don’t know what it 
involves, how important it is” (B4 interview pp32-3).   
 
“ ‘Dr Bismilla [Executive Director – Health], you know what you are doing with us, if 
you take a doctor and you ask him to make beds in the hospital, that’s what you are 
doing with the EHO’. We concentrate 50% on vacant stands, on grass cutting, on things 
like that you can give to somebody who’s just come out of school to do it. So I compare 
it to a doctor who’s making beds in hospital. You don’t use the EHO for what he was 
trained, you demote him” (Region F2 EH Manager interview pp10-1).      
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“We could rather spend our time and make sure that food premises complies, that we 
take food samples which we don’t do, we don’t do food samples. Look at the air 
emissions, what’s happening in the factories, those kind of things. We have studied for 
that. But I mean grass cutting, if the grass is higher than this I’ll still debate it, is it 
really a health nuisance? Grass is higher than me… is somebody going to die of long 
grass? But they can die because of a food factory. I’ve got a food factory here, I can 
show you, it’s horrifying. They are manufacturing sauces in a panel beating shop, that’s 
our work, to go and sniff out those places. Grass cutting, I mean, really, give it to City 
Parks” (Region F2 EH Manager interview pp10-1).   
 
In response EHPs thought the HPCSA and the SAIEH should be doing more to protect and 
promote EHPs. They also thought the National Director of Environmental Health should be 
doing more, but this post had been vacant for long periods and senior EHPs remained concerned 
about the lack of national direction and the risk that the post could disappear altogether. A new 
National Director was appointed during fieldwork and her representative acknowledged the past 
problems with capacity and assured EHPs they were now ready to assist them to “…ensure this 
noble profession is taken to higher heights” (Murdoch in Nzo 0005Obs/Central p9). Given past 
events CoJ EHPs remained hopeful but sceptical.   
 
Given this context it’s not surprising that only two case-EHPs (B1 and D1B) considered 
themselves as part of a national public health workforce. The others identified themselves more 
as local guardians of environmental health. Operations Manager B3 linked both by stating that 
EHPs have to protect and serve the community to make Johannesburg a world class African city 
(Operations Manager B3 interview pp35-6), but the local identity of most EHPs was also not 
surprising given their local government work and the relatively undeveloped state of the 
HPCSA and SAIEH in 2007. Six years later progress was being made with an EHP (Aneliswa 
Cele, former SAIEH secretary) appointed National Director of EH and the SAIEH and NDoH 
contributing to South Africa’s first National Environmental Health Policy (NDoH, 2013) and 
establishing a National Environmental Health Forum (Chaka, 2013b). In 2012 the Professional 
Board for EHPs of the HPCSA also started publishing a bi-annual newsletter, Environmental 
Health News, featuring useful articles for EHPs alongside reminders to pay membership fees.  
 
6.5 The personal safety of EHPs   
Personal safety was a recurring theme for EHPs and there were many aspects to this. The nature 
of their work, particularly working alone, visiting places and people they may not know and the 
confrontational nature of regulation exposes EHPs to more risk than many other occupations. 
The EHPs recognised Johannesburg’s reputation for violence which you had to accept to work 
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there, inner city EHP F1A commenting that “anything can happen when you are working there” 
(F1A interview pp17-8) but EHPs also thought their safety could be managed much better.   
 
EHPs all recalled being threatened in their work, particularly being obstructed, warned to ‘go 
away’ or having their paperwork ripped up for example. Some had been locked in rooms, 
threatened at gun point and one EHP suspected her car had been vandalised by business owners 
who had threatened to get her. Two EHPs recalled stories of colleagues being killed. D1B 
described a warehouse inspection when an EHP asked about unlabelled packages and was killed 
because the operators thought the EHP knew they contained drugs (D1B email of 24 March 
2010). D1B also recalled the CoJ removing telephone containers from street corners used by 
hawkers and others for trading. In response the local people were unhappy and accused the local 
EHP of their removal and he was killed (D1B email of 24 March 2010). F1B recalled a 
Township EHP who fined somebody and was later killed for doing so (F1B interview p37). The 
author was unable to verify these accounts but the Executive Mayor dedicated one publication 
to the 12 CoJ employees killed at work during his first five years in office (CoJ, 2005b).      
 
F2B thought her gender and race were also a factor, with female EHPs at greater risk in the field 
and she also thought this might explain why so few white women (like her) were becoming 
EHPs. Amongst the male EHPs observed the author rarely detected any macho safety culture, 
indeed all the EHPs were open about Johannesburg’s dangers and even experienced male EHPs, 
including former soldier F1A, admitted they were sometimes frightened at work.   
 
The results found that safety concerns usually related to specific areas, certain tasks or premises, 
specific cases or some combination of these factors, as summarised in Table 6.1 below. Certain 
areas had reputations for danger, particularly in the townships and the inner city, and EHPs were 
reluctant to work there for fear of being targeted. Some areas and premises were considered ‘no 
go’ zones by EHPs for routine work and could only be visited with police backup. Work in 
remote and inaccessible areas during activities like water sampling was potentially hazardous 
but EHPs were always on the lookout for people, snakes or unstable river banks for example. 
EHPs also notified office colleagues of their whereabouts and sometimes worked in pairs. They 
took great care working in informal settlements, conscious that well founded tensions (e.g. fear 
of forced removal) could get them into trouble unless they worked with settlement leaders from 
the outset. In one informal settlement with serious and on-going sanitation problems there was 






Table 6.1 Factors EHPs associated with increased personal safety risks  
Areas and premises  
Areas with reputations for violence 
Remote and inaccessible areas  
Informal settlements 
Bad buildings, night clubs, prisons  
‘Illegal’ premises (e.g. shebeens, hijacked buildings, informal car workshops)  
Characteristics of people 




Working higher up the regulatory pyramid (e.g. fines/summons) 
Blitz work   
 
EHPs also associated certain premises with a greater likelihood of safety problems. These 
included bad buildings that might shelter other activities (e.g. drug dealing, prostitution) and 
night clubs whose owners were frequently uncooperative and whose patrons could be 
antagonised by the presence of CoJ officials. EHPs also associated the inspection of provincial 
government prisons as potentially more hazardous even when planned in advance and escorted 
by prison officers at all times. Premises associated with illegal activities put EHPs at greater 
risk, particularly because they might not realise until entering the premises. For example D1A 
recalled an encounter with an armed caretaker when she visited an accommodation 
establishment for a routine inspection:   
 
“Leave, if you don’t leave, you see this street? I’m going to blow your head and your 
brain will be scattered there” (Caretaker in D1A interview p44).  
 
EHPs were wary of encounters with potentially violent people and would usually leave the 
area/premises and call for backup if they thought their safety was at risk. Encounters with 
uncooperative people were common but sometimes this went further and EHPs recalled 
encounters where they had been locked in rooms, thrown out of premises or threatened with 
violence if they did not leave. Indeed F1C thought the greatest challenge facing EHPs were 
public resistance and intimidation and he found it “psychologically disturbing” to have been 
thrown out of a building and understood the reluctance of EHPs to return to areas they have 
been told to stay away from (F1C interview pp50-1).  
 
Returning to Table 6.1 above EHPs acknowledged that working alone increased their 
vulnerability. Great care was taken when entering buildings, particularly those in the inner city 
and away from busy areas. The use of increasingly punitive approaches also increased the risk 
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because, as one Region D1 with more than 20 years of experience put it, you never know how 
people will react when served with a fine/summons (0004/D1Observation p17). Blitz work 
targeting EH hotspots exposed EHPs to greater danger and sometimes required them to wear 
bullet-proof vests but they were also better prepared and accompanied by (armed) Police and 
other CoJ organisations.      
 
Some personal safety controls were in place. On a daily basis EHPs sometimes did not notify 
colleagues, managers or administrators of their whereabouts but after a few months they 
developed a good working knowledge of their areas. Areas, premises and/or buildings known to 
be more dangerous were designated no-go zones and only visited in numbers and/or with the 
Police. When encountering unforeseen dangers EHPs emphasised the importance of leaving 
immediately and returning when appropriate with colleagues, managers and/or the Police. 
Further, EHPs considering more punitive approaches would routinely request similar backup if 
they suspected a person could get violent, though this was hard to predict.    
 
EHPs generally felt supported by managers (see section 5.3.3 above) but some believed their 
support for managing safety was lacking. For example some described a perception amongst 
managers that EHPs brought trouble upon themselves and they must deal with it. EHPs were 
offered counseling after incidents and could request Police support anytime but in reality this 
could take hours because the Police themselves were so short staffed. Knowing the local police 
helped, but D1B recalled calling 10111 [the national emergency services number] in desperation 
once when her colleague was being threatened (D1B interview pp32-3).  
 
A new task team was being established by senior managers to investigate these problems, with 
one EHP delegate per region. F1C hoped they could be “the voice of all the EHPs” and produce 
recommendations to ensure managers treat these cases seriously in the future (F1C interview 
pp50-1). Initial suggestions from EHPs included dedicated Police support for the CoJ and the 
prosecution of all who obstruct EHPs but past experience made EHPs sceptical of 
improvements and some were considering getting their Unions involved because, as F1C put it, 
“…at the end of the day it’s our life involved” (F1C interview pp50-1). This chapter now 
explores the views of EHPs about regulation, starting with their role as Peace Officers.  
 
6.6 The EHP as Peace Officer  
All the case-EHPs apart from B1 were Peace Officers authorized by the CoJ to enforce the law 
following the completion of a law enforcement training course. New starter B1 had not yet 
attended this course but had regulatory experience from his previous jobs and in the meantime 
relied on his Peace Officer colleagues and managers when taking more punitive approaches. 
Most case-EHPs had studied environmental health law enforcement at University, but F1C 
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admitted he had not and Region F2’s EH Manager was notably vociferous about the need to 
address this gap in the Universities: 
 
“…I think we must get into the Universities, I think they must really look at their 
curriculums, make it more what the EHOs are doing on the job. Because I think 
sometimes they create a picture for them that is not a reality, and they get the shock of 
their life when they start and see they must prosecute this person [laughs] and all those 
things, like that nuisance building here, I mean these things, and you throw a junior 
EHO in there and he won’t know where to start, what must he do, and the notices that 
they must write. I think that the lecturers are a bit out of touch with reality, especially in 
Jo’burg, with the conditions that we have here… Sometimes I think they must get real 
environmental health, people that’s working, to come and input into the lectures and say 
‘this is the kinds of things that you get, this is how you must solve it’…” (Region F2 
EH Manager interview pp20-2).  
 
EHPs had fond recollections of the week long law enforcement course and cited benefits 
including an awareness of regulatory procedures and the courts, the legal rights of offenders and 
their own responsibilities and accountabilities as Peace Officers and local government officials. 
Course ring binders full of legislation and standards sat beside the desks of most EHPs for easy 
reference. They also valued the yearly refresher training for EHPs, past topics including updates 
on new legislation, legal loopholes, writing fines correctly, building a case and how to manage 
with people. Some EHPs and managers also called for more frequent law enforcement training, 
particularly for inexperienced EHPs.   
 
Experience was vital and the Region B EH Manager expressed concerned that it could take six 
months to get new EHPs trained as Peace Officers but:  
 
“…if I can get them trained tomorrow they STILL have got a piece of paper but they 
haven’t got the experience and the knowhow and the confidence to go out and do it” 
(Region B EH Manager interview pp15-6).   
 
The Region F2 EH Manager illustrated this problem when recalling a scrap metal factory 
making food sauces:  
 
“Next week two young ones [EHPs] go and tell the guy to put in the roofing and 
protective clothing, but you can’t do that after you’ve issued the guy with a cease 
trading notice. You are contradicting your own field. But you see they don’t think of 
this [laughs]…. A week ago you’ve given them a cease trading [notice], because I went 
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with them on a blitz… But then just after that [the inexperienced EHP] takes his 
colleague and says ‘Now you must put in ceiling and’ but the building I mean, totally, 
totally, there’s no way that you can approve that as a food premises. So you can’t after 
you’ve issued a cease trading, I mean, go and tell the guy that now, all these things, 
because first his building I think must comply, so I said ‘No way, [inexperienced 
EHP]’” (Region F2 EH Manager interview pp24-5).  
 
For managers experiences like this reinforced the need for the on-going training and close 
supervision of all their EHPs, particularly those with limited CoJ experience. Further, those 
moving to the CoJ from rural areas also required more training and supervision: 
 
“One thing that we’ve realized is that EHOs that works in the rural areas and EHOs that 
have been here, their work is TOTALLY different. So it’s a huge adjustment for them, 
to come out from an area that’s more rural then to come and work. Here we are more 
law enforcement orientated, in your rural areas you are more education oriented” 
(Region F2 EH Manager interview p6). 
  
The Professional Board for EHPs of the HPCSA also recognised problems with the law 
enforcement knowledge of EHPs and in response produced a newsletter article reinforcing the 
need for persuasion AND punishment (as below) before describing the basic steps in preparing 
a prosecution when all else fails:  
 
“There is always an expectation that all Environmental Health Practitioners constantly 
engage in the health education of the consumers of our services, particularly the general 
public. Our task is to educate, educate, and educate.... It does not, however, work single 
handedly. It is accompanied by awareness campaigns involving health promotion, 
roadshows, street drama, etc. The question still remains as to what needs to happen 
when all of these fail to achieve the desired results? 
 
...It is expected that when all else has failed, people who violate the right of the public 
to a safe and clean environment should be brought to book” (Ngqulunga, 2013 p8).  
 
Most case-EHPs had also attended regulatory training courses organised by the CoJ and 
covering technical subjects (e.g. food risk management, food fortification and fats and oils 
sampling) and service delivery subjects (e.g. customer services, Batho Pele and conflict 
management). Some EHPs joked about how many times they had attended customer services 
courses (almost yearly), D1B suggesting this could be due to complaints that officials are rude 
and disrespectful but she believed this had no basis in fact: 
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“You don’t come and sit there [office reception] and people don’t attend you. You will 
be sitting there and about five people would ask you ‘Have you been served?’...even in 
the area we treat our clients very well. So maybe because we are doing the right thing 
it’s quite annoying to have to go to so many customer care training” (D1B interview 
pp12-3).   
 
6.7 The general views of EHPs about regulatory law enforcement 
EHPs were largely complementary about the law. Those with apartheid era experience reflected 
how the ethos of the law had shifted from being strict and highly prescriptive to becoming more 
accommodating and flexible. The Region B EH Manager reflected that EHPs now needed a far 
broader knowledge than before to “…know WHY are you asking for something, not just ‘the 
law says’” (interview pp21-2) and achieving this was among the greatest challenges for South 
African EHPs.   
 
The case-EHPs were almost equally divided between those who prefer precise definitions of EH 
standards (B2, B4, D1A, F1B and F1C) and those who preferred standards subject to individual 
interpretation (B1, D1B, F1D, F2B), with F2A undecided. In the field EHPs valued the greater 
discretion and flexibility of the new legal framework, particularly when applied to complex 
cases like the informal sector. But some were concerned about what their colleagues, 
particularly those with limited experience, were doing because for “...one inspector something 
can be bad, and the other one think ‘ag, he can still get away with that’” (F2B interview pp6-7).  
 
The case-EHPs did not recognise most of legal uncertainties described in section 5.2 above. 
Instead, as Hutter (1988) found, these uncertainties were considered problems to be solved and 
EHPs were more concerned about the daily practicalities of regulation, particularly the 
application of so much law. The DD-EH thought the legal knowledge of EHPs was of “Biblical 
proportions” and bringing it together to “function in harmony” was core to their work (DD-EH 
10 April interview p5). EHPs frequently referred to the law and there was general agreement 
amongst them that some laws, particularly the CoJ Public Health By-laws, 2004 were easier to 
understand than others. After five years at the CoJ B2 did not refer to the law every day but he 
still encountered cases where the law and possible regulatory approaches actions were not clear 
(B2 interview pp15-6) and it was common for EHPs to call on their colleagues and managers 
for assistance. EHPs were concerned about the lack of guidance in certain areas, particularly for 
closing premises, but the Central EH Unit was responding to these concerns.    
 
One of the greatest challenges for EHPs was regulating the informal sector as explored in 
section 7.7 below. Another challenge involved long term cases, particularly in housing where 
tracing building owners could take years whilst the tenants - often living in very poor conditions 
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- remain silent for fear of eviction. One EHP had observed how buildings had deteriorated in the 
years following his intervention such that he questioned whether this work was a good use of 
his time. EHPs were also concerned that their effectiveness was limited because they do not 
routinely work evenings or weekends. Complaints could be followed up the next working day 
but this might only result in a warning because the evidence had disappeared.  
 
The requirements for permits/licenses also presented many challenges for EHPs. There was a 
significant backlog in applications across the four regions whilst EHPs constantly discovered 
new premises. Further, the payment of fees for some permits/licenses created an ‘unwritten 
promise’ in the applicant’s mind that they would automatically get their permit. Standards could 
also drop soon after businesses receive their permit/license because some considered it their 
right, not something that was earned and could be lost. Relations between EHPs and applicants 
could also be strained by the multiple licenses required by some premises. For example one 
Operations Manager recalled that some night club owners assume that once they have their 
liquor license they can operate; she then spends years chasing the owners and using increasingly 
punitive approaches to secure the other permits (B Operations Manager interview p45).  
 
The law enforcement training for EHPs included the identification of legal loopholes, but only 
F1B flagged his on-going problems with them during fieldwork. He thought the CoJ Public 
Health By-laws, 2004 required urgent review because the (Section 63) requirements for 
accommodation establishments place the duty to apply for a permit on the ‘person’ who 
conducts the establishment, not the owner, and was being exploited by building hijackers:  
 
“Let’s say I hijacked your house and chased you away. I go and apply for a permit. I’ve 
cleaned my house, everything is nice and clean, the health inspector comes and says 
‘oh, this is fantastic, let me process your permit because everything is in order’. He 
gives me a permit. They [EHPs] don’t enquire whether I’m the owner, the fact that you 
applied HERE it’s like you have a right to occupy the house... I get a permit... I rent it to 
different people and they will have the confidence that this person is the owner of the 
house because he has given him or her documentation” (F1B interview pp31-3).  
 
F1B feared this loophole was legitimising criminal activity and therefore he and his colleagues 
were spending more time checking property ownership. Further, one former Regional EH 
Manager thought EHPs should be working much more closely with the CoJ Legal Department 
to address problems like this (AD-Res 12 July interview p2).    
 
Another challenge was the use of English as the official language of regulation. All paperwork 
was in English, but most visits were conducted in other South African languages. EHPs were 
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potentially disadvantaged if they did not speak isiZulu for example and some commented after 
encounters that many South Africans do not speak English. No translation services were 
available but EHPs supported each other with translation or enlisted the help of the regulated 
and others (e.g. friends, relatives) during visits. In areas like the inner city where non-South 
African languages were common this happened regularly, but EHPs were comfortable that 
provided their visits were cooperative they could work around these problems.  
 
The Region B EH Manager was also concerned that many inexperienced EHPs spoke good 
English but it was not their “mother language” and completing legal paperwork in English was a 
different thing altogether (Region B EH Manager interview pp15-6). F2A commented that 
ideally all legal paperwork should be written in the language of the regulated as well as English 
(0007/F2 Observation pp11-2), but this assumed people were literate which was sometimes not 
the case. Therefore at the end of each visit EHPs spent time explaining (in the appropriate 
language) all English paperwork they were about to hand over and what would happen next. 
During fieldwork the CoJ was publishing advisory EH information in all eleven South African 
languages and others (e.g. Mandarin) and EHPs were busy distributing this during fieldwork. 
There was some grateful acknowledgement from the Chinese community in one shopping mall, 
though some managers feared there could be translation errors because they had been unable to 
check final draft with the original translator (0009/B Observation p9).   
 
In summary EHPs held pragmatic views about the laws they used to regulate environmental 
health each day. Bringing these laws to life was challenging but EHPs had developed a wide 
range of strategies to work around them whilst awaiting further guidance. This chapter now 
considers the views of EHPs about the criminality of environmental health offending.   
 
6.8 The uncertain criminality of EH offending  
Crime has long been a sensitive subject in South Africa and fieldwork coincided with a 
broadcast by BBC World Affairs editor John Simpson on this subject from inner city 
Johannesburg. Broadcast the day before President Thabo Mbeki’s State of the Nation address, 
Simpson (2007) described a city at war with itself where inner city buildings were empty 
because of crime and the number of deaths on some days were comparable to those in Iraq and 
he also emphasised President Mbeki’s recent denial that there were any problems with crime in 
South Africa. One of South Africa’s leading criminologists also describes a country at war with 
itself where crime is common, particularly for the poorest in society, but the government 
sometimes denies its existence (Altbeker, 2007).         
 
Crime was mentioned constantly by EHPs during fieldwork. All described its problems in their 
areas and its wider impacts on environmental health and their own personal safety (see section 
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6.5 above). Two of the four regional offices were burgled during fieldwork with valuable 
photocopiers, computers and printers taken despite 24 hour security protection. F1B 
summarised the concerns of EHPs well by commenting that sometimes his cases were not being 
addressed because “South Africa has got too many crimes” and environmental health is not a 
priority (F1B interview pp27-8). Similarly, Operations Manager B3 recalled inspecting a 
nightclub when an owner responded:   
 
“‘ok, what is wrong? Did you see, there was this woman who was killed the other day, 
and you are telling me I’m making noise!’” (Operations Manager B3 interview pp51-2). 
 
Reflecting on the lawlessness he had witnessed Region B EH Manager described people who 
dump rubbish on the pavement because “for the last 5 years nothing has happened to me” 
(interview p13). The start of fieldwork also coincided with the Executive Mayor’s State of the 
City Address that drew attention to these attitudes, including for EH offences: 
 
“It is unfortunate that people who complain about so-called ‘big crimes’ such as 
robbery or murder often have no compunction to commit ‘small crimes’ such as traffic 
offences, illegal dumping, engaging with acts that lead to pollution and some even fail 
to pay rates or taxes. I urge you to observe the speed limit, pay your traffic fines, do not 
dump your rubbish on open sites, and pay for the consumption of services such as water 
and electricity. Repent and serve the community” (Masondo, 2007 p21).   
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly EHPs varied in their opinions of the criminality of EH offences. B1 
thought all offences were criminal because, regardless of the offence, contraventions of the law 
were an offence for which you could be prosecuted. Other EHPs thought only some offences 
were criminal because most of their work was about promoting health, not punishing people. 
One EHP summarised this well, stressing that EHPs use criminal procedures when people 
behave in criminal ways, but he was hesitant to criminalise people because environmental health 
was a function of the Department of Health (F1A interview pp40-1).  
 
EHPs were also reluctant to describe EH offenders as criminals. They did not think there were 
any typical offenders because each case was different, but EHPs aligned most people with 
Kagan and Scholz’s (1984) organisationally incompetent: people who broke the law because 
they lacked knowledge and who therefore required education and persuasion that ‘this is wrong’ 
and ‘this is what you need to do’ as EHPs often described it. More punitive approaches were 




So-called technical offences were less likely to be considered criminal by EHPs compared to 
those where motive or intent were involved. For example more criminal offences included 
intentional acts (e.g. obstructing EHPs, using adulterated cooking oils, timing offending outside 
working hours) or omissions (e.g. failure to provide ID, trading without a permit), persistent 
offending and people motivated by profit at the cost of safety. Other offences more likely to be 
considered criminal included serious offences (e.g. illegal dumping, building hijacking, food 
adulteration) and offences affecting the public, particularly children and the poor.   
 
Occupation was also a factor, with uncooperative and/or dishonest behaviours most often 
associated with nightclub and bad building owners. Business size was sometimes a factor, with 
EHPs aware that compliance was easier for large businesses but they also should know better. 
At the other extreme, EHPs were very familiar with the dilemmas facing SMMEs, particularly 
in the informal sector. They responded in very pragmatic ways to try improve conditions there 
(see section 7.7 below) but EHPs also knew informal traders could be deliberately evasive and 
dishonest. EHPs also associated nationality with criminal activities and they sometimes blamed 
gangs from Nigeria, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for building hijackings 
for example.  
 
6.9 EHPs’ views of criminal sanctions and the criminal courts  
The spot fine/summons was the most common punitive sanction used by EHPs. They generally 
considered it in response to intentional and/or persistent acts of non-compliance and when other 
approaches had not worked. Serious offences and those affecting members of the public were 
also more likely to result in a fine/summons on a case by case basis, particularly during blitz 
work targeting offending hot spots. When asked about the fine/summons, EHPs thought they 
were needed to punish offenders, to deter future offending and to encourage compliance by 
making people aware that EHPs have legal powers and should take their interventions seriously.  
 
EHPs also valued the threat of criminal sanctions when using more persuasive approaches like 
education, persuasion and negotiation. For example EHPs warned people that an offence could a 
R500 fine or that their fines are like JMPD [CoJ Police] fines, where non-payment leads to a 
Court summons and possible prison sentence. EHPs also sought to persuade by warning people 
of the futility of the fine/summons:      
 
“So you show them that the R1000 that I’m going to fine you, you would have 
repainted the wall as I requested, you would have bought paints and painted the walls. 
So now you’re going to give me that R1000 because you don’t want to paint the wall 
and I’ve got to come back AGAIN next month to give you another R1000 because you 
won’t have money to buy the paints again” (F1D interview pp39-41).  
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But EHPs also had many concerns about the fine/summons as a sanction. All recognised they 
were sometimes necessary, but they questioned their effectiveness unless combined with 
education and awareness raising activities. Administering the fine/summons someone could also 
put the personal safety of EHPs at risk (see section 6.5 above), but all the EHPs provided 
examples of persistent offenders who simply paid their fines and then carried on as usual. They 
also knew that some persistent offenders were prepared to call their bluff because the chances of 
offending being detected were so remote, particularly during evenings and weekends. The J175 
procedure existed to prevent this problem, in theory, by enabling EHPs to force persistent 
offenders to court without the option of paying fines but the next section raises important 
questions about the effectiveness of the courts in such cases.   
 
The maximum sanctions for environmental health offending were another concern of EHPs, 
relating back to the discussion in section 5.2.6 above. Sometimes EHPs defended them on the 
basis that, like traffic fines, sanctions were standard for all offenders regardless of 
socioeconomic status. But EHPs also knew the consequences of this: 
 
“... in the day care centre a fine is R1000, and then in the informal day care to them 
R1000 is almost the whole profit which they are generating a month” (D1A interview 
p53).  
 
EHPs acknowledged that those on low incomes frequently complained about this and some 
were unable to pay. They were also concerned that for others their fines were too low to be 
effective, particularly as a punishment for serious offences. Some EHPs had also seen nightclub 
owners temporarily increase admission fees to cover the costs of a fine/summons, but perhaps 
the greatest concern of EHPs was that they did not know what happened after their 
fine/summons had been served and this could undermine their authority:  
 
“...last year I remember I gave this guy a fine and when six months later I saw him… 
and he had a fine and obviously he didn’t pay the fine, he just took it. Ok, and I gave 
him another fine because it was keeping on again, giving notices and he just took the 
fine and put it away in a draw. And I wondered who follows up these fines if they are 
not paid? ... he doesn’t respect me when I go, because he knows that whatever I say he’s 
not going to do it, because there is no mechanism to force him to do it” (F1B interview 
pp40-1).      
 
 “...immediately I’ve issued a ticket I will take it to the Metro offices. From there where 
is it taken? Either it’s paid, I don’t know who is controlling that? I think that is one of 
the areas that needs a research for our Environmental Health Practitioners... can I do a 
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mini research as to check how many fines have been issued at the City of Johannesburg 
and how many have been paid, how many are not paid, what is happening with those 
that were not paid, were there anyone arrested?” (F2A interview pp31-2) 
 
“We can work so hard, 100% for everything, but did we really do, make an impact?... 
We’ve written how many, 200 and something fines, so what? We don’t get the money 
back… does it really make an impact? How many of the fines were paid, we don’t 
know… we’re not even in control, it goes to JMPD’s hands” (Region F2 EH Manager 
interview p14). 
 
Such problems led F1C to liken the fine/summons to a “dead snake” (F1C interview p42) that 
had prompted him and another EHP to carry out further investigations. F1C had discovered that 
some of his fines had been dismissed in court because of errors, but he maintained there were no 
errors and suspected something else was happening (F1C interview p42). In one month 
Operations Manager B3 had served 20 fines/summons but on visiting court only one had been 
paid, some were not recorded and vital control documents had gone missing. She met with the 
Public Prosecutors to investigate further and they complained that there were many mistakes in 
the paperwork (e.g. no time recorded, lost carbon copies) and she illustrated this with an 
example on her desk from one of her EHPs:  
 
“Ok I’ve just got one here you see, but I’m still trying to work with them, we are 
meeting next week just to see where our problems lie, exactly. You find that I’ve seen 
one where because it’s in triplicate, but because you give someone a summons you 
think ‘oh, I didn’t write in the time’ but on a control document then you can see it’s in 
clear pen. Ok, this person has just thrown them away... Even if you put initials there, 
you don’t put their ID, you know, even if there’s scratches there they will not issue it...” 
(Operations Manager B3 interview pp23-4) 
 
Senior managers recognised the high numbers of cases thrown out of court and the need to 
follow the correct procedures for the completion and submission of paperwork and this topic 
had been included in recent law enforcement refresher training for EHPs. The correct 
completion of paperwork was even more difficult when sanctioning the informal sector which 
F2B likened to an ‘on-going circle’ that might never change other than with education and time: 
 
“...we’ve got a lot of people that have got premises… in buildings that’s permanently. 
THOSE people pay their fines, because they know tomorrow we’ll get them there 
again... They’ve got nowhere to go. Now you’ve got… the people that’s like the 
hawkers, the informal traders, the people who are like selling food on the corner like the 
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informal traders, you prosecute them, they give you the wrong names, the wrong 
addresses, they haven’t got ID books. Now you prosecute them, tomorrow they’re back 
on the same piece [of land] because they’ve given you the wrong information and they 
don’t pay it. So prosecutions there don’t help, they don’t help” (F2B interview p24).    
 
There was some evidence that things were improving in the inner city because EHPs had 
recently been working with colleagues and the JMPD following up cases involving unpaid fines 
and persistent offending with warrants of arrest. But EHPs also did not trust the local criminal 
justice system because it was already overloaded and could get worse with the coming 2010 
World Cup. Using the JMPD traffic system had advantages in theory, particularly the storage of 
criminal records and any outstanding fines and warrants of arrest on the ID card database which 
most police officers had access to in the field. EHPs suspected this was why some people, 
particularly informal traders, did not carry their ID books but they also acknowledged that the 
chances of being stopped by the police were small if you did not drive and avoided public 
transport. Operations Manager B3 suspected that the JMPD did not get paid for processing the 
fines/summons of EHPs, but she thought other reasons might explain her recent experiences:    
 
“So they [JMPD] concentrate on their own responsibilities for traffic. What is that 
noise, or food premises which are dirty or whatever gotta do with the traffic? ...I used to 
be very vacant and tried to ignore this. You go over there and say ‘ok, here are the 
summonses’ and there’s a huge pile like this... summonses that you’ve issued six 
months ago, they are not even on the system! Nowhere on the system! Then you have 
to… go to this Station Commander or whoever is in charge, the Superintendent, and 
you complain and he says ‘no, no, no, we can resolve it.’ And it means that he must go 
there and resolve it, but why? They have their own [issues], like we have our own 
issues, yeah? They are short staffed themselves, now they are overloaded with 
environmental health problems...” (Operations Manager B3 interview pp38-9). 
 
Another problem with the fine/summons concerned allegations of corruption amongst the public 
prosecutors. One (anonymous) EHP recalled a case involving a persistent offender who’d been 
subpoenaed to the Court but the case was delayed. The EHP went to the public prosecutor to 
find out why and discovered that the case had been withdrawn. The EHP suspected corruption, 
with the business owner probably approaching the prosecutor directly to avoid a court 
appearance. In another case of persistent offending the same EHP recalled how a Ward 
Councillor intervened at the request of a business owner by contacting the prosecutor who 
withdrew the case because, in his opinion, the owner now complied. The EHP was furious 
having spent weeks on the case only to be told by the prosecutor (who had not worked on this 
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case before) that it had been withdrawn. The (anonymous) EHP commented that: “you 
prosecute because you’re serious... [but] no one will back you”.   
 
The incorporation of fines within EHPs’ monthly performance targets was another common 
concern of EHPs that illustrates how neo-liberal influences on workplace quality could be 
counterproductive. In section 5.3.4 above case-EHPs admitted it was usually not difficult to 
meet or exceed their monthly targets for the fine/summons, but they were more concerned about 
being pressured in this way, particularly given their preventive ethos and the potential for the 
fine/summons to harm their relations with the public. EHPs also voiced concern that the laws 
were too new for such emphasis on sanctions.    
 
In response to these issues some EHPs wanted more emphasis on the alternative punitive 
approaches.  Three advocated a return to what F1B described as the “more serious sanctions of 
the old days” when premises were closed and re-opened only when EHPs judged they were in 
compliance, particularly for affluent and persistent offenders. There was some evidence that this 
was happening because the Region F2 EH Manager had recently closing a sauce manufacturer 
operating out of a scrap dealers and EHPs were requesting more guidance from the Central EH 
Unit on how to close premises. These problems were acknowledged by senior managers and 
two further initiatives were also being developed. In October 2007 all CoJ regulators were 
invited to a workshop organized by the public prosecutor to review the current law enforcement 
situation in Johannesburg and make it more integrated (Mtetwa in CoJ 2007). During fieldwork 
new Regional Law Enforcement Manager posts were being advertised with responsibility for 
coordinating law enforcement across the CoJ and Operations Manager B3 successfully secured 
the Region F post shortly after fieldwork ended. This section now explores EHPs’ views of the 
criminal courts.  
  
Most case-EHPs had little or no recent court experience because prosecutions were usually 
managed by Operations Managers and the Regional EH Manager working with the public 
prosecutors. But thanks in part to their law enforcement training EHPs were aware of the role of 
the courts and their own accountabilities to the law. B4 and F2B gained considerable courts 
experience during the apartheid era, but in the last five years F2B had not yet returned to court 
(F2B interview p25). B4’s on-going housing caseload included referrals to magistrates to 
determine the course of action and he sometimes appeared in court to give his opinion (0010/B 
Observation p8). B2 had only attended court once in nearly five years during a persistent noise 
nuisance case, but on the day vital evidence was never obtained and the case was struck off the 
roll by the magistrate (B2 interview p38). Unsurprisingly therefore EHPs were unsure about 
how their cases were treated in the courts but they were concerned that the courts did not take 
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them seriously and considered them “minor prosecutions” (F1C interview p42). D1A imagined 
a magistrate saying:  
 
“I was supposed to be dealing with criminals, now I’m busy with a person who is 
DUMPING! What is dumping after all” (D1A interview pp54-5). 
 
EHPs suspected the courts prioritised more serious crimes, but they knew EH offenders did not 
like going to court, particularly when their fines were increased. However, EHPs also feared 
that the courts would be lenient on offenders because they lacked environmental health 
knowledge. Operations Manager B3 provided evidence that these fears were being realised in a 
case that was common knowledge amongst Region B EHPs. She had forced a persistent noise 
case to court using the J175 procedure and after many delays the trial eventually began but the 
visiting magistrate opened proceedings with the following words:    
 
“ ‘What is this?’ [B3 imitates the magistrate tapping his desk], ‘what is this? Lady [to 
B3], who brought you? What’s your name? You are just wasting my time in court!’...  
 
[the magistrate then addresses the defendant]: ‘If this woman [i.e. B3] calls, I will just 
throw this out, because you [B3] are wasting the Court’s time’ (Operations Manager B3 
interview p47).  
 
Operations Manager B3 reported the case to managers but was not surprised by the outcome:  
 
“...we have the crime problem in the media, it is a priority, you know, a shortage of 
police... you hear all the time on the radio and there is an outcry, you know, people of 
South Africa, Johannesburg, crime and all that. And when you go to these courts the 
Magistrates know nothing about all these environmental laws. They know nothing. And 
it is sad that you have to take in the same court where a person who is being tried for 
rape, murder, burglary, car jacking. You have to take the same court as somebody who 
is playing a radio, who is making people not sleep…” (Operations Manager B3 
interview p47).  
 
 “...the reality is that if I was a magistrate this same place where you see the same 
people in chains where they are being brought up from the cells in the same court! With 





B2 had reviewed the previous year’s (2005-6) law enforcement statistics and was concerned 
about their deterrent effect because so few went to court:  
 
“Last year it was said that more than 1200 cases relevant to environmental health were 
recorded, ONLY 12 of them in the City of Johannesburg I think were taken to court and 
were successfully prosecuted. The rest, NO! So that’s what, 1200 versus 12, you can see 
that something needs to be done, because we are telling them to comply but nothing 
happens” (B2 interview pp39-40)   
 
One senior manager also expressed concern that magistrates considered the CoJ Public Health 
By-Laws to be unimportant when compared to national legislation (0006Observations/Central 
p2). In response EHPs agreed that the judiciary needed training in environmental health law or 
should employ an EHP or someone similar to ensure such offending is taken seriously.  
 
Some EHPs also wanted dedicated EH courts that, in B2’s words, could develop a reputation 
that they “mean business” (B2 interview pp39-40). Region F1 already had a dedicated EH court 
but following his rejected fines/summons F1C was not convinced it was working properly (F1C 
interview pp43-4). Operations Manager B3 confirmed that dedicated EH courts had been trialed 
in other regions but had fallen flat because of insufficient cases to sustain them (Operations 
Manager B3 interview p45). The EH Sub-directorate also had their own public prosecutor, but 
after one case when he kept missing vital meetings Operations Manager B3 did not have much 
confidence in him (interview p42). She also identified the need for better collaborative working 
between CoJ organisations and politicians (interview p45).  For example joint action between 
CoJ organisations could close premises immediately or confiscate offending equipment (e.g. 
amplifiers, polluting vehicles) and in Region F1 EHPs were already working with the CoJ’s 
Inner City Task Force which had more experience of doing this.   
 
6.10 Conclusions   
This chapter argues that the backgrounds and motivations of the EHPs themselves shape and 
reinforce the regulatory pyramid. The case-EHPs had many different backgrounds, but work 
experience was the most important factor and used to justify the close supervision of less 
experienced EHPs. All acknowledged their role as law enforcers but considered their primary 
role to be remedial rather than punitive and typically aligned themselves with persuasive 
activities. This was also reflected in their professional identities and was reinforced by 
professional organisations. EHPs’ views about law enforcement, sanctions and the courts were 
largely shaped by the everyday practicalities and problems they encountered that often favoured 
more persuasive approaches and identified some serious obstacles for sanctioning offenders. 
The final results chapter now considers relations between EHPs and the regulated. 
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Chapter 7 External factors: Relations with the regulated  
 
7.1 Introduction  
Chapter 7 completes the governance model in Figure 4.1 by returning to external factors to 
review how relations between EHPs and the regulated influence regulation. The chapter begins 
with EHPs’ typologies of the regulated and complainants and how these can reinforce the 
regulatory pyramid. Factors surrounding the severity and persistence of offending are then 
examined before considering the influence of different characterisations of the regulated. Moral 
factors are then explored followed by sections on how EHPs regulate the informal sector and the 
problems of corruption before conclusions are made.        
 
7.2 Typologies of the regulated and complainants 
All EHPs covered areas they described as combinations of ‘undeveloped/developing’ alongside 
‘developed’ areas. The ability to work with people from so many different backgrounds was 
central to their work and EHPs admitted there was no typical person they encountered. In 
accordance with Lipsky (1980) and Maynard Moody and Musheno (2000, 2003) EHPs’ 
descriptions of the regulated were frequently shaped by moral considerations and generally 
conformed to those in section 2.5.6 above. Sometimes EHPs, as Lipsky’s (1980) street-level 
bureaucrats, stereotyped people in an attempt to conclude cases as quickly as possible, but the 
results below describe a complex world where such ‘people processing’ was often not possible.         
 
EHPs described the regulated as mostly organizationally incompetent or victims because they 
were well intentioned and inclined towards legal compliance, but their offending was due to 
their poor knowledge of environmental health and the law and their socio-economic 
circumstances. D1A articulated this using Maslow’s hierarchy of needs:  
 
“If you haven’t met the first level, how can you go to the third level and complain about 
the services? You cannot take money which you want to buy bread or buy clothes… 
and have to make a telephone call to lodge a complaint” (D1A interview p19).       
 
During such encounters EHPs typically responded with persuasive regulatory approaches 
including education, advice, information (e.g. copies of the law itself) and support to the 
regulated. Such responses also accorded with their individual motivations towards helping 
people (see section 6.2 above) and sometimes, they admitted, their own failures to inform the 
public about environmental health.   
 
EHPs also identified small numbers of amoral calculators or villains motivated by profit 
seeking and whose offending results from economic calculation. Typical examples included 
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illegal dumpers, building hijackers, the owners of bad buildings and some nightclubs. In 
response EHPs were likely to use more punitive approaches, particularly the fine/summons. 
EHPs also identified a few political citizens, those inclined to comply with the law but whose 
non-compliance resulted from principled disagreement with laws they consider authoritarian or 
unreasonable. For example the owner of an overcrowded township crèche accused the CoJ of 
delays with her permit before describing far worse conditions in neighbouring crèches and 
accusing EHPs of targeting her crèche. The owner then stated her disappointment with the 
unfairness of the CoJ and her concern about what the parents of the children about to be 
excluded would think of them. In response D1A acted like Kagan and Scholz’s (1984) 
politician, recognising the high standards of the crèche but remaining firm in her demand that 
the crèche must reduce its maximum number of children by 10.    
 
EHPs also described Beall et al.’s (2000b) fixers, those contributing towards the improvement 
of municipal services and/or making community based environmental health a reality. 
Returning to Figure 4.4 above, EHPs identified those working with them on projects or 
promotional activities as fixers and they included schools, businesses, community groups and 
NGOs (see section 4.4.6 above). In their day to day work EHPs sometimes considered those 
willing to make improvements as fixers, particularly the urban poor. 
 
After Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) EHPs also described regulatory actors as ‘multiple selves’ 
that occupy more than one typology at the same time and/or moving between typologies. B4 
identified the residents of a new RDP housing area that replaced an informal settlement as both 
victims and villains. He hoped the shacks and abandoned cars there would soon be removed 
following his report to the CoJ Department of Housing, but he also believed that people must 
learn to live in formal conditions and these standards must be enforced (0010/B Observation 
p14). EHPs sometimes cast street hawkers as victims and villains: 
 
“[P]eople just SIT wherever they want to sit, SELL wherever they want to sell because 
they want to make money. Whether that place is prohibited for selling or not it’s none 
of their business. People prefer to sit on the road and do it because they want to make 
money... And at the end of the day we understand they are trying to make money, but 
make money in a way that you will never be against the law, but they don’t understand 
that. It’s so, so difficult because today we get a van of Metro. Police taking their goods, 
removing them, tomorrow you have extra people sitting there. So it’s actually not taking 
us anywhere” (F1D interview pp25-6).     
 
D1A recalled a complaint investigation in which the owner of a township cottage factory was 
initially very aggressive towards her, assisted by his large dog (villain). She recalled his 
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reluctance to move to the nearby factory area for fear of losing his livelihood and house 
(victim). D1A applied increasingly punitive approaches during her first revisit, including the 
threat of a fine/summons, but after this the owner moved. He then became a fixer because his 
first two weeks had been tough but his business had already grown in the new industrial area 
and he apologised for his early behaviour and considered D1A a “blessing in disguise” (D1A 
interview p24). This section now explores EHPs’ typologies of complainants.  
  
EHPs’ perceptions of a complainant’s motivations were an important factor in determining the 
actions taken. The complainants observed and described in the results corresponded to four of 
Hutter’s (1988) five main categories as summarised in Table 7.1 below. These are not set in 
stone and the ‘multiple selves’ argument also applies here. For example when investigating 
residential noise complaints EHPs initially suspected the complaint could be genuine or a mix 
of intolerance, psychological factors or a possible dispute until further investigation. One 
Region B EHP described a complaint of illegal dumping by a neighbour from a complainant he 
had previously fined for this very offence. Ordinarily the EHP admitted this complaint would 
not be a priority because he suspected a dispute was behind it, but further reports of a dead dog 
led him to visit and make immediate arrangements for its removal (0008/B Observation p4).          
 
Table 7.1 Four main categories of CoJ complainant  
Complainant type 
(From Hutter 1988) 
Fieldwork examples and potential responses of EHPs 
Genuine  For EHPs these included serious cases with immediate potential health 
risks (e.g. allegations of food poisoning, pest infestations, sanitation 
problems) and resulted in rapid and often more punitive responses.   
Intolerant These included some noise complaints, particularly from retired people 
in suburban areas. EHPs investigated them and treated these 
complaints seriously but used mainly persuasive approaches to try to 
resolve them.     
Psychological These included complaints from people who EHPs suspected maybe 
lonely, unhappy and/or had nothing better to do. In response EHPs 
usually visited the alleged offender and used persuasive approaches 




Where possible EHPs tried to avoid getting involved in these cases, 
though such disputes sometimes weren’t obvious at the early stages of 
investigation and often related to alleged nuisances (e.g. noise, litter).  
Where possible EHPs tried to smooth over the situation using informal 
approaches and tried to avoid further involvement.       
 
During fieldwork the author did not encounter any financially motivated complainants (e.g. 
compensation seekers) but there is no reason why Hutter’s (1988) fifth categorisation shouldn’t 
apply in Johannesburg too, particularly given the potential for financial interests to influence 
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regulation (see section 7.8 below). Other characteristics of complainants were important to 
EHPs, particularly socio-economic factors. EHPs typically differentiated between more affluent 
and ‘vocal’ complainers and those from poorer backgrounds who complain rarely, if at all. In 
response EHPs were careful when handling of the former, particularly if lawyers were involved, 
and to explain their approaches and why investigations can take time. EHPs knew that on-going 
complaints made people angry, but they also felt that sometimes these people did not appreciate 
their complexity. EHPs were also trying to improve the access of the poor to the complaints 
process, for example by attending community meetings in person.   
 
The involvement of local politicians increased the speed of complaints investigations. EHPs 
were very careful to constantly update their managers and were wary of the motives of 
politicians, particularly around election times, and their sometimes unrealistic expectations. The 
preferences of complainants also influenced the actions taken, but sometimes the judgement of 
the EHP could overrule these. For example during one smoke complaint the complainant was 
adamant that B1 should contact the property owner directly and not the builders next door 
because, she feared, they would just laugh and know she complained. But B1 disagreed and 
visited the builders straight afterwards; they were very apologetic and agreed to start using 
smokeless stoves by the end of the week (0004/B Observation pp16-7).  
 
In summary, these characterizations of the regulated and complainants were complex and 
subject to constant change but inherently moral and largely conformed to more persuasive 
activities towards the base of the regulatory pyramid. This chapter now continues the moral 
theme by exploring two ways in which moral culpability can influence the decisions of EHPs.  
 
7.3 The severity and persistence of offending  
The severity of actual offences or the potential for serious offences was an important influence 
on how EHPs regulate. The seriousness of offences was a product of their potential to cause 
harm, the likelihood of harm occurring and the persons likely to be harmed. For EHPs they 
included offences related to illegal dumping, bad buildings, food adulteration and poisoning and 
offences affecting the public, particularly children and the poor. In response EHPs were more 
likely to use more immediate and more punitive approaches. During fieldwork the only 
fine/summons observed occurred during the proactive inspection of a township crèche when 
D1B fined them R1000 due to a failure to supervise children who had direct access to a busy 
road via an open child gate (0004/D1Observation pp7-8).  
 
Cases of persistent offending were more also more likely to result in more punitive approaches, 
sometimes regardless of whether the actual offence was serious. The association of persistent 
offending with intentional acts/omissions was important and associated with criminality. For 
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example F1C recalled a shop keeper who continued to sell “rotten foods” to the poor at a 
discounted price (F1C interview pp39-40). After inspecting the shop F1C served a notice and 
observed the shopkeeper removing the foods from sale, but when he returned the following day 
the foods were back on the shelves. He immediately served a fine/summons and continued to 
monitor the business closely. Similarly B4 thought the only way to handle persistent offending 
was regulatory law enforcement:  
 
“If you don’t want to comply in terms of listening what I’m saying, what I’m saying is 
the By-laws, not me, this is what the Council wants you to do. So if you don’t want to 
do that then I will have just to take action in terms of these By-laws, I will give you this 
Court Summons” (B4 interview pp29-30).    
 
When faced with such cases EHPs consider all available options including prosecution, 
prohibitions and closure and other measures (e.g. confiscation of equipment) and requested the 
assistance of others (e.g. colleagues, managers, police) to make this happen.   
 
7.4 The character of the regulated 
This was important to EHPs and the product of many factors including the behaviour of the 
regulated, the physical conditions of the premises and the history of compliance. In common 
with Hutter (1988) EHPs described behaviours ranging from the cooperative and friendly to 
those who could be uncooperative, aggressive and threatening. Most fieldwork visits were 
cooperative, but EHPs were more likely to use punitive approaches in response to uncooperative 
behaviours. This was also in accordance with their training in law enforcement and conflict 
resolution where EHPs were taught that people could be uncooperative for many reasons, 
sometimes as a deliberate tactic. EHPs were aware of this and, in the words of D1A, listened 
first but adopt a firm stance about their role as EHPs (D1A interview p27).   
 
The initial reception during visits provided important behavioural cues and all EHPs knew their 
own approaches could elicit more cooperative behaviours. They often spoke of the importance 
of “getting to know people” (B1 interview p22), being “in touch with the people” (F1A 
interview p53) and “being human” (B4 interview p30). Further, EHPs were aware of historical 
public attitudes towards them characterised by distrust, fear and sometimes hostility and that 
building relationships took time. B4 summarised his own approach as one of empathising with 
people, sitting down next to them and discussing their problems; only then could you start 
talking to them (0010/B Observation p9).  
 
EHPs also recognised the importance of respecting people and giving them a chance and hoped 
that when people knew more about their roles, beyond the ‘inspector’ stereotypes, they would 
181 
 
become more cooperative and this would, in turn, make it easier for EHPs to do their jobs. For 
example F1D commented that “people are more afraid of what is it that you are going to do and 
your attitude towards them” (F1D interview p37) and therefore clear introductions, particularly 
when meeting people for the first time, made cooperation more likely. At the start of every visit 
all EHPs took time to explain who they were and what they would be doing. Titles were also 
important at this stage and despite their many good reasons to be known as EHPs (see section 
6.3) they usually referred to themselves as ‘health inspectors’ to avoid confusing people.  
 
EHPs themselves could also prompt more uncooperative encounters. B4 thought some EHPs 
pushed and provoked people during inspections which could make them defensive. He 
illustrated this by dropping a pen on the floor and kicked it around whilst repeating ‘what is this, 
what is this’ in an aggressive manner (0010/B Observations p10). He associated this with 
inexperience but B4 was also concerned that some EHPs did not appreciate the danger they 
could be putting themselves in. F1C was unsure why nearly half the people he encounters do not 
respect him; he thought his age might be a factor because the “old guys” he used to work with 
were well respected by the public (F1C interview pp36-7). B1 was the only relatively 
inexperienced case-EHP but whilst some EHPs were more formal than others during visits, 
none were observed being aggressive as B4 suggests above.  
 
The inner city Region F1 case-EHPs were not observed in the field but other data suggested a 
more formal tone compared to the other EHPs. For example all three Region F1 case-EHPs 
commented that ‘the only language uncooperative people understand is to prosecute’, whilst 
F1D added that “...if it’s a fight they want, it’s a fight they get” but if people listen she was 
prepared to negotiate (F1D interview pp28-9). Considering these EHPs work in some of the 
most challenging areas this more combative tone was predicted, but the overall regulatory 
approaches they described were no different to the other regional offices.   
 
Two observed encounters were quite hostile - with EHPs being shouted at - and echoed F1B’s 
comment that for “…some people, even if you approach them in a good manner they always 
have a bad attitude towards you” (F1B interview p38). In response during both visits the EHPs 
remained calm but were noticeably less flexible and went by the book, conscious that their 
decisions could be under close scrutiny. But EHPs also gave people the opportunity to complain 
directly to their managers and provided their contact details, an exchange which also helped 
calm things down. The most hostile included the ‘rich’, D1A commenting:  
 
“...when you come they don’t look at you as a professional, they just measure you 
concerning their wealth. It seems like you are too poor to come talk to them, ‘send 
someone else’ they said to me [laughing]” (D1A interview pp14-5).  
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Friendly and cooperative behaviours could result in persuasive approaches even in potentially 
serious cases. For example during a food premises revisit a cooperative manager explained to 
F2B that the problems identified in her last visit had not yet been fixed because the restaurant 
was closing soon and relocating but the staff had not yet been told. F2B also found evidence of 
smoking in the kitchen, but she accepted the manager’s reassurances that all problems would be 
rectified immediately or by her next revisit (0005/F2 Observation p15).      
     
The physical conditions of premises also provided EHPs with indicators of the character of the 
regulated. Those running premises that appeared clean and well maintained suggested a 
conscientious character that advantaged large, formal businesses:   
 
“Your formal food premises, your [National petrol company], when we went there, 
those are the ones that can comply because they are huge... When I say to [name], I tell 
them without blinking: ‘I want a double wash hand basin, I want your wash up 
facilities’ because the structure is built exactly for that” (D1B interview pp28-9).    
 
At the other extreme small, informal businesses were inherently disadvantaged but EHPs knew 
this and used their discretion to develop pragmatic ways towards compliance. EHPs expected a 
more hostile reception when visiting informal sector premises, but were often impressed at how 
hygienic standards were maintained there. For example a clean and well maintained shack could 
also indicate a conscientious character, but the complexities of regulating the informal sector are 
explored in section 7.7 below. Two visits to formal small businesses revealed the need for 
potentially costly and avoidable alterations to fulfill the requirements of permits/licenses. Both 
EHPs understood why people did not approach them earlier and admitted that they should also 
be better at communicating standards, therefore both were willing therefore to work with 
businesses using persuasive approaches towards compliance.     
 
The history of compliance also provided clues about the character of the regulated. People 
concerned about offending or acting on the advice of EHPs were usually subject to less punitive 
approaches and given more time for compliance than ‘stubborn’ people, as EHPs called them. 
Before revisiting a township fish and chip shop for example D1B explained that they were still 
operating without a business license and Certificate of Approval and did not attend the free food 
hygiene training she offered them. Therefore D1B started the inspection expecting to serve a 
fine/summons but by the end, having observed their satisfactory standards and improvements, 
she instead wrote a statutory notice stipulating that their license application be started in 7 days, 
the Certificate of Approval application received within 14 days and all other problems rectified 




A poor history of compliance inevitably resulted in more attention from EHPs and their 
discretion usually resulted in more frequent surveillance of problem areas and premises. History 
also influenced some aspects of their work, for example EHPs now monitored festivals 
following a food poisoning outbreak in 2000 that affected around 400 children who attended an 
unregulated festival (0006/F2 Observation p4). Occupation was also a factor, with 
uncooperative and/or dishonest behaviours most often associated with nightclub and bad 
building owners, though informal traders also had a reputation for being deliberately evasive. 
 
7.5 The ethnicity, nationality and culture of the regulated 
EHPs thought working with people from ‘different’ backgrounds to their own was something 
they really enjoyed about their work. B2 recalled how tough it was as a Black-African to 
regulate a Coloured township, but he now enjoyed working there though you still had to be 
careful. F2B had recently worked alongside other White EHPs in the inner city and relished this 
experience though it was sometimes difficult and dangerous. The Black-African case-EHPs all 
grew up during apartheid and were arguably therefore better equipped for working in poorer 
areas than their White colleagues, but all EHPs observed covered very diverse areas.        
 
EHPs sometimes attributed standards and behaviours to ethnicity and nationality. Amongst 
South Africans themselves, Whites had a reputation amongst EHPs for high standards and 
expectations and a willingness to complain. In contrast Black-Africans, particularly those from 
poorer areas, appeared to complain much less but had some of the worst standards because, 
EHPs commented, of the legacy of apartheid and wider socioeconomic issues. B2 worked in an 
area with large South African Indian and Coloured populations and whilst the former seemed to 
complain more, he thought both were trying to resolve their own problems and only contacted 
him when deadlocked (B2 interview pp31-2). EHPs also associated ethnicity and nationality 
with the potential for bribery (see section 7.8 below).   
 
In the two Region F inner city offices EHPs often referred to ‘foreigners’ or ‘immigrants’ and 
associated some with poor environmental health and uncooperative behaviours as per the 
amoral calculator/villain typology. Those from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Mozambique, Nigeria and Zimbabwe particularly were singled out. F1B believed foreigners 
thought he was going to ‘impose on them’ or is ‘against them’ during his work, even when 
providing health education, and this could make things worse:  
 
“So, you find that you give them [foreigners] notices, verbal warnings and in a way that 
we have no choice but to give them tickets. When you give them tickets, or fines, then 
they tend to have an attitude like you are a bad person” (F1B interview p37). 
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F2B questioned whether ‘immigrants’ did not know about the law because they had no health 
inspectors in their countries (F2B interview – p29). F1B thought most of his informal food 
businesses were foreign owned and considered some organisationally incompetent because they 
wanted to improve but lacked the money and knowledge. But others were amoral calculators 
who “…want to make money out of it, they are not interested in putting back... making sure that 
their premises is in good condition...” (F1B interview p38). The Region F2 EH Manager 
thought things were more complex and was prepared to challenge other nations whilst 
speculating why they were uncooperative:  
 
“What is ok for people from the Congo, is not ok here. What is right for you is not right 
for me. They don’t see why we are making a fuss? It’s normal for them. Where do we 
draw the line? Eight people in a room is ok for them, but for us it’s overcrowding! We 
can’t be enemies with the people, they are staying here (Region F2 EH Manager 
reflections p2). 
  
A visit with Region B EHPs to a large shopping mall occupied by mostly Chinese businesses 
highlighted tensions between them and EHPs. The visit was a proactive one and EHPs were 
tasked with distributing Mandarin information leaflets to raise awareness of the law and their 
services. During most encounters the leaflet was welcomed, particularly when the businesses 
discovered they did not have to do anything, but the responses of the Chinese workers were 
mixed. Each encounter began with the usual introductions by EHPs and some staff were quite 
welcoming, but others were suspicious and reluctant to engage with the EHPs who themselves 
did not know how to respond (0009/B Observation p8). B2’s attempts to learn to say ‘good 
morning’ and ‘thank you’ sometimes lessened the tensions, but they might not be entirely the 
fault of EHPs because the visit coincided with a raid by police and port officials looking for 
counterfeit goods. However EHPs clearly found it hard to regulate this ethnic group. 
 
EHPs also associated cultural differences with offending, particularly when investigating 
complaints. B2 provided two examples of clashes between African cultures and suburban 
lifestyles. In the townships powerful stereos are status symbols but in the suburbs many people 
do not like loud music, do not know their neighbours and are more likely to complain. EHPs 
still considered it necessary to investigate and act on suburban noise complaints but B2 was 
sometimes accused by Black-Africans of having a “bad attitude” (0006/B Observation p14). 
Plans for the ritual slaughter of animals in Johannesburg could also result in dilemmas for 
EHPs. On one hand B2 thought this was common in rural areas and he did not have a problem 
with it, but in Johannesburg it was an offence unless certain conditions were met and this case is 




7.6 The influence of morality on relations with the regulated   
This section starts by exploring the moral culpability of offenders before considering how moral 
overtones can shape regulation. As covered in section 5.2.4 above most environmental health 
laws incorporate strict liability offences where intent should not be a factor, but as Hutter (1988) 
found questions of moral culpability remained important to EHPs. Cases associated with moral 
culpability that could result in more punitive regulatory approaches included: 
 
- persistent offending 
- offences linked to profiteering (e.g. overcrowded homes and crèches) 
- offending outside EHP working hours (e.g. illegal dumping) 
- attempts to obstruct and/or deceive EHPs  
 
Businesses knowingly trading without permits/licenses were also implicated by EHPs. In 
principle they believed the law was the law and businesses, particularly large ones, should know 
better and the threat of a fine/summons often followed. But EHPs also showed leniency towards 
businesses (large and small) trading without permits that had improved since their last visit and 
on condition that businesses agreed to a schedule for completing the permit/licensing process. 
Further, EHPs were reluctant to punish these offenders because of their own failures in 
communicating the law on permits/licenses and the backlogs in processing them.   
 
As Lipsky (1980) and Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000, 2003) found, moral overtones 
frequently shaped the decisions of EHPs, particularly in their views of the regulated. EHPs were 
more likely to help those considered worthy, even when some might be offenders:  
 
“Let’s say you’ve given a person a statutory notice and he is not complying and you 
give him maybe another two days to rectify the problem, but you have to act, 
unfortunately. But if you have given a person statutory notices... let’s say you’ve given 
him 10 requirements and he’s done already 7 requirements, I believe that give him 
another chance. He’s showing that he’s going to complete the statutory notice that 
you’ve given him” (B2 interview pp48-9).     
 
Worthy traits included anyone cooperative and trying to improve their environmental health 
despite lacking knowledge and/or experiencing difficult socioeconomic circumstances and 
included the organisationally incompetent, victim and fixer typologies described in section 7.2 
above. Conversely, EHPs were more likely to use punitive approaches towards the less worthy 




EHPs sometimes framed their arguments in moral terms for many reasons, not least to persuade 
people that they were not there to just “enforce laws against all odds for the benefit of the 
Council” (D1B interview p39). For example one statutory notice for improving vacant stands 
referred to their unsightliness, health risks and fears that they could “…provide shelter to 
vagrants and criminal elements, a matter which is of great concern to this Local Council and 
ratepayers” (B2 statutory notice - undated). D1B described how small businesses often accused 
big businesses of taking their customers, but she asked them to think like a customer:  
 
“Would you rather come to your shop or would you rather go to Shoprite? …just 
outside it’s dirty, there’s graffiti. You come inside it is dark, not sufficient light, not 
sufficient ventilation, the walls are black instead of light coloured, the ceiling is 
sagging. The people serving you, you can see that they have not washed. There is no 
protective clothing. You see the area is a mess. So I’m like ‘those basic things, you are 
not doing that for the State, you are not doing that for Environmental Health 
Practitioner, you are doing that for your business... maybe you don’t care about the 
safety of the food, but just attracting your customers?’ ” (D1B interview pp39-40)      
 
This argument that improving environmental health was also good for your business and health 
and could save money was often used by EHPs:   
 
“Here I’m saying: ‘put sufficient ventilation’. It means that you must put a window, the 
reason being that it should provide sufficient ventilation and natural lighting. So the 
window is going to help you, that during the day you should not switch on the light. At 
least you will have natural light and it will also allow the cross ventilation of the air 
from the door to the window, clearing the air and then you will never have a lot of 
headache...” (D1A interview pp39-40)  
  
 “Educate them to make their premises look clean, tell them that by giving people fresh 
food it’s good for their customers as well and it’s good for their businesses. Not like... 
looking for the cockroaches so you can issue them with a fine. We must move away 
from such things” (B2 interview p34).   
 
EHPs incorporated similar moral sentiments in statutory notices for illegal dumping that 
sometimes ended with the following paragraph:  
  
“Your co-operation in keeping the area of jurisdiction of the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality in a clean, neat, tidy, sanitary and safe condition, which will 
not only be conducive to the health and well-being of its communities, but will also 
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prevent urban decay and promote investment, will be highly appreciated” (F1C 
statutory notice 23 October 2006). 
 
The CoJ also used moral arguments to encourage people to self-regulate. These included 
statements that regulating offending cost the CoJ a lot of money that could be better spent on 
urgent projects like housing; that all stakeholders (not just the CoJ) were responsible for 
environmental health matters; and that by prosecuting offenders the CoJ was protecting the 
peoples’ Constitutional rights (D1B statutory notice - undated).  
 
Offenders also used moral arguments to try to persuade EHPs of their worth in the hope that 
negotiations would go in their favour. Sometimes this was successful, for example D1A now 
measured the floors of all pre-school premises to one decimal place following an inspection 
where a crèche owner argued that the final sum could equal one more child (Observation 
0004/D1 pp3-4). One crèche owner used different moral arguments to try to persuade D1A to 
accommodate 10 extra children in her overcrowded crèche. These included accusing the CoJ of 
a one year delay with her crèche permit, asking D1A whether she would tell the 10 children and 
their parents herself that they could no longer attend and accusing D1A and the CoJ of targeting 
her unfairly when there are so many worse crèches nearby. D1A acknowledged the delays and 
the high standards of this crèche but was not prepared to use her discretion to bend the rules. 
The owner later complained in writing to D1A’s Operations Manager and the Executive 
Director-Health and D1A was concerned about what would happen next.    
 
Returning to the amoral calculators/villains described above, EHPs sometimes blamed 
individuals and businesses themselves for environmental health problems. They sometimes 
referred to people who ‘should know better’:  
 
“If there is a bin in front of you and you prefer to throw on the floor, it’s bad behaviour 
that you have because you know what is the bin for... peoples tend to suffer each other 
in those wrong doings, we’ve got shops, they know very well that they have to have... a 
proper waste removal, they are shops. But you find shops dumping at the corner of a 
street because people are dumping there, they are as well dumping there, they are 
dumping meat [and] perishable goods... it’s a nuisance...” (F1D interview pp24-5). 
 
Descriptions of villains and victims were also framed in moral terms. For example B4 hoped 
action would be taken soon to remove shacks and abandoned cars in a new RDP housing 
settlement that replaced an informal settlement there, but he also reflected that people must 
learn to live in formal conditions (0010/B Observation p14). F1D had recently inspected a 
church sheltering more than 100 migrants recently arrived in Johannesburg from countries like 
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Zimbabwe. Some children there were barely two weeks old and F1D thought conditions there 
were very bad but she also questioned how ‘these people’ could have children and then raise 
them in such difficult circumstances. Regulating the informal sector also involved EHPs 
navigating complex moral terrain and is explored in the next section.  
 
Certain tasks also created moral tensions for EHPs. Their work in some housing cases, 
particularly in the inner city, involved inspections of environmental health conditions for other 
CoJ organisations. EHPs were well aware that this work could result in the eviction of people 
and they felt very uncomfortable when expected to attend these evictions:    
 
“They [the CoJ] have the powers to take action, but they want us to be there on the day 
of the eviction, of which it is not our role to be evicting the people, or to make sure that 
the people are eventually evicted.”  (F1B interview p49)       
 
The walls of their offices featured newspaper articles covering these evictions, particularly the 
plight of the evicted and the brutality of evictors including the notorious Red Ants, a private 
security firm whose employees wear distinctive red overalls and have a violent reputation. The 
author did not ask why the EHPs posted such uncomfortable articles on their walls, perhaps it 
was a constant reminder of their failure and guilt about these cases.   
 
Blitz work targeting known environmental health hotspots was potentially more confrontational 
but justified by senior managers on moral grounds. There were no blitzes during fieldwork but 
in November 2007 in response to two blitzes in Region G one senior manager stated that the 
CoJ “…are not trying to harass people” but with the on-going investment of millions of Rands 
towards improving environmental health related services “we expect you [business owners] to 
meet us [the CoJ] half way” (Ziaaman in Madumo, 2007a). Similarly, commenting on a Region 
E blitz around the same time another senior manager commented that we “…are not here to 
harass people, we want to reinforce the law and make sure that there is compliance” 
(Cruywagen in Madumo, 2007b). In the same two articles some business owners were hostile 
but others supported the blitz: 
 
“If I know I follow the law, then why should I be afraid?” (Patel in Madumo, 2007a).      
 
On a case by case basis EHPs were potentially willing to bend the law where there were 
tensions with the moral aspects of a case, but there was little evidence of this during fieldwork. 
For example a complaint about plans for a cow to be slaughtered in the suburbs for a funeral 
had strong moral overtones for B2. In his rural home such practices were commonplace but he 
acknowledged that in Johannesburg it was an offence unless certain conditions were met and 
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further complaints could result (B2 stories p13). B2 was a qualified meat inspector and arranged 
to supervise the slaughter and visited the complainants to reassure them of this. This did not 
resolve their concerns but, much to B2’s relief, the cow was slaughtered elsewhere because, he 
suspects, of pressure from the complainants and their threats to report the case to his managers 
and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (B2 stories p14). The willingness of 
EHPs to bend the law when there were moral tensions was explored further using two vignettes 
based on fieldwork cases.     
 
Situation 2. A crèche applying for a permit in your area has been given provisional approval by 
the (CoJ’s) EMS (Emergency Management Services), building and licensing inspectors. The 
person providing the service is friendly and co-operative and is providing facilities and care of 
a high standard, however your calculations of indoor care area space find that there is only 
space for 30 children, but the crèche has 35 each day.   
 
When asked how they would proceed all case-EHPs began by explaining the law to the 
owner/manager and possible ways to accommodate the extra children like removing or re-
arranging furniture, conscious that “we don’t want to be seen outside as people who are not 
helpful” (F1C questionnaire p4). There was general agreement that five more children was 
possible but not many more. They would then issue a statutory notice summarising their 
decision in writing and all agreed that if extra space could not be found, 30 children was the 
maximum permissible on the permit and appropriate time would be given for compliance. EHPs 
were unwilling to bend the rules because they sign the permits and wanted to be fair to other 
crèches in the knowledge that many owners/managers had been trained by them already. By 
giving time they also hoped to give parents affected reasonable notice to find another crèche.   
 
The EHPs were also asked if they would act differently if the service provider was aggressive 
and uncooperative? Most admitted they would act differently in this situation, typically with 
less flexible and more punitive approaches. For example if non-compliance continued three 
EHPs considered closing the premises provided the other CoJ Organisations involved agreed. 
However, B1 and D1B claimed they would not act differently because cases should be driven 
by the facts and responding in kind with aggression could make matters worse.  
 
Situation 3. Imagine that you find two identical food premises in your area that have both been 
trading for one month without a CoA (Certificate of Acceptability). One is owned by a national 
company, the other is owned by a young family that have taken out a huge loan to set up their 
new business.  
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All the case-EHPs, except D1A and D1B, would treat both cases the same because the law was 
the law and applied to all businesses and trading without a CoA was an offence. However, the 
next step by all was to inspect the premises immediately and start the CoA application process. 
If the premises complies a CoA would be issued, if not EHPs would issue a statutory notice 
with appropriate timescales for compliance. All agreed that the national company would comply 
more easily, but for both premises continued non-compliance would result in more punitive 
approaches. D1A and D1B admitted that in the townships they would usually treat the two cases 
differently and were more likely to be lenient towards family shops who do not know the law, 
partly due to their own failure to communicate the law effectively. In summary, despite the law 
attempting to remove morality from offending (see section 5.2.4 above) it remains integral to 
EH regulation for all involved. This chapter now turns to one of the most challenging moral 
aspects of EHPs’ work.    
 
7.7 Regulating the informal sector  
All EHPs considered regulation relatively straightforward in developed areas. Beyond just 
having more resources for compliance, F2B commented that formal premises usually pay their 
fines because “they’ve got nowhere to go” (F2B interview pp23-5). Section 5.2.3 described how 
the informal sector is inherently disadvantaged because of their socioeconomic circumstances 
and laws based on formal sector standards and for EHPs this work was a constant challenge:   
 
“[Informal local shops] are falling apart and people feel that they can’t fix them because 
they don’t get enough income. So you go there, you inspect and you give 
recommendations and somebody doesn’t have money to even paint”  
(D1B interview pp17-8)   
 
“I want to do what you say, but I don’t have money”  
(Imitating an informal business owner in F1B interview p38)  
   
“Like you have maybe a spaza shop, your tuck shops or maybe your informal crèches, 
they will be in a shack. So before you even come with the By-laws, the By-laws will tell 
you that maybe that’s not wanted, that maybe the premises are supposed to be of a solid 
structure, and there are supposed to be hand wash basins, and then double bowl sink, the 
floor to be of a smooth surface, light coloured paint. You can’t enforce that in a shack”  
(D1B interview pp23-4)  
 
“But why prosecute people [in informal settlements] if they can’t comply with By-
Laws? If you’re gonna look for something you’re gonna find it. It’s ridiculous! You 
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can’t prosecute them for no water if they have no water! You give them the 
requirements, but work around them.”  
(F2B questionnaire p3) 
 
Discretion was therefore critical but before taking any action EHPs were careful to establish 
whether the informal business/settlement was considered ‘legal’ by the CoJ. This involved 
checks on land ownership and use and liaison with other CoJ organisations, particularly the 
Departments of Planning and Housing. If the informal business/settlement was illegal the case 
was referred immediately to the appropriate CoJ organisation and the involvement of EHPs 
ended there. EHPs knew the implications of this and why informality persisted but they also 
knew that to provide basic services before carrying out these checks risked legitimising (in the 
eyes of the informal) what could be an illegal occupation. Such actions also helped distance 
EHPs from what happened next (i.e. forced removals), though this was not guaranteed and some 
EHPs expressed guilt for their actions/inactions in this area.   
 
Further action depended on the case. For example EHPs regularly compiled reports monitoring 
conditions in informal settlements that were then sent to the relevant CoJ organisation in the 
hope that further action would be taken. Sometimes EHPs were helped by information and 
complaints from the urban poor, but EHPs also knew they could be very quiet for 
understandable reasons including a distrust of officials, fears of eviction and satisfaction with 
their homes/businesses. For example some informal settlement dwellers thought their living 
conditions in Johannesburg were better than where they had come from. For these reasons EHPs 
expected a hostile reception until they got to know people better.    
 
Regulatory approaches also depended on the case. EHPs sometimes attempted to formalise 
informal businesses in different ways. For example D1A recalled eventually persuading - using 
increasingly punitive approaches - an informal manufacturer of window frames to move to the 
local industrial zone where his business began to flourish and he eventually thanked D1A for 
her persistence and apologised for initially being so uncooperative (D1A interview p24). But 
EHPs mostly used their discretion to accommodate the informal sector within the law. For 
example EHPs regularly worked with informal food businesses towards compliance with 
minimum standards that could not be compromised (see Appendix R). This enabled these 
businesses to comply with the law, including eligibility for the CoA permit for example.  
 
CoJ Department of Health data supported this approach by suggesting that informal food traders 
were no riskier than their formal counterparts. For example over 2005-6 there were 8073 
inspections/revisits to informal food traders, some 23% of these identifying health risks, a figure 
slightly lower than the 24% of health risks identified during inspections/revisits to food 
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premises (n = 21149) and factories (n=542) over the same period. During this period some 3604 
informal food traders (98% of applicants) were awarded CoAs, the same percentage as for the 
10629 formal food premises that successfully applied (CoJ DoH, 2006). But some EHPs 
remained uncomfortable about issuing CoAs to informal food traders:   
 
“So am I going to overlook the fact that the walls will not be of a smooth surface and a 
light coloured paint? There will obviously be no ceiling, no double wash hand basin, 
just the hand wash basin... ok can we ignore that and issue a certificate knowing that 
you’ve trained this person especially on personal hygiene and how to handle food? 
...although she’s cooking in a shack everything is in shelves, they’ve tried to put shelves 
there, they’ve cleaned this and you feel they are not compromising the consumers, then 
you issue a certificate”  (D1B interview pp27-8).    
 
These ‘rules of hygiene’ were observed being applied during the inspection of a street hawker’s 
cart with F2A (see Appendix D), but this case also identified other challenges including 
problems of language and literacy (0007/F2 Observations pp4-6). Some verbal hygiene advice 
was given early on but F2A focused more on offences relating to the CoJ’s Street Trading By-
laws. He did not once mention the CoA permit but this was his first visit and F2A would now 
start monitoring them closely. Other EHPs were also reluctant to attempt more punitive 
approaches because of the tactics used by street hawkers to evade regulation like not carrying 
any ID documents. EHPs were also conscious that sanctioning the informal sector could 
backfire and damage their relations with the public and the media. Further, one manager 
summarised these that by enforcing the law in this way “…we just move the problem, not solve 
it” whilst “…everybody flocks to Gauteng!” (Region F2 EH Manager reflections p2).    
 
The CoJ Street Trading By-laws created further tensions between EHPs and street hawkers. F1D 
was visibly uncomfortable during a training course for street hawkers when one recalled how 
the JMPD (CoJ Police) have moved him four times recently and confiscated his vegetables and 
similar accounts featured in the newspaper articles (e.g. Donnelly, 2007). The hawker wanted to 
know more about these By-laws, but F1D evaded this by explaining that she focuses on hygiene 
whilst street trading is regulated by the JMPD though other EHPs like F2A were observed 
enforcing street trading laws. After the course F1D explained that inner city hawkers pay R130 
for their business license and once awarded their (free) CoA then apply to the CoJ for a stand. 
Having invested time and money they have high expectations but are often disappointed by the 
shortage of stands in prime locations and then return to their old ‘illegal’ areas (0007/F1 
Observations pp12-3). Around this time the Executive Mayor recognised that informal trading 




“…as is the case in many countries and cities of the world, [it] should be legally 
controlled and properly managed. Trading should only occur in those areas that are 
suitably designed for this particular purpose” (Masondo, 2007 p23).   
 
Another problem was that minimum standards for non-food related informal premises had not 
yet been developed and these businesses remained ineligible for licenses/permits. During 
fieldwork this was becoming urgent in Region D1 where EHPs were confused about whether to 
start processing a permit application from an informal settlement crèche: 
 
“...do we actually issue that person with a permit? Maybe yes you could say, because 
she has to comply with the area, to say how many kids can she put there… she must 
provide separate basins for washing and… rinsing, your basic things. So to be honest I 
don’t know if they’re actually going to give them permits... they will never be fully 
compliant because of the area, the structure that they find themselves in, so it’s that 
challenge we have that people may never be fully compliant” (D1B interview p27).  
  
After further investigations D1B found that its location was considered ‘illegal’ by the CoJ and 
there was little more they could. Further, data on compliance suggested these other areas were a 
priority for intervention with some 88% of the 14918 evaluations revealed health risks when 
compared to 36% of the 24450 visits to formal dwellings (CoJ 2006a). EHPs also believed these 
informal sector challenges would continue whilst Johannesburg’s population grew at a rate far 
exceeding the supply of housing and other infrastructure and services.  
 
7.8 The potential for corruption 
Environmental health law and organisations including employers and the HPCSA outline the 
standards by which EHPs should work and establish systems to hold them to account for their 
actions. Further, the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 was 
promulgated to strengthen these safeguards in the public and private sectors and this Act defines 
corruption for public officers like EHPs to include:  
 
(a) any public officer who, directly or indirectly, accepts or agrees or offers to accept any 
gratification from any other person whether for the benefit of himself or herself or any 
other person; or 
(b) gives or agrees or offers to give to a public officer any gratification, whether for the 
benefit of that person or any other person (Section 4)     
 
Sanctions for these offences include fines and imprisonment but this Act also establishes a 
register to restrict convicted offenders from opportunities for future offending and places a duty 
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on certain persons in authority to report corrupt transactions. But EHPs often commented that 
corruption was part of South African culture and hard to eradicate. Fieldwork coincided with 
investigations into the then head of the South African Police Service (and Interpol), Jackie 
Selebi, who was later convicted of corruption related to drug smuggling and sentenced to 15 
years imprisonment (Basson, 2010). Some EHPs described the custom of handing the police 
around R20 when they stop you driving in the hope they will waive a R200 fine. No EHP 
thought themselves corrupt, but the regulated were willing to offer them bribes across all three 
of Reisman’s categories as is now explained.  
 
Variance bribes to stop EHPs enforcing the law were the most common examples described. 
F2A recalled inspections where instead of fixing simple problems, long periods of negotiation 
would end with offers of gifts on the condition that problems are overlooked until the next 
inspection (F2A interview pp28-9). B2 recalled a shop owner who needed a wash hand basin 
costing less than R150, but the owner refused and instead offered him a television worth R4000 
(B2 stories pp8-9). Whilst working in port health one EHP recalled the manager of a breakfast 
cereal company visiting his office and making him sign a pile of import forms without 
inspecting any containers. The EHP reported the incident to his manager and his error later 
became public when a huge basket full of cereals arrived at the office. The EHP’s manager 
recorded its contents before returning them to the company manager (0005/B Observation pp12-
3). In 2011 a newspaper reported the arrest of a Region F EHP suspected of bribery (Tau, 2011). 
He was suspected of demanding a R2000 variance bribe from the owner of a bad building to 
stop reporting his unsafe building to the CoJ, but the EHP was caught by a sting operation.  
 
Evidence of a possible transaction bribe (intended to speed up decision making) was observed 
during a visit to a contract caterer applying for two liquor licensing permits, one covering every 
day operations and one for a special function involving 1000 VIPs the following week. Whilst 
travelling to the premises the (anonymous) EHP explained that liquor licensing was not his 
responsibility but was overseen by his licensing colleagues and subject to further Police 
approval. The catering managers sought his re-assurance that all would be ok, particularly for 
the imminent VIP function, and the EHP reassured them of this because he knows the local 
police Captain. After reviewing the licensing requirements, the catering manager promised to 
thank the EHP “in the usual way” (implying this had happened before) by organising a barbecue 
at his house for friends and family which the EHP accepted without hesitation.     
 
Attempts at outright purchase bribes to capture EHPs were recalled by B2. After inspecting a 
water bottling plant he was asked by its manager how many bottles of water he wants every 




“No, no, no, no, it does not work here, we don’t work like that. As long as I’m not 
happy with you I’m going to give you requirements, if needs be then I’ll summons you, 
that’s what I’m going to do. Yes, I’m not going to just take your things as a sign that 
you look like you are buying me...” (B2 stories p9).   
 
In another case B2 revisited a new business to give its Managing Director (MD) his CoA permit 
having found no problems during the previous inspection (B2 stories p4). In return, the MD 
offered B2 a large A4 envelope whilst out of sight of other staff members. B2 refused and 
explained that there was no fee for a CoA, but the MD persisted and suggested B2 buy presents 
for his girlfriend. B2 went to his car but the MD threw the envelope inside only for B2 to hand it 
back stating that his premises comply. The MD tried again and claimed he was not bribing B2 
but merely wanted to say thank you for the quiet and speedy way he’d handled the CoA. The 
MD also suggested that on future visits B2 should feel free to tell him that the envelope is 
‘small’. When B2 again refused, the MD instead offered to organise something for B2 anytime 
he wants it. As B2 drove away the MD again attempted to throw the envelope inside his car and 
B2 feared someone could be taking pictures to set him up. After the incident the MD called B2 
to explain how upset and let down he felt, but B2 reported everything to his manager 
immediately and remained concerned about it.   
 
Offers of soft drinks or coffee/tea were not uncommon during visits, particularly during post-
inspection discussions. Most EHPs observed applied what they called the ‘can of Coke’ or ‘10 
Rand rule’ to establish clear limits on what was acceptable and nearly all offered to pay for any 
drinks immediately, though F2A felt that even a can of Coke could constitute bribery and “an 
insult to the profession” (F2A interview p28). Further, to maintain their distance most EHPs 
refused to eat in premises they visited and refused all offers of lunch. The possible transaction 
bribe case above was the one exception observed to these rules.   
 
For EHPs the factors most associated with bribery were ethnicity and nationality. EHPs singled 
out some Black-African business owners, particularly Nigerians and Congolese, who constantly 
tried to do deals with ‘fellow Africans’ because they want their license/permit immediately. 
Two case EHPs believed it was rare to complete the inspection of Indian owned businesses 
without being offered something, B2’s three examples above all involving Indian owners. 
Similarly, F2A commented:  
 
“I’m not trying to be racist but I think the Indian group are the one that are giving me 
more problems because, instead of fixing things, they will LIKE negotiating, 
negotiating. Even a SIMPLE thing that they can even fix it, if you ask them or give 
them a notice or warning, ‘can you clean the area for 1,2,3,’ you give them the reasons 
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but you find that these guys… they will want to negotiate: ‘please, can we do it next 
time, here is the drink’”  (F2A interview pp28-9).  
 
Following his experiences in New York Leff cautioned that EHPs like him were more 
susceptible to bribery because of poor salaries and warned that a “city that underpays its 
municipal employees is likely to be a corrupt city” (1988 p45). In section 6.2 above complaints 
of poor salaries amongst EHPs were widespread and when combined with the apparent 
willingness of people to offer bribes the conditions for corruption were ever present. In response 
to the potentially corrupt Region F EHP case, the Region F Manager commented “[I]f you work 
with slumlords and building hijackers, no matter whether you are a city employee or who you 
are, you are in the same category” (Mthetwa in Tau, 2011).  
 
More recently warnings from the CoJ, the HPCSA and in Johannesburg newspapers described 
the rise of ‘bogus health inspectors’ in Johannesburg and across South Africa that were 
exploiting the potential for corruption. People typically approached businesses, identified 
themselves as EHPs using fake ID cards and then conducted inspections. Offences were 
identified and demands made of between R1000 to R20000 or more, with threats of heavier 
fines if unpaid (Chaka, 2013a). In Johannesburg one bogus EHP targeting food businesses was 
drafting statutory notices requiring the CoA permit and business license. He then produced fake 
application forms and demanded payment for completion and promised to ‘speed up’ this 
process, after which he issued fake permits (Boyce, 2015). In response the CoJ were urging the 
public to check the ID cards of EHPs and stressed that CoA permits were free but payments for 
other permits were to be made at designated pay points and not EHPs (Nkabinde, 2014).  
 
7.9 Conclusions  
Chapter 7 argues that relations with the regulated shape and sometimes reinforced the regulatory 
pyramid. Most offenders were considered organisationally incompetent and in need of 
education and support but a small minority of amoral calculators merited more punitive 
approaches though, as other chapters found, this was easier said than done. Cases involving 
severe and persistent offending were more likely to result in punitive approaches and the 
character of the regulated was also important, with cooperation more likely to result in 
persuasive approaches and vice-versa. Characteristics including the size of the business, its 
history of compliance and the ethnicity, nationality and culture of the regulated were also 
important. Moral considerations shaped relations between EHPs and the regulated, with 
pragmatic EHPs sometimes willing to bend the law in response to moral tensions. In regulating 
the informal sector EHPs typically resorted to pragmatic, flexible and persuasive approaches. 
Lastly, the potential for corruption was always present and being exploited by criminals. The 
next chapter now brings the four results chapters together in a further discussion. 
197 
 
Chapter 8 Discussion of results 
This chapter explores common themes from the results and draws on the literature review in 
Chapter 2. The discussion starts by revisiting the theoretical framework and how the results 
support governance and critical approaches to regulation. This chapter then considers why EHPs 
can be considered responsive regulators and their work on EH project and promotional activities 
before exploring the limits to these regulatory activities. Chapter 8 then explores the 
contributions of EHPs to developmental local government and the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals before considering the difficult balance between environmental health and economic 
interests and the influence of political factors on regulation.  
 
8.1  Revisiting the theoretical framework for regulation  
The key studies in Table 2.1 that underpin this thesis provide thorough descriptions of street-
level environmental health regulation but are grounded in theories of the bureaucratic 
interventionist and surveillance state, specifically the rational-legal authority of professional 
local government EHPs to intervene in the activities of business and the public and issue 
environmental health commands to discipline and control populations. Alternatively, and in 
support of Crook’s (2007) historical research, this thesis conceptualises environmental health 
regulation as governance by describing the continuous circulation of power within and between 
local government itself, other spheres of government and many civil society actors.   
 
This conceptualisation also supports and extends Tombs and Whyte’s (2007) critical approaches 
to regulation given the many other civil society actors (apart from business and the public) 
influencing regulation and the struggles of EHPs themselves with local government and other 
spheres of government. Here power in the governments, streets, businesses and homes of 
Johannesburg was distributed unequally and sometimes not with CoJ EHPs themselves, but 
spaces for challenging it were plentiful and rarely captured or closed down. CoJ EHPs were 
undoubtedly powerful regulators but sometimes businesses, the public and government itself 
(e.g. via politicians) did not hesitate to hold CoJ EHPs to account for their actions/inactions. 
The media were sometimes powerful in giving the poorest a voice, particularly when the actions 
of CoJ EHPs and others were considered unreasonable.  
 
The results also confirmed the dualistic role of CoJ EHPs, representing Hall’s (2012) state, as 
simultaneously repressive and protective given how they construct the offences they then 
regulate. In accordance with the key studies and the earlier work of Lipsky (1980) and Maynard 
Moody and Musheno (2000, 2003), morality was central to the regulatory work of EHPs (see 
section 7.6 particularly) who often went to great lengths to appear reasonable. But like Lipsky’s 
(1980) street level bureaucrats, they faced constant dilemmas that defied easy resolution. These 
included vast and persistent inequalities, a suspicious and sometimes hostile public and the 
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knowledge that sometimes their interventions could make matters worse for the public’s health 
such that for EHPs the line between protection and repression could sometimes be very thin. 
 
Revisiting the other theories of regulation, at face value the results support compliance-based 
theories of regulation that in broadly pluralist societies assume the most effective regulatory 
strategies are those involving persuasion, bargaining and compromise between the regulator and 
regulated as exemplified by the key studies of Hawkins (1984), Hutter (1988) and Richardson et 
al. (1983). The results fit best with Hutter’s (1988; 1989) insistent regulatory strategies because 
CoJ EHPs were generally accommodating but less flexible and more likely to take more 
punitive action when compared to Hutter’s persuasive regulators. For example at the CoJ the 
probability of a business being served with a fine/summons during a routine visit was calculated 
to be around 1:50 (see section 4.4.4 and Table 4.2 above). This more closely reflected the range 
of probabilities of food premises being prosecuted by insistent (1:35 to 1:88) than persuasive 
departments (1:171 to no prosecutions) (Hutter, 1988; 1989). However, Johannesburg could 
hardly be described as a pluralist society and this interpretation is made with caution.  
 
The association of CoJ EHPs with insistent regulatory strategies provided no evidence for 
Black’s relational distance hypothesis that the greater the distance between parties in dispute, 
the greater the likelihood that the law will be used to settle it (Black in Hutter, 1989). Both 
Hutter’s (1988, 1989) insistent departments regulated cities where, unlike their rural more 
persuasive counterparts, EHPs were not closely integrated into the community, were more 
suspicious of the regulated and believed that more punitive approaches were the best way 
towards compliance. Some CoJ EHPs described this difference in approaches, managers in 
particular using it as an argument for more law enforcement training and supervision of former 
rural EHPs. But whilst the relational distance of EHPs was high in Johannesburg, none 
expressed a general preference towards more punitive regulatory approaches and other factors 
were more influential as discussed in the next section below.       
 
Alternatively, revisiting capture theories of regulation the potential for EHPs to be captured by 
businesses was ever present, but EHPs knew their work was being monitored closely and 
potentially corrupt EHPs (and their impersonators) were being caught and attracting 
professional scrutiny and media coverage as explored in section 7.8. Returning to neoliberal 
theories of regulation, neoliberal policies influenced the regulatory context (see section 4.6.2) 
and the structure and organisation of the CoJ and its EHPs (see sections 4.2.1 and 5.3.4)  but in 
contrast to other studies (Snider, 2003; Tombs, 2016) there was no evidence that EHPs were 




8.2 A solid and flexible foundation: EHPs as responsive regulators and promoters 
Overall, this thesis argues that CoJ EHPs, managers, politicians and others have created a solid 
foundation for environmental health regulation in a very short time. In 2007 the role of EHPs 
remained largely that of the traditional ‘Victorian’ type law enforcer but, after Crook (2007), 
EHPs were regulating in far more responsive ways than this stereotype suggests. Regulation 
began long before decisions about when to punish or persuade, but once a case reaches this 
stage the results confirmed Ayres and Braithwaite’s (1992) pyramidal distribution of regulatory 
activities. However, in accordance with the critique in 2.4.3 above the results confirmed that the 
movement of cases up and down the pyramid was in response to far more than the behaviours of 
the regulated as will now be explored.   
 
Returning to Kaufmann’s (1960/2006) metaphor, regulation as per the governance model in 
Figure 4.1 above resembles a vast funnel with the CoJ EHP at its throat; all the factors above 
them pour out materials which, blended and mixed by the EHP, emerged in a stream of 
regulatory action in the field. Each case EHPs encountered was unique, but Table 8.1 below 
summarises the most influential factors on their decision making from Chapters 4 to 7 results 
and why the pyramid shape of responsive regulation - where persuasive approaches predominate 
- applies in early 21st century Johannesburg.   
 
Beginning towards the top of the regulatory pyramid and Table 8.1, the absence of major 
influences towards more punitive approaches in the regulatory context (section 4.6) and the law 
(section 5.2) was no surprise given that the opposite was usually the case. Evidence of the CoJ’s 
support for punitive approaches was significant (see section 4.4.4), but usually directed towards 
offending hotspots in the hope of sending a wider message to potential offenders. This support 
for deterrence was increasingly reflected in the policies of national government (NDoH, 2013) 
and the South African Institute of Environmental Health (Ngqulunga, 2013). A preference for 
persuasive approaches still existed in these policies, but more punitive approaches were no 
longer considered ‘non-developmental’ or linked to ‘apartheid’ as before (e.g. NDoH, 2004).   
 
Remaining with organizational factors, the existence of a performance target for a punitive 
sanction, here the fine/summons, is not described in the wider literature on EH regulation 
probably because most key studies pre-date the neoliberal reforms from the early-1990s (e.g. 
Hood, 1991; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). In section 5.3.4, EHPs were not unduly concerned 
about meeting this target but remained worried about its existence and its potential to undermine 
their authority. The results in section 6.6 suggest that more experienced EHPs were more 
willing to use punitive approaches, but this was also influenced by a lack of training and 
guidance (also see section 5.2.6). In Chapter 7 a failure to secure compliance by persuasive 
approaches and the behaviours of the regulated themselves had considerable influence on EHPs, 
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as supported by the literature, with offending associated with more traditional criminal 
behaviours making punitive responses more likely.  
 
Table 8.1 The most influential factors in the regulatory decision making of EHPs 
To punish: 
Regulatory context  None identified 
Legal  None identified 
Organisational  CoJ support for deterrence - e.g. zero tolerance, targeting offending 
hotspots  
 Performance targets for fine/summons 
Individual  More experienced EHPs 
Relations with 
regulated 
 Failure of more persuasive approaches 
 EH offenders considered amoral calculators 
 Serious offences and those affecting the public 
 Offending associated with criminality (e.g. persistent offending, 
obstruction of EHPs) 
 Uncooperative behaviour of EH offenders 
To persuade: 
Regulatory context  EH inequalities and legacy of apartheid  
 Public distrust and hostility 
 Media criticism of EHPs using punitive approaches 
Legal  Emphasis on persuasive activities as ‘developmental’ 
 Uncertain criminality of EH offences 
 ‘Low’ maximum sanctions risked undermining EHP authority 
 Uncertain legal mandate of EHPs  
Organisational  Expectations of colleagues and managers 
 Performance targets 
 Lack of CoJ guidance on punitive approaches 
Individual  EHPs see themselves as educators, not law enforcers 
 Personal safety risks of more punitive approaches 




 Most EH offenders are organisationally incompetent 
 Informal sector businesses  
 EHPs rely on the cooperation of the regulated  
 
Towards the base of the regulatory pyramid and from the centre of Table 8.1 above, the factors 
influencing EHPs towards more persuasive regulatory approaches were simply more extensive 
and partly reflected the uncertain mandate for regulation of CoJ EHPs, not least their wish to 
cooperate with the regulated and public. Further, these factors largely echo those of the key 
studies from the global North, though the scale of problems encountered by CoJ EHPs was 
usually more extreme. In section 4.6 above, the regulatory context was characterised by huge 
and persistent EH inequalities, a public suspicious of being regulated and a media watching the 
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CoJ closely and willing to publicise perceived injustices. The legal mandate for CoJ EHPs 
explored in section 5.2 was broad and complex and its uncertainties provided little 
encouragement for EHPs towards more punitive approaches. Within the CoJ itself, its controls 
on EHPs via colleagues and managers (section 5.3.3) and performance targets (section 5.3.4) 
generally favoured more persuasive approaches. Further, EHPs also lacked guidance on how to 
take more punitive approaches (section 5.2.6).  
 
The views of EHPs themselves were amongst the most influential persuasive factors, 
particularly their desire to be seen as educators and advisors (section 6.3) and the real dangers of 
using more punitive approaches in Johannesburg (section 6.5). EHPs were also well aware that 
they could not rely on the criminal justice system for support in prosecuting EH offenders 
(section 6.9). EHPs’ association of most offending with organisational incompetence, not 
criminality, was also critical to their preference for more persuasive approaches (section 7.2), 
particularly towards the informal sector (section 7.7) where punishment could be very 
counterproductive. EHPs were also largely reliant on the cooperation of the regulated for many 
reasons including the frequently long term nature of compliance (section 5.2) and their desire to 
build good working relationships (section 6.3).            
 
Lastly, one departure for this thesis from the key studies was the identification of a second 
regulatory pathway in Figure 4.4 above involving EH project and promotion activities that 
reflects more the 21st century ‘new public health’ direction described in section 1.3 above and 
advocated by McGranahan (2007) and others (Burke et al. 2002; CEH, 1997; Dhesi and Lynch 
2016). But this pathway’s only appearance in section 4.4.6 reflects the limited data collected 
and its secondary importance to traditional regulatory work. The routine and planned activities 
(e.g. schools awareness days, business training courses) observed seemed to be working well 
but there was considerable scope for improvement as recommended in section 9.3 below.     
 
Returning to the model of governance in Figure 4.1 above, this thesis therefore argues that once 
cases reach the regulatory pyramid, analysis of the many factors that are then mixed and 
blended together by EHPs shows a clear emphasis during responsive regulation towards 
persuasive regulatory strategies. The very existence of more punitive factors towards the top 
half of the pyramid and Table 8.1 is significant, not least in establishing a legitimate means of 
deterring environmental health offending in Johannesburg. But across the model of governance 
there was a clear and continual emphasis towards EHPs using more persuasive regulatory 
strategies in their daily work. The potential for escalation via more punitive strategies was 
always there, particularly in response to serious offences and behaviours associated with 
criminality (see top of Table 8.1), but for CoJ EHPs regulation remained largely a persuasive 
activity, with punishment a last resort.  
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8.3 The limits on the regulatory activities of CoJ EHPs  
This section returns to Figure 4.4 above to consider how regulation is limited at three different 
stages. First, before reaching the regulatory pyramid section 5.3.2 above described the 
monitoring by EHPs for other CoJ organisations and provincial government. EHPs admitted 
there were advantages to this work, not least in increasing the breadth of their knowledge and 
abilities to enlist others in regulating environmental health. But monitoring also put 
considerable additional pressure on their workloads and could undermine their other regulatory 
activities and relations with businesses and the public, particularly when others failed to act on 
their reports but EHPs were blamed for this. However, the discovery that EHPs were exploring 
legal avenues to force other CoJ organisations to take responsibility for their own environmental 
health matters suggests this role is vital to hold them to account, though the Constitutional 
vision for ‘co-operative government’ remains some way off.      
 
Second, though CoJ EHPs regulated responsively, limits to this responsiveness were identified 
in accordance with many factors identified in section 2.4.3 above. Towards the top of the 
regulatory pyramid, as Crook and Ayee (2006) and Hutter (1988) found, EHPs were sometimes 
reluctant to use punitive approaches for fear of damaging their relations with the regulated, 
particularly smaller and informal businesses, and a concern that some sanctions, notably the 
fine/summons, provided an inadequate deterrent for the poor (who cannot afford to pay) and 
more affluent alike (see section 6.9). Further, their use could backfire and undermine EHPs’ 
authority when they were accused of punishing the poorest (see Appendix O) or when offending 
continued because sanctions weren’t being enforced by the criminal justice system.  
 
Deterrence could be further undermined because the outcome of the few prosecution cases that 
got to court was far from certain. For example public prosecutors and the judiciary seemed far 
from convinced of the need to prosecute EH cases, particularly when faced with the most 
serious criminal cases, whilst allegations of corruption involving public prosecutors and a local 
politician further complicated matters (section 6.9). Other factors discouraging EHPs from more 
punitive approaches included understandable concerns about personal safety (section 6.5) and 
whether their managers would support them (section 5.3.3).   
 
Towards the base of the regulatory pyramid persuasive approaches were also limited by 
resources, particularly the time EHPs had to provide education, information and advice to civil 
society (section 5.3.6). EHPs knew this was a problem and were trying to work around it during 
their traditional regulatory work (e.g. scheduling their visits geographically) and 
project/promotional activities (e.g. attending schools, community meetings) but the scale of EH 




Third, the work of EHPs in project and promotional activities beyond their well-established 
training and educational roles sometimes seemed to be creating as many problems as they were 
trying to solve. In section 5.3.3 EHPs complained about top-down projects being imposed on 
them by managers with little notice and they were concerned about their sustainability and 
effectiveness. There were a few interesting examples of EHPs developing their own small scale 
local projects in section 4.4.6, particularly around waste management, but section 9.3 below 
makes policy recommendations for strengthening all aspects of responsive regulation including 
a far more prominent role for project and promotional activities.  
 
8.4  CoJ EHPs: bringing developmental local government and the SDGs to life?  
Observers of local government EHPs (Eales et al. 2002; McGranahan, 2007), including some 
senior EHPs (NDoH, 2004) and their political masters (Mfikoe in CoJ DoH 2006b), associate 
development with more persuasive regulatory approaches (e.g. education, advice, negotiation) 
and EH project/promotional activities. One important departure for this thesis is that the model 
of governance summarized in Figure 4.1 demonstrates that by regulating - whether by 
punishment, persuasion or promotional activities - EHPs are potentially bringing developmental 
local government to life in Johannesburg.  
 
This is summarised in Table 8.2 below and echoes Chadwick’s (1842/1965) original arguments 
in section 1.3 that improving environmental health was integral to creating better societies. Here 
examples from the thesis results illustrate how CoJ EHPs are also delivering the aims of the 
South African Cities Network (SACN, 2004) and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs in UN, 2015). The question mark in the title of this section is important for two 
reasons. This thesis does not test the effectiveness of regulation but assumes that CoJ EHPs are 
generally maintaining and improving environmental health, though their effectiveness is limited 
by the weaknesses summarised in the previous section and the potential for corruption. 
 
Another challenge was that EHPs at all levels rarely saw their work in this developmental way. 
Instead, the results overall reflected Hutter and Manning’s (1990) comment on regulation as the 
product of the tensions between senior managers focused on overall performance, middle 
managers focused on controlling their inspectors and inspectors themselves pre-occupied with 
their areas (see p44). EHPs at all levels mentioned their role in delivering Constitutional rights 
to environmental health (see section 6.3), but those at street-level remained focused on fighting 
fires whilst their managers were busy supporting them and monitoring their performance. Thus 
section 9.4 below argues that by viewing their work as development, EHPs could create 




Table 8.2 The contribution of EHPs to development and the SDGs   
SACN (2004) 
framework 
Examples of developmental contributions  
of CoJ EHPs from results 







 Regulating food, water, sanitation, air, 
housing, businesses, schools, crèches etc.  
 Persuasive activities like education, advice 
and information to support businesses and 
the public. 
 Punitive activities to punish criminal 
activities and deter potential offenders. 
 EH project and promotional activities in 
schools, communities, hostels etc. 
 Regulation that accommodates and supports 
the informal sector. 
               
1 - Ending poverty  
3 - Good health & 
wellbeing 
4 - Quality education  
5 - Gender equality 
6 - Clean water & 
sanitation 
7 - Affordable & clean 
energy 
8 - Decent work & 
economic growth 




 Regulation that protects and promotes the 
Constitutional rights of all.  
 Regulation that responds to the voices of 
business and the public, including the 
poorest. 
 Regulation that accommodates and supports 
the informal sector. 
10- Reduced inequalities 





 Regulation shaped by moralities and 
flexibility, not just legalities.  
 EHPs accountable to the public, politicians, 
CoJ, courts and the media.  
 EHPs holding others to account (e.g. 
businesses, public, CoJ & provincial 
government) for their EH responsibilities.  
11 - Sustainable cities & 
communities 
16 - Peace, justice & 
strong institutions 
 
8.5 Balancing environmental health and economic interests  
Determining how much EH should be compromised in favour of business and other interests 
was a constant challenge for EHPs. Environmental health law sometimes requested EHPs to 
consider Constitutional matters (e.g. equality, reasonableness, historic inequalities) in their work 
but otherwise they provided little guidance on the ‘right’ balance (see section 5.2.1). Instead 
EHPs used their discretion to determine this and, as Hutter (1988) found, took their cues from 
factors including the seriousness of the problem, its history and public impacts, the regulated 
themselves (see Chapter 7) and the wider regulatory context (see section 4.6). In a context 
characterized by uncertainties and limited resources, the regulated are therefore in a relatively 
strong position compared to CoJ EHPs.       
 
There was limited evidence that this balance could be further skewed by the capture and 
corruption of EHPs by the regulated. The risks of corruption from all sizes of business was ever 
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present (see section 7.8), but there was no evidence that this was widespread and there was little 
evidence that EHPs were biased in favour of big businesses, though they acknowledged it was 
usually much easier for them to comply. Indeed, EHPs spent considerable time supporting small 
businesses, particularly the informal sector (section 7.7). Further, though neoliberal policies 
shaped the work of EHPs (see sections 4.2.1 and 5.3.4) there was no evidence they were 
pressurizing them towards more persuasive approaches.  
 
8.6 Political and professional influences on EH regulation 
This thesis raises important questions about the relationships between politicians at all levels 
and regulation. On the one hand EH regulation remains ideally situated in local government for 
reasons including its local focus and the duties on its officials and democratically elected 
politicians to be responsive and accountable to the public. But this thesis also describes political 
interference in regulation and therefore explores two alternatives to local government control.    
 
Sections 5.2.8 and 6.3 above described the fragmentation of EH regulation across different 
national and provincial departments and the lack of national, provincial and professional 
leadership in policy and the promotion of EHPs. There was some evidence that this situation 
was improving, including an EHP in the post of National Director of Environmental Health and 
the final publication of a National Environmental Health Policy (NDoH, 2013). A few senior 
EHPs (notably Jerry Chaka (2013b) and Selva Mudaly (2013), both EH Directors in 
Metropolitan Municipalities and past/current President of the SAIEH respectively) continued to 
represent EHPs in national matters. However there was little evidence of EHPs becoming more 
organised via the HPCSA or SAIEH, hence the recommendation in section 9.3 below. 
 
In the CoJ itself increasing budgets (section 5.3.6) and declarations of strategic and personal 
support for EHPs from the MMC-Health (section 5.3.5) were reassuring but EHPs and 
managers still felt they remained a ‘Cinderella service’ with little influence in their own 
Department of Health, let alone the wider CoJ (section 6.4). Local politicians were also 
interfering in regulation and sometimes undermining EHPs (section 5.3.5). Additional 
safeguards were being put in place to prevent this by the MMC-Health and senior managers 
during fieldwork and EHPs also suggested the need for better education of local politicians in 
environmental health and how the CoJ works, but section 5.3.5 found that EHPs understandably 
continued to exercise great caution in their relations with politicians.     
 
Section 4.2.1 summarised how the Environmental Health sub-directorate already functions as a 
contractor to its Department of Health client, therefore alternative neoliberal options include its 
transformation into another CoJ owned utility/agency or outsourcing its work to a company 
employing EHPs and others (e.g. licensing officers, pest controllers). In both cases the legal 
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responsibility for delivering environmental health would remain with local government, but 
business would presumably argue that their EHPs would be less burdened by bureaucracy. 
Concerns about the loss of accountability might be countered by arguments that EHPs are 
employed as highly educated and accountable professionals, though the inclusion of an ‘external 
auditor’ clause in draft food safety law (see section 5.2.3) suggests such businesses might have 
no obligation to employ EHPs in the future. Further, in section 4.6.2 Samson (2008) and Bond 
and Dugard (2008) argued that similar arrangements had already enabled two CoJ utilities to put 
profits before legal rights. In the UK similar changes led Tombs (2016) to raise concerns about 
the loss of local democratic accountability and potential conflicts of interest, alongside the lack 
of evidence that that these models are cheaper or more effective.   
 
Another option would be to re-organise EH services to become a provincial or national 
government function. This would entail amendments to the Constitution and other legislation, 
notably the National Health Act, 2003, but provincial and national infrastructure and services 
for EH regulation already exist that could be used by EHPs. Local representation could be 
maintained via the daily work of EHPs and more formal arrangements with local representatives 
to replace local government itself. Existing provincial or national government headquarters 
could be extended to give support and expertise. This option could also enhance the role of the 
National Director of Environmental Health, which in turn might increase her influence on 
national government in this fragmented policy space. But given that local government for all 
South Africans is less than twenty years old and its EH services (as municipal health services) 
are younger still, it is arguably too early for alternatives like these. This thesis now turns to the 
final chapter and makes conclusions and recommendations.  
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Chapter 9  Conclusions and recommendations 
The chapter starts by revisiting the aim and first two objectives of this thesis and then drawing 
conclusions by revisiting the gaps in knowledge and explaining the original contributions to 
knowledge made by this thesis. The next section completes the third objective by making 
recommendations for policy. Chapter 9 ends with further reflections on the strengths and 
weaknesses of this research and makes recommendations for future research.   
 
9.1 Revisiting the research question, aim and objectives  
This thesis originated in the question: how do the EHPs of the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality regulate environmental health? The aim of this thesis was to describe 
and explain how these EHPs regulate environmental health via three objectives:  
 
 to develop a model that illustrates how CoJ EHPs regulate environmental health  
 to explore and analyse the factors that influence how CoJ EHPs regulate  
 to make recommendations for policy   
 
How the first two objectives are met is covered in the next section.  
 
9.2  The governance model of regulation: completing the first two objectives 
The governance model in Figure 4.1 above successfully describes and analyses how CoJ EHPs 
regulate environmental health. Beginning at the centre of this model the work of EHPs still 
largely follows the traditional regulatory pathway summarised by Figure 4.4 above. Each case 
passes through preliminary stages to determine whether they enter the regulatory pyramid, or 
are referred elsewhere, or are subject to monitoring. 
 
For cases that reach the regulatory pyramid, the results confirmed that EHPs were responsive 
regulators and mainly used persuasive regulatory approaches, with more punitive approaches 
usually reserved for serious cases or when persuasion is unsuccessful. The results across 
Chapters 4 to 7 explored and analysed many other factors influencing these regulatory decisions 
in accordance with the governance model in Figure 4.1, with the most influential summarised in 
Table 8.1 above. But EHPs were also limited in their responsiveness, particularly due to 
resources and weaknesses in punitive approaches.  
 
The results also described a second regulatory pathway in Figure 4.4 above involving EH 
project and promotion activities more in tune with ‘new public health’ policy, though these 
activities remained secondary to more traditional regulatory work. More routine and planned 
training and educational activities seemed to be working well, but the results in section 4.4.6 
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identified wider problems with the planning, effectiveness and sustainability of many projects. 
Reflecting on these results this chapter now draws conclusions by claiming four contributions to 
knowledge of this thesis.   
 
9.3 Original contributions to knowledge 
This section revisits the gaps in literature before summarising the main contributions to 
knowledge of this thesis, namely how local government EHPs regulate urban environmental 
health in South Africa and developing countries. This thesis also makes two secondary 
contributions to the knowledge of EH regulation as both governance and development.        
 
9.3.1 Revisiting the gaps in literature 
Chapter 1 outlined how and why environmental health remains a complex, persistent and 
wicked problem, particularly for cities like Johannesburg. In response local government EHPs 
are potentially well placed given their responsibilities for regulating using protective laws that 
could make cities more productive, inclusive, sustainable and better governed but we know little 
about how they regulate environmental health. Chapter 2 developed a model of governance to 
fill this gap with responsive regulation at its core that combines persuasive and punitive 
approaches to regulation. This was embedded within a wider framework of governance to 
explore the complex and interacting factors known to influence EH regulation.  
 
In Chapter 2 key studies from the UK and other Northern countries found that the regulatory 
context, the law itself, local government, the backgrounds and views of EHPs and their relations 
with the regulated can all influence how EHPs regulate environmental health. Further, these 
factors identified an overall preference for persuasive approaches to regulation, with punishment 
generally a last resort. These factors were supported by the limited literature on EHPs from 
other African countries, including South Africa, and this thesis fills this gap with the following 
contributions to knowledge.  
 
9.3.2 A contribution to the knowledge of how local government EHPs regulate urban 
environmental health in South Africa  
The few studies of local government EH services in South African cities that exist were 
conducted a few years after democracy and focused on the scale of problems and the many 
challenges faced by EHPs and others (Lewin et al. 1998; McDonald, 1997). A decade later, this 
thesis is the first in-depth socio-legal study of local government EHPs in a South African city. 
Many similar problems and challenges remain and their work still follows a traditional 




At the start of the regulatory pathway this thesis described an important monitoring role by 
EHPs for other CoJ organisations and provincial government that holds them to account for 
their environmental health responsibilities whilst demonstrating a commitment, though strained 
at times, towards more cooperative ‘environmental health’ government. Using a model of 
governance developed from key studies this thesis found that persuasive regulatory approaches 
predominate in Johannesburg, with more punitive approaches reserved for serious offences or 
when other approaches have failed. In support of these key studies the influence of the 
regulatory context, the backgrounds and views of EHPs themselves, legal and organisational 
factors and the relations between EHPs and the regulated together explained why persuasive 
regulatory approaches predominate. Further, this thesis improves our understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of regulation and makes recommendations for its improvement below.    
 
This thesis also identified a second regulatory pathway not described in the literature and 
associated with EH project and promotional activities. This role is aligned with the ‘new public 
health’ policy advocated by McGranahan (2007) and others (e.g. Burke et al. 2002; CEH, 1997; 
Dhesi and Lynch 2016) and has the potential to meet the considerable needs for environmental 
health education, information and advice of urban populations. These activities were relatively 
undeveloped and remained secondary to the traditional regulatory pathway but this thesis also 
makes recommendations for their improvement below.  
 
Together this thesis uses the model of governance to argue that, despite all the problems and 
uncertainties they face, local government EHPs continue to play a vital role in maintaining and 
improving the environmental health of South African cities. Therefore this thesis also makes an 
important contribution to the evidence base for EH regulation and the work of local government 
EHPs in South Africa.      
 
9.3.3 A contribution to the knowledge of how local government EHPs regulate urban 
environmental health in developing countries 
The urban environmental health challenge persists with more than half the world’s population 
now urban and predicted to double in size in the cities of Africa and Asia between 2000 and 
2030 (UNFPA, 2007). The populations of these mainly developing country cities bear far 
greater environmental health burdens but are further disadvantaged by far less established and 
resourced systems of environmental health regulation when compared to their Northern 
counterparts. This thesis confirms that these challenges persist but environmental health 
regulation by local government EHPs makes an important contribution to the development of 





9.3.4 A contribution to the knowledge of environmental health regulation as governance 
This thesis extends Crook’s (2007) historical work on EHPs by demonstrating the utility of 
governance for describing and explaining contemporary environmental health regulation as the 
continuous circulation of power within and between local government, other spheres of 
government, business and civil society. Governance here also recognises Tombs and Whyte’s 
(2007) critical approaches to regulation by recognising the unequal distribution of power 
between these regulatory actors, whilst opportunities for challenging this power are rarely 
captured or closed down by powerful interests.  
 
9.3.5 A contribution to the knowledge of environmental health regulation as 
development  
The literature on local government EHPs in South Africa (Eales et al. 2002; NDoH, 2004) and 
other developing countries (McGranahan, 2007) typically associates development with 
persuasive regulatory approaches (e.g. education, advice, negotiation) and environmental health 
project and promotional activities. This thesis contributes to this literature by arguing that ALL 
the regulatory work of these EHPs - whether by punishment, persuasion or promotional 
activities - is potentially developmental and contributes towards creating the better societies 
envisaged by the South African Cities Network and the Sustainable Development Goals. The 
word ‘potential’ is used because this thesis did not measure the effectiveness of regulation and 
in acknowledgement of the problems identified (e.g. corruption) and that EHPs could be 
working more developmentally as explored in the next section. Therefore this thesis also 
contributes to Satterthwaite’s (2015) gap by describing how local government is delivering the 
SDGs in cities. By recognising regulation as development this thesis also contributes to the 
growing literature (e.g. Tombs, 2016) on the benefits of environmental health regulation.  
 
9.4 Policy recommendations 
Returning to the final research objective in section 9.1 above, this thesis now makes three broad 
policy recommendations.   
 
9.4.1 What might ‘good enough’ regulation look like?  
This thesis argues that overall CoJ EHPs, politicians and others have created a solid foundation 
for environmental health regulation in a very short time. Many shortcomings remain, but the 
complex and responsive model of governance described here is far removed from the inspector 
stereotypes of EHPs. Based on these results, the following recommendations could help address 
many of the shortcomings identified and assist EHPs towards ‘good enough’ regulation. After 
Grindle (2004), the term ‘good enough’ is used here in recognition of the complexities and 
tensions inherent in the model of governance described here and in acceptance that it is 
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unrealistic to strive towards some ‘ideal’ regulation. Far better instead to embrace this 
complexity, focus on improving what’s working and to treat the role of EHPs seriously.           
 
The first policy recommendation involves strengthening the traditional regulatory law 
enforcement pathway summarised in Figure 4.4 above. The operation of the fine/summons 
sanction needs to be reviewed. Dilemmas concerning its scale (unaffordable for the poorest, too 
low to deter others) are difficult to resolve, for example alternatives like fines adjusted to the 
means of offenders would be very difficult to operate in the field. There is also a need to find 
out what happens to the fine/summons when it enters the criminal justice system at the police 
station. This review should include the fine/summons as a performance target. The results 
suggest that if this target was removed EHPs would still use this sanction, but without feeling 
additional pressure to do so when the circumstances might not warrant it. Given these problems, 
the review should also cover the use of alternative sanctions including the withdrawal of 
permits/licenses and the use of prohibitions. EHPs were keen to use these alternatives and 
though they have their own problems, their greater use could provide a more effective and 
immediate sanction with a wider deterrent effect than the fine/summons.   
 
This review should also explore how the criminal justice system handles environmental health 
cases and the role of other actors including police officers, the judiciary and public prosecutors. 
This thesis accepts that South Africa is confronted by problems that would challenge the most 
established criminal justice systems and it’s understandable why EH offending is not considered 
a priority. Potential recommendations include training and guidance for the judiciary and others 
in environmental health law. For example guidance developed by the UK Magistrates 
Association (2009) was produced following similar concerns about low levels of prosecutions 
and fines in the UK and could easily be adapted for South Africa.  
 
The second policy recommendation involves strengthening the second regulatory pathway with 
more strategic EH project and promotional activities. The EH challenges faced by 
Johannesburg’s growing population and the lack of public trust in EHPs and local government 
more generally suggest these activities remain essential. EH promotional activities were an 
integral part of the five year IDP programmes of the CoJ (see Appendix Q) and EHPs expressed 
considerable interest in them but they remained secondary to their traditional regulatory work. 
Further, though some EHPs had initiated their own projects others were being imposed by 
senior managers with little consideration for their sustainability or effectiveness.   
 
To strengthen these activities this thesis recommends revisiting past activities like the 
Johannesburg Healthy City Project. This was started in 1993 by Johannesburg City Council,  
based in its Environmental Health Department and initiated programmes towards healthier 
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environments, housing, schools and foods/markets and engaged with many actors including 
other City departments, businesses, communities, tenants and local politicians (Mathee et al. 
2002). One of its continued successes is the mainstreaming of so many of its activities11 into the 
city strategy (see Appendix Q) and the work of EHPs but the results suggest this work has also 
become piecemeal and of secondary importance. Revisiting past strategic projects could help to 
reinvigorate these activities and would not be very difficult given that some key actors, 
including Mathee herself, remain very active in Johannesburg’s environmental health. Future 
activities must also engage with the emerging challenges of climate change (Wright et al. 2014) 
that were rarely mentioned by EHPs during fieldwork though their work remains integral to 
urban local government responses to this growing threat.            
 
Further, to build on the more bottom-up community based approaches advocated by the SACN 
(2004, 2006 and 2016) and others (Baumann et al. 2004; McGranahan, 2007; Mitlin and 
Satterthwaite 2004) how could the CoJ and its EHPs better work with those fixers already 
improving environmental health? Section 4.4.6 of this thesis described a few examples, but one 
starting point would be a more systematic analysis of how EHPs are already supporting 
businesses, NGOs and community based organisations in this way and whether there is scope 
for investing more resources here. EHPs would potentially need further training in areas like 
project management and such investments of public resources are not without risks, but enough 
is known about the effectiveness of fixers to warrant further investigation. For example the 
South African alliance of community organizations and support NGOs affiliated to Shack/Slum 
Dwellers International (SA-SDI, 2016) is well established and past research into its partners has 
described vital roles for city governments in supporting their work (Baumann et al. 2004).    
 
Returning to the debates about whether EHPs should work in their traditional, generalist roles or 
more specialized roles, this thesis also recommends maintaining the generalist role given the 
need for EHPs to continue covering all regulatory pathways as, after Cornell (1986), the general 
practitioners of public health for the 21st century. Further, the CoJ is unlikely to be able to fund 
more specialist EHPs in the foreseeable future. The need for more specialist training and 
support for EHPs is also identified, particularly in areas like project management and regulating 
the informal sector, but much of this expertise already exists amongst present and former CoJ 
EHPs (e.g. now retired EHPs like B4) and others (see below) that could be utilised much better.  
 
                                                     
11 Johannesburg Healthy City activities now integral to the work of CoJ EHPs include the 
hygiene training of informal food handlers, environmental lead awareness workshops, bad 
building projects and EH promotion in schools.   
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The third policy recommendation is to make small adjustments to the performance targets of 
EHPs to better capture the developmental outcomes of EH regulation. For example a few 
requirements for data on premises compliance already exist (e.g. numbers of CoA permits 
issued for formal and informal food premises), but these could be extended across all MHS 
activities as EHPs suggested alongside more comprehensive data on offending trends (e.g. 
number of permits withdrawn). These activities also need to be better linked to wider 
developmental outcomes like those identified in Table 8.2 above. By doing so, this activity data 
could provide more powerful arguments in the CoJ and beyond for investing in environmental 
health services.     
  
The fourth policy recommendation is for the CoJ, professional organisations and the National 
Director of Environmental Health to explore ways of supporting EHPs better. At the CoJ, 
progress was being made during fieldwork to address the gaps in pay and allowances between 
the CoJ and other metropolitan municipalities and senior managers were beginning to respond 
to the safety concerns of their EHPs. The author doesn’t know if these initiatives worked but 
until these fundamentals were addressed it seems likely that the high levels of staff turnover 
would continue. Resources for training EHPs were limited during fieldwork, but the CoJ is 
recommended to support training needs in existing areas (e.g. law enforcement) and new areas 
suggested by this thesis (e.g. project management, regulating the informal sector and research). 
The emergence of new professional CPD requirements for EHPs to maintain their HPCSA 
registration to practice further supports this recommendation. 
 
As professional organisations the HPCSA and SAIEH could be doing more to support, organise 
and promote their EHP members. The literature review (section 2.5.5) warned of the 
professional prison that values status and specialization to the neglect of complex realities and 
the poor but these two professional organisations were too new and undeveloped to have fallen 
into this trap. Opportunities for specialization did exist, but most EHPs continued to work as 
generalists with the poorest of society whilst those few EHPs in more specialist roles still 
worked with the poor. During fieldwork there was little evidence that the HPCSA or the SAIEH 
was doing much for EHPs beyond registering them to practice, though more senior EHPs 
undoubtedly benefited from the SAIEH’s bi-annual conference. More recently, the publication 
of the National Environmental Health Policy as a result of the SAIEH’s work (Chaka, 2013b) 
and the promotion of the SAIEH’s former secretary to National Director of Environmental 
Health are encouraging developments. However Wright et al. comment that the National 
Director’s work remains “woefully under-capacitated” (2014 p20) and unless more is done at all 




In conclusion, a vast literature supported by this thesis suggests that the work of EHPs will 
always be under-resourced but local government has to make the best use of its available 
resources and it is argued that these recommendations towards ‘good enough’ regulation could 
benefit EHPs and therefore the environmental health of all in Johannesburg.   
 
9.4.2 Promoting the contributions of EHPs towards a better South Africa  
This thesis argued in section 8.1.5 above that the model of governance demonstrates how CoJ 
EHPs are bringing developmental local government to life and thereby creating the better 
societies envisaged by the South African Cities Network and the United Nations’ Sustainable 
Development Goals. However EHPs rarely saw their work in this way (section 6.3) and this 
thesis argues that by viewing and promoting their work as (after Cornell, 1986) 21st century 
‘general practitioners of public health’, EHPs could create more powerful arguments that 
engage a much wider audience whilst better demonstrating the value of EHPs compared to less 
qualified (e.g. EH Assistants) and more specialist (e.g. Environmental Management Inspectors) 
professionals.    Further, beyond local government itself, organisations and individuals including 
the HPCSA, the SAIEH and the National Director of Environmental Health could and should be 
more active here. There are obvious risks when things go wrong (e.g. media coverage of corrupt 
EHPs), but this thesis argues that the benefits of such promotion far outweigh the risks.       
 
9.4.3 Towards a more evidence based environmental health? 
This thesis recommends that EHPs need to be making their work more evidence based and this 
study has a direct contribution to make. Elsewhere the author and others have defined evidence 
based environmental health as:  
 
“…environmental health policy and practice supported by the best available evidence, 
taking into account the preferences of citizens and the wider public and our own 
professional judgment” (Couch et al. 2016 p6)  
 
Implicit in this definition is the ability of EHPs to give a clear and up-to-date rationale for their 
practice. Policy is also included because as legislation and guidance it remains an important 
driver of practice, as Chapter 5 of this thesis confirms. This definition also recognises that 
evidence is often uncertain, changing, vulnerable to politics and can be difficult to access (hence 
‘best available’), but EHPs should have the confidence to embrace its uncertainties and use 
them to improve environmental health. Further, evidence works alongside professional 
judgement because of the limits of the available evidence and the unique and complex nature of 
cases, whilst judgements should also consider the preferences of all those affected where 




Once published this thesis will contribute evidence on how EHPs regulate and therefore needs 
to be communicated to EHPs across South Africa, particularly those in Universities educating 
future EHPs. South Africa’s Environmental Health Research Network provides one means of 
doing this and was established in 2009 to develop and co-ordinate environmental health 
research and establish a community of practice for all interested parties, including EHPs 
(Wright et al. 2014). The author’s own experience establishing a similar UK network suggests it 
could take years to persuade EHPs to engage with research and make their work more evidence 
based (Couch et al. 2016), but in Canada the National Collaborating Centre for Environmental 
Health provides an important example of what is possible with national government support. 
Their work includes systematic literature reviews to support EHPs and policy makers and 
building networks of practitioners, policy-makers and researchers across Canada (NCCEH, 
2016). Towards this end EHPs could be supported to become more research active, not least by 
realising that as regulators they already share many skills with researchers including the ability 
to collect and interpret data, to draw conclusions and communicate them (Couch et al. 2016). 
 
9.5 Reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of the research 
Building the reflections on the case study design in section 3.5 above, this thesis was based on a 
small sample size but grounded in a socio-legal framework that created a flexible structure for 
responding to events that the author could manage alone. As explained in sections 3.5.2 and 
3.5.3 above, the grounding of the case study design in a responsive ethical framework was also 
a great strength of the research. The author did not anticipate that so few EHPs would volunteer, 
but the holistic multiple case study design and the application of theoretical replication to the 
ten case-EHPs meant this was not a problem. The sample constituted EHPs with at least 2 years 
work experience and potentially biased the results towards more experienced EHPs. However, 
inexperience and its control was a recurring theme and the author suspects a sample of ten 
newly qualified (closely supervised) case-EHPs would have produced similar results. Another 
strength was that the holistic case study assisted in the development of the model of governance 
during the research process as the author’s understanding of how EHPs regulate grew.  
 
There were also a number of weaknesses in the research. The author attempted too many 
methods for the time available and the busy schedules of EHPs. With hindsight he would extend 
the observation period then conduct one longer interview (including vignettes) only with the 
case-EHPs. The author did not anticipate that EHPs would know so little about more punitive 
approaches like prosecutions and prohibitions. This was a finding in itself but the author ran out 
of time to find out more about these processes, hence their inclusion in the recommendations for 
future research below. Another potential weakness was that the author analysed all his data 
alone and without the assistance of a second coder to review emerging themes and 
interpretations. This might have biased the results, but the theoretical framework provided some 
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structure to this process and by working alone the author had total control over analysis and 
avoided the influence of others.   
 
The author did not think it would take nearly nine years to write up this thesis. Much will have 
changed during this time and more recent data on CoJ and South African EHPs was therefore 
incorporated into this study including the new National Environmental Health Policy (NDoH, 
2013) and a recent survey of municipal health services (Mudaly, 2013). The author’s recent 
attempts to contact the CoJ and update his results have been unsuccessful so far but the author is 
confident this will change once this thesis is complete and he starts communicating its findings. 
Further, the author is confident of its continued relevance because of its grounding in key 
studies from more than 30 years ago and a wider literature dating back to the Victorian era. All 
this suggests that whilst environmental health conditions may be constantly changing, the way 
that local government EHPs regulate environmental health has not changed substantially since 
the Victorian era and this is no bad thing. What has changed are the tools to view and interpret 
their work, the role of governance being the key tool for this thesis.         
 
9.6 Recommendations for future research  
The first recommendations build on those in section 9.4.1 above, specifically the need for 
research into the weaknesses identified by this thesis towards achieving ‘good enough’ 
regulation. For the traditional regulatory pathway further research into the use of sanctions, 
particularly the fine/summons, by EHPs and the criminal justice system is recommended. For 
the EH project/promotion pathway, an evaluation of the effectiveness of past and present 
activities by EHPs is recommended to learn from past experience and identify the considerable 
work EHPs are already doing in this area which, this thesis suggests, is not widely known. 
Further, research to identify examples of existing EH related projects run by local groups and 
others in South African cities could also help to identify suitable projects and the benefits and 
risks to EHPs of this work.  
 
To build on some themes identified by this thesis, further in-depth research into how EHPs are 
regulating the informal sector is vital for many reasons, not least predictions of this sector’s 
continued growth in cities (UN, 2015; WHO 2008b) and the need for more guidance for EHPs 
in this complex area. This thesis was focused on the city, but the model of governance could be 
used to investigate EHPs based in the rural municipalities that cover most of South Africa. The 
results of this thesis and key studies like Hutter (1988) suggest that their work is even more 
characterised by persuasive regulatory approaches when compared to their urban counterparts. 
This thesis was assisted by the research of historians on the development of local government 
and its EHPs in Victorian Britain, notably Crook (2007) and Hamlin (1998 & 2013). The results 
above, particularly section 4.6.1, suggest some similarities in South Africa but further research 
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is recommended to better understand how local government and EHPs emerged during 
colonialism and apartheid and its continued influence on EH regulation today.      
 
Section 9.4.3 above recommended a more evidence based environmental health and how this 
thesis contributes to the ‘best available evidence’ for how South African EHPs regulate urban 
environmental health. The Universities and the South African EH Research Network were 
identified as possible organisations for disseminating this knowledge, but given the 
organisational weaknesses identified above this thesis recommends future research to better 
understand the complex relationships between evidence, research, policy and practice. For 
example the author’s own work in the UK has identified barriers for EHPs including poor 
access to research knowledge, practice based cultures that do not value research and wider 
political issues including a reluctance to criticize institutions (e.g. government) upon which the 
status of EHPs depends (Couch et al. 2016).  
 
This research describes how EHPs regulate urban environmental health and the factors that 
influence their decision making and raised important questions about its effectiveness but more 
focused research to measure the effectiveness of regulation in improving and maintaining 
environmental health is needed. The work of EHPs Fairman and Yapp (2005a & b) in the area 
of food control provides a useful model that could be adapted for a South African setting, but 
this research is not straightforward and would require investment including an institutional 
home (e.g. a research active University department) and a strategy for communicating its 
findings to EHPs.     
 
Finally, this thesis explores regulation from the perspectives of EHPs themselves and the law 
and wider policy and organisational factors but it also described the significant roles of other 
actors in regulation including businesses, the public, the media, other government organisations 
and the criminal justice system. Therefore future research is recommended that explores the 
influence of other actors in environmental health regulation, particularly how they could 
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Appendix A Regional Environmental Health Manager briefing  
 
23 February 2007 City of Johannesburg Regional EH Managers Meeting 
 




Thank you for inviting me to your meeting. My name is Rob Couch, I’m a British EHP and 
researcher working with the WHO Collaborating Centre for Urban Health and based at the MRC’s 
Environment and Health Research Unit in Parktown. My presentation should last about 10 minutes 
and aims to introduce our proposed research, ask for your suggestions and finally ask for your 
participation.   
 
Main research aims 
I’m interested in how your street-level EHPs implement environmental health policy. They’re at the 
front lines of improving environmental health in Johannesburg, but I’ve found little research that 
describes how EHPs make important day to day public health decisions. Environmental health is 
changing rapidly, but I would argue that until we better understand how we work, the full potential 
of our work may not be realised. Our main research aims are: 
 
 To describe how environmental health practitioners (EHPs) implement environmental 
health policy at the front-line in Johannesburg; 
 
 To consider the implications of these findings for environmental health policy (including 
local by-laws, IDP, HDS, growth and development).  
 
The focus: street-level EHPs  
I’m interested in the stories of front line EHPs, workers who are interacting with the public daily in 
their efforts to improve environmental health. I’m sure they have very interesting stories to tell 
about their work, it’s these stories I would like to hear about. For example they could be stories 
about cases they’ve worked on, interesting people they’ve worked with or perhaps events that 
changed the way they work in environmental health?  
 
Research methods 
Firstly I would like to spend some time in your Regional Offices and Wards to get to know your 
EHPs and learn more about their work. After a certain period I will invite a small number (maybe 5 
from two regional offices TBC) to an entry interview of about 1 hour to provide me with 
background on themselves and their work. At the end of this interview I will brief them on a simple 
work story collecting method. They will each be invited the following week for about half an hour 
to tell me 2 or 3 work stories, which I will record and then transfer into text. They don’t have to 
write their stories down, by taping them I hope to get a better account. They will each be invited to 
check their stories in typed form, making any corrections or additions if necessary and to check that 
these are the stories they wanted to tell.  
 
They will then be invited to provide more stories at a convenient time. At the end of the research 
period they will be asked to complete a short questionnaire. Before the end of June 2007 I would 
like to return to your offices and discuss my initial findings and get some feedback on the research 
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process and how it could be improved. I will then return to the UK to write up these results with the 
aim of communicating them to yourselves and the City of Johannesburg in early 2008.  
 
Research confidentiality and co-ordination 
Only I will have access to your EHPs’ data and no data will be passed to supervisors or managers. 
Names and work groups will be permanently coded, only I will know the codes. Place names will 
also be changed, the location will only be identified as “Johannesburg.” The coded research 
findings will be used in my thesis and may also be published in environmental health research 
journals at a later date. This investigation has been approved by the ethics committees of the 
University of Johannesburg and London South Bank University in the UK. Dr. Bismilla approved 
this research on 01 November 2006 and Peter Manganye is co-ordinating my work.  
 
Research participation 
Your participation is completely voluntary and there will be no problems if you don’t wish to 
participate. If you decide to participate I will then contact you and arrange a date to visit your 
Regional office and brief your EHPs about my research in a similar manner to today, again asking 
for their voluntary participation. Your EHPs will also be asked to sign a consent form before I 
proceed with my research, reminding them that participation is voluntary and that they can 
withdraw from the investigation at any time without penalty and without giving a reason. The 
research period will be from March to early June 2007.  
 
Though I cannot pay your EHPs to participate, I can buy them lunch! However, I hope the 
experience will provide a learning opportunity for all participants, myself included. If we are to 
demonstrate our value as EHPs I think we must become more research active in our day to day 
work, and I hope our research will make an important contribution to this. 
 
Research suggestions and request for participation 
Does anyone have any questions or feedback on these proposals? 
 
Would you like to participate in this research? If yes, please could you write your name, region, 
contact details (including email) and regional address on the paper provided and I will contact you 
shortly.  
 
Thank you for your time, if you have further questions/comments my contact details are: 
  
Rob Couch Mobile: 0762 857 825  Email: couchr@lsbu.ac.uk  
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Thank you for inviting me to your meeting. My name is Rob Couch, I’m a British EHP and 
researcher working with the WHO Collaborating Centre for Urban Health and based at the MRC’s 
Environment and Health Research Unit in Parktown. My presentation should last about 10 minutes 
and aims to introduce our proposed research, ask for your suggestions and finally ask for your 
participation.   
 
Main research aim 
I’m interested in how you implement environmental health policy in your day to day street-level 
work. You’re at the front lines of environmental health in Johannesburg but I’ve found very little 
research that describes how you make important day to day public health decisions. Environmental 
health is changing rapidly the world over, but I would argue that until we better understand how we 
work, the full potential of our work may not be realised.  
 
The focus: street-level EHPs 
I’m interested in your stories as EHPs at the front line, workers who are interacting with the public 
daily to improve environmental health. I’m sure you have very interesting stories to tell about your 
work, it’s these stories I would like to hear about. For example they could be stories about cases 
you’ve worked on, interesting people you’ve worked with or perhaps events that changed the way 
you work in environmental health?  
 
Research methods 
Firstly I would like to spend some time in your Regional Offices and Wards to get to know you and 
learn more about your work. After a certain period I will then invite a small number of you (maybe 
5 from two regional offices TBC) to an entry interview of about 1 hour to provide me with 
background on you and your work. At the end of this interview I will brief you on a simple work 
story collecting method. You will then each be invited back the following week for about half an 
hour to tell me 2 or 3 work stories, which I will record and then transfer into text. You don’t have to 
write your stories down, by taping them I hope to get a better account. You will then be invited to 
check your stories in typed form, making any corrections or additions if necessary and to check that 
these are the stories you wanted to tell. You will then be invited to provide more stories at a 
convenient time. 
 
At the end of the research period you will be asked to complete a short exit questionnaire. Before 
the end of June 2007 I would like to return to your offices and discuss with you my initial findings 
and get some feedback from you on the research process and how you think it could be improved. I 
will then return to the UK to write up these results with the aim of communicating them to you in 
early 2008.  
 
Research confidentiality 
Only I will have access to your data and no data will be passed to your supervisors or managers. 
Your names and regions will be permanently coded, only I will know the codes. The location will 
be identified as “Johannesburg.” The coded research findings will be used in my PhD thesis and 
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may also be published in environmental health research journals at a later date. This investigation 
has been approved by the ethics committees of the University of Johannesburg and London South 
Bank University in the UK. Dr. Bismilla approved this research on 01 November 2006 and Peter 
Manganye, Deputy Director Environmental Health, is co-ordinating my work. 
 
Participation in the research 
I’m interested in you all as one regional office group, therefore I will ask you all as a group at the 
end of this meeting if you would like to participate in this research? Your participation is 
completely voluntary and there will be no problems if you don’t wish to participate.   
 
If you wish to participate as a regional office, I will then ask each of you whose work involves 
implementing policy at the street-level whether you would like to participate as an individual. 
Please note that even if you as a group wish to participate, you do not have to participate as an 
individual. Participation is voluntary and you may withdraw from the investigation at any time 
without penalty and without giving a reason. I will ask you to sign a consent form before I start 
researching. 
 
Unfortunately I cannot pay you to participate in this research, though I can buy you lunch! 
However, one of my aims is that the experience should provide a learning opportunity for all 
participants, myself included. If we are to demonstrate our value as EHPs I argue that we must 
become more research active in our daily work, and I hope this research will make an important 
contribution to this. 
 
Next steps after this meeting 
I will ask shortly if you have any questions or comments and give you my contact details. As you 
may want to discuss this research with your colleagues before deciding whether or not to 
participate, please consider: 
 
Do we want to participate in this research as a Regional Office? 
Do I want to participate in this research as an individual? 
 
If you are interested in participating, the research period will be from March to June 2007. I will 
return to your offices shortly and ask for your verdict. 
  
Any questions or comments?  
Thank you for your time, if you have further questions my contact details are:  
 




Appendix C Written consent form  
 
Environmental health policy in practice: the EHPs of the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality 
 
Written consent form 
 
 I have read the attached information sheet on the research in which I have been asked to 
participate and have been given a copy to keep. I have had the opportunity to discuss the 
details and ask questions about this information. 
 
 The Investigator has explained the nature and purpose of the research and I believe that I 
understand what is being proposed. 
 
 I understand that my personal involvement and my particular data from this trial will remain 
strictly confidential. Only the investigator will have access to my data.  
 
 I have been informed about what the data collected in this investigation will be used for and to 
whom it may be disclosed if published. 
 
 I have received satisfactory answers to all of my questions. 
 
 I hereby fully and freely consent to participate in the study which has been fully explained to 
me. 
 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, without giving a reason for 
withdrawing. 
 








As the investigator responsible I confirm that I have explained to the participant named above the 
nature and purpose of the research to be undertaken.  
 




Appendix D Extract from case-EHP F2A observation notes  
 
0007Observations/Region F2 – 03 May 2007 
 
We then stop by a street hawker selling food underneath a road sign and very close to the 
kerbside. There are two men, both wearing dirty clothes. They are frying chicken pieces in a 
wok on a barbecue burning charcoal that looks fairly well buried into the ground, indicating to 
me that it may have been there some time. Their preparation area is made of a three wheeled 
shopping trolley, the fourth missing wheel being propped up by a brick. On the trolley they have 
placed a board, onto which goes a very old wooden chopping board and knife with dangling 
tape for a handle. They also have a washing bowl on the preparation surface, containing what 
appears to be soapy water. By the side of a tree opposite are two large metal pots, both covered 
with lids, that presumably contain the chicken pieces, though these were not looked at.  
 
F2A conducts his discussion with the two in isiZulu and isiXhosa (I confirm later with him). 
The encounter appears amicable, with smiles all round, but F2A appears very clear on what he 
requires them to do. There appears to be some negotiation with F2A, but the meeting culminates 
in F2A writing them a written warning on the green carbon copy pad I have seen Melinda refer 
to. While F2A is writing this note with the one hawker, the other sells the last remaining 
chicken pieces in the oil to two factory workers. They walk by and appear to ask him for the 
chicken then visit another street vendor to make a phone call (using the Telkom phone and car 
battery set up) and then return for their chicken which in the meantime has been chopped and 
bagged expertly (but very unhygienically) by the vendor. F2A then takes a picture using a 
digital camera of the stall and hawkers, one of whom has turned away from the camera 
deliberately it appears. F2A then shows me the picture and points out the road sign they are 
trading underneath, a direct by-law offence.   
 
After F2A has written the notice, he spends a minute explaining it to the one vendor, who 
appears poorly dressed but has a very smart cell phone. F2A is explaining the warning notice to 
the vendor in isiZulu, because he has written the notice in English. This is because the warning 
notice will be checked later by his manager and he explains that he always takes time explaining 
notices because people often do not understand English or they may be illiterate. F2A states that 
they are not meant to trade below a road sign, they must be a minimum of 3 metres from the 
road side and they cannot use charcoal as a fuel (they must use gas). He does not refer to their 
standards of hygiene, but in the warning notice he asked them to close their stall immediately. 
Neither of them had their ID and to take any further action he would need this. He explained 
that if he has asked on this occasion they would just have given him a false ID. On the drive 
back to the office later F2A checks that they have gone and indeed they have, but he speculates 
they will be somewhere else tomorrow.  
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Appendix F EHP semi structured interview protocol 
 
Thank you for agreeing to this interview which should last around 1 hour. 
With your permission I would like to record the interview.  
 
Firstly, some questions about you and the area you work in.   
 What is your job title & main work responsibilities? 
 How long have you worked as an EHP for the CoJ? Why choose CoJ? How were you 
initiated into CoJ? 
 Before working in Joburg did you work as an EHP elsewhere?  Probe – where, how long? 
 What made you become an EHP? 
 Before becoming an EHP did you have any other jobs? Probe 
 What is your highest qualification? What EH qualifications? Which Institution and when? 
How well did EH qualifications prepare you for CoJ work? 
 Are you studying for further qualifications? Probe - what, where and when graduate? If no, 
why not? Would you like to? 
 Have you attended any training courses while at CoJ? Probe – what, where, when, changed 
your work? 
 Are you a member of any professional organisations? Probe - which & why? 
 Are you a member of a Union? Probe – which, why, have you needed them? 
 Do you live in this Region? Probe – If Y how long, affects on work?  If no, why?                       
 How would you describe the areas you work in? 
 
Some open questions about your work 
 What’s it like working in this office? 
 What do you like most/least about your job? Probe – why? 
 What do you think is the main purpose of the CoJ EH Department? 
 Do you refer to any policies or other documents in your day to day work? If yes, which and 
why?  
 How would you describe your relations with: (TBC) Administrative staff; EHP colleagues; 
Managers (Ops & Regional); Ward Councillors; Other politicians? 
 Which other CoJ Depts do you work with? Probe relations? 
 What external (i.e. non-CoJ) organisations do you work with? Probe relations? 
 How is your work as an EHP monitored? Probe thoughts on this 
 
Some open questions about your relations with clients  
(Clients defined as the subjects of your interactions who are not involved in service delivery) 
 How would you describe your general relations with clients? 
 How do clients access the services you provide as an EHP? 
 How would you describe the typical client you encounter? 
 Are any similarities between you and your clients? Probe 
 Who do you find the easiest/most difficult clients to serve and why? Probe 




Some open questions about legal procedures 
 Have you received any training in legal procedures? Probe 
 Do you consider EH offences to be criminal offences? If Y, how many? Which & why? 
 In day to day work, how often do you see yourself as dealing with criminals? 
 Do you associate any particular client groups with criminal behaviour? 
 Are you a peace officer at the CoJ? If yes, for how long? If no, is this a problem? 
 While at CoJ have you ever fined someone? Probe – are fines improving EH?    
 While at CoJ have you ever been involved in a prosecution? Effectiveness? Maximum 
penalties for EH offences? Political influences? 
 How do the Courts view environmental health cases in your experience? Probe fairness, 
relations with magistrates/judges?  
 
Final section 
 Over the history of your EHP work, are there any specific events that changed the way you 
do things? 
 What do you feel about the attitude of the public to you in your work area? Probe – 
supportive, ambivalent, hostile?  
 What do you feel about the attitude of the media/politicians to the work of EHPs in the CoJ? 
Probe – supportive, ambivalent, hostile?  
 What makes a good EHP? 
 What are greatest challenges facing EHPs in your region of Johannesburg? In South Africa?  
 Where were you born and brought up? What year were you born? What is your marital 
status? Children? 
 
Thank you for your time, is there anything you would like to add?  
 
I would now like to brief you on the story collection methods and to arrange a date and 
time for our next meeting.  
 




Appendix G Managers semi structured interview protocol 
 
Thank you for agreeing to this interview which should take around 30 minutes. 
With your permission I would like to record the interview.  
 
Some questions about your Region and the Department 
 Numbers of EHPs in Regional Office? 
 
 Region B Region D1 Region F1 Region F2  
 
Date 
    
Number of non-
Manager EHPs 
    
Number of Ops 
Managers 
    
Number EHPs 
with less than 2 
years experience 
at CoJ 
    
 
 How would you describe your Region? 
 What do you think makes a good EHP? 
 For F1, F2 and D1 – how do you work with the other office in your Region? 
 What do you think of environmental health targets? 
 What do you think of political influences on the work of the EH Department? 
 Do you think fines/prosecutions are improving environmental health?   
 What are greatest challenges facing EHPs in your Region of Johannesburg? In South 
Africa?  
 
Thank you for your time, is there anything you would like to add?  
 
Investigator to provide general feedback on research process and next steps.  
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Appendix H Story briefing  
 
I would like you to use this small book to write down a short outline of 2 or 3 different stories. 
These stories should describe situations that take place within your workplace during this time, 
or situations you might recall from the past. The outlines will help you remember the story 
when you tell me it later. You will not need to show me your outlines, they are only to help you 
remember.  
 
I am interested in stories about how or when your own beliefs about fairness or unfairness 
helped you make decisions. At times your own beliefs may have conflicted with your 
organisation’s informal or formal policies. At other times, these policies may have supported 
your own beliefs.  
 
For example stories could involve an encounter between you and your clients, or be about 
encounters between you and your Department, other Departments, or members of your Regional 
Office. You may also retell a story that happened to someone else, even if you are not a 
character in that story.  
 
As far as possible your stories should: 
 
 have a plot or storyline, with a beginning, middle and end; 
 identify who the characters are; 
 explain the relationships among the characters; 
 describe the feelings of the characters towards each other and the events; 
 and include a description of the setting and circumstances in which the event(s) 
occurred.  
 
During the research period you will be invited to a short meeting with Rob to describe your 
stories, which will be recorded using a digital voice recorder with your permission. This 
recording will then be typed up and presented to you for checking before the end of the research 
period. 
 
Thank you for your participation.  
 
If you have any questions please contact Rob on 0762 857 825 or couchr@lsbu.ac.uk 
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Appendix I Two part questionnaire  
 
Questionnaire briefing 
You are reminded that your answers are strictly confidential.  
Part I questions will be read out by Rob and your answers transcribed by him.  
Please complete Part II multiple choice by circling the answer that you most agree with. 
If you do not understand a question please do not answer it.  
(Adapted from Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003 and Hutter, 1988) 
Part I 
 
1. Imagine that while driving through a remote part of your area you notice a new tuck shop serving an 
informal settlement. There are no other tuck shops in the area. On your first inspection you find that the 
tuck shop is built of temporary materials and sells only packaged bread and a few tins of food.  
 
a. How would you proceed in this situation? 
 
b. What do you think your EHP colleagues would do?  
 
c. What would your Managers expect you to do? 
 
d. Would you act differently if it was the last day of the month and you had only served two fines instead 
of your monthly target of three? 
  
 
2. A crèche applying for a permit in your area has been given provisional approval by the EMS, building 
and licensing inspectors. The person providing the service is friendly and co-operative and is providing 
facilities and care of a high standard, however your calculations of indoor care area space find that there 
is only space for 30 children, but the crèche has 35 each day.        
 
a. How would you proceed in this situation? 
 
b. What do you think your EHP colleagues would do?  
 
c. What would your Managers expect you to do? 
 
d. Would you act differently if the service provider was aggressive and unco-operative? 
 
 
3. Imagine that you find two identical food premises in your area that have both been trading for one 
month without a CoA. One is owned by a national company, the other is owned by a young family that 
have taken out a huge loan to set up their new business.    
 
What would you do and would you treat the two cases in the same way? Please explain your answer 
 
 
4. You receive ongoing noise complaints from local residents about a nightclub in your area that backs 
onto a residential area. You have visited the nightclub every Friday night with your enforcement 
colleagues since the complaints started and have issued statutory notices and now three fines. The owner 
has paid the fines but is unwilling to do anything else. The angry complainants have now contacted the 
Ward Councillor and are demanding results.          
 








Part II multiple choice questions 
 
 
1. In your day to day work, how much authority do you have in determining what tasks you do?  
 
None A little Some Quite a bit Considerable 
 
2. How much authority do you have in establishing the rules and procedures about how your work 
is to be done?  
 
None A little Some Quite a bit Considerable 
 
3. When clients do not comply with these rules and procedures, how much authority do you have in 
deciding how they should be handled? 
 
None A little Some Quite a bit Considerable 
 
4. How clear and reasonable do you consider the Environmental Health Department’s vision and 
objectives?  
 




Undecided  Clear & 
reasonable 
Very clear & 
reasonable 
 
5. When clients do not comply with this vision and these objectives, how much authority do you 
have in deciding how they should be handled?  
 
None A little Some Quite a bit Considerable 
 
6. During a normal working week, how frequently do you encounter non-compliant clients? 
 
Very rarely Occasionally Quite often Very often Constantly 
 
7. What percentage of time do you have written rules and procedures for dealing with your day to 
day work situations?  
 
0 – 20%  21 – 40% 41 – 60% 61 – 80% 81 – 100% 
 
8. How precisely do these written rules and procedures specify how your main work tasks are to be 
done?  
 
Very general Mostly general Undecided Quite precisely Very precisely 
 
9. Do you prefer rules and procedures which give a precise definition of standards or those which 
involve your individual interpretation?   
 
Precise definition Undecided Individual interpretation 
 
10. In the last month how often did you follow rules and procedures to complete your day to day 
work? 
 





11. Do you find the rules and procedures available to you are adequate to deal with the everyday 
problems you face in your work? 
 
Very inadequate Inadequate Undecided Adequate Very adequate 
 
 
12. How often do you perform the same work tasks from day to day?  
 
Very rarely Occasionally Quite often Very often Constantly 
 




Very different Sometimes 
different 
Mostly the same Nearly always the 
same 
 
14. How much of your work deals directly with people face to face? 
 
None About 25% About 50% About 75% All of my work 
 




Very different Sometimes 
different 
Mostly the same Always the same 
 
16. How easy is it for you to know whether you did your work correctly? 
 
Very difficult Quite difficult Undecided Quite easy Very easy 
 
17. What percentage of the time are you generally sure of what the outcomes of your work efforts 
will be? 
 
40% or less 41 – 60% 61 – 75% 76 - 90% 91% or more 
 
18. How much do you feel your day to day work is influenced by local government politics? 
 
Very much Considerable Some A little Not at all 
 
19. Do you think that politics should affect your work?  
 
Yes Sometimes No Don’t know 
 
20. How adequate would you describe the resources you have to work with?  
 
Very inadequate Inadequate Undecided Adequate Very adequate 
 
21. How heavy was your workload in the past month? 
 






22. My work as an EHP is monitored too much by the Environmental Health Department.  
 
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree 
 
23. The Departmental targets I have to meet do not reflect the value of my work as an EHP. 
 
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree 
 
 
24. I feel I am paid fairly for my work.  
 
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree 
 
25. I believe that managers in this Department are paid fairly.   
 
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree 
 
26. I am concerned about the differences in pay between front line staff and managers in this 
Department.  
 
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree 
 
27. I am concerned about the differences in pay between front-line staff and managers in society in 
general. 
 
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree 
 
28. I am concerned about the differences in pay between EHPs in this Department and in other 
Metropolitan Municipalities. 
 
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree 
 
 
29. The role of government should be to help people. 
 
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree 
 
30. It is the responsibility of government to meet everyone’s needs, even in cases of poverty, 
sickness, unemployment and old age. 
 
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree 
 
 
31a. How loyal do you feel towards your Regional Office? 
 
No feeling of 
loyalty 
Very little loyalty Some loyalty Moderate loyalty Very strong 
feeling of loyalty 
 
31b. How loyal do you feel towards the City of Johannesburg Environmental Health Department? 
 
No feeling of 
loyalty 
Very little loyalty Some loyalty Moderate loyalty Very strong 






32. Overall, how satisfied are you with your job? 
 
Very unsatisfied  Quite unsatisfied  Satisfied  Quite satisfied Very satisfied 
 
33. If a suitably qualified friend of yours was thinking of following a career as an EHP, would you 
advise her or him to do it? 
 
Definitely yes Probably yes Undecided Probably no Definitely no 
 





Appendix J Case study database components  
 
Part 1: Case study diaries  
Notes were maintained within diaries that summarised all research activities and contacts made 
in Johannesburg. These diaries assisted in maintaining the chain of evidence and were archived 
by the researcher.   
 
Part 2: Fieldwork observation data and notes 
These data were written straight onto computer at the end of each fieldwork day. They provided 
empirical data for this thesis and also informed the design of the case study.    
 
Part 3: Interview, questionnaire, document and narrative analysis data and notes from case 
EHPs  
These data comprise the original digital files and transcripts from the methods undertaken with 
each case EHP and any work related documents (e.g. law enforcement and performance 
management related documents). They also include reflective notes maintained by the 
researcher after the completion of each method.   
 
Part 4: Interview notes from other EHPs and managers 
These data comprise the original digital files and transcripts and reflective notes from the 
interviews with other (non-case) EHPs and managers during fieldwork.  
 
Part 5: Bibliography of fieldwork related documents  
A bibliography was created for all law enforcement paperwork and the wider environmental 
health and local government related policy documents collected from EHPs, managers and other 
sources (e.g. CoJ offices, conferences, newspapers) during fieldwork.  
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Appendix K1 Activity data by MHS category over July 2005-June 06   















D1   
Region 
F1   
Region 
F2  
Food control Food premises (retail) 19084 2538  753  1317  899  
Food factories 1024 70 2 93 220 
Informal food traders 15765 581 183 2543 230 






Places of care (e.g. 
crèches, retirement 
homes)  
5601 589 528 87 192 
Accommodation 
establishments (non-food 
e.g. bad buildings, 
hotels) 
1117 138 5 281 122 
Business premises 
(formal, non-food – e.g. 
offices, mortuaries) 
26333 4558 1261 2130 881 
Personal services (e.g. 
hair dressers, clinics) 
2407 414 303 324 107 
Formal dwellings 747196 146586 102383 44 483 33 263 
Informal dwellings 227 315 4886 26513 1901 602 
Community facilities and 
recreation premises (e.g. 
night clubs, pools) 
1254 186 189 109 186 
Animal related premises 
(e.g. kennels, pet shops) 
742 36 1 47 31 
Waste 
management 
Solid waste/sanitation 4405 3078 4 755 21 
Open areas (e.g. public 
areas, vacant stands) 






279 - - - - 
Bacteriological samples 72 - - - - 
Vector control Visits to rodent infested 
premises & treatments 
35577 & 
11838 




Noise: after hours 
inspections & complaints  
1268 & 524 - - - - 
Air – Related complaints  1473 - - - - 
Air - Diesel vehicle 
emissions tests 
7655 1513 661 1039 660 
Chemical 
safety 
Awareness training and 
poisoning investigations  




Appendix K2 Evaluations and health risks by MHS category over July 2005-June 06 
(Source: CoJ DoH 2006b)      (- = No data) 
MHS category Sub-category of 








































Food sampling - 
microbiological & 
chemical 
492 (2%) & 
124 (5%) 














2583 (62%) - - - - 








Personal services 308 (29%) - - - - 
Formal dwellings 24450 (36%) - - - - 
Informal dwellings 14918 (88%) - - - - 
Community facilities and 
recreation premises  
764 (18%) - - - - 
Animal related premises  1195 (3%) - - - - 
Waste 
management 
Solid waste/sanitation 126 (25%) - - - - 











- - - - 























Appendix O Front page of City Vision newspaper on housing eviction  





Appendix P HPCSA EHP competency requirements and scope of profession  
(Source: HPCSA, 2006a)  
 
Industrial, Commercial and Housing Developments 
Matters relating to EIA for development/programmes, and the inspection of building plans for 
safety, health, adequacy of lighting, ventilation, space and amenities, the orientation and 
aesthetics thereof including accessibility to sanitary services. 
 
Waste Management 
Matters relating to the handling, storage, transportation and disposal of industrial, domestic and 
commercial solid waste, including waste from health and veterinary care facilities, as well as 
effluents and sludges.  This includes cemeteries and crematoria. 
 
Water Services 
Matters relating to the inspection of water and waste water treatment works and networks to 
determine the public health and safety in respect of the adequacy of processing, existence of 
nuisances and quality monitoring of water for human and animal consumption. 
 
Pest Control 
Matters relating to the identification, eradication of vector breeding areas and their destruction, 
including procedures defined on the International Health Regulations for the control of vector 
borne communicable diseases associated with international travel. 
 
Food Safety 
Matters relating to the safety of production storage, transportation, processing and retailing of 




Matters relating to safety and hygiene of road, air and sea-going vessels, including the 
transportation of foodstuffs, and the general accident prevention and management of hazardous 
substances. 
 
Tourism and Leisure 
Matters relating to safety and hygiene of buildings, facilities and amenities for holiday 
accommodation and leisure. 
 
Pollution Control 
Matters relating to the prevention of air, water and soil pollution, including and radiation hazard 




Research and Development 
Matters relating to the identification, design and conduct of Environmental Health research 
related to Environmental Health and development of new methods and technologies for 
Environmental Health Practice (law, service, Policy). 
 
General 
Any other matter incidental to or of Environmental Health significance, which, if unattended 
would compromise the quality of public and Environmental Health including education and the 
promotion of healthy lifestyles. 
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surface, water, air, 






measures on an 
on-going basis  
Reduce 
pollution levels 
from a baseline 





Pollution prevention and reduction 
programme   
1.Identify all major sources of industrial and 
commercial air, water and land pollution within 
three years and institute rigorous monitoring 
and covering at least 15% of polluters annually 
2. Reduce specific pollutant level through 
rigorous enforcement of legislation and by-laws 
3. Investigate and take action in identified 
pollution hotspot areas 
4. Through pilot projects with respect to 
specific pollutants, investigate appropriate 
mechanism 
to introduce a polluter pays principle 
5. Strengthen legislative compliance 
monitoring, adherence and enforcement with 
respect to issues such as chemical and sewerage 
spillage 
6. Anticipate risks and threats of transportation 
of hazardous waste 
Air pollution prevention programme (edited) 
1. Reduce specific pollutant levels of air 
pollution through the implementation of 
mitigation 
measures 
2. Reduce air pollution in townships and 
informal settlements by facilitating and 
adoption of coal 
efficient burning devices 
3. Expand testing and enforcement of emissions 
levels in private vehicles 
Land pollution (edited) 
1. To specifically combat land pollution: more 
vigorously discourage the illegal dumping of 
litter 
Water pollution (edited) 
1. To specifically combat water pollution: 
through ongoing water quality-monitoring 
programme 
(of surface, ground and potable water) with an 
emphasis in those areas most at risk of 






























Noise, visual and light pollution 
1. To specifically combat noise pollution: ensure 
that all new developments are established 
within clear noise contouring standards; etc 
2. To specifically combat visual/light pollution: 
review policies governing outdoor advertising 
to mitigate nuisance; investigate the replacement 


























Environmental health risk management 
programme (edited) 
1. Develop a seamless approach to health & 
safety surveillance so that there is a single point 
of certification (preferably one in each region) for 
buildings, food establishments, early childhood 
development facilities, other places of care, etc 
2. Within this seamless approach, further develop 
and maintain well-resourced and efficient 
systems of monitoring compliance and 
enforcement for: food hygiene at food 
establishments; waste management at key points 
of waste generation; water quality; disposal of the 
dead at funeral undertakers and cemeteries; 
chemical safety; and general public health at high 
risk buildings and premises 
3. Increase the number of environmental health 
officers in the field based on actual workloads. 
4. Reduce the risk of vector-borne diseases 
through targeted vector control programmes in 
selected hotspots (key targeted areas to include: 
Alexandra) 
5. Develop a clear set of health and safety 
guidelines for all new City of Johannesburg 






























Environmental health promotion programme 
(edited) 
1.Within a seamless approach, promote 
environmental health and safety awareness and 
compliance in ‘nuisance’ buildings, Early 
Childhood Development facilities etc to create 
environmental health awareness and compliance 
to legislation 
2. Working across City Departments and with 
external partners, assist proprietors and residents 
who have demonstrated need and limited 
financial capacity to upgrade to the applicable 
standards.  
3. Run five citywide campaigns to promote 
public awareness around the safe handling and 
storage of chemicals 
4. Develop and run an on-going health promotion 
and education campaign targeting food handlers 
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Appendix R Rules of hygiene for informal food traders 
 
 
